

"GAY PROPAGANDA" AND MORALITY POLICY: ORTHODOX FRAMING IN LGBT RIGHTS DEBATES IN RUSSIA

Caroline HILL¹

Department of Theology and Institute of Russian and Eurasian Studies,
Uppsala University, Sweden

Abstract

The adoption of laws in the Russian Federation prohibiting propaganda of homosexuality and "non-traditional sexual relationships" to minors at the regional and federal levels, respectively, has raised questions regarding the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in public life. This article shall evaluate statements via online media sources by clerics and other figures serving in the Orthodox Church in order to analyze framing strategies employed. Drawing upon the typologies set forth in morality policy research, the author will examine specific arguments regarding child protection, demographics, national identity, Russia's external relations — and protection of LGBT activists from a conservative backlash.

Key words: *Russian Orthodox Church, Russia, framing, morality policy, LGBT, human rights, media*

Introduction

In the years following the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian Orthodox Church (hereinafter also referred to as the "ROC" and "Church") has enjoyed a rebirth in terms of adherent numbers, reclaimed property, and an increased public profile as an institution promoting moral conservatism, including participation in political debates. In the case of adoption of laws banning propaganda of "homosexuality," "*muzhelozhstvo*" (literally, "man lying with mankind"), and "non-traditional sexual relationships" at the regional and federal levels from 2006 through 2013, Church clerics played a prominent role in discussions of the legislation in public hearings and mass media sources.

This article seeks to shed light on the ROC's place in the Russian political and social landscape by examining arguments that prominent figures in the Church make regarding issues they deem important. Theories of framing and morality policy will be used as a lens through which to analyze public statements by clerics and others serving in the Russian Orthodox Church in an attempt to pinpoint the Church's communication strategies.

¹ caroline.hill@teol.uu.se, carolinehillrus@gmail.com

"Gay Propaganda"

As the Soviet Union fell, the opening of Russia's borders and new freedoms led to an influx of ideas and goods from abroad — including "pornography, erotica, and talk of sex and sexuality (and homosexuality) [that] flooded the media" (Baer 2002, 502). One phenomenon that arrived alongside *Cosmopolitan* and McDonalds was

... global activism, including a gay international activism that was in fact always a Western one... Even in the 1990s, the homosexual as a species, as a gay or lesbian identity, was already being constructed by state officials and regular folks alike as a foreign import and one that was completely at odds with indigenous Russian values. (Essig 2014, 53)

The mid-2000s marked the beginning of a series of showdowns between a small contingent of openly gay activists and their foreign supporters on one hand, and the conservative views of the Russian majority on the other. In May 2006, LGBT activist Nikolay Alekseyev called for the country's first gay Pride parade in Moscow (Kon 2009, 55). Although the Moscow City authorities placed a ban on the proposed march and approximately 1,000 riot police were deployed to prevent violence, 50 gay rights protestors and 20 counter-demonstrators were arrested following brawls in close proximity to the Kremlin (BBC News 2006).

Three days before the first attempt at a Moscow Pride parade, the first regional-level law prohibiting "public activities directed at propaganda of homosexuality (*muzhelozhstvo* and lesbianism) among minors" was adopted by the Ryazan Oblast Duma (legislative assembly) (*Law of Ryazan Oblast* 2006). It would be five years before the next law, under which an article stating that "Public activities directed at propaganda of homosexuality among minors will not be allowed" was added to existing legislation on "protection of child morality and health" in Arkhangelsk Oblast (*Law of Arkhangelsk Oblast* 2011). The Arkhangelsk Oblast law kicked off the adoption of similar legislation in a total of 10 regions of Russia, including the city of St. Petersburg, from 2011 through 2013 (Human Rights Watch 2014).

The law "On Amendments to the Law of St. Petersburg 'On Administrative Violations in St. Petersburg'" was unusual in that its author, Legislative Assembly Deputy Vitaliy Milonov, was a Russian Orthodox *ponomar* (altar server) at the time². Under the law, bans on both propaganda of homosexuality and propaganda of pedophilia were added to an existing law on administrative offenses:

Article 7.1. ... Public actions directed at propaganda of muzhelozhstvo, lesbianism, bisexuality, transgenderism among minors will be subject to application

² By the time that my research was conducted, Milonov had been promoted to *ipodiakon* (subdeacon).

of an administrative fine... Note: This article considers public actions directed at propaganda of muzhelozhstvo, lesbianism, bisexuality, [and] transgenderism among minors to be understood as follows: activities for deliberate and uncontrolled distribution of information through public means that is capable of causing harm to the health, moral, and spiritual development of minors, including the formation thereby of a distorted view of the social equality of traditional and non-traditional marital relations...

Article 7.2. ... Public actions directed at propaganda of pedophilia will be subject to application of an administrative fine... Note: This article considers public actions directed at propaganda of pedophilia to be understood as follows: activities for deliberate and uncontrolled distribution of information through public means that is committed with the goal of creating distorted views of the conformity of intimate relationships between adults and minors with social norms. (Law of St. Petersburg 2012, my emphasis)

The process of adopting the St. Petersburg law was also notable in terms of the presence of ROC clerics at hearings. Participants in the public hearing on 24 February 2012 prior to the adoption of the St. Petersburg law included Hieromonk Dimitriy Pershin of Moscow; Archpriest and psychologist Aleksey Moroz, head of an alcohol and drug treatment program in St. Petersburg; and Archpriest Igor Aksyonov, Superior of the Church of the Prophet Elijah in the Leningrad Oblast town of Vyborg (YouTube.Com 2012b). Moroz and Archpriest Nikolay Golovkin of St. Petersburg testified at an additional hearing on 22 June of the same year regarding practical applications of the law (YouTube.Com 2012f).

The final step was adoption in 2013 of an amendment to a federal law "with the goal of protection of children from information propagandizing rejection of traditional family values" that added an article in which

Propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations among minors, in the form of distribution of information directed at creation of non-traditional sexual arrangements, attractiveness of non-traditional sexual relationships, a perverted image of the social equality of traditional and non-traditional sexual relationships, or the imposition of information about non-traditional sexual relationships and creation of interest in such relationships among minors

would be added to a list of administrative offenses and made punishable by fines for Russian citizens, fines and forced temporary shutdowns of activities for organizations, and fines or up to 15 days in jail followed by "removal" from the country for foreigners and stateless persons (*Federal Law of the Russian Federation from 29 June 2013 No. 135-FZ*). Framing strategies of Russian Orthodox clerics and others serving in the Church before, during, and following the passage of the Arkhan-

gelsk Oblast, St. Petersburg City, and federal laws will be the primary focus of this article.

The Politics of Morality

The concept of “morality policy” has evolved over the past two decades from a substantive category of policy to a type of framing used by actors. Mooney and Lee (1999a) defined morality policy as separate from other “classes” of policy in that it “regulates social norms or evokes strong moral responses for other reasons” (81, 82). Depending on the country or region being studied, morality policy may include policies governing abortion rights, alcohol and drugs, pornography, homosexuality, prostitution, gambling, school prayer, euthanasia, gun control, and the death penalty. However, it is not so much the policy outcome as the subject of conflict that typifies morality policy. Morality policy debates have been characterized as centering around so-called “first principles,” or the basic values surrounding life, death, sex, and other topics that are put forth (Mooney and Lee 1999a; Mooney and Lee 1999b; Mooney and Schuldt 2008; Mucciaroni 2009; Knill 2013).

Morality Policy as Framing

As attention has focused on the types of arguments made in morality policy debates, questions have been raised as to how “moral” these discussions truly are. Studlar (2008) floated the concept of “blended issues” that “take on different dimensions” depending on how they are framed, concluding that “morality policy appears to be more of a continuum” than a static policy category (393, 406-7). When examining gay rights debates, Mucciaroni (2009) took exception to the fact that “the morality politics perspective assumes that moral arguments are of paramount importance... without undertaking a systematic examination of the arguments that advocates actually put forward” (13). In response, he divided morality politics issues into those defined by “deontological principles,” “social consequences,” and “procedures,” depending on whether they involved “intrinsically wrong” behaviors, a positive or negative impact on society, or calls for state authorities to intervene, respectively (Mucciaroni 2009, 13-14).

Mucciaroni (2011) is considered seminal in the field of morality policy framing due to his expansion upon his previous concepts of deontological, consequence-based, and procedural frames. In doing so, he declared that “morality policy is not so much a policy as a strategic approach to framing public policy issues” in which “different types of morality policy frames exist, depending on what kind of behavior — private, social, or governmental — is the target of moral judgement” (2011, 211). While LGBT rights are often seen as an ideal type of morality policy issue, “gay rights opponents typically do not frame the issues in terms of the immorality




Figure 1 — Online Data Sources by Jurisdiction.

of homosexuality or religious proscriptions against it at the federal and state levels of government" (Mucciaroni 2011, 211). Instead, Mucciaroni's findings indicated that gay rights opponents employed so-called "rational-instrumental" frames "calling attention to the negative consequences for society, or some important part of it" (such as children and families), or "procedural terms" regarding "how policy makers should make decisions" (2011, 211).

Mucciaroni was quick to state that "when we say that opponents are 'strategic' in how they frame issues, we do not mean that they are being disingenuous about the arguments that they give for opposing gay rights" (2011, 211-212). While rational-instrumental or procedural frames "have the best chance of persuading a crucial mass of audience members," there should be no conflict of interest between frames used strategically and a group's "deep-seated beliefs" (Mucciaroni 2011, 212, 209). In the case of arguments by Russian Orthodox Church actors against propaganda of LGBT identity to minors, the contention that homosexuality is a gateway to dire consequences for Russian society may not employ explicitly religious framing, but is not inconsistent with their personal convictions.

Methodology

In order to determine which frames figured prominently in ROC communicators' morality policy strategies, this article consists of a pilot study of framing utilized in reference to the anti-propaganda laws passed in Arkhangelsk Oblast, the city of St. Petersburg, and at the federal level in the Russian Federation (see Figure 1). The study utilized both qualitative content analysis and quantitative calculation of framing strategies employed by ROC clerics and others serving in the Church in the following materials: articles and public statements in religious and secular online media sources; television broadcasts; and legislative hearings.




Figure 2 — Arkhangelsk Oblast, Media Sources, Dominant Frames Employed (Number of Times)

Findings

Arkhangelsk Oblast

For Arkhangelsk Oblast, a sample of 7 online articles was examined (5 from Russian Orthodox sites, and 2 from secular Web pages). Within the sample, the majority of overall frames used were rational-instrumental, followed by religious-moral frames (see Figure 2). None of the articles sampled had a dominant procedural frame. Three of the 5 articles from the Orthodox Internet had an overall rational-instrumental frame (Arkhangelsk Eparchia Press Service 2011; Chaplin 2011a; Chaplin 2011c) one had a tie between religious-moral and rational-instrumental frames (Chaplin 2011b), and one had a religious-moral dominant frame (Russkaya Liniya 2011). The secular publications were as follows: one with a religious-moral dominant frame (Remizov 2011), the other with a rational-instrumental frame (Interfax-Religiya 2011).

Prior to the passage of the Arkhangelsk Oblast anti-propaganda law, rational-instrumental framing by Church figures focused primarily on a sub-frame of child protection in the face of interest in underage citizens by LGBT activist groups. Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin (at the time, chairman of the Synodal Department for the Cooperation of Church and Society of the Moscow Patriarchate) stated that “Propaganda of homosexuality presents a particular danger for children and youth, who are... particularly susceptible to influence. It is known that this propaganda is directed first and foremost at youth and teenagers” (Chaplin 2011b). Debates over the draft law against propaganda of homosexuality coincided with controversy over texts authored by a professor in the city of Arkhangelsk, Gennadiy Deryagin, who was quoted as writing that pedophiles’ efforts to acquire legal rights mirrored those of the early LGBT rights movement, and that “teenage boys often engage in voluntary sexual activity with adults” (Chaplin 2011c). The ROC balked at reports that the texts were




Figure 3 — St. Petersburg, Media Sources, Dominant Frames Employed (Number of Times)

used within the Ministry of Internal Affairs' higher education institutions, with Chaplin declaring that "this upsetting material contains demands for the legalization of homosexual relationships with children, [and] propagandizes pedophilia, considered around the world to be one of the worst crimes" (Interfax-Religiya 2011).

While there were appeals to universal revulsion at pedophilia on one hand, another prominent rational-instrumental sub-frame indicated that LGBT activism was an aggressive product of foreign influence: Bishop Daniil (Dorovskykh) of Arkhangelsk and Kholmogorsk was quoted as stating that "financing of propagandistic events is carried out with means from foreign funds, the goal of which is the spiritual and moral decay of Russian society" (Arkhangelsk Eparchia Press Service 2011). In contrast, the Russian public was portrayed as home to a moral majority; Chaplin stated that "the majority of Russian citizens do not accept in any way the propaganda of sexual perversion that certain external forces and certain very small — but aggressive — groups within our society are trying to force upon us" (Chaplin 2011a).

St. Petersburg

For the city of St. Petersburg, a combination of online articles, televised debate programs, and videos of hearings (the public hearing on 24 February 2012 prior to the adoption of the law, and the 22 June 2012 hearing regarding practical applications of the law) were analyzed. Of the 7 online articles, 3 were from the Orthodox Internet, while 4 were from secular Web pages. Both of the two televised debates that were transliterated and analyzed took place in secular programs. As with the media sample prior to the passage of the Arkhangelsk Oblast law, none of the articles or broadcasts in the St. Petersburg media sample had a dominant procedural frame, and rational-instrumental frames were in first place (albeit by a greater margin than in the Arkhangelsk Oblast sample; see Figure 3).

Of the 3 articles from the Orthodox Internet, only one had a purely religious-moral dominant frame (Romanov 2011), another had a rational-instrumental dominant frame (Zaytseva 2012), and the third had a tie between religious-moral and rational-instrumental framing (Borisova 2012). The 4 articles from secular Web pages all had dominant rational-instrumental frames (Dobrokhotoy 2011; Sopova 2012; Rosbalt.Ru 2012a; Rosbalt.Ru 2012b). Of the 2 debates on secular television broadcasts, both had dominant rational-instrumental frames (NTV.Ru 2011; YouTube.Com 2012a).

As with the arguments made before the adoption of the Arkhangelsk Oblast anti-propaganda law, a rational-instrumental child protection sub-frame was prominent: in one of the televised debates, Deputy Milonov asked the audience, "Do you want your children to be attacked by all manner of LGBT movements, who use the fact that [children] are not yet sufficiently psychologically independent?" (NTV.Ru 2011). Hieromonk Dimitriy (Pershin), who participated in the first round of St. Petersburg hearings, was quoted by the Pravoslavie i Mir Orthodox Internet portal as contending that "In childhood and adolescence, impressions of norms for family relationships are not yet clearly formed, a child's psyche is unstable, and it is possible to cause serious trauma with consequences for the rest of their life" (Borisova 2012).

Another rational-instrumental argument that carried over from the debates concerning Arkhangelsk Oblast was that of a Russian majority versus ideological interlopers funded from abroad. While Hieromonk Dimitriy (Pershin) supported the idea that "the rights of children and teenagers must prevail over the rights of any minorities" (Zaytseva 2012), Deputy Vitaliy Milonov stated that "the first thing that the opponents of the law did was not to approach us, the deputies, but to skulk around [foreign] consulates and file complaints about us" (Rosbalt.Ru 2012b).

Russia was both compared to other countries that defended children's rights, or posed as an opponent to an aggressive West. Hieromonk Dimitriy (Pershin) noted that "in a number of American states, the rights of the child in terms of propaganda of any sort of sexual practices and perversions are under far stricter protection than that which the deputies of the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly are proposing" (Sopova 2012). He went on to blend rational-instrumental and religious-moral framing, declaring that

Since [US Secretary of State] Hillary Clinton has announced that gay rights are human rights... and all the Sodomites of the planet are under the protection of the USA, there is one thing left for us to do: take all the children on Earth under our protection, and stand up for their right to grow up and be raised in normal families... the Church, until the end of its days, will defend the rights of every little one to not be dragged into sin. (Borisova 2012)

A rational-instrumental connection was also made between defense of children, the country's demographics, and a unifying "national idea" for Russia: Hieromonk Dimitriy told the Blagovest-Info Orthodox portal that "the job of all people of good will is to say that our national idea is our children," while "homosexuality, unfortunately, is a place of death — children are not born there" (Zaytseva 2012).

One rational-instrumental frame that was not cited in the Arkhangelsk Oblast case but rose to prominence in the run-up to the St. Petersburg law's adoption was that of protection of LGBT activists. Hieromonk Dimitriy (Pershin) exercised rational-instrumental and religious-moral framing when maintaining that the St. Petersburg law would protect LGBT activists who chose to target schools and other children's facilities from vigilantism by enraged parents, stating that it would

... specifically protect individuals, who have defiled themselves with Sodom's vice, from the risk that they bring upon themselves by encroaching upon underage Russians' ways of thinking and acting, [minors] whose parents may resort to mob rule. (Sopova 2012)

In the sample of videotapes of the St. Petersburg hearings (one of the 24 February hearing, and three of the 22 June hearing), three had dominant rational-instrumental frames (YouTube.Com 2012b; YouTube.Com 2012d; YouTube.Com 2012e), and one had a dominant religious-moral frame (YouTube.Com 2012f); no dominant procedural frames were found. Rational-instrumental sub-frames of prioritizing the needs of a moral majority and child protection persisted; Deputy Milonov stated that Russia was "a sovereign country that must act on the interests of citizens, the people, living within the Russian Federation" (YouTube.Com 2012b), while Hieromonk Dimitriy (Pershin) asked those assembled (a group that included LGBT activists) "Can you really not cope without accosting minors with propaganda of homosexuality and other perversions?" (YouTube.Com 2012b). A rational-instrumental sub-frame of a link between homosexuality, demographics, and Russia's future as a nation was a continuation of previous references to Russia's "national idea." Archpriest Aleksiy Moroz spoke of a "reproductive instinct" among human beings at the hearings, stating that "contradiction thereof is perversion, pathology" and that "the problem of homosexuality in the population, homosexuality of youth, is a problem of national security" due to a demographic crisis among Russia's Slavic population (YouTube.Com 2012b).

Federal Level

For the federal law, a sample of 16 online articles, blog posts, secular televised debates, and religious broadcasts were analyzed. Of the articles selected, 4 were from the Orthodox Internet, and 7 were from secular news pages. Of the 5 video materials transcribed and analyzed, 3 were secular television broadcasts, one was a




Figure 4 — Federal Level, Media Sources, Total Dominant Frames Employed (Number of Times)

broadcast by the Orthodox Christian television channel Soyuz, and one was a video post from an Orthodox multimedia blog run by Archpriest Dimitriy Smirnov of Moscow (see Figure 4).

As in the cases of the Arkhangelsk Oblast and St. Petersburg anti-propaganda laws, the overall frames employed in the sample were mostly rational-instrumental, with religious-moral framing taking a distant second. Unlike the previous two samples, however, the federal sample included one dominant procedural frame.

Of the 4 articles from the Orthodox Internet, half had combined religious-moral and rational-instrumental dominant frames (PravMir News Service 2012a; Zaytseva 2013), while half had purely rational-instrumental overall frames (PravMir News Service 2012b; Milonov and Interfax-Severo-Zapad 2012). Of the 7 articles from secular pages, 5 had purely rational-instrumental dominant frames (News-Ru.com 2012; Gazeta.Ru 2012; Regions.Ru 2012; Chyornikh and Tumanov 2012; Fetisov 2013), one had a combined religious-moral, rational-instrumental frame (Runkovich 2012), and one had a combined religious-moral, procedural frame (Tutina 2013), respectively. In the case of the article by Fetisov (2013), the fact that the dominant frame is rational-instrumental is particularly interesting due to the fact that it was featured in a secular business news site, but penned by an Orthodox priest. Of the secular television broadcasts analyzed, all three had purely rational-instrumental dominant frames (YouTube.Com 2012c; YouTube.Com 2015; YouTube.Com 2013). Both the Orthodox television broadcast video (YouTube.Com 2012d) and video blog post (Multimedia Blog of Archpriest Dimitriy Smirnov 2013) had a dominant rational-instrumental frame.

In addition to rational-instrumental warnings about potential threats to children (Priest Dimitriy Fetisov of Ryazan warned of a slippery slope by which “the simple and convincing thesis that ‘if you really want something, it’s permitted’ can continue in any direction — for example, into pedophilia”), the argument that the law

represented the views of a moral majority of Russian citizens became especially prominent (Fetisov 2013). Protodeacon and missionary Andrey Kurayev of Moscow viewed anti-propaganda legislation as a step away from a democratic deficit that favored the LGBT community, declaring that "all expansions of the rights of these homosexual minorities in Western countries were carried out in a non-democratic way... this was a certain consensus of liberal elites who imposed their will," and indicated that the American Psychological Association's declassification of homosexuality as a mental disorder was the result of "terror" and "intense pressure" against academia (PravMir News Service 2012b). Kurayev's democracy sub-frame was backed by St. Petersburg Deputy Vitaliy Milonov, who stated that "no country has ever said in a referendum 'we want to destroy our values and make a norm out of that which was once a sin'" (Milonov and Interfax-Severo-Zapad 2012).

Foreign and domestic criticism of the St. Petersburg anti-propaganda law became a driving force behind rational-instrumental framing in support of federal legislation, as the specter of aggressive Western states and LGBT activists supported by American and European funding was cited as proof that such laws were necessary. In a question-and-answer session broadcast by the Orthodox Soyuz television channel, Mitropolit Pavel (Ponomarev) of Ryazan (the city where the country's first anti-propaganda law was adopted) called US Government criticism of the existing laws "shameless intervention in a sovereign state," and asked the audience to

Look at the democracy that the USA is trying to impose upon us. Where does their democracy lead... look at Yugoslavia, look at Libya, look at Iraq... Do you want this to happen in Russia? It didn't work out for [the US] there, now they're trying to impose their ideas on another front. (Soyuz 2012)

On a similar note, St. Petersburg Deputy Milonov called foreign protests against the anti-propaganda laws "A violent, literally forcible intervention in our internal sovereignty" and stated that for activists, protesting against the laws was "a serious source of income. We know about the [monetary] figures that are sent here every year for support of these foundations" (YouTube.Com 2013; YouTube.Com 2015).

The protests that erupted in response to regional laws banning propaganda to children were framed in rational-instrumental terms as evidence of an unhealthy connection between homosexuality and pedophilic tendencies, and a need for further restrictions. Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin remarked that

I'm very surprised [that] homosexual organizations, which are composed primarily of people who negate the connection between homosexuality and pedophilia, are also the ones who are so up in arms against these laws, protesting their adoption in all sorts of ways. (NewsRu.Com 2012)

The protests were also seen as a sign of the need for legislation that would shut them down: Hieromonk Dimitriy (Pershin) used a combined rational-instrumental and procedural frame when declaring that

The determination that representatives of sexual minorities have displayed, and their intention to protest yet again outside of facilities for children show how timely the adoption of the regional [St. Petersburg] law was, which, without delay, should be given federal status — but this is already a job for [parliamentary] deputies. (PravMir News Service 2012a)

As in the case of the St. Petersburg law, the idea of LGBT activists at risk of physical retaliation from irate parents was used in rational-instrumental framing of anti-propaganda laws as a means of protecting such protestors from vigilante violence. When informed that LGBT activist Nikolay Alekseyev planned to picket schools in response to the St. Petersburg law, St. Petersburg Deputy Milonov warned that

Of course we can't recommend that anyone physically resist them — that's illegal. But... how can a person stand back, if a pervert approaches his children and starts holding these types of protests... it's the very same as coming to a gunpowder storage facility with lit matches. (Milonov and Interfax-Severo-Zapad 2012)

Priest Dimitriy Fetisov posed LGBT individuals as worthy of sympathy, but issued a warning for those who participated in public protests:

I feel immensely sorry for those few people who suffer from such deviations. But my pity and desire to help won't contradict righteous fury paired with legal charges or other, ruder means if such a sufferer can't limit their promiscuity and starts to ecstatically tell my children about same-sex love. (Fetisov 2013)

One rational-instrumental frame that first appeared during debates over the St. Petersburg law but bloomed in the run-up to adoption of the federal anti-propaganda legislation was that of a connection between homosexuality, the country's demographic situation, and a unifying “national idea.” Archpriest Dimitriy Smirnov of Moscow opined that

There are often discussions about our country not having a national idea. It's completely clear that this is stupidity. Our national idea is giving birth to and raising children. (Tutina 2013)

Smirnov cautioned that

Soon young people will have nobody left to marry. There will only be same-sex families, in which (by the way, according to American data) children grow up to be more unhappy, cruel, and prone to violence and suicide. (Tutina 2013)




Figure 5 — Total Dominant Frames Employed (Number of Times)

St. Petersburg Deputy Milonov applied a combined procedural, religious-moral, and rational-instrumental frame to his own work and the future of Russia, stating that

As a People's Deputy, I don't have the right to allow lust and sin to be legalized and made a norm, because that will be the final year of our country's existence. (YouTube.Com 2013)

Discussions of a federal anti-propaganda law were particularly notable in that they were the first to include a dominant procedural frame. In addition to Milonov's references to his responsibilities as a deputy, Mitropolit Pavel of Ryazan praised the work of those deputies who "in the name of the people, try to do everything possible to turn off this spigot of filth [and] nastiness, so that [it] won't enter our Russian land" (Soyuz 2012). However, there also were protests against those politicians who objected to the idea of adopting federal-level anti-propaganda legislation. Archpriest Dimitriy Smirnov remarked that

It would seem that [the law] is an obvious and most necessary document. So? A huge number of civil servants, deputies, even those who are obligated to protect human rights as part of their jobs are speaking against it for some reason!...Why is the fate of such a serious law being decided by a cluster of those in power?...In Switzerland, for example, referendums are held for the most trivial matters, but here, even serious problems are not subject to public debate. (Tutina 2013)

In conclusion, when the dominant frames from each stage of the analysis (Arkhangelsk Oblast, St. Petersburg, and the federal level) were totaled, rational-instrumental dominant frames held a clear lead, with religious-moral and procedural frames a distant second and third (see Figure 5).

Conclusion

This article intended to pinpoint the framing strategies employed by clerics and others serving in the Russian Orthodox Church. By doing so, the author hoped to apply framing theory to the ROC, and expand morality policy research beyond its traditional home in the West.

The results of content analysis of media sources and recordings of public hearings on the law were as follows: while rational-instrumental framing was dominant, procedural framing lagged far behind the results of previous research. The results form a strong argument for inductive research of the ROC and other religious and social institutions and groups that have long puzzled researchers in the West, in order to create a robust research design before launching larger-scale analyses. This article is intended as a pilot for future studies of morality policy disputes involving the Moscow Patriarchate, ROC clerics, and Orthodox activist groups within the Russian Federation and other countries within the former Soviet Union.

While the nature of governance in Russia means that gleaning the exact nature of Church-state relations may be next to impossible for researchers who have not been embedded in ROC affairs for decades, longitudinal studies of fluctuations in morality frames used over time regarding different issues and a comparison of outcomes may yield clues as to which argumentation strategies have worked in the Church's favor. Morality policy and content analysis may also assist with other areas of inquiry related to religion and politics in Russia, such as examinations of tolerance levels for individual behavior (for example, comparing morality policy frames used when discussing homosexuality with respondents' attitudes toward reinstatement of Soviet-era criminal penalties).

References:

- Baer, Brian James. 2002. "Russian Gays/Western Gaze: Mapping (Homo)Sexual Desire in Post-Soviet Russia." *GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies* 8(4), 499-521.
- BBC News. 2006. *Banned Moscow Gay Rally Broken Up*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5023466.stm> on 8 October 2016.
- Essig, Laurie. 2014. "'Bury Their Hearts': Some Thoughts on the Specter of Homosexuality Haunting Russia." *QED: A Journal in GLBTQ Worldmaking* 1(3), 39-58.
- Federal Law of the Russian Federation from 29 June 2013 No. 135-FZ City of Moscow "On Including Changes to Article 5 of the Federal Law "On Protection of Children from Information Harmful to Their Health and Development" and Separate Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation with the Goal of Protection of Children from Information Propagandizing Rejection of Traditional Family Values"/Federalnyi Zakon Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 29 iuniya 2013 g. N 135-FZ g. Moskva "O vnesenii izmeneniy v statyu 5 Federalnogo Zakona "O zashchite detey ot informatsii, prichinyayushey vred ikh zdorovyu i razvitiyu" i otdelnye zakonodatelnye akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii v tselyakh zashchity detey ot informatsii, propogandiruyushey otritsaniye*

- traditsionnykh semeynykh tsennostey.*" Adopted by the State Duma 11 June 2013, approved by the Federation Council 26 June 2013, published 2 July 2013. Retrieved from <http://www.rg.ru/06/30/deti-site-dok.html> on 11 September 2016.
- Human Rights Watch. 2014. *License to Harm*. Retrieved from <http://www.hrw.org/reports/12/15/license-harm-0> on 11 September 2016.
- Knill, Christoph. 2013. "The study of morality policy: analytical implications from a public policy perspective." *Journal of European Public Policy* 20(3), 309-317.
- Kon, I. 2009. "Homophobia as a Litmus Test of Russian Democracy." *Sociological Research* 48(2), 43-64.
- Law of Arkhangelsk Oblast "On Making Changes and Additions to the Oblast Law 'On Individual Measures for Protection of Morality and Health of Children in Arkhangelsk Oblast'"/*Oblastnoy Zakon O Vnesenii Izmeneniy i Dopolneniya v Oblastnoy Zakon "Ob Otdelnikh Merakh po Zashchite Nravstvennosti i Zdorovya Detey v Arkhangelskoy Oblasti.*" Adopted by the Oblast Assembly of Deputies on 28 September 2011, signed 30 September 2011. Retrieved from <http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&prevDoc=123023715&=1&nd=&rdk> on 11 September 2016.
- Law of St. Petersburg "On Amendments to the Law of St. Petersburg 'On Administrative Offenses in St. Petersburg'"/*Zakon Sankt-Peterburga O Vnesenii Izmeneniy v Zakon Sankt-Peterburga "Ob Administrativnykh Pravonarusheniyakh v Sankt-Peterburge.*" Adopted by the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg on 29 February 2012, signed 7 March 2012. Retrieved from <http://gov.spb.ru/law?d&nd=537913971&razdel=888800001&prevDoc=537913971&spack=010listid%3D010000000700%26listpos%3D0%26lsz%3D21%26nd%3D888800001%26nh%3D0%26razdel%3D888800001%26> on 11 September 2016.
- Law of Ryazan Oblast "On Making Changes to the Law of Ryazan Oblast 'On Violations of Administrative Law'"/*Zakon Ryazanskoy Oblasti O Vnesenii Izmeneniy v Zakon Ryazanskoy Oblasti "Ob Administrativnykh Pravonarusheniyakh.*" Adopted by the Ryazan Oblast Duma from 24 May 2006, signed 15 June 2006. Retrieved from <http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?=&nd=114016805&rdk=&backlink=1> on 11 September 2016.
- Mooney, Christopher Z. and Lee, Mei-Hsien. 1999a. "Morality Policy Reinvention: State Death Penalties." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 566(1), 80-92.
- Mooney, Christopher Z. and Lee, Mei-Hsien. 1999b. "The temporal diffusion of morality policy: The case of death penalty legislation in the American States." *Policy Studies Journal* 27(4), 766-780.
- Mooney, Christopher Z. and Schuldt, Richard G. 2008. "Does Morality Policy Exist? Testing a Basic Assumption." *Policy Studies Journal* 36(2), 199-218.
- Mucciaroni, Gary. 2009. *Same Sex, Different Politics: Success and Failure in the Struggles over Gay Rights*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mucciaroni, Gary. 2011. "Are Debates about 'Morality Policy' Really about Morality? Framing Opposition to Gay and Lesbian Rights." *The Policy Studies Journal* 39(2), 187-216.
- Studlar, Donley T. 2008. "U.S. Tobacco Control: Public Health, Political Economy, or Morality Policy?" *Review of Policy Research* 25(5), 393-410.

Content Analysis Sources

- Arkhangelsk Eparchia Press Service. 2011. *Bishop Daniil Supported the Ban on Propaganda of Homosexuality among Children/Yepiskop Daniil Podderzhal Zapret na Propagandu Gomoseksualizma Sredi Detey*. Retrieved from http://arh-eparhia.ru/news/390/17396/?sphrase_=1567.

- Borisova, Aleksandra. 2012. *Propaganda of Sodom Is Forbidden: "Caution, Children!"*/Propaganda Sodoma pod zapret: "Ostorozhno, deti!" Retrieved from <http://www.pravmir.ru/ostorozhno-deti/>.
- Chaplin, Vsevolod. 2011a. *Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin on the Canceled Gay Parade and Victory Day Celebrations*/Protoierey Vsevolod Chaplin o nesostoyavshemysya gay-parade i prazdnovanii Dnya Pobedy. Retrieved from <http://www.pravmir.ru/protoierey-vsevolod-chaplin-o-nesostoyavshemysya-gay-parade-i-prazdnovanii-dnya-pobedy/>.
- Chaplin, Vsevolod. 2011b. *Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin Answered the Authors of a Letter Regarding Propaganda of Homosexuality*/Protoierey Vsevolod Chaplin otvetil avtoram obrascheniy po voprosam propagandy gomoseksualizma. Retrieved from <http://www.pravo.ru/48570.html> on 11 December 2016.
- Chaplin, Vsevolod. 2011c. *Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin: They Are Starting to Call for Legalization of Pedophilia in Russia*/Protoierey Vsevolod Chaplin: V Rossii nashali prizyvay k legalizatsii pedofilii. Retrieved from <http://www.pravmir.ru/vsevolod-chaplin-v-rossii-nachala-propagandirovatsya-legalizatsiya-pedofilii/>.
- Chyornikh, Aleksandr and Tumanov, Grigoriy. 2012. *Orthodox Christians Are Begging for a New Law*/Pravoslavnie vymalivayut novyy zakon. Retrieved from <http://www.kommersant.ru/1971842>.
- Dobrokhotoy, Roman. 2011. *Deputy: "The Main Goal of Gays is To Satisfy Their Sick Lust"*/Deputat: "Glavnaya tsel geev — usladit svoju bolezennuyu pokhot." Retrieved from <https://republic.ru/posts/1/706343>.
- Fetisov, Dimitriy. 2013. *Archpriest Dimitriy Fetisov: Unlimited Promiscuity*/Ierey Dimitriy Fetisov: Neogranichenniy promiskuitet. Retrieved from <http://vz.ru/columns/2013/2/8/.html>.
- Gazeta.Ru. 2012. *ROC: The Law Against Propaganda of Homosexuality Must Be Adopted at the Federal Level*/RPTs: zakon protiv propagandy gomoseksualizma nado prinyat na federalnom urovne. Retrieved from https://www.gazeta.ru/news/2012/03/11/_2238433.shtml.
- Interfax-Religiya. 2011. *The Church Asks Prosecutors to React Harshly to Textbook for Students of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Justifying Pedophilia*/V Tserkvi prosyat prokuraturu zhyostko otreagirovat na uchebnik dlya kursantov MVD, v kotorom opravdyvaetsya pedofiliya. Retrieved from <http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=>.
- Milonov, Vitaliy and Interfax-Severo-Zapad. 2012. *Deputy of the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly V. Milonov: "Many in Europe Support the Ban on Propaganda of Homosexuality, But Are Afraid to Declare It"*/Deputat Zakonodatel'nogo Sobraniya Sankt-Peterburga V. Milonov: "Mnogie v Evrope podderzhivayut zapret propagandy gomoseksualizma, no boyatsya ob etom zayavit." Retrieved from <http://www.pravoslavie.ru/html>.
- Multimedia Blog of Archpriest Dimitriy Smirnov. 2013. *Blog Post of Archpriest Dimitriy Smirnov. Part 48*/Blogpost protoiereya Dimitriya Smirnova. Vypusk 48. Retrieved from <http://www.dimitrysmirnov.ru/blog/otvet-19802/>.
- NewsRu.Com. 2012. *The ROC Recommends Introducing a Federal Ban on Propaganda of Homosexuality among Children*/V RPTs predlagayut vvesti federalnyy zapret propagandy gomoseksualizma sredi detey. Retrieved from <http://www.newsru.com/jan2012/chaplin.html>.
- NTV.Ru. 2011. *NTVshniki: Can the Government Creep into Our Bed?*/NTVshniki: Mozhnet li gosudarstvo lezt v nashu postel? Retrieved from <http://www.ntv.ru/090936/video/>.
- PravMir News Service. 2012a. *Hieromonk Dimitriy (Pershin) Supported the Idea of Giving the Law on Propaganda of Homosexuality and Pedophilia Federal Status*/Ieromonakh Dimitriy (Pershin) podderzhal ideyu pridaniya federal'nogo statusa zakonu o propaganda gomoseksualizma i ped-

- ofilii. Retrieved from <http://www.pravmir.ru/dimitrij-pershin-podderzhal-ideyu-pridaniya-federalnogo-statusa-zakonu-o-propagande-gomoseksualizma-i-pedofilii/>.
- PravMir News Service. 2012b. *Andrey Kurayev: There is Democracy in the Law on Banning Propaganda of Homosexuality/Andrey Kurayev: V zakone o zaprete propaganda gomoseksualizma yest demokratichnost*. Retrieved from <http://www.pravmir.ru/kuraev-v-zakone-o-zaprete-propagandy-gomoseksualizma-est-demokratichnost/>.
- Regions.Ru. 2012. *Hieromonk Dimitriy (Pershin): The St. Petersburg Ban on Propaganda of Homosexuality is Encouraging/Ieromonakh Dimitriy (Pershin): Peterburgskiy zapret propagandy gomoseksualizma obnadyozhivaet*. Retrieved from <http://regions.ru/news//>.
- Remizov, Dmitriy. 2011. *Gays Are Being Cornered/Geev zagonyayut v ugol*. Retrieved from <http://www.rosbalt.ru/russia/2011/09/29/895589.html>.
- Romanov, Sergey. 2011. *Vitaliy Milonov: The Rebirth of Spirituality is Key!/Vitaliy Milonov: Vozrodit dukhovnost — glavnoe!* Retrieved from http://www.vzov.ru/2011/12_01-02/04.html.
- Rosbalt.Ru. 2012a. *The St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly Will Examine the "Law on Gays" in the Final Reading/Peterburgskiy ZakS v poslednem chtenii rassmotrit "zakon o geyakh."* Retrieved from <http://www.rosbalt.ru/piter/2012/02/29/951378.html>.
- Rosbalt.Ru. 2012b. *Milonov Threatens the Group Rammstein with Gay Propaganda Charges/Milonov grozit privilech za gey-propagandu gruppu Rammstein*. Retrieved from <http://www.rosbalt.ru/piter/2012/02/29/951531.html>.
- Runkevich, Dmitriy. 2012. *Demanding Enactment of a Law on Banning Gay Propaganda in Moscow/V Moskve trebuyut vvesti zakon o zaprete gey-propagandy*. Retrieved from <http://izvestia.ru/news/536901>.
- Russkaya Liniya. 2011. *The Gay Parade Will Not Pass!/Gey-Parad ne proydyot!* Retrieved from <http://rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=50615>.
- Sopova, Aleksandra. 2012. *In St. Petersburg, Advertising of Homosexuality Will Be Charged/V Sankt-Peterburge reklama gomoseksualizma stanet platnoy*. Retrieved from <http://izvestia.ru/news/516827>.
- Soyuz. 2012. *Conversations with Lord Pavel — Propaganda of Homosexuality/Besedy s Vladykoy Pavlom — Propaganda Gomoseksualizma*. Retrieved from <http://tv-soyuz.ru/peredachi/besedy-s-vladykoy-pavlom-ryazan/propaganda-gomo>.
- Tutina, Yuliya. 2013. *Archpriest Dimitriy Smirnov: A Woman and Man Are Not Equals. This Is an Axiom!/Protoierey Dimitriy Smirnov: Zhenschina s muzhchinoy ne ravny. Eto aksioma!* Retrieved from <http://www.aif.ru/society/religion/42114>.
- YouTube.Com. 2012a. *Open Studio: Same-Sex Law/Otkrytaya Studiya: Odnopolyy Zakon*. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LIOpSejmlE1>.
- YouTube.Com. 2012b. *Don't Say Gay! 24.2.2012/Ne govori gey! 24.2.2012*. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wuD9gWrAR8g>.
- YouTube.Com. 2012c. *Historic Process: Homosexuality and Pedophilia/Istoricheskiy Protsess: Gomoseksualizm i Pedofiliya*. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wtwUmpx8pA>.
- YouTube.Com. 2012d. *Law on Propaganda St. Petersburg-Regions. Part 1/Zakon o propagande SPb-Regiony. Chast 1*. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qRDakqXl0fQ>.
- YouTube.Com. 2012e. *Law on Propaganda St. Petersburg-Regions. Part 2/Zakon o propagande SPb-Regiony. Chast 2*. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QUv01gqKEak>.
- YouTube.Com. 2012f. *Law on Propaganda St. Petersburg, Regions. Part 3/Zakon o propaganda SPb-Regiony. Chast 3*. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyRKc-1WBzw>.

- YouTube.Com. 2013. *Duel: Milonov vs. Gelman/Poedinok: Milonov vs. Gelman*. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bKVSoqHSxmE>.
- YouTube.Com. 2015. *Evening with Vladimir Solovyov. Program Theme — Homosexuality/Vecher s Vladimirom Solovyovym. Tema programmy — Gomoseksualizm*. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/?v=mhK5tLxVs8M>.
- Zaytseva, Yuliya. 2012. *The Rights of Children Must Be above the Rights of Any Minorities/Prava detey dolzhny byt vyshe prav lyubykh menshinstv*. Retrieved from <http://blagovest-info.ru/index.php?ss=2&s=3&id=46077>.
- Zaytseva, Yuliya. 2013. *Hieromonk Dimitriy (Persin): The Law Enters into Force When Moral Norms Stop Working/Ieromonakh Dimitriy (Persin): Zakon vstupayet v silu togda, kogda perestayut rabotat moralniye normy*. Retrieved from <http://www.blagovest-info.ru/index.php?ss=2&s=5&id=53115>.