"OTHERING" OF LGBT MOVEMENT AS AN ELEMENT OF CONTEMPORARY POPULIST DISCOURSE IN POLAND¹

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Abstract

The article explores how LGBT movement is "othered" as an element of contemporary right-wing populist discourse and as a political strategy used by right-wing populist actors. I focus on the current ruling Polish party, Law and Justice, whose anti-LGBT rhetoric increased ahead of the 2019 parliamentary election. By conducting Critical Discourse Analysis (using Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl's analytical framework) of the selected texts and visuals from the party's official website and Twitter accounts of its prominent members, I analysed by which discursive means the party representatives "other" LGBT Poles, how they frame homophobia within their broader populist discourse, and instrumentalise it for political gains. I compare my findings to the findings from an analysis of Law and Justice's anti-migration discourse ahead of the 2015 parliamentary election, and draw comparisons. The study is conducted within a larger study on "othering" and enemisation as manifestations of contemporary right-wing populist discourse in Central and Eastern Europe.

Key words: LGBT, homophobia, right wing, populism, Poland, Law and Justice, discourse

Introduction: the situation of LGBT community in Poland

LGBT (Abbreviation for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender) is an umbrella term most often used to refer to the community of non-heterosexuals as a whole. Other frequent abbreviations include LGBT+, LGBTI, LGBTQI. In academia, nowadays the preferred umbrella term is "queer", as it is inclusive of all not heterosexual people. Originally an abusive term, it has now been reclaimed by many persons of the community. For the purposes of this paper I choose the term LGBT movement, as it is how the object of the research, Law and Justice party, refers to it, and since they are most often not talking about LGBT persons per se but the movement for LGBT rights as a whole.

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As a conservative society, characterised by a very strong grip of the Roman Catholic Church, Poland has never been very accepting towards the LGBT community. However, during the past decade, following Poland's accession to the EU, "attitudes towards LGBT groups have eased in Poland, with polls showing rising support for civic partnerships and gay marriage. But this year, the increasingly fraught political environment has begun to take its toll." According to Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS)'s statement from last year, "previously, research showed a slow increase in openness to gays and lesbians. The last survey indicates that this trend has stopped." According to a CBOS poll, in 2014, before Law and Justice party (PiS) coming to power, 77% of the surveyed Poles would accept a homosexual as their neighbour. A recent CBOS poll from 2019 reports that "not much more than a quarter of Poles agree that gay and lesbian couples, i.e. two people of the same sex in an intimate relationship, should have the right to marry (29%) and publicly show their way of life (28%), while every eleventh person (9%) would allow these couples to adopt children." In 2019, "several Polish municipalities have declared themselves free from "LGBT ideology", while a right-wing magazine Gazeta Polska distributed "LGBT-free zone" stickers with one of its editions." Tensions escalated in July 2019, when hooligans and far-right groups chased, beat and threw bottles and other items at participants of the first equality march in Bialystok, a conservative city in the east. Slava Melnyk from Campaign Against Homophobia (KPH) has summarised, "Bialystok and the things that happened around the march were a tipping point in the public discourse regarding LGBTI issues in Poland and this part of Europe as well...Physical violence was very rare, at least in this decade in Poland. Previously there were instances of hate crime, but violence to the extent that there was hunting of people and an almost pogrom-like atmosphere, this hasn't happened before."

Many claim that this increased homophobia was fuelled by the ruling Law and Justice party ahead of the 2019 European elections. "(The) Law and Justice party has sought to rally its conservative base by presenting itself as a bulwark against LGBT groups, which it portrays as a threat to Catholic family values". This strategy of creating or revoking enemy images in order to gain fear-based support in an upcoming election is already a repetitive pattern for Law and Justice. "Last time [in 2015] refugees were the candidate for the government to frighten people... Now the gays are the new enemy for the government."

This is the problem that has been studied in this paper. I have carried out a Critical Discourse Analysis of Law and Justice's discourse related to the LGBT community, based on material from their official website, Twitter, and Twitter accounts of its prominent members with the aim of studying the process of enemization of the LGBT community by Law and Justice.

Background: Law and Justice's success and discourse

Law and Justice, or in the original Polish "Prawo i Sprawedliwosc", hence the acronym PiS, is a national-conservative, Christian democratic and right-wing populist party, according to the Popu-List. In the European Parliament, they are a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists Party. They have been continuously in power in Poland since 2015, and avoided defeat in most major elections since then. In the 2015 parliamentary election, Law and Justice won the majority of seats in both the lower and upper chambers of the parliament: the Senate and the Sejm. They also won the presidential election that year. In the 2018 local elections, Law and Justice received the biggest number of seats in Regional Assemblies. In the latest European election, Law and Justice also came first. Its result rose by 13.60% compared to the previous European election, which then was its best result ever. In the 2019 parliamentary elections, yet again Law and Justice beat its competitors in both the Sejm and the Senate.

How did they achieve such impeccable success? Many academics, such as Klaus, Krzyżanowski, and Łaciak & Segeš Frelak, to name a few, agree that an important factor behind Law and Justice's success in 2015 was how it managed to utilize in its campaign the so-called European migration crisis, that unfolded immediately before the election. They were inciting fear of Muslim refugees, a message that they tried to reuse later in the local elections. Law and Justice presented migrants as "an issue of security, both national, and cultural, direct and symbolic" (Klaus), and presented themselves, Law and Justice, as a Messiah that could save Poland from this threat, thereby gaining fear-induced support. Klaus (2017) states that: "the discourse about refugees is usually based on the differentiation: us vs them", where "us" are primordially good and them are primordially bad. This is an antagonism that is inherent to right-wing populism.

Thus, I will now discuss how Law and Justice has created a very successful right-wing populist narrative by presenting the LGBT community as others, and even as enemies.

Theory: right wing populism and enemy images

Firstly it is necessary, to provide a suitable definition of a right-wing populist narrative.

I take Mudde and Kaltwasser's ideational definition of populism and I only work with a variation of the thick type of populism, the right-wing populism, which is the combination of populism with nativism and authoritarianism. This allows an analysis of populism in terms of a triad or a two-dimensional space (Brubaker 2017), where on the horizontal axis, the "pure" people are threatened by "enemies"

and on the vertical axis, they are separated from the "corrupt" elites. Moreover, the elites often ignore or even exacerbate the danger that "aliens" pose, — the "aliens" usually being immigrants (external others), minorities (internal others) — but could also be very abstract, like an ideology itself. As we see, enemy-making is an inherent part of right-wing populism, as the "pure" people have enemies both "above" and "outside". This is constructed through discursive manoeuvres, which set up symbolic boundaries between the imagined groups and define their cultural substances (Kubik 2018).

Gerő, Plucienniczak, Piotr P. Kluknavska, Navrátil and Kanellopoulos (2017) write that there has being a rise of politics based on antagonism in contemporary Europe, including populist radical right parties winning elections in CEE, "blame games" between countries, anti-immigration discourse. While analysing this process, Wodak refers to this as "politics of fear". Gerő et al. (2017) argue that besides the analytical lens of populism and right-wing ideologies, it is essential to focus on the "images of the enemy" that political actors construct and their context. According to the authors, even though enemy-making has always being part of politics, its intensity at this moment in time is quite strong and diverse. "The use of the 'enemy' narrative is now intense, regardless of electoral campaign cycles that have regulated it before. Enemies are invoked to fuel various mobilization efforts outside of elections: popular votes, pro- and anti-government protests, mobilizations pro- and against refugees, consultations, petitions, contentious activities of the left and right wing, and so on".

Note on methodology

This paper deconstructs this triad for the case of Law and Justice's discourse in 2019, and explores how LGBT community is used as an enemy image within the right-wing populist triad.

The main method of my study was Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as its aim is to critically examine the use of language to explore social issues (Regmi 2017). In particular, I applied the analytical framework to CDA proposed by Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl (2003), as it was developed specifically for research purposes such as mine. Thus, in my research I uncover the nomination, predication, and legitimization strategies that Law and Justice used in regard to the discursive othering of Polish LGBT community.

I have analysed the news, interviews and other publications from the official web-site (pis.org.pl) of the Law and Justice party. The research sample was selected by search by keywords: "lgbt" (4 articles, all from 2019, identified) and "homoseksual" (3 articles, all from 2019, identified), "lesbian" (1 article from 2019 identified), "family values" — 1 article from 2019 identified, "Christian values" — 1 article from 2019 identified — 1 ar

cle from 2017, "gay" — 1 article from 2019, "same sex marriage" — no matches. Some of the identified articles overlap, all of them were analysed.

Additionally, I analysed tweets from the official Twitter account of Law and Justice @pisorgpl, and 11 of its leading members: Andrzej Duda (@AndrzejDuda), Mateusz Morawiecki (@MorawieckiM), Beata Szydło (@BeataSzydlo), Mariusz Błaszczak (@mblaszczak), Elżbieta Rafalska (@E Rafalska), Jacek Sasin (@SasinJacek), Jadwiga Wiśniewska (@j_wisniewska), Marek Kuchciński (@MarekKuchcinski), Paweł Lisiecki (@lisieckipawel), Piotr Gliński (@PiotrGlinski), Stanisław Karczewski (@StKarczewski) as well as The Chancellery of the Prime Minister (Kancelaria Premiera) (@PremierRP) and the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy (Ministerstwo Rodziny) (@MRPiPS_GOV_PL). The sample was selected by searching for the same keywords as above. The results were the following: "lgbt" — 68 matches, "homosexual" — 3 matches, "lesbian" — 1 match, "gay" — 2 matches, "family values" — 227 matches, "Christian values" — 216 matches. Many of those results overlap. Primary focus was put on the sample generated by keywords "lgbt", "homosexual", "gay" and "lesbian", as per the objectives of the study. The material generated by search by keywords "Christian values" and "family values" was used as supporting material. Results identified by "same sex marriage" were ignored, as due to the fact that in Polish the phrase consists of 5 words (małżeństwa osób tej samej płci), there were many false matches (overall 1514 matches). The material was collected and coded with the help of NVivo and Ncapture software.

All original data is in Polish, therefore the search by keywords was conducted in Polish, accounting for all possible grammatical forms of the nouns. All translation from Polish into English are the author's own. The main limitation of searching by keyword is that it does not account for subtle references and euphemisms. This, however, does not seriously limit this research, as its aim is to investigate purposive discourse on LGBT community. The research was conducted in November-December 2019.

Analysis

The first thing that became visible while analysing the data is the timing of the collected material. All but one of the articles analysed from Law and Justice's website are dated within two months from an important election: 3 from May 2019, 2 from March 2019 (before the European elections 2019), 2 from October 2019 (one of which right before the 2019 Polish parliamentary election), and one from November 2017. The same tendency to ignite debate around LGBT issues was also noticeable on Twitter, particularly in spring 2019. This allows us to suggest that indeed the issue was brought up in order to mobilise conservative voters.

Nomination strategies

I started my analysis by identifying nomination strategies for "others", in this case Polish LGBT community and movement. The names identified were either neutral or negative in their connotation. Below some of the most frequent and interesting examples can be seen in table 1.

Neutral	Negative
"LGBT activists" ³	"rainbow plague" ⁴
"LGBT community" ⁵	"leftist avalanche" ⁶
"LGBT movements" ⁷	"the sick ideology" ⁸
"homosexual couples"9	"ideological revolution" ¹⁰
"homosexual circles" 11	"cultural war" ¹²
"the LGBT case" 13	"sexualization of children" 14

Table 1 — Examples of names used to refer to the LGBT community and movement.

It is noticeable that when it comes to negative nominations, these are derogatory ideologonims, such as "the sick ideology". They refer to the whole movement, rather than personalised offences against queer people. The second observation is that searching through the sample, there were very few matches mentioning "gays", "lesbians" or "homosexuals", rather "LGBT" as a whole, so again, not necessarily personalised attacks against the people. However, it was also mentioned in a tweet that: "the purpose of the acronym LGBT is to falsify (hide) reality" 15.

³ Paweł Lisiecki, retrieved from Twitter account @lisieckipawel.

⁴ An especially vivid term was coined by the Archbishop of Krakow, but repeated in Twitter discourse by Law and Justice members. Retrived from Jadwiga Wiśniewska's Twitter account @j wisniewska.

⁵ Paweł Lisiecki, retrieved from Twitter account @lisieckipawel.

⁶ Paweł Lisiecki, retrieved from Twitter account @lisieckipawel.

⁷ Jacek Sasin, retrived from Twitter account @SasinJacek.

⁸ By Zofia Klepacka, retweeted by Paweł Lisiecki.

⁹ Jarosław Kaczyński, retrieved from: http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/polska-plus-czy-polska-minus-o-tym-bedziemy-decydowac-13-pazdziernika.

¹⁰ Jacek Sasin, retrived from Twitter account @SasinJacek.

¹¹ Paweł Lisiecki, retrieved from Twitter account @lisieckipawel.

¹² Jarosław Kaczyński, retrieved from: http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/polska-plus-czy-polska-minus-o-tym-bedziemy-decydowac-13-pazdziernika.

¹³ Mateusz Morawiecki, retirieved from: http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/wybory-zdecyduja-czy-chcemy-polski-silnej-czy-uleglej.

 $^{^{\}bf 14}$ Beata Szydło, retrieved from: http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/w-europie-glosuj-za-polska-wybierz-liste-nr-4-prawo-i-sprawiedliwosc.

¹⁵ Paweł Lisiecki, retrieved from Twitter account @lisieckipawel.

A lot of discourse on LGBT rights in Poland is mixed together with "gender politics and sexualization of children" 16, the latter phrase in particular putting a very negative connotation on the movement, especially in the light is numerous recent scandals concerning child molestation.

Predication strategies

Next I analysed predication strategies, that is identifying and analysing how the "others" are described, which qualities and features are attributed to them. Below is a table, where on the right there is a selection of ways LGBT Poles are described, and on the left implied meanings of such descriptions, as well as others analysed and presented further below.

Table 2 — Examples of predication strategies

Quotes	Meanings
"a constant attack on everything that constitutes our cultural circle, including, of course, the Christian religion" ¹⁷ "those who try to get to the children" ¹⁸ "offending religious feelings" ¹⁹ "walks with abortionists, leftists and communists, will fight with them against the Church and religion at schools, and bring refugees" ²⁰ "He is hiding behind sexual orientation and LGBT. He claims to be persecuted" ²¹ "LGBTs could speak up and tell everyone how to live in fewer areas" ²²	 — Anti-religious — Demanding special treatment — Dangerous — Child molester — Provoker — Manipulator — Liar — Pretentious — Leftist/communist — Anti-Polish

They themselves stigmatize the LGBT circle... a diversity tram, and the rest are to ride ordinary trams; lighthouse keepers in schools for LGBT, and the rest will go to a school psychologist; separate city hostels, and the rest waiting for a communal apartment for two years.²⁵

¹⁶ Beata Szydło, retrieved from: http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/w-europie-glosuj-za-polska--wybierz-liste-nr-4-prawo-i-sprawiedliwosc.

 $^{^{17}}$ Jarosław Kaczyński, retrieved from: http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/polska-plus-czy-polska-minus-o-tym-bedziemy-decydowac-13-pazdziernika.

¹⁸ Paweł Lisiecki, retrieved from Twitter account @lisieckipawel.

¹⁹ Jadwiga Wiśniewska, retrieved from Twitter account @j_wisniewska.

²⁰ Paweł Lisiecki, retrieved from Twitter account @lisieckipawel.

²¹ Paweł Lisiecki, retrieved from Twitter account @lisieckipawel.

²² Paweł Lisiecki, retrieved from Twitter account @lisieckipawel.

²³ Paweł Lisiecki, retrieved from Twitter account @lisieckipawel.

The quote above particularly illustrates the implication that LGBT Poles demand special treatment, implying that they want to be different from the rest, hence they are an "other", not one of the people, and they bring it onto themselves. So, Law and Justice wants to say, it is not us "othering" or discriminating against them, they are they ones "othering" themselves, and if we provide what they ask for, "normal" Poles will be discriminated against

Us vs them

Building upon the previous points, I dig further into what the thematic contents of "othering" are, and how the difference between "us" and "them" is linguistically constructed. Below are selected quotes.

"LGBT want equal rights. Not true! They want privileges, because the possibility of adopting a child is a privilege thanks to which the basic goal is to be achieved... i.e. the child's right to have a father and mother." 24

"I have nothing against gays and lesbians but only against the privileges of belonging to LGBT." ²⁵

"We laugh at Podlasie, Podkarpacie or Masurian villages, but I will tell you that there all this progressiveness, LGBT etc. will never arrive. These will be the last bastions of normality if we do not stop this leftist avalanche." ²⁶

"This is an attack on our identity. On Polish culture." 27

As mentioned above, these quotes illustrate the implied specialness of the LGBT community and their abnormality compared to the "normal" Poles. Furthermore, LGBT Poles, according to Law and Justice, threaten the unity and homogeneity of the Polish people as well as Polish culture and Polishness itself.

Legitimization strategies

The last and most important part of the analysis is identifying legitimization strategies. Here, I analysed, what the argumentation strategies used to legitimize the exclusion of "others", here LGBT, are.

Below is a table where on the left there are some selected topoi, and on the right conclusions from the analysis.

²⁴ Paweł Lisiecki, retrieved from Twitter account @lisieckipawel.

²⁵ By Zofia Klepacka, retweeted by Paweł Lisiecki.

²⁶ By Zofia Klepacka, retweeted by Paweł Lisiecki.

²⁷ Mateusz Morawiecki, retrieved from: http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/nowa-piatka-pis-to-inwestycja-w-przyszlosc.

Table 3 — Examples of Legitimization strategies

Quotes	Legitimization strategies	
"NO to gender ideology and LGBT"28 "ideological war"29 "a threat to the [EU] member states"30 "defending the rights of parents	 — Protecting national sovereignty and Polish values, "Polishness" — Protecting the Polish family and children — Protecting Catholic values and religious 	
and children"31	feelings — Abiding by the Constitution — Sexual orientation — private, not public matter, and protecting privacy — Need for authorities to focus on more	
"No to the attack on children. We won't be bullied. We will defend Polish families" 32		
"protect our values"33		
"LGBT + declarations will be incompatible		
not only with laws, but with the Constitution in general"34	important problems	
"I demand separation of LGBT from the state" 35		

Law and Justice tries to position its anti-LGBT discourse within positive, not negative structures: saying we are "not AGAINST gays and lesbians", we are FOR Polish families and Polish values.

Comparison with migration discourse

In order to put this research into perspective, I compared my results with Law and Justice's migration discourse³⁶. Below I present the common features identified:

- Us vs them antagonism.
- "us" or "self" stands for Law and Justice government, and by extension Poland or "normal" Poles "them" stands for "old EU", Western European countries and politicians, or "Brussels elites". In the migration discourse it was personalised to Donald Tusk and Angela Merkel, in the LGBT discourse to Frans Timmermans. Thus, firstly we notice "othering" of elites in both discourses. "Othering" of refugees or LGBT Poles comes second.
 - Political opponents are presented as enemies of the people

²⁸ Jadwiga Wiśniewska, retrieved from Twitter account @j_wisniewska.

²⁹ Beata Szydło, retrieved from Twitter account @BeataSzydlo.

³⁰ Paweł Lisiecki, retrieved from Twitter account @lisieckipawel.

³¹ Beata Szydło, retrieved from Twitter account @BeataSzydlo.

³² Stanisław Karczewski, retrieved from Twitter account (@StKarczewski).

³³ Jadwiga Wiśniewska, retrieved from Twitter account @j_wisniewska.

³⁴ Paweł Lisiecki, retrieved from Twitter account @lisieckipawel.

³⁵ Paweł Lisiecki, retrieved from Twitter account @lisieckipawel.

³⁶ Olena Yermakova, "Mythology of Law and Justice's Migration Discourse", unpublished.

— These could be either the EU or Law and Justice's biggest competitor — Civic Platform (PO) party. Below are some quotes to illustrate the statement:

"Sovereign states must have the ability to decide"37

- "Parents have the right to decide"38
- "The policy of pressure from the European Union is being applied. We can not give in to it." ³⁹
- An overwhelming appeal to emotion, and little appeal to rationality This is observed throughout both discourses. Both issues have become moral panic, and this was endused with the use of dramatizing vocabulary, such as "rainbow plague" or "refugee flood".
 - Refugees/LGBT are a threat, antagonists

Both discourses are focused around presenting the "other", be it refugees or LGBT, as a threat, something that Poles and Poland need to be protected against.

— Law and Justice as a Messiah

In both cases, Law and Justice positions itself as the protector, who will defend Poland against the above-mentioned "threats", whereas their political opponents (particularly PO) will not. This missionary politics is typical for populists. Given the contexts of upcoming elections, this is a manipulation in order to gain voters sympathies. The picture below illustrates this, depicting Law and Justice as a protective umbrella for "normal" Polish families (white, heterosexual, heteronormative, with children) against the LGBT movement.

— EU is an ideological opponent and a usurper, antagonist

The EU in both cases is positioned as the reason of the above-mentioned "threats", the foreign power trying to convert Poland into their foreign and mad ideology. Below is a selected quoted by the Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki ahead of the European elections 2019 to illustrate the statement: "The [European] elections will decide whether we want a strong or submissive Poland.

The dispute at stake is the dispute over the world of values...a dispute whether to build modernity on the foundation of tradition, family warmth, or build on shocking moral revolutions, where a traditional family is ridiculed, and children subjected to aggressive indoctrination against the will of their parents. Tradition and

 $^{37\,}$ Mateusz Morawiecki, retrieved from: http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/wspolnie-mozemy-wplynac-na-losy-europy.

³⁸ Beata Szydło, retrieved from: http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/w-europie-glosuj-za-polska-wybierz-liste-nr-4-prawo-i-sprawiedliwosc.

³⁹ Beata Szydło, retrieved from: http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/polska-broni-dzisiaj-wlasnych-interesow.



Picture posted by Stanis_aw Karczewski on Twitter (@StKarczewski)

modernity can not just be reconciled. And modernization does not have to be at the expense of respect for the past, our history and traditional values" 40

Conclusion

If we deconstruct the right-wing populist triad for Law and Justice's LGBT discourse, we have the following result:

Table 4 — LGBT discourse of Law and Justice within the right-wing populist triad

Theory	LBGT discourse of Law and Justice
"pure" people	"normal" Catholic heterosexual Polish families
"corrupt" elites	the EU
"enemies/aliens"	"LGBT ideology"

The discursive discrimination of the LGBT movement serves the political goals of populists in Poland, who try to appeal to emotion, activate fears and prejudices, and claim to defend "normality". They take different "othered" groups and enhance their image as enemies, as well as the image of their political opponents in order to justify their positions and gain fear-based support.

In the LGBT case, the enemy is not so much LGBT persons, but what Law and Justice refer to as "LGBT ideology", different value systems, even modernity and

⁴⁰ Mateusz Morawiecki, retrieved from: http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/wybory-zdecyduja-czy-chcemy-polski-silnej-czy-uleglej.

progressiveness, and everything that goes against the traditional norms. This neotraditionalism and rebellion against modernity is a frequently observed feature of contemporary populists in power.

Many legitimization strategies for "othering" LGBT community and movement were identified, however, not many nomination and predication strategies. This might again suggest opposition to the movement as a "foreign import" from the West, incompatible with traditional cultural Polish norms, rather than "othering", dehumanisation or demonization of the LGBT persons. It is the "LGBT ideology", the movement for LGBT rights, that is presented as an enemy, not LGBT Poles themselves.

Overall, this paper is based on a relatively small research sample. Law and Justice discourse beyond what is available on its website and Twitter needs to be further researched in order to more definitively demonstrate the preliminary conclusions drawn above. However, this paper could serve as an illustration and as a point of departure for deeper investigations into Law and Justice's discourse, ideology, political strategies, and into their vision of the EU and Poland's role in it.

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