

Analysis of the Relationship between Sociology of Religion and Social Movements

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Pregledni rad
(primljeno: 10. listopada 2018.)
UDK 316:2
316.74:82

The study of social movements and the sociology of religion share similarities and they can benefit from each other. Theorizing for both fields is somehow similar. This paper is an attempt to briefly present the supply-side and resource mobilization theories in the study of the sociology of religion and literature on social movements. This paper is a sort of a comparative analysis on the sociology of religion and literature on social movements. It presents a brief literature overview of the supply-side theory, and some examples of studies that have used this model; a brief overview of the resource mobilization theory; and finally, an assessment of the recruitment tactics and commitment levels in both of these fields of sociology.

Keywords: sociology of religion, social movements, supply-side theory, resource mobilization

Introduction

The study of social movements and the sociology of religion share similarities and they can benefit from each other. Theorizing for both fields is somehow similar. This paper is an attempt to briefly present the supply-side and resource mobilization theories in the study of the sociology of religion and literature on social movements. Since the 1970s and until recently the resource mobilization theory dominated the field of social movements, but not any more. In the last decade, the supply-side theory gained a lot of support for its hypotheses from religious studies in the United States and Europe. However, this model has also received some critique from various scholars in many studies. Nonetheless, one is of the view that at the present time, this model is very convincing in its assumptions and hypotheses. This paper will be some sort of a comparative analysis on the sociology of religion and literature on social movements. The paper presents a brief literature overview of the supply-side theory, and some examples of studies that have used this

model; a brief overview of the resource mobilization theory; and finally an assessment of the recruitment tactics and commitment levels in both these fields of sociology.

Theoretical Background

The Macro Level

The supply-side theory suggests that religious participation rises when there is available religious supply and that religious competition increases religious participation. It also suggests that religious monopoly and state support decreases the level of religious participation.¹ The state plays an important role in controlling the level of religious competition. The state might leave the religious market free of regulations or with very minor ones (the United States, for example), or regulate and restrict religious practices (the former USSR and East Europe in the past), or support one or two religious firms and restrict other unwanted religious groups (Latin America).²

Finke and Iannaccone described religion as an object of choice and production. In their economic model, they view churches and religious administrators as producers who design their products and design how to market them.³ While consumers, on the other hand, choose from the religious market what they want to adapt and to what extent they want to participate in it. In a free religious market, religious producers compete to produce goods that can attract consumers and keep up with the market. They also noted the importance of the government's role in regulating or deregulating this type of a market.⁴ In the religious market, religious firms compete to produce attractive commodities, and consumers choose what religion (if any) they will participate in and how much involvement they will have in it.⁵

¹ See Paul FROESE, "Hungary for Religion: A Supply-Side Interpretation of the Hungarian Religious Revival" *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 40 (2001) 2, 251-268; Rodney STARK, Laurence R. IANACCONE, "A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the 'Secularization' of Europe", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 33 (1994) 3, 230-52. doi:10.2307/1386688

² Anthony GILL, *Rendering unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998.

³ Roger FINKE, Laurence R. IANACCONE, "Supply-Side Explanations for Religious Change", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 527 (1993) 1, 27-39. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716293527001003>. Retrieved on March 20, 2019.

⁴ R. FINKE, L. R. IANACCONE, "Supply-Side Explanations for Religious Change"; Mark CHAVES, David E. CANN, "Regulation, Pluralism, and Religious Market Structure: Explaining Religion's Vitality", *Rationality and Society*, 4 (1992) 3, 272-290. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463192004003003>. Retrieved on March 20, 2019.

⁵ L. R. IANACCONE, "The Consequences of Religious Market Structure: Adam Smith and the Economics of Religion", *Rationality and Society* 3 (1991) 2, 156-177. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463191003002002>. Retrieved on March 20, 2019.

It is argued that in the absence of state regulations on religion, religious competition will increase, which will lead to a high level of religious participation. Froese tested this assumption in his study on Hungary, 2001. He claims that as a communist country, Hungary witnessed a relatively low level of religious participation. Little before the mid-1990s, anti-religion campaigns started and church lands were nationalized. Later, the state started regulating religion and nationalizing church schools to prevent the church's influence on the young generation and alienate them from religion. The secularization doctrine at the same time gained a lot of support and followers, and the state declared itself as an atheist country in 1949. Religious participation and church attendance dropped during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. This decrease can be explained by the state regulations on religion and the methods of coercion that were used to enforce these regulations. All churches had to sign an agreement with the state that regulates and limits their activities. Church officials and religious leaders had suffered many forms of harassment and pure coercion.⁶

Froese used data from the World Values Survey that was collected in 1981, when the country was under the communist regime, and in 1990, when the country brought in new laws that granted religious freedom. The data strongly supported the supply-side hypothesis. In 1981, the percentage of the Hungarian population that indicated that they prayed was 45%, while in 1990, the percentage was 57%. This indicates an increase in the level of religious participation.

Even though Eastern Europe has provided a strong support for the supply-side theory after communism, there were some exceptions that did not appear to support this economic model. The exceptions are best described by the cases of Poland and East Germany. The economic model may appear to be unable to explain these cases. Research indicates that the level of religious participation decreased after the collapse of communism and even after the emergence of laws that allowed a free religious market. According to this economic model, the decrease of the government's regulations on religion will increase the level of religious participation. Churches will regain their institutional freedom and the public will be allowed to participate in religion.

Furthermore, a free religious market that will allow free religious competition will increase religious consumption. However, this was not the case in Poland and East Germany. The level of religious participation decreased

⁶ P. FROESE, "Hungary for Religion: A Supply-Side Interpretation of the Hungarian Religious Revival".

even though religious pluralism was present. Nonetheless, a study on these two countries done by Froese and Pfaff used to further advance the economic model and provide an explanation for these two cases.⁷ In their study, they use claims and explanations of sociologists of religion that helped serve and advance this economic model. It is argued that specific situations, such as a conflict instead of a competition, may produce high-level religiosity.⁸ It is also claimed that some groups — such as marginalized groups, and social and political movements — use their religious communities as “free social spaces”.⁹ Religious communities may become a source of support for marginalized groups and provide support to social movements; for example, the role of black churches in the civil rights movement and religious institutions in the Middle East. Churches also have the role of representing the nation’s identity in the form of a “national church”. This role becomes possible whenever there is a monopoly of one religion. In this case, such church is able to carry the identity of the nation.¹⁰ This type of churches will have committed members during communism, because they will be a symbol of nationalism and opposition to communism. As a result, the collapse of communism leads to a low rate of membership and commitment. Therefore, a reduction in religious participation in this situation should not contradict the general assumptions of this economic model.¹¹

Iannaccone indicates that the levels of religious belief and participation tend to be low when the religious market is monopolized, and high when the religious market is competitive.¹² In the case of Poland, the Catholic Church during communism was privileged with the monopoly over the religious market, which according to this economic model should lead to a low rate of participation and commitment of its members, but this was not the case. Having the monopoly, the Catholic Church became the national church that gave the Poles their cultural identity. It was a symbol of a strong nation

⁷ Paul FROESE, Steven PFAFF, “Replete and Desolate Markets: Poland, East Germany, and the New Religious Paradigm”, *Social Forces* 80 (2001) 2, 481-507, <https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2001.0093>. Retrieved on March 20, 2019.

⁸ Rodney STARK Roger FINKE, *Acts of faith: Explaining the human side of religion*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000.

⁹ Darren E. SHERKAT, Christopher G. ELLISON, “Recent Development and Current Controversies in the Sociology of Religion”, *Annual Review of Sociology* 25 (1999) 1, 363-394. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.25.1.363>. Retrieved on March 20, 2019.

¹⁰ Steven BRUCE, *Choice and Religion: A Critique of Rational Choice Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

¹¹ P. FROESE, S. PFAFF, “Replete and Desolate Markets: Poland, East Germany, and the New Religious Paradigm”.

¹² L. R. IANNACCONI, “The Consequences of Religious Market Structure”.

that resisted the atheistic communist government. As a result, the collapse of communism will vanish the need for this type of a church because there will be no conflicts anymore.

The situation in East Germany was a little different than that of Poland. Before the collapse of communism, the Church used to have some sort of autonomy and served as an alternative for the state-controlled institutions. After the collapse of communism, the Church lost that position, individuals who participated in religious activities for political reasons and in order to oppose communism did not need to get involved with the Church anymore. The new political system provided freedom for individuals to pursue their personal interests. The merge of the Lutheran Church in East Germany with the Evangelical Churches Association after the unification of the republic might be another reason for the religiosity decline in East Germany. This merge brought about the German federal law on church taxes for members of religious organizations. Furthermore, the Church's involvement in East Germany before the collapse of communism appeared to be a positive involvement in the eyes of the public, but after the unification, the Church appeared to be involved in political wrongdoing.

One of the assumptions of the supply-side theory is that religious participation will be high when religion is less regulated by the state. Chaves et al supported the supply-side theory by testing this hypothesis on minority groups.¹³ They argued that this hypothesis applies on Muslim minorities in Christian dominated societies. They included 18 countries that have Muslim minorities in their study. They used the rate in which Muslims do the "Hajj" to Mecca as an indicator of religious participation. They found a negative relationship between the state's regulation and religious participation. Once the socioeconomic status is controlled, religious participation (practicing the Hajj) tends to be higher in less-regulated countries.

The Mezzo Level

Iannaccone argues that strict churches are stronger than lenient churches. He states: "strictness makes organizations stronger and more attractive".¹⁴ He argues that Protestantism in the 1950s started losing members, and the trend was that liberal denominations had the highest decline rate compared to conservative denominations, while the most conservative denominations

¹³ Mark CHAVES, Peter J. SCHRAEDER, Mario SPRINDYS, "State Regulation of Religion and Muslim Religious Vitality in the Industrial West", *The Journal of Politics* 56 (1994) 4, 1087-1097.

¹⁴ L. R. IANNACCONI, "Why Strict Churches are Strong", *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (1994) 5, 1180. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2781147>. Retrieved on March 19, 2019.

grew. Iannaccone notes that religion is a social phenomenon that, in practice, has to be experienced in groups: “religion is a commodity that people produce collectively”.¹⁵

Religious organizations have always been faced with the problem of free riding. This problem emerges when members of an organization receive benefits from the organization because of their collective work. Each member receives these benefits regardless of his/her own efforts. Some members, rationally and by following their own interests or even sometimes unintentionally, try to reduce the effort and free-ride off the efforts of others. Strict churches indirectly reduce the problem of free riding by penalizing and prohibiting members from participating in other activities that may use other members' resources. Penalties and prohibitions push the less committed members out of the organization. There are some activities that are easily monitored, but there are some activities that are hard to monitor such as drinking, smoking, sex and diet. Iannaccone agrees that these activities are hard to monitor, but still, the costs of deception will be high. It would be easy to hide yourself when you drink alcohol, and it is not the same when you drink at parties or in bars.

Iannaccone measured church strictness by developing a scale of the strictness or distinctiveness of various religions and compared it to church attendance. The results showed consistency with the suggested hypothesis. He also tested the Protestant denominational differences. He used a scale of the level of strictness (liberal, moderate, and conservative) and compared the differences between these three denominations regarding income, education, attendance, church contributions, membership in church-affiliated groups, and secular membership. The data showed that for “every variable the pattern of variation is monotonic, increasing (or decreasing) steadily as one moves from liberal to moderate to conservative”.¹⁶ In terms of income, education and secular membership, the variables tend to decrease when we move from liberal to conservative, while in terms of attendance and membership in church-affiliated groups, the variables tend to increase when we move in the same direction. Therefore, the stricter the organization is, the poorer and less educated its members tend to be. They also tend to contribute more to the church and attend services more often than those of less strict churches. On the other hand, people who are liberal and religiously moderate have a bigger tendency to participate in secular activities and in organizations outside the church. Iannaccone believes that “a high-cost

¹⁵ Id. 1183.

¹⁶ Id. 1194.

group maintains its strict norms of conduct precisely because they limit participation in competing activities and thereby raise levels of participation within the group”.¹⁷

Semi-Involuntary Participation

In their study on church participation among black Americans, Ellison and Sherkat investigated “the regional variations in African American religious life”.¹⁸ They compared black communities of the south to communities of the urban non-south regarding three issues:

1. the social role of religious institutions;
2. the availability of alternative lifestyles and secular opportunities in terms of status and resources;
3. social norms and community expectations regarding church involvement.¹⁹

They suggested that: 1) church participation will be the highest among the rural southern communities; 2) due to the semi-involuntary thesis; the southerners will be more likely to participate intermittently and less likely to abandon the church than non-southerners. According to the semi-voluntary thesis, the norms of church participation and the social sanctions on individuals who do not participate will be highest among the rural south. They also hypothesized that “the magnitude of the relationships between perceived rewards of congregational involvement and reported patterns of church participation will be weakest among rural southerners and strongest among non-southerners”.²⁰

To test these hypotheses, they used data from the National Survey of Black Americans (NSBA), and household probability samples gathered by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. The results were consistent with the hypotheses. Church participation was the highest among rural-south communities, and rural southerners were more likely to engage in religious activities. Blacks from urban and suburban non-south who did not receive benefits from their congregational involvement searched for happiness in secular venues without having the problem of social sanctions.

¹⁷ Id. 1197.

¹⁸ C. G. ELLISON, D. E. SHERKAT, “The ‘Semi-involuntary Institution’ Revisited: Regional Variations in Church Participation among Black Americans”, *Social Forces* 73 (1995) 4, 1415. <https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/73.4.1415>. Retrieved on March 19, 2019.

¹⁹ Id.

²⁰ Id. 1419.

The Individual Level

In many cases, religious consumers are underestimated and viewed as passive recipients of religion.²¹ Church members do not rely completely on the clergy, but they also use their skills and experiences to find religious satisfaction. Iannaccone uses the economic model of household production and human capital to test a model of religious participation. The personal skills and experiences contain religious knowledge, some type of knowledge of the church doctrine and rituals, and social relations with other worshippers, which Iannaccone calls religious human capital. This human capital is important to enable the individual to produce and appreciate religious commodities. Without this “religious investment” it is hard (or even impossible) to appreciate religious services, because you must have the means to understand and become familiar with these services. Thus, religious mobility “becomes progressively less likely as people age”.²²

Social Movements

The supply-side theory has a significantly greater dominance over the sociology of religion than it did before and still develops the field of sociology in explaining religious participation among other things. It is documented in literature that most religious affiliations and groups tend to be more active in recruiting people when there is competition in the religious market and when there is no monopoly in the religious market. Consistently, social movements can also become more active when there is competition in the market. In literature on protest movements, Olzak and Uhrig argued that “competition and legitimating processes affected the rates of protest activities”.²³ In sociology-of-religion literature it is argued from the supply-side theory’s point of view that the legitimacy of a religious group is expected to increase the popularity of that group, unless the group has a monopoly over the market. However, when this group is illegitimate and banned by the state, it usually faces a lot of troubles and obstacles to survive. Social movements are similar to religious groups in that sense: “legitimizing of a practice or an organizational form increases its frequency or popularity by increasing rates of initiation and decreasing rates of abandonment”.²⁴

²¹ L. R. IANNACCONI, “Religious Practice: A Human Capital Approach”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 29 (1990) 3, 297-314. doi:10.2307/1386460

²² Id. 313.

²³ Susan OLZAK, S. C. Noah UHRIG, “The Ecology of Tactical Overlap”, *American Sociological Review* 66 (2001) 5, 695. doi: 10.2307/3088954

²⁴ Id.

Social movements, such as religious movements, compete for limited resources. They compete for a niche that has a limited capacity, and only the fittest survive. The success of one movement depletes the resources for other movements. Therefore, movements try to innovate different tactics and methods for their political behaviour. In a competitive market, innovations are encouraged. As a result, when movement tactics produce successful results, these tactics become imitated and used by other movements. Olzak and Uhrig stated that “replicated activities may become institutionalized as routine political behaviour”.²⁵ The imitation of tactics and activities in organizations literature is called isomorphism i.e. the adoption of methods and tactics of other successful organizations.

The Resource Mobilization Theory

The resource mobilization theory is one of the essential theories on social movements. This theory in general deals with the dynamics and tactics of social movements as they grow, decline, and change. It also examines all kinds of resources that need to be mobilized, the relationships between a social movement and other groups, a social movement’s need for external support for its success, and the tactics that the state uses to facilitate or oppress a social movement.²⁶ This perspective considers the study of the aggregation of resources (money and labour) crucial for understanding social movements. Resource aggregation requires some sort of organization. Furthermore, the participation of individuals or groups from the outside of the collectivity is very crucial for the success or failure of that movement.

There are some assumptions about the resource mobilization perspective. First, social movements do not have to be based on grievance, and their members are the ones who provide the movement with the major support of resources. It’s also not always that those supporters are committed to the values and beliefs of the movement. Secondly, they see that social movements have all kinds of strategic tasks in dealing with authorities. These tasks vary from tactics to mobilize resources, neutralize opponents and make them by standards, and transforming the masses into their sympathizers. Third, they believe that society is the entity that provides all the means that a social movement may need. Society provides the infrastructure which social

²⁵ Id.

²⁶ John D. McCARTHY, Zald N. MAYER, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory”, *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (1977) 6, 1212-1241. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2777934>. Retrieved on March 19, 2019.

movements utilize, such as the media, levels of affluence, access to institutional centers, networks.²⁷

Some organizations depend heavily on volunteer work (religious organizations, for example), while others pay for work. They see a social-movement organization's (SMO) goals as products and the adherents as a demand. They agree that the higher the education of individuals is, the more likely it is that they will invest their time, and people who invest more time to volunteer work are expected to give more money.²⁸

Recruitment

Social movements can use a variety of tactics for mobilization; these could be on the macro, mezzo, or micro levels of mobilization. Macro mobilization may occur when a SMO advertises itself nationwide and targets all sections of society via TV networks, or organizational networks. Mezzo-level mobilization is the mobilization of subgroups, minorities, specific sects of society or members of other SMOs within the same social-movement industry (SMI). Micro mobilization is a mobilization on the individual level that targets individuals through personal networks, or a personal interaction.²⁹

Religious groups and religious movements use very similar tactics for mobilization and recruitment. They try to mobilize supporters on many different levels. They target the general public, racial or ethnic groups, and individuals. Furthermore, it seems that social movements are more successful in utilizing social networks in their processes of recruitment than it is the case with religious groups. Scholars of the sociology of religion admit that there is a "present weakness of the empirical basis for the network component of recruitment theories".³⁰ Stark and Bainbridge tried to provide some empirical support for the argument that interpersonal relations are at the center of the recruitment process. In their paper, they traced the development of two lines of the recruitment process: the old one, which focuses on the ideology of religious cults and sects and the needs of its potential recruits; and the more advanced one, which focuses on the interpersonal relation as an es-

²⁷ Id. 1217.

²⁸ Id. 1224.

²⁹ David A. SNOW, E. Burke ROCHFORD, Steven K. WORDEN, Robert D. BENFORD, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation", *American Sociological Review* 51 (1986) 4, 464-81. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095581>. Retrieved on March 19, 2019.

³⁰ Rodney STARK, William Sims BAINBRIDGE, "Networks of Faith: Interpersonal Bonds and Recruitment to Cults and Sects", *American Journal of Sociology* 85 (1980) 6, 1376-395. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2778383>. Retrieved on March 19, 2019.

sential element for recruitment. Their study focused on cults and sects, and it suggested that cults and sects are similar to deviant movements that tend to recruit people that have grievance and suffer from deprivation. Also, in order to understand whom a sect or a cult may recruit, it is important to see who benefits from its ideologies.

In some earlier studies, Lofland and Stark studied the “Moonies”, and they concluded those interpersonal bonds between cult members and potential adherents are essential for recruitment.³¹ They argued that when these bonds existed, people joined, and when those bonds did not exist, recruitment failed and people did not join. The acceptance of the ideology usually came later, after people had already joined. In the case of the Mormons, bonds between church members and non-Mormons are at the center of recruitment into the Mormon Church. Interpersonal ties and bonds are important for recruiting new adherents into cults and sects because people who join need to have a relation of trust and confidence with the members because most of these groups are radical or extreme and different from the mainstream. Later studies provided further support for the important role that interpersonal relations play in recruitment into cults and sects.³² All these studies provided strong support for this thesis; nonetheless, this thesis has less empirical support in terms of conventional faiths.

Commitment

There are some differences between social movements and religious groups and organizations regarding commitment. It seems that members of most social movements lack strong commitment to their ideas and beliefs, or at least they lack the same level of commitment that religious groups' members have. This paper will try to provide explanations for this trend in the following paragraphs. One of the reasons for this trend is strictness, as indicated above. Most religious affiliations and religious groups that are known as strict have a high level of commitment. It is argued that liberal denominations decline more rapidly than conservative ones; and what is more, conservative denominations grow.³³ In his paper “Why Strict Churches are

³¹ John LOFLAND, Rodney STARK, “Becoming a World-Saver: A Theory of Conversion to a Deviant Perspective”, *American Sociological Review* 30 (1965) 6, 862-875. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2090965>. Retrieved on March 20, 2019.

³² R. STARK, W. S. BAINBRIDGE, “Networks of Faith”.

³³ L. R. IANNACONE, “Why Strict Churches are Strong”; R. FINKE, “An Orderly Return to Tradition: Explaining the Recruitment of Members into Catholic Religious Orders” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 36 (1997): 2, 218-230. doi:10.2307/1387554; Laurence R. IANNACONE, Daniel V. A. OLSON, Rodney STARK, “Religions Resources and Church

Strong”, Iannaccone (1994) argued that people who join strict churches and remain their members are those people who have strong beliefs and a strong level of commitment. As a result, those people are willing to conduct a lot of activities (volunteer, donate, and participate in religious activities) that they would not do if they were not highly committed to their churches. Free riding is a problem that exists in almost all social and religious movements. Raising the cost of participation decreases the problem of free-riding. Strict churches have high cost demands and prohibitions such as the prohibition of joining secular activities. Therefore, members who remain in these churches are those who are willing to meet these demands. Consequently, members of strict churches are people who have a high level of commitment. Most social movements, however, do not have this kind of strictness and as a result they usually have a lower rate of commitment than religious groups. Religious groups, unlike most social movement, limit and restrict non-group activities to increase the production of collective goods and commitment.³⁴ You cannot be a Muslim and participate in religious Hindu activities, but you can be a peace activist and a women’s rights activist too.

The supply-side theory provides us with the argument that if a religious denomination has a monopoly over the market, religious participation and commitment will be low, and vice versa. In a study done on Catholics, Stark and McCann showed that “ordination rates, the ratio of priests to nominal Catholics, and catholic school enrolments are proportionality highest where Catholics are few”.³⁵ Competition and plurality are expected to increase participation and in turn also increase commitment.

Montgomery argued: “Individuals with higher incomes prefer less strict denominations”.³⁶ He claimed that there had been a misunderstanding to the dynamic nature of religious economy, and he provided a model that explained this economy. There has always been a decline in some religious denominations, and, at the same time, an increase in some other denominations. However, the mistake was that this decline was perceived as a result of secularization. According to Montgomery, the religious economy as a

Growth”, *Social Forces*, 74 (1995) 2, 705-731, <https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/74.2.705>. Retrieved on March 20, 2019.

³⁴ R. FINKE, “An Orderly Return to Tradition”.

³⁵ Rodney STARK, James C. McCANN, “Market Forces and Catholic Commitment: Exploring the New Paradigm”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 32 (1993) 2, 111. doi:10.2307/1386791.

³⁶ James D. MONTGOMERY, “Dynamics of the Religious Economy”, *Rationality and Society*, 8 (1996) 1, 81. <https://doi.org/10.1177/104346396008001004>. Retrieved on March 20, 2019.

whole remains stable. He illustrated his argument by giving the following example: a strict denomination starts with members from a lower class, and over time most of those people gain some social upward mobility. As a consequence, they may consider lowering the strictness of their denomination and secularize it. When they succeed, individuals with lower class income move out of that denomination and form a strict sect, while their first denomination becomes secularized. This is an example that explains the secularization of some denominations and the formation of new ones, and the overall religious economy remains stable.

Another reason for the difference in commitment between social movements and religious groups is that most people who join conventional faiths do so because of the ideas and the ideologies of these faiths. In most cases, the ideas of a religion appeal to its potential adherents and make sense to them, and then they join. Recruitment in social movements, on the other hand, depends heavily on social networks and personal ties. Ideology and ideas receive more attention from conventional religious groups than from social movements.

The Framing Perspective

Social movements started to have more focus on ideas and beliefs since the development of the frame analysis perspective by Snow et al.³⁷ Scholars of the framing perspective argue that the actors who actively engage in their production develop ideas and meanings. Benford and Snow argued that social movements should not be viewed as carriers of ideas that have been developed from structural arrangements and existing ideologies, but rather “movement actors are viewed as signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers”.³⁸ They see framing as an active processual construction of meanings. It is active because there is action that is being done and processual because it is evolving and changing, it is not static. The notion of resonance of the framing processes is central to this perspective. Benford stated that frame resonance is “how reality should be presented” instead of “what reality ought to be real”.³⁹ The concept of resonance is related to

³⁷ D. A. SNOW et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation”.

³⁸ R. D. BENFORD, D. A. SNOW, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment”, *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000), 613. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/223459>. Retrieved on March 20, 2019.

³⁹ R. D. BENFORD, “Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement”, 679.

the effectiveness of proffered framings, and it shows whether framings are effective or not.⁴⁰

Donations

Social movements and religious groups and organizations tend to exhibit similar trends in terms of donations and contributions. It is argued that in the sociology of religion, people who are strongly committed to God will give more money to the church.⁴¹ Iannaccone argued, “the distribution of the amount of money that is being contributed to any church is skewed”.⁴² He tried to explain this skewness in terms of three facts: 1. percentage rates of donations vary from one case to another; 2. income also varies; 3. there is a weak correlation between the income a household generates and the amount of donation they give to a church. He indicated that most people contribute between zero and 4% of their income, with a mean of about 2%. There is a weak relationship between income and donations (income only explains 1% of the variation).⁴³

Conclusion

This paper was a brief overview of the supply-side and resource mobilization theories of the sociology of religion and studies on social movements. The paper presented these theories briefly in order to see and understand the relatedness of those two fields of sociology. There are a lot of similarities in their recruitment tactics and tasks. We thought it would be helpful to and beneficial for both fields to understand and share their commonalities. These commonalities and assumptions from both sides can be applied and operationalized in either field. However, the paper did not try to prove that there are no differences and variations between them. This paper is a humble attempt to lay out these commonalities and differences. Sociologists dealing with social movements or the sociology of religion may be able to benefit from these fields and learn from their findings.

⁴⁰ R. D. BENFORD, D. A. SNOW, “Framing Processes and Social Movements”.

⁴¹ Dean R. HOGE, Fenggang YANG, “Determinants of Religious Giving in American Denominations: Data from Two Nationwide Surveys”, *Review of Religious Research* 36 (1994) 2, 123-48. doi:10.2307/3511404.

⁴² L. R. IANNACCONI, “Skewness Explained: A Rational Choice Model of Religious Giving”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 36 (1997) 2, 141. doi:10.2307/1387549

⁴³ Id.

Adesoji A. Oni

Analiza odnosa između sociologije religije i sociologije društvenih pokreta

Istraživanje društvenih pokreta i sociologija religije imaju sličnosti zbog kojih mogu biti od uzajamne koristi. U oba područja primjenjuju se slični teorijski pristupi. Ovaj je članak pokušaj da se ukratko izlože teorija ponude i teorija mobilizacije resursa u sociologiji religije te literatura o društvenim pokretima. On je svojevrsna poredbena analiza sociologije religije i literature o društvenim pokretima. U članku se daje kraći pregled literature o teoriji ponude te neki primjeri studija koje su taj model primijenile, kratak prikaz teorije mobilizacije te naposljetku ocjena taktike regrutiranja i razine posvećenosti u tim dvama područjima sociologije.

Ključne riječi: *sociologija religije, društveni pokreti, teorija ponude, mobilizacija resursa*