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EDITORIAL NOTE

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The conference was organized by the Institute of Social Sciences *Ivo Pilar*, Metropolis and the Croatian Centre for Strategic Research.

Editors

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CROATIA

I.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

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OVERVIEW ON CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION PROCESSES

The continued growth of international migrations is one of the fundamental challenges for worldwide social, political and economic systems today. It is well known, that more than a hundred million immigrants, refugees with asylum and immigrant workers live outside their native countries. This number is expected to grow even faster in the twenty-first century than in the twentieth. This process is mostly caused by poverty, wars, political persecutions, ecological catastrophes, and the like.

Therefore, it is no coincidence that the subject of migration is at the very centre of international discussions about our planet's future. The specific reason for this is that the main migratory directions are from third-world countries towards industrial and post-industrial societies. In other words, from a cultural perspective, from countries with more developed collectivist cultures towards countries with more developed individualist cultures. However, for some time, attention has not been paid to cultural differences between immigrant societies and migrant minorities in comparison to political and economic aspects. Cultural studies only began to receive greater attention when it became clear that intercultural differences were among the main causes of interethnic tensions that often threaten with major consequences and that intercultural tolerance is a necessary precondition for future integration processes. Nowadays, the social and cultural aspects of migration seize the same amount of attention as political and economic ones.

As a social psychologist, I will take this opportunity to say something more about this subject.

For migrants, international migrations constitute the main episode in their lives since migration implies a transfer of individuals or groups of people from one geographical location and cultural milieu to another. This shift touches all aspects of a migrant's life and according to scientific understanding, it causes changes in socioeconomic

statuses, social networks, as well as greater or less acculturation among immigrants. Migrants, in their experience are linked by different social contexts – that from which they came and the one they came to, in a way that makes the best adaptation possible.

In their encounter with a new culture, the quality of their adjustment mostly depends on personal characteristics like age, sex, the level of education gained in their origin society, and their migrant status (as immigrant worker or a refugee), and is also related to changes of socioeconomic status, social networks, sense of belonging and ethnic identity.

At national levels, there are large differences in relations towards migrants. In Europe, for instance, although there are common standards for migrants, prepared within the European Union, national policies towards migrants often differ considerably. Namely, their integration policies span from the French model of cultural assimilation on one end of the continuum towards the Swedish multicultural model on the other. Therefore, discussions lately about drawing together different models from the largest immigration and emigration countries are very developed and necessary in the context of globalization and integration processes.

A specific question that I wish to address, which is important for understanding the modern structure of migration processes and patterns, is what motivates people to migrate. According to social psychology, migration motivation is based on three groups of factors.

The first group consists of pulling/attraction factors which are related to industrial countries' needs for a labour force from underdeveloped countries. For example, this motivated five million Mexicans to emigrate to the USA and thirty million people from Southeastern Europe and North Africa to Northern Europe during the 1950s and 1960s.

The second group consists of pushing/repressing factors, which are related to better living conditions for large numbers of unemployed people from emigration countries, especially in jobs that do not require special skills and are not favoured by inhabitants of immigration countries. Therefore, immigrant workers are mostly employed in sectors of building, agriculture and tourism. However, highly educated migrant groups can also be motivated by this factor when they find themselves caught up in a process known as "brain-drain".

The third group refers to the already existing social networks of emigrated relatives and friends who help new

migrants or whole migrant families to migrate legally or illegally. Most often, this involves middle-aged persons who are inhumanely exploited due to language barriers and insufficient education in their new environments.

Concisely, the analysis of motivation factors reveals that not all migrants voluntarily change their places of living. Some have been displaced, some have escaped, and not all of them are equally accepted in receiving countries. Likewise, some migrant groups enjoy special protection in some countries, while others are not welcome and the receiving societies express prejudice and discriminate them. Let us mention some propositions from the so-called contact hypothesis in order to lessen hostilities between migrant groups and groups from receiving societies as well as between various migrant groups. This model is based on the psychological procedure according to which the communication between hostile groups should proceed. The procedure requires: 1) equal status between members of the groups that communicate together; 2) constant contact between representatives of a majority group and minority groups with high status; 3) the creation of a positive social climate for contacts; 4) friendly and rewarding rather than protocol contacts; and 5) important and functional achievements based on contacts. Let us also mention factors, which increase hostilities. These are: contacts that are competitive in nature, involuntary and unpleasant contacts, contacts that diminish the reputation and status of one or both groups, contacts that provoke frustration or look for a scapegoat, and contacts which destroy the moral and ethical standards of one or both groups.

Thus, the solution to many problems related to migration processes and their various aspects is in the shaping of various identities, processes of acculturation, drafting common standards to achieve a humane multicultural climate, and decreasing the negative influences of ethnocentrism that provokes ethnic conflicts, etc.

Croatia is a country that has survived war, displacement, exile, asylum, legal and illegal immigration, as well as emigration in the past ten years. On the other hand, Croats have emigrated from Croatia for centuries such that Croatian Diaspora is one of the largest among European countries. Particularly strong waves of emigration from Croatia were recorded in the second half of the twentieth century when hundreds of thousands Croatian citizens left their homeland. Motivated by either the pulling/attraction motives, that is to say, developed countries' demand for a labour force, or by pushing/repressing motives that implicated political exile from Yugoslavia or po-

litical disagreement with its state structure and totalitarian regime.

Nowadays, Croatia is building a modern, tolerant, democratic society and wishes to be included in all integration processes at a European and global level. For this reason, it gladly accepted to participate in this important international migration project called Metropolis. Through participation, we want to share our rich experience and knowledge connected to migration processes with others, as well as learn from others' experiences. My deep belief is that in the future, migrants should represent bridges of integration processes between their two homelands and between all the countries they inhabit, and not be a source of ethnic conflicts, which threaten with disintegration processes based on prejudices, intolerance and discrimination. I hope that this conference will be an additional contribution of Metropolis to such a migration future on our planet.

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DUBROVNIK CONFERENCE PAPER

Diaspora, once again an important concept in the field of migration, refers to the community that is sometimes formed by one's nationals in another country. Some questions that must be answered when examining what constitutes a diaspora include: How does a diaspora differ from an immigrant group, or does it at all? When does an ethnic group become a diaspora? Is a diaspora viewed as something positive either in the sending or receiving country? What are the interests of the respective countries with regard to a diaspora, and if they differ, in what ways do they do so?

These are among the important questions that we must ask ourselves when analyzing diasporas, diasporic politics, the opportunities that diasporas can create for the sending country, and the notion of emigrant responsibilities toward the sending country. Other questions include: How does the individual become part of a diaspora? Who pays the largest costs when an individual leaves a country? Who should reap the greatest benefits as a result of the act? Why should an individual continue to remain responsible to its sending country? Theoretically speaking, it is very important that we, as an academic community, answer these questions about diasporas and their relationship to sending and receiving countries in order to adequately analyze and make well-informed statements about the concept.

This commentary makes a series of observations regarding emigration, emigrant communities, and the importance of building strong relationships between sending and receiving countries. I propose that many factors, both from the sending and receiving countries, affect the construction of a diaspora. Moreover, the extent to which a diaspora participates in the development of the sending country is examined.

The factors that play a significant role in the construction and role of a diaspora include: the type of migra-

tion experience, the outflow size, the size of the countries in question, how an emigrant community constitutes and organizes itself while abroad, the structure and immigration policies of these countries, and the relationship between the emigrant and immigrant countries.

The conditions and treatment of non-citizens in the receiving country greatly affect how an immigrant group perceives itself in the host community. Canada, for example, views all immigrants as prospective members of society and therefore has created a direct and uncomplicated path through which immigrants can become citizens. In Europe, the process leading to citizenship is neither as direct nor as clear. A diasporic community often times forms when the bond between emigrants and their country of origin is stronger than the bond that forms with their host country. In fact, this suggests that it may be more likely to have a diaspora in Europe than in classic immigration countries.

The migration path that emigrants pursue often has an important effect on the sending country. Emigrants follow many migration paths, such as: legal, illegal, permanent, temporary, skill-based, family reunification-based or the refugee and asylum paths. If a large proportion of emigrants are leaving their country as refugees, we can assume that this country is experiencing some form of conflict. In contrast, if the majority of emigrants enter receiving countries via skilled-based positions, it might suggest that the sending country has already achieved a certain level of development. Whether a diaspora forms as a result of migration, can thus be both predicted and affected by the type of migration. For example, skill-based emigrants may be the least likely set of individuals to view themselves as – or organize – a diaspora. The stage of development of the sending country can thus shape the formation of a diaspora from an emigrant group. The size of the emigrant outflow in relation to the sending country is another significant factor in the creation of a diaspora and ultimately has consequences for the sending country. If a very small country loses 10–20 highly qualified individuals a year, this can have a huge effect on the country's development. Conversely, if a large country with a first class educational system has large numbers of its educated emigrate, such emigration may actually be an asset for the sending country, due to the capital gained through their remittances. The extent of such help, however, may be hard to estimate.

The size of the sending country and the return migration of its successful emigrants is an integral component for the future development of that country. For example,

in a small country like Croatia, having a return migration of 50,000 successful people could have an enormous agglomeration effect on the current population of four and a half million people. In contrast however, a large country like Mexico that has nearly one hundred million people, is not likely to experience the same degree of change even with the return of two million individuals. Therefore, if the sending country is small in population size, the effect of a well-organized diaspora and the return of many of its migrants is much more significant to the sending country and can dramatically affect the rate and type of development it experiences.

How a sending country organizes itself to benefit from migration is another especially important feature in the discussion of diasporas. First, it is important to understand why people migrate. The literature provides us with two broad explanations: survival and mobility. If significant social and political reforms occur during the period of the individual's absence, such changes may encourage the sending of remittances and return migration. When the role of the sending country in the individual emigrant's experience, some important questions include: Does the state relate to its emigrants, and if so, how? What does the state do to attract return migration? The economic development of the country of origin can thus be affected significantly by its connection (or lack thereof) to its emigrant communities.

Finally, the relationship between the sending country and the receiving country can lie at the core of the development of the sending country. Some examples include Canada, the U.S., and Mexico in the context of NAFTA, and the European Union.

Strong relations between sending and receiving countries can create a climate of cooperation rather than conflict. Moreover, close cooperation between sending and receiving countries can lead to financial and structural assistance, thus fostering economic development in the country of origin.

In conclusion, diasporas must be examined through the lens of the emigrant and immigrant countries' specific characteristics and their interests in and actions toward the migrant community. The size of the country itself, the size of the migration movement, the type of movement and the structure and relationship of the sending and receiving countries, all contribute a diaspora's engagement in the country of origin's progress as a state.

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RETURN TO THE HOMELAND: THE BUILDING OF A STATE

Until recently, major activities of different immigrant groups have been directed towards persuading local and federal politicians to politically condemn the country from which they escaped because human rights had been violated. In most cases, they wanted the governments of their new homeland to implement economic blockades and not to establish or maintain friendly diplomatic relations with their native countries. This type of activity was especially rambling before the fall of the Berlin Wall and it involved the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. However, turn of the last century people who have researched diaspora, particularly the relation between diaspora and native countries, have noticed a new trend in the activities of different diasporas. This entails the growing interest and influence that members of diaspora achieve in their native countries. For instance, I'll mention just a few cases that illustrate and confirm this trend in the best way. The article "A world of exiles" in the January 4th, 2003 issue of the Economist, a well-known English weekly magazine, reports that the Australian government did not permit the opening of a Macedonian embassy an ex-Yugoslav Republic but now an internationally recognized, newly established state. This is because a large number of Greeks live in Australia, and due to that number and their economic and political power the Australian government does not want a confrontation with them, which would certainly happen if the doors of this embassy were opened. Regarding the Greek diaspora, it is also interesting to mention the case of the Alexander the Great Foundation in Chicago whose leadership claims that their members will donate 45 million US dollars to carve a 73 metre high statue of Alexander the Great on Mount Kerdyllion. A great number of publications have been written on the significance and influence of the Italian diaspora in the USA and Canada, South America (especially Argentina), and particularly about its organization and influence in the

USA. With regards to the Jewish diaspora, one can be daily informed just by reading the pages of the New York Times, Boston Globe or Los Angeles Times, as well as serious, specialized magazines.

However, there are other unheard of diasporas which cannot be compared to the aforementioned in terms of their number and influence, but through their financial contributions and active role in the internal politics of their native countries they had great influence. So for instance, during the war between Somalia and Eritrea from 1998 until 2000, 333,000 emigrants from Eritrea agreed to give 2% of their salaries to finance the war. It is a well known fact that in the 19-year war between Tamil Tigers and Sri Lankan government, where 65 thousands of people have lost their lives so far, Tamil diaspora has been helping the Tigers in their military combat in all possible ways, especially financially.

When the Berlin Wall fell and the USSR as well as Yugoslavia disintegrated, ten new democratic and free countries were created. During that process or, in other words, their rebuilding, diaspora played a very important part in many cases. For example, a returnee from Canada became the Latvian president, and an American of Latvian origin became the Minister of Defence. A large number of diplomats and Members of the Parliament are ex-emigrants. The other two Baltic states, Estonia and Lithuania also have similar examples. In Estonia, two Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as well as the Minister of Defence are former emigrants. The president and the head of staff in Lithuania are also Americans of Lithuanian origin. Bearing in mind that a relatively large number of prominent and successful business people, writers and university professors returned once liberty and democracy was restored in Lithuania.

When we speak about diasporas contribution to their native countries, we should certainly point out the Mexican and the Philippine diaspora, especially their economic contributions. Moved by the world trend of diaspora–homeland relations, India, for instance, has drastically changed its relation towards 20 million members of its diaspora at the beginning of 1990. Among other things, every year a gathering of Indian emigrants from all over the world is organized. This year, for example, there were two Nobel Prize winners at the gathering, Sir V. S. Naipaul, the Nobel Prize winner for literature and prof. Amartya Sen, the Nobel Prize winner for economics. Sir Anerood Jugnauth, the Prime Minister of Mauritius was also among the guests. A large number of university professors,

business and influential people who left India and went to the western world, were also present at this significant gathering. It is very interesting to mention that 70% of all foreign investments in the Chinese economy in the last fifteen years have been made by its emigrants.

Since Dubrovnik, that is to say, Croatia is the host of this Metropolis conference "Diaspora and Homeland", I will briefly describe the relation between Croatia and its diaspora, or in other words, its contribution to the creation of the free, democratic and sovereign Republic of Croatia.

The relation between Croatia and its diaspora was always a reflection of social and political events that prevailed in the homeland. During their history, Croats left their country on a massive scale as a result of the political terror they suffered, as well as difficult economic conditions, especially at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Croatian diaspora, particularly their active part, always kept close ties with the homeland and helped it in various ways. This help usually consisted of sending financial support to family members as well as organizing all sorts of humanitarian aid during different kinds of disasters that struck their villages and towns, etc. They also financially supported many projects such as hospital modernisation, church building, etc. They did this because Croats have always thought of the Croatian Catholic Church as the sole institution that has guarded and protected Croatian national interests. When Serbia and the Yugoslav National Army attacked Croatia in 1990, Croatian diaspora showed great solidarity with the homeland. Croats, even those born in America, Canada, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Venezuela, Australia and other countries, voluntarily joined the newly formed military units, and with rifles in their hands they went to the front-lines.

Parallely, Croatian immigrants organized demonstrations around the world, in front of the parliaments of the main world capitals. Masses of 10 to 30 thousand people gathered at these demonstrations. They sought the recognition of an independent, sovereign and democratic state of Croatia. Different groups were lobbying politicians and governments around the world. This activity brought some good results. Serious analysts and experts for South-East Europe believe that Germany's early recognition of Croatia prior to the decision of the EU members was on account of Croatian diaspora. Besides the embargo on weapons, Argentina illegally sold the weapons to Croatia as a result of Croatian immigrants influence. Australia was the first country outside the European Union to recognize

Croatia, among other things, because of the influence of Croatian immigrants.

At the newly established Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20% of the employees were members of Croatian diaspora who had professional experience and spoke three, four or more foreign languages. During the HDZ's rule, Gojko Šušak, the Minister of Defence, a returnee from Canada, was one of the most influential politicians in the Government of Dr. Franjo Tuđman. Ivica Mudrinić, also a returnee from Canada, was the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Communications, and later the Director of Croatian Television.

The late Vinko Nikolić, Boris Maruna and Ante Beljo, eminent returnees from Spain, the USA and Canada were the Directors of the Croatian Heritage Foundation, a very important institution which maintains ties with Croatian emigrants around the world. As a token of recognition for everything they contributed in creating a free and democratic Croatia, at the initiative of the first President, Dr. Franjo Tuđman, the government of the Republic of Croatia set up a special electoral unit for diaspora, so that individuals from the USA, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden and Venezuela could have parlamentary representation.

When we take into consideration investments in the Croatian economy, it is indisputable that since a free and democratic Croatia has been established, Croatian immigrants have been ready to invest in their homeland, but they have always been motivated more by emotional impulse than by business logic. Unfortunately, the situation was not positive for their investments. The war was certainly one of the objective barriers. However, regardless of the war, in the period between 1992 and 1999 Croatian emigrants invested 151.385 million DM in the Croatian economy through the Croatian Privatization Fund only. According to the statistics of the Croatian National Bank, direct foreign investments amounted to 256.6 million DM in 1993. They were constantly increasing every year and reached a final amount of 3.082,6 million DM in 2001. Particularly until 1996 a large majority of foreign investments in most cases were directly or indirectly connected with Croatian immigrants. Regardles of the fact that nowadays relations between the homeland and Croatian diaspora are not as strong and active as they were before the year 2000, those relations and contacts are still being maintained.

II.

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

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THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF DIASPORA RETURN. THE IOM EXPERIENCE

The original Greek word, signifying expansion and settler colonisation, can loosely be compared to the latter European (especially British, Portuguese and Spanish) settlements of the mercantile and colonial period. However, this meaning was "hijacked" to describe a forcible dispersal of a people and their subsequent unhappiness in their country of exile. Nowadays, with the increased use of the term to describe many kinds of migrants from diverse ethnic backgrounds (Cohen, 1997)[1] a more relaxed definition seems appropriate:

Common Features of Diaspora

1. Dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically, to two or more foreign regions;
2. Alternatively, the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions;
3. A collective memory and myth about the homeland;
4. An idealisation of the supposed ancestral home;
5. A return movement;
6. A strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time;
7. A troubled relationship with host societies;
8. A sense of solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries;
9. The possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in tolerant host countries.

Highlighting their most important characteristics, using a qualifying adjective, Cohen (1997) created a simple means of typologizing various diasporas giving also central examples, as follows:

Victim diasporas (victim origin is either self-affirmed or accepted as determining their essential character):

– Babylon for the Jews;

- Slavery for the Africans;
- Famine for the Irish (1845–1852);
- Genocide for the Armenians (1915–16), when the Turks deported two-thirds of their number to Syria and Palestine;
- Formation of the state of Israel for the Palestinians.

Labour and Imperial diasporas (diaspora caused by the expansion from a homeland in search for work or to further colonial ambitions):

- The Indian indentured workers deployed in British, Dutch and French tropical plantations from the 1830s to about 1920;
- The Italians who made the translatlantic crossing, mainly to the USA and Argentina late nineteenth-early twentieth centuries;
- Turks and North Africans who entered Europe in the period after the Second World War;
- All the powerful nations-states, especially in Europe, established their own diasporas abroad to further their imperial plans. The Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, German, French and British colonists fanned out to most parts of the world and established imperial and quasi-imperial diaspora.

Trade diasporas (diaspora caused by the expansion from homeland in pursuit of trade):

- the Chinese traders;
- the Lebanese (seventeenth-nineteenth centuries.

Cultural diaspora (created bonds of the imagination without the formal features of (physical) migration and the territorialization of identity):

- The Caribbean.

Recent profound changes in the political and economic world order have generated large movements of people in almost every region (Van Hear, 1998).[2]

IOM RETURN PROGRAMS: AN OVERVIEW

Return migration may be defined as the process whereby people return to their country or place of origin after a significant period in another country or region (King, 2000).[3]

It is possible to devise a typology of return and reintegration programmes on the basis of numerous distinctions, perhaps the most important of which are between voluntary and involuntary return, permanent and temporary return, and assisted and unassisted return (Koser, 2000).[4]

Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) is one of the many services IOM offers to its Member Governments in the interest of efficient migration management. It aims at orderly, humane and cost effective return and reintegration of asylum seekers, denied asylum seekers and other migrants currently residing or stranded in host countries, who are willing to repatriate voluntarily to their countries of origin. The return process is based on existing and well-tried IOM return and reintegration programmes in Europe and elsewhere, and always comprises: arrangement of travel, post arrival reception, information, referral, and onward travel to the home location and immediate reintegration assistance. It may also include: information and counselling to potential returnees, medical assistance (if necessary) and longer-term reintegration assistance. IOM Assisted Voluntary Return programmes can be divided into four categories:

a) **Return of irregular migrants in transit**.
b) **Return programmes generally available to all irregular migrants.**
c) **Specific return programmes available to certain irregular migrants.**
d) **Return of qualified Human Resources:** in the context of orderly migration and migration for development, IOM has for many years dealt with programmes for the return of qualified human resources which aim at the social and economic advancement of developing countries, of origin. These are essential capacity-building programmes, that are demand-driven rather than supply-driven.

Return Benefits

In most cases, assisted return is likely to be a more cost-effective, humane, politically acceptable, and ultimately durable solution than forced return. Where reasonable reintegration assistance is provided, it bridges the gap between return and initial housing and employment, thus considerably enhancing the chances of a successful and lasting reintegration.

Causes and effects of return migration

King (2000)[5] summed up causes and effects of return migration. He asserts that the causes of return migration are many and varied, and a migrant may decide to return home for a complex of reasons rather than just one.

ASSESSMENT OF RETURNEES' IMPACT: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Under the assumptions that:

- some migrants do actually acquire new skills and
- most migrants make use neither of old nor of new skills upon return

it appears that two potential development resources could be tapped. Firstly, by ensuring the absorption into productive employment of migrants within occupations for which skill scarcities exist in the local labour market. Secondly, by identifying migrants with relevant skill gain, which, when tapped, would constitute an element of technology transfer. A method for identifying skill gains and losses would thus meet a real need.

The **ideal methodology** for assessing skill gain and loss during migration and degree of utilization of acquired skills upon return, as Pedersen (1988)[6] argued, is to directly measure the skills involved rather than using indirect means, all of which could be assumed to be effects of changes in skills and be used as indicators (changes in wages, wage differences between migrants and non-migrants, etc).

Pedersen suggests that an **ideal solution** would be to directly measure the skill gain, loss, and utilization of a random sample of individuals within a given occupation. To do so, we would need to know:

a) the number and type of skills possessed by each emigrant at the point of departure;
b) the individual's proficiency level in each skill before departure;
c) the proficiency in each old skill upon return;
d) the number and type of new skills acquired while abroad;
e) the proficiency in each new skill and
f) the degree of utilization of new skills upon return.

This method would answer the question of "what" is learned or lost; "how well" or "how badly" the skills have been learned or damaged; "how many" migrants incur these gains or losses, as well as "to which extent" new skills are being utilized upon return. Therefore the socio-economic effects of diaspora who return to their homeland.

Having proven that the ideal approach involving direct assessment is not feasible for several reasons, he developed MONISKIL, a low-cost survey methodology able to produce a picture of skill gain and loss by migrants. It was developed as part of Sub-Programme 3 of the Asia Re-

gional Program on International Labour Migration, which was financed by UNDP and implemented by ILO.

This survey methodology is based on a draft prepared in early 1986 and improvements made following two pilot surveys in Pakistan and the Philippines. MONISKIL surveys measure skill acquisition, loss, and utilization through five indicators, which are assessed through structured interviews with respondents from three groups of respondents. Each indicator is measured by using direct or indirect questions, and, in some cases, by combining answers from different groups of respondents. The first three indicators highlight conditions and events during the migration period, while the last two relate to the period following return.

Indicators

- Amount of on-the-job and off-the-job training received;
- Amount of on-the-job learning;
- Type of skills acquired/lost;
- Job performance compared to non migrants and
- Degree of skill utilization upon return.

Respondents

Group A: Return migrants;
Group B: Employers of return migrants and
Group C: Domestic employers of migrants (if any).

Having determined that skill acquisition does take place and that it, at least in the occupations surveyed (Pakistan and Philippines), outweighs skill loss, the next question is whether it is possible to increase the utilization of these skills.

Assuming that more return migrants would be absorbed into the labour market if employees were aware of job opportunities and employers were aware of the qualifications of return migrants, a solution which improves the functioning of the labour market, according to Pedersen, may be pursued.

IOM's Assessment of Impact of Returnees

The importance of the employers' survey

In the assessment of the impact of returnees assisted by the RQAN program to return to their country of origin, IOM identified the perceptions of employers as one effective way of measuring immediate "success" of such a demand-driven program.

Measurement of Impact: difficulties

Measurement of impact should recognize many inputs of resources that are expended before change and growth are realized. Indeed impact is deemed to occur when there is a change or growth of the output or enhance capacity within the workplace to produce future output. In impact assessment, special attention has to be given to how far the returnee has extended his/her normal boundaries for the benefit of the workplace.

Selection of the most appropriate tool(s) for measuring impact in the workplace

a) Returnee's Performance Evaluation (RPE)

RPE refers to the appraisal performance that the supervisor of the returnee may carry out. RPE measures also how the returnees' job has altered over a period of time. Specific variables: leadership qualities; creativity and critical thinking; innovativeness; introduction of new systems; growth of the organization, etc.;

b) Quality Improvement (QI)

QI is the enhanced value or value added to a product or service in order to satisfy customers;

c) Projected Cash Flow (PCF)

This is the measure of the expected future cash flow and discounts taking into account risk factors associated with the specific business of the organization;

d) Balance Score Card (BSC)

BSC is a model that measures the organization's performance based on the long-term satisfaction of the customer. The tool may help a manager to link today's actions with tomorrow's goals in recognition that companies do not exist purely for financial gains, but for the ultimate benefit of the customer.

Techniques employed for acquiring primary data

1. **Direct observation in the workplace.** The observer is familiar with the situation before and, therefore, able to identify change and growth by observation only.

2. **Interviews (both with the returnee and the employee).** A method of collecting data from a subject face to face by asking questions.

3. **Focus Group Discussion.** Focus group processes, culture, environmental challenges, strategy, and it is directed by a consultant.

4. **Questionnaire.** It is a survey method utilized in the collection of data.

EFFECTS OF DIASPORA RETURN ON THE NATIONAL ECONOMY'S KEY SECTORS (EDUCATION, HEALTH, AGRICULTURE, ETC.)

The Return and Reintegration of Qualified Nationals (RQAN) program

The Return and Reintegration of Qualified Nationals (RQAN) program was established in 1983 to assist African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries to acquire and utilize "qualified, highly qualified and skilled African personnel" in their development. It was funded by the European Union in the context of Lome II and III Conventions.

The RQAN program was largely founded around the "brain drain" metaphor – to retrieve African intellectual (human) resources currently deposited and utilized in industrialized economies and expend them in the development of Africa and/or their respective countries.

A unique feature of RQAN was its emphasis on demand for the expertise or skills as opposed to the mere facilitation of African nationals to return to their countries of origin. Emphasis was placed on linking the demand of a particular agency or government to the relevant pool of expertise and skills abroad. This was largely managed by identifying specific job vacancies in the participating ACP countries, and for each of the vacancy, identifying suitable African candidates based in the industrialized countries (i.e. European countries, North America).

Program's Main objective: Mobilizing and promoting the utilization of highly qualified, qualified and skilled personnel in the development of African, Carribean and Pacific (ACP) countries.

IOM assessed the impact of returnees in the workplace, which is to determine, measure, evaluate performance, and contribution of the returnees to the organizations and the countries in which they have been posted.

Out of a total 664 returnees a sample of 433 was chosen from 19 countries. The findings were broad and varied:

1. Most (74%) of the returnees had worked abroad for more than 10 months but less than 4 years.

2. 68.7% of the returnees were in normal operational management of the companies with 47.9% as experts and 25.4% in middle management.

3. In terms of frequency in decision-making, returnees in Ghana, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe made them very often/always.

4. Most of the returnees contributed to the financial growth of the workplace through provision of services that brought income (49.5%) and cost savings measures (18.3%).

5. Almost all returnees (93.6%) transferred both new knowledge, technology and management skills to the workplace and were always/sometimes (90.5%) competent in doing so.

6. The returnees contributed (98.6%) to the learning/growth of the organization in almost all the countries and in all the sectors (97.7%).

7. Contribution to learning/growth was through bringing new skills and technology (24.8%) and transferring (39.8%) the same to the organizations.

8. The self-employed returnees reported that they transferred technological and management skills (79.3%), not only to the organizations, but also to the countries (88.9%) where they were working.

The analysis of the primary data shows that the returnees have had a positive impact on the companies/workplaces they were working for and the target countries. This is an indication of a positive change that could lead to an improved economic performance and development at national level, since they were working in key sectors (education, health, agriculture, etc.) of their economies.

Recommendations

The study/evaluation should be repeated after 2 or 3 years. Impact assessment is a dynamic concept and measuring it at different time, with varied factors, would reduce externalities and other casual effects.

The Return and Reintegration of Chilean Exiles from Belgium (1996)

The program's main objective was to support and facilitate the return of 125 cases of Chilean exiles residing in Belgium, which was later increased to 150 cases.

Main results

1. All but one returnee had been abroad for more than 6 years.

2. Returnees had a wide range of occupations; many were semi-skilled.

3. 57.1% had found full-time work within their profession, 18.3% were working part-time; 16.3% had found odd jobs; and 8.1% had not found any job.

4. 60.9% were satisfied with their job, however 87.5% consider their working conditions as only fair to poor and only 28.6% believe that they will improve.

5. 38.8% consider their overall reintegration as good; 46.9% as fair.

6. Despite difficulties 90.8% did not regret their decision to return.

7. 57.4% of returnees said that the project had played a very important to essential part in their decision to return.

DIASPORA – IOM STRENGTHENING STRATEGIES – THE MIDA

In order to meet specific human resource needs in public/private/economic sectors of the target countries, IOM is expanding the return concept, through implementing the MIDA programme.

Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) is a program for mobilising the skills and financial resources of Africans in the diaspora for development in Africa.

MIDA is a demand-driven capacity building program. Its objective is the transfer of knowledge, know-how of expertise, financial and other resources of Africans in the Diaspora for development in African countries. It differs from RQAN in some notable ways. Whereas permanent physical return of the beneficiary to the country of origin was a precondition in RQAN, MIDA has flexible eligibility and transfer options.

Under MIDA, the private sectors should remain the main actor and focus throughout implementation of the program. The MIDA program seeks to involve the contribution of all stakeholders in countries of the North and the South especially Africans in the Diaspora in order to broaden the program's ownership base. MIDA has flexible arrangements that provide for various options of skill's transfer. These include permanent, temporary, sequenced/repeated, and even tele-working transfer. The arrangements do not require that nationals, whose services are needed in their countries of origin, necessarily relocate or give up the positions or rights acquired in the host countries. They should be able to move back and forth between origin and host countries where they may be legally residing.

This new approach takes into account the need for select immigration shortages of highly qualified personnel in specific sectors in Europe, on the one hand, and the concern to mitigate the effect on the growing brain-drain on the African continent, on the other hand.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas. An introduction,* UCL Press, London, 1997.

[2] Nicholas Van Hear, *New Diasporas. The mass exodus, dispersal and regrouping of migrant communities,* UCL Press, London, 1998.

[3] Russel King, Generalizations from the history of return migration, in: *Return Migration. Journey of Hope or Despair?,* edited by Bimal Ghosh, IOM/UN, Geneva, 2000, pp. 7–55.

[4] Khalid Koser, Return, readmission and reintegration: changing agendas, policy frameworks and operational programmes, in: *Return Migration. Journey of Hope or Despair?,* edited by Bimal Ghosh, IOM/UN, Geneva, 2000, pp. 57–99.

[5] Russel King, Generalizations from the history of return migration, in: *Return Migration. Journey of Hope or Despair?,* Edited by Bimal Ghosh, IOM/UN, Geneva 2000.

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RETURNING HOME TO BUILD THE STATE

Over its 50 years of existence, with more than 11 million persons moved to new homes abroad or returned back home, the International Organization for Migration has played a major role in the creation of diasporas and in developing – directly and indirectly – their links with countries of origin. Today, I intend to describe to you the changes that have occurred in our work as a result of the changing roles and status of diasporas over recent years. In the process you will also notice commonalities and how the approach has evolved.

In particular in situations that require international assistance to rebuild war-torn societies or countries emerging from repressive regimes, we have developed special programmes that link those that moved abroad with those who remained at home.

Among the indicators for the success of reconciliation after a conflict are not only the return rates of refugees but also how they are made to feel welcome, how they are accepted and assisted in reintegrating into their home societies. A particular role in this context goes to those who, because of special qualifications, can make a substantial contribution to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of their home economies and societies as a whole.

The idea according to which return migration can have a positive impact on a country's development is not new: in the 1960s IOM launched "return of talent" programmes to allow migrants' skills to benefit their communities. During the 1980s and above all in the 1990s, this idea was further developed and such programmes were extended to post-crisis situations: "Return of qualified nationals" schemes were launched in Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Cambodia, then in Haiti, in Rwanda, in Bosnia and finally in Timor and Kosovo. The basic concept upon which these programmes were based was that the return of skilled displaced persons (or persons who had left on their own will for political and/or social reasons) was of pri-

mary importance for their home countries since they had a vital role to play in helping in the confidence-building and reconstruction efforts, thus paving the way for others to return. Progressively, this idea was developed to include rehabilitation activities in order to boost returns and to stabilise the population. It was understood that without social networks, health services and most of all jobs, refugees and displaced persons would find it more difficult to return. Hence, IOM (as well as other international and non-governmental organizations) gradually became involved in such programmes.

As you will see throughout this paper, the actual numbers of returnees receiving special attention and support are generally rather small. Still it can be argued that properly placed and employed they can have a tremendous impact. And their cost is still marginal if compared to internationally recruited experts.

My first example goes back to the 1970s and 80s and concerns Chile. It starts – like all migration stories – with the movement away. After the coup against the Allende Government in 1973, ICEM – a previous incarnation of IOM before the organization became a global player – was asked by the Pinochet Government to evacuate foreign nationals from the country. A "Sub-committee for Resettlement" was established in Chile under the Chairmanship of the ICEM representative, and a resettlement programme started in close co-operation with UNHCR and the ICRC. Although initially concerned only with foreign nationals, we subsequently also became involved in assisting Chileans who had sought refuge in embassies of foreign states. After the government authorised the Committee to do so, and delivered safe-conducts to those persons, ICEM started to arrange for their movement out of the country. In 1974, the major part of our work was indeed directed towards this latter group and their family members, since the movement of foreign nationals had been nearly completed in the first quarter of the year.[1] Finally, ICEM also became involved with Chilean political prisoners, arrested by the new regime, but whom the latter was accepting to release into exile only on the condition that firm resettlement opportunities existed for them. In 1978, the Government allowed all prisoners who had been sentenced under the Internal Security Law to leave the country. In total, ICEM provided resettlement assistance to more than 20,000 Chileans. Apart from its activities inside the country, the Committee was also concerned with those Chilean nationals having already left the country but who were in neighbouring states, particularly in Ar-

gentina and Peru, on a temporary basis and needed resettlement assistance.

While the cancer of dictatorship had affected most of Latin America in the 70s, during the following decade, within a few years, the democracy virus spread throughout the entire continent.

In 1987, we signed an agreement with the Swiss Government to assist in the voluntary return of 200 Chileans. In order to ensure a successful reintegration, the programme encouraged labour-generating projects, including the creation of self-employment and micro-enterprises, to which, whenever possible, unemployed Chileans who had not left the country were associated. By the end of 1989, 130 persons had returned to Chile, while 107 family members who never left the country also benefited from the programme. Although originally intended to last only two years, the experiment was continued through 1989, with more than 50 labour-generating projects creating employment for 210 persons.[2] Similar programmes were set up in Italy, Austria, Belgium and a number of other host countries. You have heard already about the Belgium project in an earlier session.

Given the context of the political events that had forced Chileans into exile, they had particularly well connected organizations that managed to negotiate substantial support packages with their host countries.

Nevertheles there were many problems to overcome, among them: the age of the returnees who had spent decades of their lives in exile, their children – second-generation Chileans who had built attachements with their host countries and had few links with Chile, and difficult economic circumstances upon return that made us include labour generating projects. Thus, apart from some leaders who managed to insert themselves in the political reconstruction of their country, many others seeked out a meagre living from the proceeds of small-scale economic initiatives funded by grants and revolving small loans.

The political leadership that returned from exile however had – to a large extent – been involved in political processes in their host countries. Maybe with the exception of some of those who had spent their exile in countries of the Soviet-led block, they had observed – and often participated in – democratic processes. They then applied their experiences to transfer political culture back home to their new positions in administration or government. Although difficult to measure, the contribution of returnees to this process – through constant lobbying from outside, and later from participation in the decision making processes inside – was considerable.

Return migration did not only apply to refugees but was also encouraged for persons of European origin or descent, who wished to come back to their countries of origin, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany and Greece. In this regard, the Committee opened in 1984 an office in Athens to provide counselling on the rights and obligations of ethnic Greeks wishing to return to their country. Thus former Greek migrants could receive information on the conditions upon returning to Greece.

As early as 1980, IOM started to review in which ways developing countries could be further assisted in acquiring the trained and qualified personnel they needed to take fuller advantage of existing development activities. In this respect, we examined the possibilities of extending to areas other than Latin America a programme for the return of trained nationals to their countries of origin. An increased need for such assistance was especially apparent on the African continent. This led to the establishment of preliminary contacts with some African countries, as well as with international agencies, which would provide funding and act as sponsoring actors, notably the Commission of the European Community, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). At the UN Economic Commission for Africa conference in Monrovia in October 1981 many African States expressed their deep concern over the brain-drain phenomenon and consequently voiced particular interest in ICM "Return of Talents and Reintegration of Qualified Nationals Abroad" programmes.

In December 1982, an ICM office opened in Nairobi (Kenya) to allow for the collection of job vacancies which could not be filled locally. The programme was later extended to other African countries and three additional field offices were opened in Mogadishu in 1984, in Uganda in 1988 and in Ghana in 1989. First, a pilot project launched in 1983 for the reintegration of qualified nationals, financed by a grant from the European Community provided for the return, over a four-year period, of 300 Africans to Kenya, Somalia and Zimbabwe. This goal was reached and in 1987, an extension of the project for another four year period was decided by the EC and ICM in the context of the Lome III co-operation agreement between the EC and ACP states. Three more countries were included for this new phase of the project (Ghana, Uganda and Zambia), which foresaw the return of 550 nationals. The number of returns were actually slightly higher than anticipated, despite the withdrawal of Somalia in 1991, and movements were additionally organized to 20 other African countries (including Cameroon, Cape Verde,

Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, to cite the most important only).

In 1983 also, a similar project was designed for the return and reintegration of African nationals residing in the United States and financed by grants from the Government of the United States. That project was directed at the three countries initially concerned by the European project as well as Cameroon, Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia.

IOM's operations during the Indochinese crisis in the 1970s and 1980s can be considered as the main "ancestor" or "precursor" of our current involvement in humanitarian programmes, not the least because of its length and scale. While action in times of crisis has always been part of IOM's tasks, specific post-conflict interventions are more recent. Its apparition is linked both to the new attention granted by the international community to the notion of peace-building in general (following the United Nations Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*, launched in 1992) and to the growing awareness that stability and migration issues are closely linked.[3] In implementing its programmes on behalf of displaced persons in the region IOM became progressively involved in activities other than resettlement, principally because of the duration of stays in camps. The expertise acquired on this occasion would thus later be used and developed in other contexts. The Indochinese operation itself was continued far into the last decade, until 1996 (for CPA), while the Orderly Departure Programme (ODP) was finally closed in September 1999 only.

The experience in the massive processing of persons gained during the CPA/ODP, among others, contributed to IOM being requested to act following the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Because tens of thousands of third-country nationals had streamed into Jordan from the war zone, the Jordanian authorities appealed to the United Nations for assistance.[4] UNDRO, the co-ordinating United Nations agency in the crisis then asked IOM to take the lead in providing transportation and return-related services. On 3 September 1990, a first evacuation flight took of from Amman with 182 Sri Lankan women on board. By the end of December, more than 155,000 persons had been evacuated, mostly from Jordan but also from Turkey, Iran and even directly from Iraq under the Gulf Emergency Programme.[5] Though our role was primarily to assist in the return of third country nationals (mostly Sri Lankans, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Filipinos, Egyptians, Sudanese...), the operation had also to adapt to other requirements, especially since the "Gulf war" was over, the question of Iraq Kurds emerged. The return of

foreign workers and their family members from the Middle East was probably the largest assisted mass movement of diaspora over such a short time span.

Over many years the extensive practical and logistical experience in managing activities of very different types, ranging from transportation to training, technical co-operation and medical activities has allowed us to develop working relationships with all kinds of actors. All these aspects are of special importance in a post-conflict context. Although some of the post-conflict programmes might initially appear quite remote for an organization dealing with migration issues, all of them ultimately make sense if one keeps in mind the primary goal of IOM: to encourage the "organized transfer of migrants" (Constitution article 1.1-a) and thus to prevent irregular migration. In this regard, IOM participates in activities aimed at restoring and fostering societies, providing a sense of security and stability to the country and its people. The novelty brought during the last decade was that programmes were set up to accompany returning migrants to countries experiencing difficult post-conflict situations: IOM intervention thus expanded from a form of "logistic" assistance towards a more socio-politico-economical one, aiming both at facilitating return and reintegration and at preventing further movements.

The first "integrated" experience was in Mozambique, in 1993. While most of the work in that country focused on populations displaced internally by decades of civil war, the experience acquired with their reintegration in the socio-political and economic realities of a post-conflict society laid the ground for similar operations involving diasporas. The activities undertaken on behalf of demobilised soldiers and most vulnerable IDPs in Mozambique do mark the beginning of IOM involvement in community-development. It was realised that the best way to facilitate reintegration of IDPs (be they civilian or soldiers) was to ensure stability in the communities to which they were returning, and thus to develop community-based projects. As a consequence, an important part of the assistance was given in the form of grants to support community development activities involving former combatants or IDPs.[6] The Mozambican programmes were brought to a successful conclusion in 1997. By then many other similar initiatives had been launched, mostly in Africa (Angola and Mali) and in Central America.

In 1996, another programme was set up for Bosnia and Herzegovina, following the signing of the Dayton Agreement in December 1995. While more than half of the country's population was displaced, special emphasis was to be put on returns. Already in 1995, IOM had car-

ried out an evaluation of the intentions of the refugees and displaced persons in Belgium, Italy and Switzerland in order to establish a firm base for planning return. While a Repatriation Working Group (RWG) comprising the Bosnian Government, IOM and UNHCR was set up to establish operational procedures, IOM also launched a "Return of qualified nationals" programme.

In Bosnia, the *de facto* separation of the country in three (and not two, as officially enshrined in the Constitution) territorial entities added to the usual difficulties of returning to a country devastated by war. Combined with the traumas linked to ethnic cleansing (one of the consequences of which being to discourage return to the area where such events had taken place), as well as the territorial segregation still prevailing in the country despite the peace agreement made it very difficult for most of the displaced persons to come back to their former homes, often located in the zone administered by former enemies. Despite this, IOM managed to set up different schemes to encourage repatriation from various countries, among them Germany, Belgium, Italy, the United Kingdom or the Netherlands. In order to speed up and facilitate operations, programmes already existing were used (such as REAG for refugees and displaced persons in Germany) or new ones established (for instance, a project entitled "urgent integrated interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina in favour of the populations hit by the consequences of war and for the repatriation and reinsertion of refugees and displaced persons" targeting Bosnians living in Italy; a programme jointly set up with the EC, called ROBBAG and designed to help those residing in Benelux and Germany or the Swiss reinsertion programme, implemented in co-operation with Swiss partners). Most of those schemes included a form of reinsertion assistance granted to the returnees to help them reintegrate more easily in their country of origin. As a whole, IOM assisted between 1996 and April 2000 close to 190,000 persons to return to Bosnia and Herzegovina.[7] Through the return of qualified nationals, IOM facilitated the reintegration of 829 skilled persons in the same period.[8] While encouraging returns through these various schemes, IOM also maintained its resettlement activities, mostly to the United States, Canada or Australia, thus contributing to the expansion of existing diasporas.

When the results of the referendum about the independence of East Timor (where 78.5% of the Timorese voted in favour), held on 30 August 1999, were made official, violence erupted in the province, forcing tens of thousands of persons to flee, either to West Timor or further away, to Australia for instance.[9] Together with other humanitarian agencies, IOM, which had earlier been in

charge of organizing voter registration and balloting outside East Timor for the diaspora under the UN umbrella, got involved in assisting these populations, with return logistics. In spite of systematic militia intimidation we managed during the first two months of activities to help 67,000 Timorese people to return from West Timor, other parts of Indonesia and Australia.[10] However, attempts to set up a highly-qualified return programme – to respond to obvious needs to set up a new administration from scratch – failed. The length of absence abroad and the dramatic living conditions and economic differentials are probably among the causes for this lack of success.

The story is different for Kosovo. When the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia withdrew in June 1999, IOM was entrusted with many different tasks, sometimes quite distant from what is usually considered to be within the Organization's usual assignments.

First, we obviously got involved in repatriation and reintegration activities of the many refugees and displaced persons who had left the province because of the conflict. It is estimated that about 980,000 Kosovar Albanians fled between March 1998, when the situation started to seriously deteriorate, and June 1999. But it is necessary to add to this number those who had left the province during the previous ten years, after the autonomy status was cancelled by the Belgrade authorities in 1989. As a whole, about 1.5 million persons have been displaced, representing close to 75% of the Kosovar Albanian population.[11] The challenge was enormous. Working closely with UNHCR and UNMIK (the United Nations Mission to Kosovo), IOM has been assisting in organizing the movement of returnees, from neighbouring as well as third countries. In addition to the main transportation activities, assistance also includes medical monitoring and organization of escorts for the most vulnerable, small reintegration cash allowance for targeted caseloads and referral of return movements to other assistance providers and security forces.[12] Apart from the launching of these general return programmes, we have also been requested by some Member States to help in the implemention of their own return programmes. Such is the case for Finland, Germany, Belgium, Canada and the USA. Moreover, since a number of host countries have decided to provide assistance to refugees upon their return, IOM has been tasked with helping them to set up a mechanism for the distribution of financial allowances. The involvement of IOM in this process depends on the country and can vary from handling direct and unique instalments to managing more in-depths

system, comprising phased instalments and verification of the proper use of the allocations.[13]

There certainly are enough examples and practices to analyze. At IOM we dispose of a large number of them, and the following one describes a recent and very innovative approach to support some members of diaspora to return from Berlin to Kosovo:

The Berlin Occupational Reintegration in Kosovo (BORK) project has for over two years assisted labour reintegration upon return to Kosovo of former evacuees and refugees with residence permits/temporary protection in Berlin. Its objective is to promote the occupational reintegration of returnees from Berlin, Germany, through strengthening labor market capacities in Kosovo, by opening new job placements, thus enhancing sustainable and favorable employment opportunities. Reintegration measures include financial assistance to sponsors who will provide employment conctracts for at least twelve months and for returnees who are willing to start their own business. Furthermore, training institutions willing to give occupational training for returnees in need of skill improvements, for a period of at least six months will equally benefit from the assistance. Besides the voluntary returnees to Kosovo, local workers are entitled to participate in the reintegration measures as long as they are matched with a returnee from Berlin. The financial support foresees a percapita cost of approx. 3000 EUR, including direct/administrative costs.

Within 19 months of BORK the target of 300 was exceeded by 78 cases. Those supported included:

- Job placement – 334
- Self-employment – 39
- Training – 5



Total 378 BORK assisted casses by categories of reintegration measures

Distributed participants by category:

Total assisted cases by participant category



Gender balance was one of the important issues that was taken into consideration. However, the limited number of female applicants led to the low percentage of women beneficiaries – 20%, as seen in the below chart.

Gender balance



The distribution of the 76 assisted women by categories of their engagement was as follows:

- 69 job placements
- 5 self-employment
- 2 training

Distribution of beneficiaries by IOM Sub-offices is presented in the bar chart below.

Among the positive achievements of BORK long-term employment opportunities for many participants in all Kosovo regions have been provided. Many companies have expressed their willingness to renew the employment contracts after expiry of the one-year BORK subsidies.



Overall number of BORK beneficiaries by IOM Sub-offices distribution

As you can see, we certainly do not lack experience in linking diasporas with countries of origin. It is however somewhat ironic to note that in spite of all the experiences we – and host countires – have acquired, especially over the last decade, attempts to standardize assistance to returnees are still in their early stages. Returnees are frequently puzzled by the disparities between host states (and sometimes even between smaller units within the same state). Attempts at standardization also occasionally run into the competing approaches of different organizations. Donors and beneficiaries could benefit from policy-oriented analysis of the experiences with different types and levels of assistance.

Early this year we started a Return of Qualified Afghans project in the current post-conflict phase of Afghanistan aiming at the reintegration of persons with the qualifications required by the interim administration, by NGOs and international organizations as well as the private sector. But Afghanistan has been a target for our return programmes for some time: Still under the Taliban regime, and in order to contribute to an increased access to health care and health education for the people in remote areas of Afghanistan and to strengthen the human resource capacity in this sector, we assisted Afghan health professionals in Pakistan to return to pre-identifed jobs. Beneficiaries were those who wanted to but had been unable to return due to a lack of possibilities to earn a livelihood from their professional activities. Applications from 792 qualified Afghans, willing to go back had been col-

lected in the IOM database. Two Employment Referral Units were established in Peshawar and Quetta in order to counsel candidates and provide referral services to organizations interested in recruiting people. Basic relocation assistance and supplementary training grants have thus been provided to 49 qualified Afghans (53% female) who have returned and taken up employment with NGOs working in the health and education sector inside Afghanistan. In addition, another 16 health professionals (15 female) have returned under a pilot project that was implemented from August 1999 until July 2000 with the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA). The relatively high number of returnees and the high percentage of female candidates, the clear interest and support from established NGO project partners and from other NGOs and agencies reflected the significant need the project intended to address.

Under the current programme 169 qualified returnees took advantage of the project by the end of April while 4,788 candidates were entered into the database. Many of the returnees have taken up jobs with the Interim Administration, staffing Ministries and other government offices. The Ministries of Education and Higher Education have received the largest group – 43 persons. Negotiations with Brussels are currently under way to start a specific project for qualified Afghans residing in European countries.

Besides these "traditional" operations, our involvement with diaspora has evolved further, in particular through an innovative concept called MIDA. What hides behind this acronym is a new approach to the challenge to link up diasporas with their countries of origin – for the moment in Africa. Despite all its potential, Africa is still facing numerous obstacles on the way to its development. Indeed, generally high population growth has combined with a difficult political, economic or social situation to spur many of its citizens to emigrate in order to improve their situation. Moreover, in many countries, the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic is robbing Africa of human resources essential to its economic development.

The implications are that:

- Most African countries are losing a significant number of their skills to more developed countries with a human resource deficit in some fields;
- Most African countries lack the critical mass of national experts indispensable to endogenous development;
- Job and wealth creation capacity is obviously reduced, resulting in greater unemployment and lower produc-

tivity, as well as undesirable socio-economic impacts on areas affected by significant transfers of funds;
- Research and technological innovations are delayed and the degree of dependency on more developed countries is growing hand-in-hand with the digital divide.

MIDA is an institutional capacity building programme for Africa based on a synergy between the profiles of migrants and the demand from countries, and its aim is the transfer of vital skills and resources of the African diaspora to support the development of their countries of origin. The programme no longer necessarily implies the systematic return of migrants, but prefers formulas compatible with their legal status in the host countries and with their desire to contribute to the development of their country of origin, while respecting their dual identity. It is based essentially on the notion of mobility, both people and resources.

All countries of origin, transit and host countries as well as Africans in the diaspora who wish to contribute to the development of their country of origin while maintaining their achievements in their country of permanent residence.

In partnership with Governments, universities and vocational training schools, private sector employers, and African Associations in the host countries, IOM, which this year already started implementing a MIDA programme in the Great Lakes region (Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda):
- Is compiling and maintaining a specialized data bank of identified needs for qualified human resources in African countries and skills availability in the diaspora. This data bank is shared by countries of origin and host countries;
- Recruits and traines personnel to manage the transfer of skills and other resources of Africans in the diaspora for development programmes in Africa;
- Enhances the partnership-based utilization of Africans in the diaspora for coordination and/or implementation of joint ventures between host countries and countries of origin;
- Provides assistance, where required, with travel arrangements (on-arrival reception and adjustment).

The innovations in the MIDA programme are its uses of the new information technologies to facilitate mobility and the tapping of skills as well as the transfer of resources. The programme ensures that the rights and status acquired by migrants in host countries are preserved by

guaranteeing them freedom of movement to and from their countries of origin. The potential pool of persons desiring to contribute their skills, expertise and resources in this way to the development of their countries of origin should be substantially increased as a result.

Remittances constitute an important part of the foreign exchange earnings of many African countries. Yet many migrants in the diaspora send these remittances only for domestic consumption and for small-scale community investments, which do not really help to drive development.

The MIDA programme also envisages to create conditions to assist Africans in the diaspora to channel their remittances and other resources toward productive investment that generate income, employment and work, particularly in small and medium-sized enterprises and industries.

As pointed out earlier, IOM has gained considerable experience in developing and implementing capacity building programmes around the world, in particular through voluntary return and reinsertion of qualified and experienced nationals in priority areas of national development programmes. However, MIDA goes beyond this. By innovative means, it facilitates the mobility of diasporas, the transfer and utilization of skills and resources of Africans in the diaspora for the development of their countries of origin. The role of IOM is to serve as a catalyst in the attainment of this objective.

Another important link between diaspora and home is participation in the political life – particularly relevant (in a positive sense) at the end of a conflict. The first time IOM got involved in an electoral process was in Mozambique, mostly on the basis of its practical experience in "logistical matters". But the most important operation ever undertaken by IOM in the electoral filed was the Bosnian "out-of-country" (OCV) process. According to the Dayton peace agreement, elections were to be organized in Bosnia in 1996, under the general supervision of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). This poll was considered to be one of the most complex ever organized, in part because of the massive refugee population residing outside the country but nonetheless entitled to vote. Already being involved in organizing the returns for those refugees, IOM was requested to take part in the OCV process, first in the registration of some 640,000 voters and then in the organization of the poll itself in no less than 54 different countries. Voting either took place by mail or in person at specially set-up polling

stations – mostly in FRY and in Croatia but also in a few other countries.[14] Important because of the number of voters involved, the Bosnian OCV process is also noticeable because of its duration: indeed, since those first elections in 1996, several others have taken place (in 1997, 1998 and 2000) in which IOM has been involved.

The Organization was also requested to undertake polling administration support activities in Kosovo in 1999–2000. First, IOM was tasked with organizing the registration of refugees residing outside the country. Set up to complement the registration process carried within the province by the OSCE and the UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo), this operation also includes the issuance of documents (tamper-proof UNMIK DP' cards) to the registrants in order to prove their right of residence in Kosovo (most of them having lost their documentation).[15] Ultimately, these two registration processes will lead to the establishment of a civil registry of the Kosovo population and as a basis for voters lists.

Let me conclude with another aspect of migrants in diaspora, again linked with a post-conflict situation. It proves that some such situations continue to influence matters for a long long period, and that the injustice done to victims of conflict that often also was at the origin of displacement is hardly ever put right. Recently however some legal cases led to financial compensation for victims of the Nazi regime. IOM was tasked with the labour-intensive responsibility to identify designated groups of former forced labour migrants, today scattered all over the world, but in the past forcibly sent to work in Germany. When US courts and German negotiators developed their programme to take in claims for forced labour, personal injury and property losses, the planning figure for cases in countries other than those in Central/Eastern Europe and Israel stood at 75,000. Today IOM, tasked with registration of claims for the "rest of the world", has registered 320,000 cases from among this particular "diaspora". In addition, in the framework of the Settlement Agreement reached in the Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation (Swiss Banks), IOM has been designated as one of the implementing organizations, tasked with processing claims for certain categories of (non-Jewish) victims.

The project is of special significance for IOM, which, through its implementation, comes back to its own sources: the Second World War and the displacement-related problems that were induced by the conflict.

Like migration has moved up the political agenda in recent years, diaspora is becoming a buzz-word within the

population mobility conundrum. I have tried to touch on a number of areas where my organization deals with phenomena linked to better services to and involvement of diaspora in our globalized world. They demonstrate first and foremost the breadth of the issue but also the key role that diasporas can and increasingly do play in matters in the past left to nation states.

FOOTNOTES

* Parts of this paper are based on the History of IOM 1951-2001 by Marianne Rogier published on the occasion of IOM's 50th anniversary, to which the author of this paper contributed.

[1] ICEM, *1974 Rewiew of Activities*, p. 6.

[2] IOM, *1989 Rewiew of Achievements*, p. 15.

[3] S/24111, *An Agenda for Peace*, 17 June 1992.

[4] By early September, it was estimated that 105,000 persons were caught in camps at the border, cf. IOM *Annual Report 1990*, p. 20.

[5] OPM *Annual Report 1990*, p. 20.

[6] MC/1869, 25 April 1996, *Report of the Director General for the Year 1995*, § 247, pp. 37–38. On these community-oriented aspects, see *infra*, following part.

[7] IOM assisted returns from countries outside Yugoslavia amount to 188,383 persons (Source: IOM office in Sarajevo), whereas IOM assisted movements to Bosnia (overall activities, including activities in countries of former Yugoslavia and medical activities or services) reached 190,618 persons (Source: IOM Geneva).

[8] Cf. IOM, *Activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, update: March/April 2000, p. 1, available on IOM website, www.iom.int.

[9] As a whole, 650,000 persons (more than 75% of the entire population) became displaced during the crisis. In addition, about 70% of houses and infrastructure were destroyed, while the state structures were left in vacuum following the withdrawal of the Indonesian administration., cf. UN *Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for East Timor Crisis*, October 1999 – June 2000.

[10] For a detailed description of the difficulties encountered during that operation, cf. *IOM News*, no 3/99, December 1999, available on IOM website, www.iom.int.

[11] OSCE, *Statistics and Refugee Tracking (START),* Information Report, 10 June 1999, p. 6.

[12] *IOM Project Compendium*, April 2000, p. 107.

[13] *IOM Project Compendium*, April 2000, p. 113.

[14] Cf. *RESG Final Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina National and Cantonal Elections Abroad, Vienna, 11 October 1996.*

[15] *IOM Project Compendium*, April 2000, p. 111.

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DIASPORA POPULATIONS AND SECURITY ISSUES IN HOST COUNTRIES

This paper will explore the potential challenges posed to host countries by the presence of politically-active diaspora groups, especially those linked to homeland struggless. In doing so, it will address three main sets of questions. First, what kinds of challenges might such groups pose? Second, what sort of factors may shape the nature and intensity of the threat to host country security? Third, and by way of conclusion, what sort of policy elements ought to be included in state responses to these challenges? This paper is largely a catalogue of challenges, determinants, and responses – intended to spark and frame discussion on the topic, rather than offer new empirical evidence, a new analytical perspective, or definitive conclusions.

The paper tends to focus on diaspora groups in Western, industrialized democracies, rather than the security consequence of mass regional refugee flows in the developing world. The term diaspora is far from analytically concise, and the boundaries of "immigrant", "refugee", "migrant" and even ethnic community or minority overlap and are intertwined. To reflect this, the concept of "transnational community" has been increasingly used in the scholarly literature. Here, the term diaspora is used interchangeably with that of "transnational community".

Preliminary Words of Caution

In examining these questions, the author is well aware of the dangers in doing so. By problematizing the security implications of diasporas for host countries, one risks leaving the impression that diasporas pose a particularly serious security challenge, that liberal immigration or refugee laws are therefore a threat to public safety, and that targeting diaspora communities through racial profiling or other discriminatory measures is an appropriate policy response. In its most extreme form, this kind of discourse feeds the paranoid xenophobia of France's National Front,

Austria's Freedom Party, the UK's British National Party, and other similar racist movements.

This author strongly rejects such views. Diasporas have immeasurably enriched host societies throughout human history, in cultural, economic, and myriad other ways. This paper is not the place to recount those contributions, but precisely because of its focus on security implications it is important to keep the broader balance in perspective.

The security implications of diaspora communities for host countries generally relate to their political activities. However, it is important to emphasize at the outset that it is quite reasonable and normal for diasporas to be engaged in political activities, whether locally-focused or linked to their homelands. Such activity is particularly likely when lands of family ethnic origin are themselves caught in the grip of repression, exploitation, and civil violence. Who would deny the right of diaspora South Africans to mobilize against apartheid in the 1970s and 1980s, or of diaspora Chinese to protest the repression of the students of Tianamen Square in the 1990s?

But, it might be suggested, host country tolerance ought to end when and where acts of vilence are involved. Take, for example, the following (true) story:

> A man – a militant and underground organizer, wanted by the local authorities – flees violence in his homeland. Escaping the security services, he is smuggled aboard a boat to a western country where he claims refugee status. Once there, he meets others from his homeland, and begins to coordinate with them in support of struggle back home. Funds are raised in the host country to support homeland opposition groups, weapons are acquired, cadres are trained. Linkages are formed with like-minded organizations and foreign intelligence agencies. Diamonds are smuggled to find the campaign. Criminals are recruited to assist in the struggle. In the homeland, militants – bolstered by this external support – engage in a wave of sabotage, espionage, and assassination...

Kurds working in support of the PKK? Tamils allied to the Liberation tigers of Tamil Eelam? Sikhs seeking an independent Khalistan in the Punjab? Kashmiri militants? Armenians of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, pursuing retribution for past Turkish atrocities? Kosovars of the KLA? Cuban émigres targeting the regime of Fidel Castro? Palestinian refugees, plotting against Israel?

Actually, the story is one of my grandfather, who in 1940 fled the Netherlands for Britain, and who spent WWII as a Dutch intelligence officer and resistance organizer. It is also the story of my grandmother, who served in the exiled Dutch armed forces. And it is the story of

my father, who as a young child smuggled Dutch diamonds to Britain even as he fled the Nazi advance.

In other words, even support for violence does not represent an adequate criteria for either the determination of security challenge nor for judging the appropriateness of diaspora activities. The complexities of the issue hardly need to be underscored here in the Balkans. Many diaspora groups were active in mobilizing support for the liberation struggles, wars, and terrorism that accompanied the break-up of Yugoslavia. Funds were raised, political mobilization and propaganda undertaken, and some even returned "home" to fight. How much of this represented a security threat, either to host countries, to innocent civilians elsewhere, or to international peace and security more generally? And how much of it did not?

These caveats are particularly important in the post-September 11 world. Since the tragic terrorist attacks against New York and Washington DC, there has been a veritable explosion in the amount of public, media, and policy attention to the potential links between expatriate ethnic groups and national security challenges. This is graphicaly illustrated in Figure 1, which shows (based on a

Figure 1
Webpages linking diasporas, refugees, and immigrants to terrorism, 2001–02



simple boolean search using the *Google* search engine) the number of web-pages linking the terms "diaspora", "refugees" or "immigrant" to the term "terrorism".

Scholars of transnational communities are rightly alarmed at the ease with which these linkages are made in popular and political discourse. Yet such attention can also be justified. Although almost all of the September 11 hijackers were Saudi citizens who had legally entered the United States through regular channels, al-Qa'ida operatives involved in the attack had been trained and recruited in Afghanistan, and based in Arab expatriate communities in Germany, the UK, France, and elsewhere. Previous, failed al-Qa'ida operations had included cells based in Canada, the Philippines, and other countries. Frequently, operatives made use of locally-recruited sympathizers among diaspora Arabs. In the United States in particular, this soon resulted in widespread calls for tighter immigration, visa, and refugee policies, not only in the US but also in other countries.

Commenting more generally on the challenge of ethnic communities and terrorism, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has noted:

> ...proximity to the United States, a common border, large expatriate communities and a healthy economy draw representatives of virtually every terrorist group in the world to this country. The Counter–Terrorism Branch of CSIC is currently investigating more than 50 organizational targets which embody over 350 individual terrorist targets.
>
> A large part of terrorist activity in Canada is related to on-going conflict abroad. Logistical support for terrorist acts in other parts of the world has been provided on Canadian soil. Funds are raised here to support the purchase and delivery of weapons, enhance combat training and subsidize travel. Ethnic communities are exploited through propaganda, advocacy and disinformation. Canadians with foreign roots are intimidated, coerced and manipulated while people are smuggled, documents forged and crimes committed, all in support of political, geographical and religious conflict abroad. Support networks in Canada have provided terrorists with safe-haven and transit to and from other countries, including the United States.[1]

The former chief of strategic planning for the CSIS has gone still further, arguing that:

> We need a gigantic cultural shift in this country. We are not used to seeing ourselves at the front line of any major struggle. But there is a war on. It's a global, terrorist-based war that we are all going to be facing, and it is increasingly going to become home here to Canada. We have got to get our laws and our attitudes into line to meet the threat before it's too late. We may need to look at legislation changes. But, above all, all of us have got to be more aware that no matter what kind of emphasis we want to place on multicultural-

> ism and the benefits of diversity, some of those issues open us to struggles that are going on around the world, and that we don't want to have to come home.[2]

Yes, as noted earlier, it would be a fundamental mistake, both analytically and morally, to overreact. The magnitude of the threat also needs to be placed into perspective: the 350 "individuals" cited by CSIS above represent less than 0.0006% of Canada's more than 6 million foreign-born immigrants, and an even smaller proportion of the even larger number of Canadians with transnational ethnic ties.[3]

The danger of overreaction is perhaps the strongest reason why the sorts of security issues addressed in this paper ought to be addressed by the scholarly community, and especially by those with expertise in transnational communities. Without such attention, there is a danger that not only will the issue of "security" continue to be problematized in public discourse (with the dangers outlined earlier), but that discourse and responses will be exclusively framed by security establishments and others. To date, the transnational community research establishment has devoted very little attention to this issue, however.

Related to this, some conceptual words of caution are also in order, least they reinforce the tendency to view ethnic communities as intrinsic breeding grounds for national security threats. In this regard, the very terminology used in this paper, while unavoidable, is also problematic. Concept such as "diaspora", "host country", and "homeland" tend to give inadequate weight to the extent to which transnational ethnic groups may be deeply imbedded in their country of residence as fully integrated citizens, especially in multicultural states in which there is no dominant ethnic ethos to define national identity. The existence of so-called "hyphenated" identities – Palestinian-Canadian, for example – does not imply that attachment to the place of family ethnic origin ("homeland") somehow competes with, or comes at the cost of, attachment to the "host country". In fact, both may be equally regarded as "homelands", and the willingness of the latter to accept cultural pluralism among its multi-ethnic citizenry be part of its attraction.

Finally, it is important to note that the national security challenges to host countries arise not only from inappropriate or illegal activities by militant diaspora groups linked to homeland conflict, or from the political-demographic consequences in host societies of a large diaspora presence, but also from the need to protect the legitimate rights of diasporas from external challenges. During the

Cold War, East European émigres supporting democratic reform were the frequent target of communist security agencies. The assassination of Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov in London in 1978 was perhaps one of the best-known such cases. During the apartheid era, the activities of both exiled South Africans and others were targeted by South Africa's Bureau of State Security. For example, Britain's current (south African-born) Minister of State for Europe, Peter Hain, was an active campaigner against apartheid in the UK in the 1970s. In 1972 he was sent a letter bomb that failed to explode. In 1975, he was accused of robbing a British bank (and subsquently acquitted) in what was widely seen as a South African smear operation.[4] Today, Chinese pro-democracy activists may be the targets of surveillance from the Chinese intelligence services; India operates active intelligence campaigns against diaspora Sikhs and Kashmiri nationalists; and Israel's Mossad runs world-wide operations focussed against the Palestinian diaspora. While some of these actions might be justified in the names of counter-terrorism, others can be seen as attempts to interfere with the legitimate expression of democratic or nationalist views by (diaspora) citizens of host countries, or attempts to blunt legitimate struggles for self-determination or democratic reform in host countries.

Diasporas and Threats to Host Country Security

The potential challenges to host country security posed by diaspora political activity fall into many categories. These are presented below in approximate order of their potential threat to host country security, although as will soon become evident a precise ranking is impossible.

No Threat/Valued

- *legal involvement in host country domestic politics* by diaspora groups. This certainly ought to be seen as a value, not a threat, by democratic host governments. However, there have been cases where the state or social groups have viewed diaspora (usually refugee) participation in local politics as a form of external interference, or as a challenge to the ethnic status quo. Lebanon is a case in point, where there is strong political resistance to extending full economic and civil rights to Palestinian refugees, despite their presence in that country through four generations and half a century.

- *political mobilization, recruitment, and voluntary fund-raising within the diaspora ethnic community by non-militant organizations* related to homelands and homeland struggles. This too ought to be seen as a valued exspression of political rights by the host country, even if it attracts criticism from the homeland state.
- *advocacy and lobbying efforts by diaspora groups directed at host governments.* Such efforts may seek to influence government policy towards the host country, diaspora political causes, refugee policies, or aid and humanitarian assistance efforts.
- *militant diaspora efforts support by the host government*, for example US support for the Iraqi National Congress or Syrian support for the Kurdish PKK. This is not to say that such actions do not have adverse effects on the national security of homeland countries or regimes (they do) or on international peace and security (they might, whether positive or negative). However, they cannot really been seen as a national security "problem" by host governments, and indeed diaspora militants may be viewed as a useful foreign policy ally/tool, and hence a national security asset.

Low Threat

- *political mobilization and recruitment within the diaspora ethnic community by militant organizations.*
- *voluntary fund-raising* for militant causes among diaspora communities.
- *surveillance of legitimate diaspora political activity by host countries*, involving operations by foreign (homeland) intelligence agencies in host countries.
- *criminal activity in third countries*, organized or supported by diaspora militant groups in the host country.

Medium Threat

- *diaspora-centered command, control, communications, intelligence* (known, in military terms, as "C31") *and logistics activities by militant groups.* This would include the management and training of militant cells, the secure transmission of instructions, the provision of safe houses, the provision of falsified documents, the provision of weapons and other material, and the collection of information on potential targets for paramilitary activity.

- *criminal fund-raising by militant organizations*, whether directed at the ethnic community itself (extortion) or at the host society as a whole (theft, credit-card fraud, drug-smuggling). Closely related to this is money-laundering and financial transfers used to support the activities of militants. Frequently, relations of convenience my be established between political militants and criminal groups.
- *physical/criminal intimidation of members of diaspora communities by militants*, so as to coerce family member or other in the homeland.
- *intimidation of members of the diaspora communities by foreign (homeland) intelligence agencies.* This may involve efforts to recruit informers, obtain information or intimidate homeland activists through threats to their family members abroad.
- *political and economic pressure on the host country by the homeland state, related to diaspora political activity.* This might take the form of economic sanctions or other actions affecting the interests of host countries. It might also take the form of new security and border-crossing procedures, visa requirements, or other procedures applied to the host country. In Canada, for example, the threat posed by al-Qa'ida terrorism has been accompanied a serious threat to Canadian national interest by potentional US security-related border controls.[5]
- *terrorism and criminal violence in third countries, organized or supported by diaspora militant groups in the host country.* Whether such violence is seen as a threat by host country national security decision-makers depends on both its scope and target. Efforts by al-Qa'ida operatives to organize major attacks against the US would be seen by most European governments as respresenting a high degree of security threat, while efforts by pro-Western Iraqi refugees to subvert the regime of Saddam Hussein would not (and might even be assisted.)

High Threat

- *violence against host country institutions or population by diaspora-based militant groups*. This may include violence against other ethnic or diaspora groups within the host country by diaspora-based militant groups.
- *violence against international targets* (for example, embassies, multinational companies, international organiza-

tions, or expatriates) in the host country by diaspora-based militant groups.

- *any activities by diaspora-based militant groups involving weapons of mass destruction.*
- *violence against diaspora groups by foreign (homeland) intelligence agencies,* such as assassinations against diaspora political leader, or arson or bombings attacks against political offices or community centers.
- *military retaliation by the homeland country against the host country* as a consequence of the activities of diaspora political or military activities, or retaliatory support by the homeland government of armed groups operating in the host state. Perhaps the most destabilizing example of this dynamic was Austrian military action against Serbia in response to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Bosnia in June 1914 by Bosnian Serb exiles – a sequence of events that triggered World War One. South African destabilization of Mozambique and Angola in the 1970s and 1980s in response to their support for the anti-apartheid struggle is another noteworthy case, resulting in direct or indirect civilian casualties numbering in the millions. Israeli punitive and retaliatory attacks against Lebanon and against the diaspora-based Palestinian nationalist movement there in the 1960s and 1970s culminated in full-scale war in 1982.[6] Most recently the Taliban's provision of support and sanctuary to Usama bin Ladin and his al-Qa'ida network sparked the current US military intervention in Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Factors Shaping the Security Challenge

A number of factors shape the magnitude of the security challenge that the presence of diaspora groups might pose to host countries. These are hypothesized below.

The first and most important of these relates to the *intensity of homeland conflict*, and especially the degree of *militarized conflict*. Where such conflict is high – whether in the form of ethnic discrimination, domestic repression, civil war, of military occupation – it is much more likley that diaspora-based militant groups will emerge, or that homeland militants will forge links to diaspora populations.

A second set of variables relates to the *demographic charachteristics* of the diaspora population. These include:

- *the total size of the diaspora*, and hence the potential strength and complexity of diaspora-based political organization.
- *the size of the diaspora group in the host country*, with larger diaspora communities again more likely to sustain greater and more complex political organization.
- *the geographic concentration of the diaspora population within the host country.* In general, political groups are more easily able to mobilize support in geographically-concentrated diaspora populations than those that are spread out. However, the advent of the Internet and other new information and communication technologies has dramatically increased the ability of diaspora populations to network despite geographic distance.[7]
- *the socio-economic status of the diaspora group*. Wealthier and better-educated diasporas are better able to contribute financial and organizational resources to diaspora political groups than are poorer communities. On the other hand, poorer diaspora populations may be more likely to join militant groups and engage in violent activities.

A third set of variables relate to the political (although not necessarily physical) *proximity and linkages of the host country to the homeland*. In this respect, security challenges are likely to be shaped by:

- *geographic proximity to the diaspora homeland*, with adjacent host countries most vulnerable to spill-over conflict, entangling political connections, refugee movements, intelligence operations, retaliation, and similar linkages with potential security implications. With regard to the potential threat of intelligence activity or retaliation, *the power of the homeland state* is of importance too, with more powerful homeland countries posing more potential security challenges to hosts than do weaker ones.
- *ethnic linkages to the diaspora homeland*, with the national security implications of diaspora political activity heightened when other, large ethnic communities in the host country have ethno-linguistic, religious, or other ties to large ethnic groups in the homeland country.
- *political linkages between the host country to the homeland country*, where the national security implications of diaspora political activity are likely to be greatest where the host country is a great power (or former colonial power or mediator) with extensive foreign policy linkages to the homeland.

A fourth set of variables relate to the *political relationship between the host state and the diaspora group*:

- The potential security implications of diaspora political activity is especially heightened if *the foreign policy of the host country is viewed as inimical to the interests of the diaspora population*, whether by the population as a whole or by militant groups within it. Examples of this might include host country political, financial, or military support for a repressive homeland government or to an opposing side in a civil conflict. Conversely, the security challenge is sharply reduced if the foreign policy of the host country is seen as supportive of the interests of the diaspora population.
- The potential security implications of diaspora political activity may also be heightened if the *domestic policy of the host country is viewed as inimical to the interests of the diaspora population*. Examples of this would include officially-sanctioned or tolerated discrimination against the diaspora population; refugee and immigration policies which appear to disadvantage members of the diaspora population; mobility restrictions or surveillance measures; or the arrest, detention, or extradition by the host country of diaspora militants.
- The *degree of integration of the diaspora group within the host society* has important implications for potential security challenges. More integrated groups are less likely to support militant organization which target host institutions, while less integrated and more alienated groups are more likely to do so. Such integration, in turn, is shaped by a number of additional factors. These include *the age of the diaspora presence* (with long-established, multi-generational groups likely to be better integrated), the *domestic policies of the host country* (as discussed above), and the *degree of cultural affinity or differentiation* between the diaspora population and the host society.
- Finally, *political leadership within the diaspora group* can be of importance in how the community interacts with both the state and with militant groups within its ranks. Security challenges are sharply reduced when community leaders have strong community support, good links with elected officials and law enforcement, and speak out strongly against extremist activities. Conversely, where diaspora leaders are weak (or leadership is divided), relations with host authorities are poor, and militant activities tolerated or supported by community leaders, the security challenges for the host country are exacerbated.

This paper has summarized the sorts of security implications associated with the presence of diaspora groups, and had identified those factors which may tend to increase or decrease the level of security concern. By way of conclusion, I would like to suggest some elements that are likely to enhance the ability of host countries to deal with the security challenges associated with diaspora populations.

Conceptually, these elements revolve around the notion that diaspora communities ought to be seen not as (or not only as) a potential national security challenge, but also as a key asset essential to effective counter-terrorism, counter-intelligence, criminal intelligence, and similar efforts. In particular, it should be stressed that:

- Effective integration of diaspora communities into the social mainstream – or perhaps, more accurately, a sense of belonging and participation which strengthens citizenship without the price of assimilation – dramatically reduces many of the security risks identified above. Even militant supporters of violent homeland struggles may be able to distinguish between violence directed at a homeland foe (which they may support), and violence directed at the institutions and population of a host country (to which they feel a sense of belonging, and against which they would oppose any violent action).
- Many of the chief tools of effective counterterrorism and counterintelligence are remarkably similar to those of good community policing. Diaspora populations themselves are particularly well equipped to detect in their midst activities that are detrimental to host country security – but this information is useless if it remains locked inside a tight-lipped community. Consequently, security agencies need to develop relations of trust and transparency with diaspora communities. Consultation is important with community leaders. Recruitment into security and law enforcement agencies needs to reflect the ethnic diversity of the population, and agencies need to purposefully develop the linguistic and cultural skills necessary for a nuanced understanding of community politics. Moreover, personnel from non-majority backgrounds need to be empowered to speak out against the preconceptions, misperceptions, and biases they find within their own law enforcement organizations.[8]

It follows from these observations that exclusionary or discriminatory security measures targeted against particular transnational ethnic communities are at grave risk of

failure, or even backfiring. Such measures threaten to alienate diaspora populations, aggravate the barriers between communities and local law enforcement officials, and heighten the sense of alientation upon which extremist groups may prey.

About the Author

Rex Brynen is Associate Professor of Political Science at McGill University in Montréal. He is author of *Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon* (Westview Press, 1990) and *A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza* (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000). He is also editor or coeditor of four other books, and coordinator of *Palestinian Refugee ResearchNet* (http://www.prrn.org). Professor Brynen has served as a member of the Policy Staff of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and as a consultant on security, intelligence, and conflict affairs to other Canadian government agencies.

All views expressed in this paper are his own, and in no way represent those of the Government of Canada or any other agency.

FOOTNOTES

[1] CSIS, "Operation Programmes: Counter-Terrorism", at http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/operat/ct_e.html.

[2] David Harris, quoted in "Is Canada a Safe Haven for Terrorism?" PBS *Frontline*, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/trail/etc/canada.html.

[3] Statistics Canada, based on data at http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/People/Population/demo25a.htm and at http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/People/Population/demo08.htm.

[4] BBC News, "Hain – The Radical Establishment", at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk_politics/newsid_1752000/1752805.stm.

[5] More than $1.9 bilion in goods and more than 300,000 people cross the Canada-US border each day – by far the largest bilateral trading relationship in the world, equal to 56% of Canada's Gross Domestic Product. As a result, the introduction of more time-consuming or expensive border-crossing procedures has substantial economic implications for Canada. For the high-level foreign policy attention given to this issue in the wake of Septemper 11, see http://www.can-am.gc.ca/menu-easp?mid=1&cat=10.

[6] On efforts by the PLO to maintain a secure diaspora base for its political and paramilitary activities, see Rex Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

[7] See, for example, David Romano, "Modern Communications Technology in Ethnic Nationalist Hands: The Case of the Kurds", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 35, 1 (March 2002).

[8] This is a substantial problem. One Canadian law enforcement official from a diaspora community recently expressed to me his frustration at being forced to conform to what he felt was an inaccurate understanding of his community. To challenge these biases, however, would risk his career prospects within his organization.

III.

NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

CROATIA

Mate
MEŠTROVIĆ

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CROAT STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM

In the decades between the end of World War II and Yugoslavia's collapse in 1991, the Croatian Diaspora had a negligible influence on America's policy of strong support for "Yugoslavia's independence, unity and territorial integrity", to use the State Department's standard formula. Throughout this period the State Department opposed Croatian aspirations for independence, considering them injurious to American global and regional interests.

For a variety of reasons, until the late 1980s, Croatians favoring independence were unable even to win a fair hearing from much of the media and the U.S. government. Only after Slobodan Milošević came to power in Serbia and began dismantling Tito's Yugoslavia, the State Department showed growing concern about Yugoslavia's survival, and began viewing more seriously the disruptive aspirations of the Croats, Slovenes, Albanians and others.

For a long time Croatian aspirations for independent statehood were rejected as attempts to restore the World War II Independent State of Croatia, generally regarded by the victors as a "fascist, enemy, and criminal state", guilty of genocide against Serbs and Jews.

Whatever one may think of the NDH, it marked an important watershed. For the first time in centuries the Croat state reappeared on the map of Europe. Thought detractors labeled it an "artificial, Nazi created state", the NDH possessed essential attributes of sovereignty – its own armed forces, currency, it issued stamps, and was recognized by a dozen states – and at least at the time of its establishment in 1941 it was cheered by a substantial segment of the Croat people.

American, and generally Western officials and academicians were convinced that Tito's Yugoslavia had once and for all set to rest the national question by granting constituent nations their republics or "autonomous" regions.

The West admired Tito, the "triumphant heretic", for successfully defying Stalin in 1948 and asserting Yugoslav

independence from Moscow. Consequently, Yugoslavia could count on Washington's strong support for its "independence, unity and territorial integrity". Western scholars wrote volumes extolling Yugoslavia's "workers self- management" as a marvelous concept of potentially global significance. Now these books gather dust on library shelves, a testimony to the ephemeral scholarship in the service of Cold War politics.

Croat aspirations for independence could not gain American sympathy or support because they clashed with Washington's perceptions and global and regional objectives.

The attitude of the American Croatian Community

Truth is that most American Croatians were uninterested in Croatia's independence before the collapse of Yugoslavia and the start of the "Homeland War". They were too involved in American daily life and influenced by American perceptions and policies. Even had they been united in support of Croat independence, they could have done little to change Washington policy due to their relatively small number and financial marginality. In fact, only a few diasporic communities – such as the American Jews and to a lesser extent the Cubans – can be said to have the power to substantially impact U.S. foreign policy, and this in part because the objectives of Washington, Israel, and anti-Castro Cubans, are substantially complementary.

Belgrade made great efforts to be on good terms with the Croatian Fraternal Union, the principal Croatian ethnic organization in the U.S. and Canada. Yugoslavia maintained a consulate in Pittsburgh whose job was to cultivate relations with the CFU. For its part, the CFU leadership sought to steer clear as much as possible from "disruptive old country politics".

We, advocates of Croatian independence, were a small minority in the Croatian community, deeply divided with respect to strategy and tactics. Should Croats engage in armed struggle against Yugoslavia, at home and abroad? Or, should they pursue propaganda, educational and public relations activities aimed at winning Western public opinion in favor of Croat independence? The latter believed that the "diaspora" could only be an auxiliary factor in the struggle for freedom. Only the Croats in the homeland under favorable international circumstances could achieve independence.

As the saying goes, one man's "terrorist" is another man's "freedom fighter". The violence that went on dur-

ing the entire period under discussion was in a sense a continuation of the World War II struggle between the Ustašas, Četniks and Partisans. Croatian revolutionary groups such as "Otpor" and the "Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood" attacked Yugoslav assets at home and abroad. The Yugoslav secret police in turn waged a brutal extermination battle against the Croatian revolutionaries in which it generally had the upper hand thanks to its far greater resources and tolerance of Western governments. And yet, the UDB-a was never able to completely destroy its Croat opponents.

The ill-fated attempts by Božidar Kavran and Ante Moškov to continue the armed struggle against the Yugoslav regime after World War II was renewed in 1972 by the "Bugojanci", a group of 19 young Croats from Australia – who tried to start a Castro style armed struggle in Bosnia. The UDB-a murdered Croats abroad, notably Bruno Bušić in Paris in 1976 and Stjepan Đureković in Munich in 1983. Miro Barešić murdered Vladimir Rolović, the Yugoslav ambassador in Sweden and high official of Belgrade's secret police, and so on. The violence continued till the collapse of Yugoslavia. In Scotland, in 1988, UDB-a agent Vinko Sindičić shot but failed to kill Nikola Štedul, head of the "Croatian movement for Statehood" ("Hrvatski državotvorni pokret").

Negative International Reactions

Western media and governments responded negatively to Croatian-inspired violence, which gave credence to Belgrade claims that Croats seeking independence were "fascists" and "terrorists". Croat revolutionaries paid a heavy price at home and abroad. Those engaged in diversions in Yugoslavia were mostly killed. UDB-a agents murdered or kidnapped suspected Croat opponents abroad, while UDB-a assassins mostly made a getaway, enabling Belgrade to claim that the dead were victims of feuds in the criminal "Ustaša underground".

In the U.S., the most spectacular instance of "Croat terrorism" was the 1976 hijacking of a TWA plane by a group of young Croatians led by Zvonko Bušić whose purpose was to publicize Croatia's struggle for freedom. 26 years later Bušić remains almost forgotten in an American jail. After the hijacking and murders of several Croats in the U.S., President Carter ordered the FBI to put an end to the violence. Several "Otpor" members were arrested on conspiracy charges and given draconian 40-year prison sentences. An FBI report concluded that UDB-a

agents stood behind some of the violence, with the aim of discrediting the Croat struggle for independence.

For years after the TWA hijacking, whenever I identified myself as a Croat I elicited the response, "You are the hijackers". Certainly the hijacking drew wide attention to the Croat struggle. But the publicity was entirely negative, convincing me and others that violence abroad against Yugoslavia was counterproductive. President Carter made it clear that the government would use force against those engaged in violence on behalf of the Croatian cause. It would use political means in dealing with those who were engaged in legitimate activities on behalf of their aims. Since some of those engaged in, or suspected of violence, were member of the CNC, the organization faced the prospect of being banned in some countries.

This produced a crisis within the CNC – the principal umbrella Croatian political organization of the Diaspora – which I had joined in 1979. I believed that the CNC should only engage in legal and legitimate activities in the Diaspora. An organization could not at the same time function as a legitimate political organization and pursue conspiratorial activities. The CNC majority shared this view. But, as it is often the case among Croats, the minority would not accept the decision of the majority, and left the CNC. The 1992 Vice Vukojević film about the murder of Bruno Bušić continued the long-standing dispute in the Croatian Diaspora between those favoring, and those opposed to violence.

After the demise of the "Croatian Spring" in 1971, the homeland opposition fell silent. Its leaders were imprisoned or fled abroad. At this point the Croat Diaspora again became the principal spokesman for the Croatian struggle for freedom.

Under my leadership in the 1980s, CNC focused principally on propaganda activities directed at the international community and the homeland. We took every opportunity to publicize the Croatian cause. For instance, we submitted a Memorandum to the 1980 Madrid conference on peace and security calling for the recognition of Croatian self-determination. In 1982, I delivered a lecture at the Sorbonne on the Moscow and Yalta agreements. The CNC developed excellent communications with the Islamic world through the Croatian Islamic Center in Toronto. The publishing activity of the Croatian Diaspora was amazing. The UDB-a claimed that Croatian émigrés published some 250 publications and bulletins with a total circulation of 400,000.

In 1981, unexpectedly, I was invited by Bulgarian diplomats in New York to attend the 1300 anniversary of Bulgarian statehood in Sofia. "When we give you importance, Washington will take note", I was told. The Bulgarians were right. Some émigré Croatian publications criticized my Bulgarian adventure, warning that I was following in the footsteps of Dr. Branko Jelić, who claimed to have Soviet contacts, and was eliminated by the UDB-a in Germany in 1972.

The Croatian National Congress became an object of constant Yugoslav media attacks, which inflated its importance in the homeland beyond reality. We also drew the interest of Western intelligence services. The Belgrade government protested my every move. It repeatedly demanded that the State Department curtail my political activities, but with little effect. Washington's standard reply was that "Mr. Meštrović is a free U.S. citizen and we cannot restrict his activities". Belgrade threatened to break diplomatic relations with Bulgaria because of my visit there and appearance on Bulgarian television. Belgrade protested my visit to the Soviet Union in 1988 as well as my earlier trips to Australia and elsewhere.

Incidentally, Australia was the only country I had trouble entering. My visa had to be approved by none other than the Australian foreign minister. The Australian Consul in New York warned me, "We are giving you a visa on condition that you do not deliver inflammatory speeches". "Surprise", I answered, "that's not my style". "I see that", replied the consul, "but I was instructed to tell you this".

It remains unclear to me how I was chosen to receive in 1986 the "Ellis Island Medal of Honor" as the representative of the American Croatian community, together with such prominent Americans of diverse ethnic backgrounds as Jacqueline Kennedy, the actors Gregory Peck and Kirk Douglas, Donald Trump, Mohammad Ali, Cardinals John Krol and John O'Connor, Senators Frank Lausche and Daniel Inouye, John Kluge, the billionaire, Jean MacArthur the widow of General Douglas MacArthur, Claudette Colbert, Walter Cronkite, the distinguished journalist, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Joe DiMaggio, the baseball hero. Probably it was meant as a recognition of the CNC as a legitimate political organization.

By 1987, thanks to Dr. Otto von Habsburgh, I was invited to address a causus of conservative deputies of the European parliament in Strasbourg. I visited the parliament on three subsequent occasions to speak on behalf of Croatian independence. In 1988, I was received for the first time by the State Department. I was told by Timothy

Deal, Assistant Secretary of State for Eastern Europe, that (1) the United States supports Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and independence; (2) it considers a confederal solution the best for Yugoslavia; (3) a military takeover was the worst scenario; (4) Washington was not opposed to a peaceful separation of the Yugoslav republics; (5) it did not favor the interests of one ethnic group over those of others. I was specifically told that the meeting was "on the record", that is that the meeting could be publicized.

My conversation at the State Department seemed to indicate a slight shift in Washington's policy towards Yugoslavia. Of course, the main factors forcing Washington to review its standing policy were the progressive disintegration of the Soviet Union and Milošević's dismantling of Tito's Yugoslavia. Still the State Department and the White House under the influence of Lawrence Eagleburger and Brent Scowcroft, the old Belgrade hands, continued to do whatever they could to insure Yugoslavia survival. The CIA was more realistic. It warned that the collapse of Yugoslavia was imminent and that a bloody civil war was probable.

In the late 1980s, for a brief time, the CNC had assumed the role as principal international spokesman of Croatia's aspirations. The Communist leadership of the Republic of Croatia was passive and unable to stand up to Milošević's aggressive Serbian expansionism. The Croatian opposition in the homeland remained silent. Nobody in Zagreb even dared respond to the "Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art", which called for a radical reconstruction of Yugoslavia in favor of Serbia. So, we of the CNC wrote a reply. Interestingly, only the Belgrade "Duga" commented and published extensive segments of our response probably seeking to open public debate. The Zagreb press said nothing.

But once the Croatian Communist leadership conscious of its weakness vis-à-vis Belgrade decided to permit free elections in 1990, the political balance of power was progressively redressed. The Croatian Democratic Union under Dr. Franjo Tuđman swept the 1990 elections in Croatia. Having received a mandate of the Croatian people Dr. Tuđman became the leader and the spokesman of Croatian nation's determination to establish independent state. At that point the CNC became superfluous. The reason for its existence had come to an end.

Conclusion

In the decade before Croatia's independence, the CNC played a significant role as the spokesman of Croat na-

tional aspirations in the Free World. Finally we were given the chance to present the Croatian point of view to the Western media and governments. I do not have the illusion that we significantly influenced Western views concerning Yugoslavia. Adam Fergusson, a British member of the European parliament and adviser of Marguerite Thatcher gave a "position paper" I had written to the British Foreign Secretary, who read it and dismissed it with the comment, "Interesting, but completely contrary to reports of our ambassador in Belgrade".

The State Department, the British Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsey, continued to oppose Croatian independence throughout 1991, as war began and it was clear that Yugoslavia had fallen apart. The Western Big Three took Germany to task for forcing the recognition of Croatian and Slovene independence. They sponsored the UN embargo banning the sale of weapons to Yugoslavia, which harmed poorly armed Croatia in favor of the well-armed Yugoslav National Army. Open hostility towards President Tuđman continued throughout with brief interludes, as occurred at the time of the signing of the Dayton Agreement. I well remember the State Department's reaction to Dr. Tuđman's 1990 election victory. I was told: "We recognize the legitimacy of all freely elected governments. But it does not mean we have to give them our backing!"

Has the international community given up completely on Yugoslavia? Certainly the illusion is gone that Yugoslavia as it was can be restored. But, perhaps, a common economic market, a military and political association of states could be formed? After the elections of January 2000, which brought to power an "anti-Tuđman coalition" headed by the SDP, Croatia remains under strong pressure to join a vague association of former Yugoslav republics minus Slovenia and plus Albania.

The stubborn opposition of the State Department, the Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsey to Croatia's independence, shows how difficult it is to alter long established prejudices, illusions and commitments. After all, Yugoslavia was the creation of the Versailles Peace Conference. It was brought back to life by the Tehran Conference in 1943. For Washington, London and Paris, the collapse of Yugoslavia represented a foreign policy reversal inflicted by hostile forces they failed to checkmate, and not a flawed concept that had outlived its time – a state that sought to hold together against their will peoples diverse in history, tradition, religion, cultural heritage and language.

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CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ABOUT RELATIONS BETWEEN HOMELAND AND DIASPORA

Croatian diaspora was vigorously engaged in the struggle for independence and defence of their homeland. Their contribution in building a young state's institutions was considerably smaller in post-war circumstances because domestic political, economic and cultural settings quickly earned recognition. On the contrary, in the homeland political squaring of accounts, the very role of diaspora in the creation of Croatian state was occasionally brought into question.

Starting points

The most significant political contribution of diaspora to national liberation and creation of state independence was its faith in the attainment of independence during the long, post-war decades. In the final, crucial period, at the very beginning of the nineties, emigration indirectly helped in financing and strengthening political options, which aimed at prompter recognition of Croatian statehood in the homeland. The support of displaced Croatia surely played an important role in positioning Dr. Franjo Tuđman as an unquestionable representative of that option, which the Croatian people at the first democratic elections supported almost by popular demand.

After HDZ won, during the more noticeable and unmistakable aggression towards the new Croatian government on the one hand, and the more determined implementation of the state independence programme on the other, diaspora ardently continued to help bring about changes in the homeland. As the aggression towards Croatia grew, diaspora became more resolutely engaged in its defence, leaving aside their earlier differences of opinion.

Many volunteers from emigrant Croatia participated in the armed defence of the country and subsequently played an extremely important role in the war. Along with

strong national belief, some of them brought crucial military experience from abroad. Certain people from diaspora helped in avoiding an embargo on the import of weapons, which threatened to leave Croatians to fight with their bare-hands against the fourth military force in Europe. Tens of thousands actively worked on collecting humanitarian aid in their immigrant countries, which was of great financial and spiritual importance to the homeland.

Throughout the whole world, although not so prominent, but nevertheless an extremely important part of diaspora's activity, information networks and public appearances were spontaneously organized. In this way, the truth about the conflict in the homeland and about Great-Serbian aggression penetrated western media and put pressure on official structures. Likewise, emigrant children-volunteers played a very important role in informing foreign press representatives with whom they could communicate in a persuasive way, since they were familiar with their ways of thinking (Foreign Press Bureau). I have mentioned this because the defence process from aggression and Croatian independence was an example of a new type of specific war in which, like rarely ever before, military, diplomatic and media components were intertwined. The West would never have recognized Croatia as an independent state if the black myths that Belgrade official propaganda used for decades to convince foreign media that Croats are "some kind of genocidal and fascist people" had not been dispelled.

During the war, and after it, a number of people from diaspora held some of the highest positions in the country, as ministers in important ministries and in high positions in defence, diplomacy, administration and the economy. The influence of diaspora was initially large, especially in the sector of defence; a long-standing minister and a number of young generals came from diaspora. A special ministry for emigrant Croatia was founded and diaspora was well represented in the Croatian Parliament.[1]

Nevertheless, the relative influence of diaspora decreased inasmuch as political power and state structures of the new Croatian government state stabilized, thus taking over many inherited value principles and thoroughly specific structures of earlier society.

Personal experience

I can testify quite competently about diaspora's share in the creation of the Croatian state, because I participated very intensely in this task, first as a member of the Constituent

Committee and then as the President's counsellor for modernization of the supreme state administration. I also organized the EU observers' arrival and was the Minister of Public Relations in the Government of Democratic Unity. I served as an ambassador in Paris and The Hague and was appointed manager of HINA. During the entire war, I was present at daily meetings of the First cabinet and gave daily reports to the President of the Republic, I also attended sessions of the highest state institutions. In the second half of the nineties, as manager of HINA, I had the opportunity to be present at the meetings of the highest state co-ordinations – in short, I saw, as in the British proverb, elephants dancing, and occasionally took part in this dancing. After the matter-of-principle conflict with the state leadership at the beginning of the year 1999, I had the opportunity to see how the opposition, that is to say, the party of today's government worked.

Considering some of the disparaging emphasis in later discussions on the role of diaspora in state-making, it is not inappropriate to mention that I did not come unprepared and inexperienced after forty years of exile to take on Croatian political functions. Back in 1959, I was the president of social science students in Stockholm, and later the manager of a Swedish Union of Employers, as well as an organization consultant at a high business level and a manager of a big auditing firm. I obtained a master's degree at one of the best American universities, published a few books about economy problems in Sweden, and I speak half a dozen languages. Above all, I was very active in organizing Croatian immigrants in Sweden and founded the first Society of Croatian Friends, followed by the Croatian cultural and sport societies under a very successful Croatian union, which was recognized at the highest state level.

There were more people with similar backgrounds, and they should be mentioned to understand that while helping their homeland, diaspora had some knowledge and experience that would have been impossible to gain in their country of origin. This was crucial for the recognition of the Croatian state, particularly during the first period. A good example is public relations, which is still one of the most deplorable parts of Croatian public life – slow, red-tape, bureaucratic and closed – directed towards "painting" public opinion, it irresistibly reminds us of the way socialist mastodons worked. People, who spent their lives under earlier one-party conditions, do not seem to react to this anachronism. Moreover, it certainly cannot pass in light of the conditions and way western media works.

In such an inherited environment, and at the beginning of the nineties it was immeasurably pronounced (it was emulated with great ardour against the opposing side, especially at YNA), the Croatian Ministry of Public Relations largely applied the principle of openness. The main rule was never to knowingly lie to journalists and to admit mistakes without being evasive. Censorship, which would not have been efficient in the new technological circumstances anyhow, was avoided. Journalists were allowed to approach the battlefield wherever the commands of military security permitted this. It is possible to prove that this very approach has eventually changed the admittance of Croatia to international media and gave way to an official understanding of new facts in our territory.

However, as mentioned before, such and similar positive experiences of applying those values which emigrants brought with them were not appealing enough to be continually applied in building of the state at a wider level. Why?

Conflicting relations between diaspora and homeland

Homeland and diaspora are very asymmetrical notions, not only in terms of size. Mutual homeland life strengthens a sense of identity in various ways with all its positive and negative aspects that are related to a certain space and time. With every new year of life in another environment and with every new generation, emigrants grow apart from their homeland numerically and in terms of the values that they hold. Besides, various parts of diaspora are exposed to different cultural and economic influences, depending on the country and the cultural circle in which they live. This makes diaspora additionally structureless and less assertive compared to the homeland sphere.

Therefore, those two categories often create unrealistic mental images about one another, which in addition makes the dialogue more difficult. Thus, for instance, homeland public opinion often has exaggerated ideas about migrants' standards of living and the supposed easiness it is achieved with. It misinterprets the social signs and behaviour, which migrants have adopted in their new countries, and sometimes it sees emigrants as competition in a professional or economic sense. Emigrants' remittances have already been an essential key element in the national economy for a long time, but collective consciousness barely recognizes this, and economic policy does not take them into account.

Many parts of diaspora have developed an idealized image of the homeland in which objective inadequacies that were the causes of emigration fade away in time and proportionally in terms of distance from the native land. However, when they return either for shorter or longer periods to the homeland, emigrants often find ways of life, institutional frameworks and values strange. They lack experience in recognizing social symbols specific for homeland circumstances; they lack equality and legal rights; they do not understand the logic and mechanisms according to which the government, even a democratic one, rules instead of applying laws to serve the people.[2]

At the crucial, almost revolutionary moment, when a constellation of forces in international circles made space for the realization of the Croatian nation-building ideas, the mentioned differences between homeland and diaspora were relegated to a position of secondary importance. Besides, the fact that nation-building ideas could have been publicly stated only in emigration, while in Yugoslav communist usage, at the best, it was suppressed, disguised and masked gave diaspora their "five minutes". During spasms of surviving the open aggression, the role of diaspora as a bridge to the western world was particularly emphasized.

Yet, after war conflicts ended and while everything was returning to normal, all those banked up antagonisms, which from the beginning created a certain gap between homeland and diaspora cropped up again. Indeed, in a sense, they became even more stressed now because in the sovereign state, the responsibility could not be thrown on someone outside of the national corpus.

The part of Croatian emigrants, which formed under the conditions of democratic and post-industrialist society, is rather unprepared to be included in homeland milieu, for some of the following reasons:

- Politics, public administration, economy and even judicature are tightly connected.
- Social networks and the possibility of buying power, not by clearly defined, inalienable citizen rights and duties, determine citizen status. Almost paradigmatic mistrust in citizens' integrity and honour is expressed by hyper-production of laws and regulations with contradictory content and questionable range.
- Tradition is a dominant form of communication.
- There is no systematic processing of experience as a form of continued learning.

Considering these and the other cultural differences between the two models of living and social organization

we should ask ourselves to which degree is emigrant experience useful at all and usable in homeland society if it wants to continue its trodden path. From this point of view, it is only logical that the role of diaspora in the post-war period is considerably marginalized, for in such a society emigrant experience does not carry any special value.

Campaign against diaspora taking an active part in the homeland

However, it is interesting, that in homeland discussions about emigration a diametrically opposed logic systematically appears, that is to say, "wild persons came and chased away the meek". In the process, a couple of themes known from the Communist period are recycled, onto which a new prop-phrases are superimposed. By accepting the promotional stereotypes of the ex-Yugoslav regime about the alleged Ustasha character of emigrants, some media often add, for instance, that diaspora are poorly qualified, that there is a strong presence of Herzegovians (to whom labels of "tribal" connections and mafia-style are attached), a compound of clergy and politics according to "clergy-fascist" line of the old propaganda (to which Herzegovinian monks have been subjected, especially those from the monastery in Canadian Norwal) etc.

At the same time, emigrants have been accused of financial embezzlements and suspected of taking large sums of money and other means collected during the war for the homeland. In other words, some individuals made themselves rich by making use of their contribution to war efforts and the like.

Yet diaspora, proud of their contribution, do not seem to feel the need to contradict even some of the apparent lies and contrived statements. By limiting their history mostly to the importance of their own help and their roles in the crucial days of the struggle for independence, they allow critics to impose upon them subjects and agenda of discussions. Thus, the media often use information and statements about great financial help to the homeland as a confirmation of hidden notions about the role of emigrants as some mysterious Big Brother.

Years ago, I had the opportunity to warn of the political stratification of Croatian emigrants up until Croatian Spring in 1970, but I feel the need to emphasize it again.[3] Namely, I am sure that the political situation in exile was as complicated then and subsequently during the next twenty years, up to the creation of the Croatian state. Only ignorant people or people with foul intentions could

attribute Ustashism to all emigrants, that is to say, describe emigrants as some monolithic bloc.

As for other statements, this is neither time nor place to analyze which of the mentioned above has some real foundations, and what is an arbitrary statement. It is enough to recall that it would be a true miracle if there were no large embezzlements and misuse of grave social conditions for one's own personal interests and the like at a time when the political system was changing, a new state was being created and the defensive war was led. It would be a real miracle if such phenomena were not also present among people who returned to the homeland from diaspora, exactly as there was among "the locals".

However, it is interesting, that the mentioned asymmetry between homeland and diaspora has also been expressed in the way media deals with these themes. Critical reflections and even lame hypothetical talk connected to diaspora are often much more interesting to the media than some other negative phenomena, which could have real weight in the homeland society. Reports on the "bravados" of certain rich people deservedly gained large publicity, but not in Croatian public circles. For example, according to some data, Croatian banks, during the biggest economic crisis (1992–1993) approved of at least 400 million DM for so-called managerial credits. This facilitated the transition of numerous firms into the hands of many former socialist managers who, with some exceptions, did not really prove themselves as competent, but were in such positions because of political party affiliations. We can only guess the extent of the damage to the economy, caused by recycling those almost completely non-transparent economic relations completely unprepared for market competition.

So, the real question is why embezzlements were not energetically sanctioned in the homeland? Excuses in some media, that the governing party was hiding them, are only partially correct because HDZ started investigations during their rule.

Closer to the truth is the statement that the governments, of HDZ and today's, have remained largely a prisoner of dominant social values. Using political power for the advancement of personal or particular interests is still considered, (although incomprehensible for many emigrants), with a dose of tolerance, and the system carefully disassociates itself from any change that could jeopardize the rules of the game, which facilitates such privatization of public business. Therefore, globally speaking, emigrants' experience would be useful, even precious, only in

a homeland reform that aims at a deep reexamination of institutions and values of the whole society. To begin with this is an unrewarding task and a difficult one too.

FOOTNOTES

[1] This parliamentary representation was, to be fair, politically speaking and considering the voting system, more an attempt to include the representatives of Croats in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, rather than opening up towards diaspora, scattered all around the world.

[2] Each time I heard the complaints of President Tuđman that it was much easier to win the state than to put it in order, and I heard it at least a dozen times, I recalled those emigrants who believed that by simply creating a state "everything would fall into place"...

[3] Branko Salaj, Spring and diaspora, *Croatian Review*, a renewed course II/1, March 2002, pp. 6–22.

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CROATIAN DIASPORA'S REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT: AFFIRMATIVE OR NEGATIVE?

The Croatian diaspora, along with the Israeli one, ranks among the most homogeneous ones in the world, which is a good reason for productive co-operation between Croatia–the homeland and its emigration. Throughout their history, so many emigrated Croats have been actively involved in the struggle for an independent Croatian state, especially after the year 1990. Thereby the spiritual unity of Croatia and the Croatian people has been confirmed.

The Croatian diaspora seeks to have continued co-operation and live with the problems of Croatia. Furthermore, a sizeable share of Croats would like to return to their homeland from abroad and get inserted into the country's economic activities by encouraging small and medium-sized businesses, job creation, the transfer of new technologies, etc. A great share of fairly recent emigrants are still the owners of land property in Croatia, many of them have parents who still live in Croatia and in many instances their children, as well. The case in point is that people are directly interested in what goes on in Croatia. They are not third or fourth generation members, but rather, holders of regular Croatian citizenship.

Croatian emigration's remittances have always figured prominently among national budget items during past regimes.

With regards to the national budget of the Republic of Croatia money received in remittances from its emigrants is considerable, even higher than the income from tourism. According to some estimates, since the early 1990s emigrants have donated about 700 million DM so that an independent Croatia could be established. Money transfers sent to their families on a daily basis are not included in this figure. Along with tourism and the economy, earnings from emigrants constitute the third pillar of the national budget. Croatian emigrant youth get conscripted after they return to Croatia to serve in one of the armed forces.

It is a different matter with respect to how many and who will represent the Croatian Diaspora in the Croatian Parliament – Sabor. The answer depends on the generation-related "configuration" of the emigration. First- and second-generation Croats are definitely more concerned about the Old Homeland than the other generations: the former are directly interested in maintaining a many-sided linkage with Croatia. Nevertheless, emigrants have their particular needs and problems, the same as the national minorities who live in Croatia. Moreover, the countries of emigration are advised by the international community and other related institutions to allow their emigrants to become involved in the political life of the Homeland.

As part of modern European democratic processes, it is clearly indicated that emigration should be inserted more actively into the respective source countries' normal day-to-day developments. Hence it is stated in one of the conclusions of Resolution 1035 (1994) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, *inter alia*, that the States should consider integrating emigration-related issues into their state and international policies. The Council of Europe Memorandum dated 31st August 1998 on matters of migration, refugees and demography states the following: "It is in the interest of a State that its emigrants can practice their nationality in active terms as voters, thus providing them with possibilities as would not make them just sheer objects of nostalgia."

The Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe issued a Memorandum on links between the Europeans living in foreign countries of their origin, distinguishing three groups of States:

- so-called mother countries (native lands) that have established a number of legal structures for the protection of their emigrants' interests (mostly Mediterranean countries);
- countries with long traditions of emigration that have not provided for their emigrants (mostly Protestant countries);
- new democracies, Croatia is among such States, which have viewed their emigration, respectively, as the embodiment of freedom and democracy-related values.

According to the Memorandum, the right to vote may be considered as one of the main attributes of citizenship and its application as one of the fundamentals of democracy. The Memorandum also refers to the "Croatian case" as one example of the specific representation of the source countries' emigration in their parliaments, advising

all Council of Europe States to follow the road that Croatia has taken.

The issue of emigrants' right to vote for their source countries' representative bodies has been discussed and settled in some other countries of emigration, as well. In Portugal, for instance, 1.7% of all votes are from Portuguese voters who live in foreign countries. They can vote for their parliament but not for the President of the Republic. Portugal has precise data on the number of citizens from abroad who are entitled to vote and a single electoral register for all voters at home and in foreign countries. Portugal also has a pure electoral system of proportional representation with 18 continental lists and two for abroad; from each of the lists a certain number of representatives are chosen in proportion to the number of voters in the electoral unit concerned. 2.1% of such voters vote for the parliament of Algeria, 1.3% for the one in Angola, and 5.3% for the upper chamber of the parliament of Mauritania. In Switzerland, the right to vote for representative bodies has been in existence since 1996. In Hungary, the World Alliance of Hungarians believes that a special list is a good solution and has proposed this to their parliament. Polish nationals abroad who have not acquired another country's citizenship are listed in just one electoral unit – the Warsaw centre – where they can exercise their right to vote both passively and actively in a country without dual citizenship.

Even though the international organisations mentioned above advocate a diaspora participation in the life of its source country, some of their representatives have expressed their reservations vis-à-vis the Croatian experience. For instance, amid the twenty-one conditions that were accepted and signed by President Franjo Tuđman and Academician Vlatko Pavletić on the eve of Croatia's admittance to the Council of Europe, there is one requiring that the Electoral Law be amended and, in particular, that the provision on a special list for the diaspora be annulled.

The estimated number of Croatian citizens non-resident in Croatia entitled to vote, is 398 thousand – that is, about ten per cent of the overall number of Croatian citizens with voting rights. Based on such a proportion, 12 MPs get elected from the diaspora out of 120 seats in the House of Representatives.

The Croats non-resident in their homeland vote only in elections for the President of the State and for the Parliament. With regards to the debate on the issue of Croatian diaspora's representation in Parliament: it has been controversial ever since 1995, when there was a clash of

two principal opinions, involving the Opposition and the ruling party. According to the former, it is unacceptable for the special diaspora list to provide a footing for representatives from the Croatian Democratic Union (CDU).

Indeed, the CDU was the first to recognise the interest of Croatian emigration in the Old Homeland and subsequently offered Croatian diaspora an appropriate political programme. Furthermore, this party established its coordinating associations and branches in emigration: of the former, 23 are active to-date, of the latter, 121. The Croatian World Congress was also created by the CDU, and the party has been active through other cultural, religious and sports organisations. It is not by chance that the twelve MPs from diaspora, who have been in Parliament hitherto, are CDU activists, for the most part.

This issue has to be separated from the interests and competition between parties and dealt with as one of Croatia's current general interests.

The opinion argument that the voting rights of Croatian diaspora should be withheld on the grounds that they do not make money and do not pay taxes in Croatia so they can not make decisions about the fate of the people who live in Croatia does not hold water. There are Croatian citizens who do not pay taxes, i.e., the unemployed, students and soldiers. Moreover, Croatian emigrants actually pay taxes indirectly, e.g., property tax, and their families in Croatia pay tax on consumption. If Croatian diaspora do not obtain their parliamentary representation, no one can represent their interests in Parliament.

In the 1995 elections, diaspora representatives were elected from a special list, mostly by voters from Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H). According to the related data, 98 thousand electors voted for the list: 79 thousand from B-H and 9 thousand worldwide. This points to the dubiousness of the term "emigrated Croats" since Croats in B-H are an autochthonous population. They are also one of the constituent peoples there, which is another reason why they cannot be compared to emigrated Croats. It is a fact, however, that a diaspora means a people that are scattered in some territory. Not by their own will, but by a decision made by the Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in 1943. – Croats were left outside of the territory of the Croatian state, so they cannot be denied the right to elect representatives from a special list.

The Social Democratic Party (SDP) feels that Croats in B-H are a particular case, in that they are not diaspora but a constituent people in a sovereign state. It is unprin-

cipled to insist that they are constitutive while providing, at the same time, a special list to choose from at elections, even though they are citiziens of a sovereign state.

The Croatian diaspora and the Croats from B-H – as the other half of the Croatian national body – knew how and sought together with the home country to establish and defend a modern and sovereign Croatia, so there is no reason why they should not be equally entitled to take part in its construction, as well.

The CDU has a grudge against the SDP: in the first place, with the latter allegedly aware of the responsibility for the Croats' displacement in the past fifty years so they know in advance that the electorate of the diaspora do not favour them.

Not that the Opposition are against such a solution in principle but because of the fact that in the past elections 1995, all of the twelve parliamentarians came from CDU. It obviously seems as if narrow partisan interests are at work. Even an objective observer must be critical of the opposition's inability to produce a political programme that could win over at least a part of the Croatian diaspora.

In sovereign Croatia, emigrated Croats have to be represented in Parliament as a guarantee for improving their close links with the homeland. This stems, in the first place, from the fact that the home country – Croatia and its emigration went to great lengths to jointly create an independent Croatian state. However, it is equally important that Croatian emigrants seek to continue to be an integral part of the Croatian national body. Nor should we disregard the fact that – almost as a rule in today's world-source countries have been building bridges with their diasporas, respectively, for economic, culture-related, national and political reasons. In contrast, the activities of the Croatian political parties in the diaspora have neither some good purpose at present nor any future. On the other hand, Croats from abroad are entitled to have their official and representative voice in Croatia. Putting modalities aside, the issue shoud be dealt with by our politicians.

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FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM DIASPORA

Background to Emigration

In order to fully understand and appreciate the role that Croatia's diaspora has in Croatia (both present and past), one must look at the circumstances under which that diaspora was created and the logistical support which is in place. Croats emigrated in several waves to various parts of the world. The Republic of Dubrovnik sent sailors around the world. Croatian sailors were among the crews of many famous expeditions from Columbus to Hudson. Marco Polo, the most famous explorer was born in Croatia (on the island of Korčula). These sailors not only made an imapct on the world but many of them did not return home. During this period there were large-scale migrations, within Europe, particularly during the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The first large wave was at the end of the 19th century when poverty forced large-scale emigration from Dalmatia, particularly the islands. Most of these emigrants went to North and South America.

The next large wave was between the two world wars. For economic and political reasons, Croats sought their future elsewhere. The destinations were primarily North America and Australia.

At the end of WWII, a large group of Croats emigrated to South America to avoid persecution at the hands of the communists.

Legal emigration was virtually grounded from 1946 to 1960 as the borders were sealed and only the bravest attempted to cross the border illegally at the risk of prison or death. Yugoslavia made the unprecedented decision to allowe migration in the early 1960s. This was done for several reasons. Emigration slightly changed the structure of the population, since it was primarily Croats who chose to leave. It gave the Yugoslav face of communism a social appearance and most importantly it resulted in the inflow of foreign currency. Croats who left for good, or as tempo-

rary workers sent vast amounts of money home to support relatives who had stayed behind.

This stage continued throughout the sixties. After the Croatian Spring of 1971, the next wave of political immigration occurred. Most of these emigrants stayed within Europe, although some went to North America or Australia.

Croatian organizations abroad

The oldest and most important Croatian organization abroad is the Croatian Roman Catholic Church. Croatian speaking priests were sent to wherever there were large concentrations of Croatian immigrants. They were able to preserve the language and culture as well as instigate the creation of other organizations. In Canada, for example, there are 19 Croatian parishes and 19 strong Croatian communities. In the United States there are 23 parishes and 23 strong communities. Beyond doubt, where a Croatian parish was formed the community prospered and future immigrants were naturally drawn to those centres. These parishes received strong non-financial support from the homeland. Nuns were also sent from Croatia abroad to support these communites.

In these communities, Croatian Cultural Institutions were formed (folk dancing, choirs and tamburitza groups) to preserve traditions. Eventually even soccer teams usually called Croatia were established. These teams were very successful especially in Sydney (Australian champions on more than one occasion) and Toronto (Canadian and even North American champions). Some of these teams did have contacts with Yugoslavia. Croatian players from the Yugoslav first division were given permission to play abroad. However, these teams rarely traveled to Croatia because they were seen to be overly nationalistic.

Croatian schools were opened abroad in order to preserve the Croatian language. In Europe, many of the schools were supported by Yugoslavia who sent teachers abroad to teach "Serbo-Croatian". In North America and Australia, there was no contact with Yugoslavia and the shools were independetly organized and self-financed.

The Croatian Peasant Party which had chapters around the world first organized political activity abroad. Other political groups ranging from The Party of Rights to the Croatian Democratic Union were established. The 1950s brought a proliferation of political parties primarily dedicated to the destruction of Yugoslavia. In many cases, these parties were the targets of illegal Yugoslav secret ser-

vice activity including assassinations, which numbered in the hundreds. Most political parties were disbanded or fell apart in 1990 as democratic changes took place in Croatia. The exception was the Croatian Democratic Union (CDU), which dramatically grew in North America, Australia and Europe. These organizations provided the cash for the democratic changes in Croatia and were one of the reasons that the CDU did so well in all of the elections in Croatia from 1990 until the present day.

The Croatian World Congress (CWC) was formed in 1992. Its goals and structure were based on the World Jewish Congress. The CWC is active in most countries where there is a strong Croatian presence. Since the elections in 2000, the CWC and the new coalition government have been at odds over numerous issues ranging from the treatment of returnees to the right of Croat citizens abroad to vote. The former CDU government supported CWC's activities and was able to benefit primarily from its lobbying capabilities. Today, communication is only through the media destructive.

There are several examples of Croatian financial institutions abroad. The best examples are Credit Unions which operate in the US and Canada. These Credit Unions attempted to get a foothold in Croatia in the mid 1990 with no success. The weight of bureaucracy was too heavy. They can be the future centres for possible diaspora investment funds.

Task Force was an idea based loosely on the ideals of the Jewish Kibbutz. Starting in 1992, Croatian youth from around the world came to Croatia during the summer to work on various projects. The idea was to increase ties to the homeland, which many of the participants had never seen. The first group worked in Voćin cleaning up the what was left after the war devastation. The participants came from 5 continents. Of the 45 participants, 19 chose to remain in Croatia, some permanently. The others improved their ties to the homeland and created a network of Croatian youth around the world. Task Force continues today and many of the participants return to participate again. What is remarkable is the number of non-Croats who choose to participate for various reasons ranging from research to adventure and friendship. The project is coordinated by Matica (Homeland Foundation) in Zagreb.

Investment Potential

Investment potential in Croatia in the early 1990s was questionable to say the least. After the declaration of inde-

pendence, very few external analysts gave the country a positive appraisal. The country was a risk in terms of ability to survive, border control, suppression of internal rebellion and coming to grips with the economical hardship, which were sure to follow. To make matters worse an arms embargo was declared. The purpose of the arms embargo was not to prevent fighting but rather to make it even more difficult for the newly declared country to defend itself.

The borders with Slovenia were disputed primarily due to Slovenia's attempt to gain access to international waters. The border with Serbia and Montenegro was not under Croatian control. Most importantly, the longest border with Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H) was totally compromised. The Serb paramilitary and Yugoslav army occupied 26% of Croatia's territory. To make matters worse, the occupied territories were in the heart of Croatia making normal travel impossible. A 3-hour drive from Zagreb to Osijek was extended to 6 hours. A drive from Osijek to Dubrovnik took up 14 hours instead of the usual 6.

These logistical problems created other problems and the Dalmatian coast was always on the verge of being totally cut off south of Zadar. To make matters worse an additional 25% of the country was rationing water and electricity because Serbs controlled the distribution of water and electricity.

During the height of the war, Croatia had up to 400,000 internally displaced persons. The 600,000 refugees, who fled to Croatia from neighbouring B-H were an even greater problem. It was disastrous drain on the economy just to house, feed and care for these 1 million people considering the total prewar population of 4.5 million in Croatia.

An analysis of the Croatian economy in 1989 showed that there was an over employment level of 30% in industry which relied on cooperation with other republics within Yugoslavia and was geared towards the eastern markets. Roughly 70% of Croatian industrial output was destroyed, occupied or disrupted. This additional unemployment together with a growing army of up to 250,000 meant that most of the budget funds would have to maintain the war effort or to sustain minimum standards of living. The Kuna was introduced and has remarkably maintained its stability since 1992 until the present day. There were and continue to be constant rumours of its devaluation and daily comments by so-called experts calling for its devaluation by up to 40%. Interest rates for foreign currency transactions were in the range of 11 to 14%. It was, and

continues to be impossible to borrow money in Croatia without a foreign currency clause.

Given these facts, it is needless to say that investment potential in Croatia up until 1996 was catastrophic. Very few investors were willing to risk their capital in an unstable and seemingly risky country. Most of the exceptions were companies that were owned or run in collaboration with the Croatian diaspora.

Foreign Direct Investment

Year	FDI million DM
1993	256.6
1994	250.4
1995	257.7
1996	1,100.3
1997	1,174.8
1998	2,162.3
1999	3,488.3
2000	2,403.7
2001	3,082.8
Total	**14,176**

According to statistics from the Central Bank, the total FDI in Croatia up until 1996 was 764.7 million DM. This was when tens of billions were being allocated into Central Europe and Hungary and the Czech republic took more than their share. It is remarkable that the country was able to survive until 1995 when two military actions operations "Flash" and "Thunder" liberated almost all of the occupied territories. FDI jumped to over 1.1 billion DM in 1996 and 1997 and to over 2 billion DM in 1998. The best year for FDI was 1999 when 3.5 bilion DM was invested primarily in telecommunications, banking and pharmaceuticals.

In January 2000 new elections were held. This was heralded as the post Tuđman/Croatian Democratic Union era. The process of "Democratization" and Euro-Atlantic integration insured prosperity and growth for Croatia. It was hoped that foreign investment would flood in and the six party coalition would run the country in an officient, non-corrupt and tranparent manner. The campaign was waged on "important" issues such as:

- Will sell "Tuđman's" jet and travel with regular airlines;
- Will move the president's office from Pantovčak;

- Will not use the Islands of Briuni to entertain foreign guests;
- Will reduce the number of expensive cars in the government pool.

Other issues, which the coalition partners raised were:

- Reduction of the VAT from 22% to 17%;
- Creation of 200,000 new jobs;
- Drastically reduce salaries of government officials;
- Take away the right of non-resident Croats to vote;
- Reduce bureaucracy at all levels and decentralize and downsize the government.

The post-election expectations have been shattered. None of the above promises have been kept and in fact the only positive result has been one of International acceptance. However, this acceptance has not been translated into the surge of foreign investment. It was expected that FDI would double and perhaps even triple immediately. In fact, if we compare the two pre-election years and the 2 post-election years it has decreased.

Diaspora Investment

The key question is how was Croatia able to survive prior to 1996 given that foreign investments were so low. The answer lies in the contributions of diaspora. The importance can be seen through a specific example. The Croatian Privatization Fund (CPF) is a State Privatization Agency. Up until the elections investors by providing information in an attempt to bypass bureaucracy. A web site was opened in order to insure timely access to potential diaspora investors from around the world. This policy had immediate results as one can see from the chart below (CPF statistics).

Year	DM (million)
1992	2,600
1993	17,067
1994	58,132
1995	5,472
1996	49,623
1997	10,395
1998	6,482
1999	1,030
2000-02	0,584
Total	**151.3**

This total of 151 million DM only relates to shares purchased from the CPF. As a result of the structure of the privatization portfolio, which includes reservations, small shareholders and State Pension Funds the actual investment was greater than 600 million DM including recapitalization. The most important role of these investment relates to the time at which they were made. From the FDI chart, we can see that there was very little interest in Croatia prior to 1996 due to the circumstances mentioned. These same inhibitions were not prevailing and did not affect the willingness of Croats from abroad to invest. Each investment dollar prior to 1996 was certainly much more valuable than one that was invested later.

If we dissect the CPF diaspora investment we can see that most of the investment came from countries where the Croatian community was large and active. Nearly 40% came from Germany where Croats have worked as "foreign workers" for the past 40 years. Followed by the United States and Canada with over 20%. Even Australia contributed 9% despite the distance. These three communities were among the best organized if the number of churches, soccer teams, cultural institutions and political organizations are considered.

One of the more interesting stories is that of billionaire Andronikо Lukšić from Chile. According to Forbes, Lukšić is one of the wealthiest men in the world. His parents emigrated to Chile from the island of Brač. He had never visited Croatia and in 1994 he purchased a brewery in Karlovac. At that time his factory was 43 kilometres from the front lines. His 9 million DM initial investment was illogical except for the fact that he had Croatian roots. This was typical of the way most diaspora investors thought.

In addition to investment through the purchase of shares, a great deal of money was deposited in the Croatian banking system. Estimates range from 500 million to 1 billion DM. Money continued to pour into Croatian Banks up until the financial crisis struck several banks (e.g., Glumina). Most of the depositors, which lost parts of their savings, lived abroad. Only the first 30,000 DM from each account was covered by deposit insurance. The government refused to cover the rest although indirectly most of the money was recovered through a process of coincidental withdraws and deposits which created the illusion of multiple accounts.

Croatian communities around the world raised funds to finance the opening of diplomatic missions. Over 20 million DM was raised in Australia, Germany, the United

States and Canada. The amount of money and energy spent on lobbying for the recognition of Croatia is impossible to measure. Nearly 1 billion DM worth of "humanitarian" aid was sent to Croatia. This included food, clothes, and medical as well as military equipment. Estimates on the amount of direct cash, which was sent, range from 275 to 500 million DM. This amount is impossible to verify because various groups tend to exaggerate their contributions. Official documentation has not yet been made public because most of the funds were used to circumvent the arms embargo.

Over 5,000 Croat families have returned from abroad since 1990 until the present day. Estimates on the amount of cash they brought with them vary but many experts agree that the amount exceeded 350 million DM. Even more importanly, diaspora sent roughly 250 million DM in family support during the war years of 1991 until 1995. Although this type of support continues today, the initial family support was used to purchuase weapons, food and cover other expenses.

The greatest source of foreign currency in Croatia besides tourism is generated by workers pensions earned abroad (primarily Germany). Each year over 100 million DM is brought into Croatia. In addition, foreign pensions that belong to Croats living in B-H find their way into Croatia because most of the goods that these Croats purchase are of Croatian origin. In fact B-H is the only country in the world with which Croatia has a favourable trade balance.

Virtually all of the Greenfield investments in Croatia prior to 1996 were diaspora backed. In total, nearly 400 million DM was invested in construction alone. These ventures included shopping malls, housing, marinas, and other tourist related activities. In this sector alone nearly 10,000 new jobs were opened. However, more important than the investment itself was that new technologies were introduced.

Government and Institutional response

Diaspora played and continues to play a key financial role in Croatia. The only difference now is that they are no longer appreciated. The war is long behind us and the climate of unity and gratefulness has emerged into one of resentment.

Immeditely after the elections in 2000, the government-run press attacked Croatian diaspora, particularly its role in investment and monetary support. The attempt to

descredit everything associated with Croats living abroad was based on the overwhelming support the diaspora offered the former CDU Government. Remarkably, Andronico Lukšić, a billionare of Croatian heritage from Chile was questioned about the discounts he received although he had purchased his brewery according to the existing tender laws. Many other companies, which were purchased by the diaspora also experienced difficulties when they tried to renew their concessions, more over, the financial and criminal police investigated their activities. The main aim was to show that they had purchased their shares in a non-transparent manner and that they had made secret contributions to the former government. To this date not a single case has been successfully prosecuted in the courts. The effect however has been to discourage further investment not only by the diaspora but by other investors as well.

Croatia opened diplomatic missions around the world immediatley after international recognition. As mentioned earlier, in many cases, local Croats funded the purchase of consular buildings for these missions. After the elections in 2000, the President's office and Ministry of Foreign affairs announced the closure of many missions. This was described as a cost saving measure. These missions included consulates in Mississauga, Cleveland, Chicago and Melbourne, where Croatian communities were among the most numerous and active in the world. The message was clear; they had to be punished for supporting the previous government. Since this announcement there has been some back peddling because of the backlash and internal disagreement among the coalition partners, some of whom believed that cooperation with the diaspora was essential to the future prosperity of Croatia.

Croats who returned from abroad had unbelievable problems in securing the required documentation to enable them to work. The greatest difficulties were related to recognition of tertiary degrees. Even prior to the elections in 2000, it was a long, tedious and expensive process to gain recognition of degrees obtained abroad. The exceptions were for degrees from the former Yugoslav Republics. A degree from the "University" of Banja Luka is readily recognized but a degree from Harvard required:

- Translated course outlines;
- Additional courses (Marxism in some cases);
- Certificates from the American Embassy;
- Certificate from the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- Approval from the University of Zagreb.

As incredible as this sounds this process is very expensive and often lasts several years. In the meantime many occupations require certain levels of education and prior to this diploma recognition individuals are penalized in terms of position and salary.

The most sensitive issue is related to whether or not Croats who live abroad have the right to vote. During the 1995 elections, 12 seats were reserved for the Croat Diaspora List. All 12 elected members were on the CDU list, which received 90% of all votes cast. During the elections of 2000, all 6 MPs elected by the diaspora were CDU members, garnering over 90% of the votes cast. This was a clear sign for the new ruling parties to do everything in their power to prevent the political influence of the diaspora. The public campaign began and was based on the idea that if you did not pay taxes in Croatia or serve in the army you could not vote. These arguments failed for several reasons. What about the unemployed, the retired or students. They do not pay taxes either. In terms of military service, what about women who are required to do compuslory service in the army. Many of the voters in the diaspora did military service before, during and after the Homeland war, and pay taxes even though they live abroad. The biggest stumbling block was the constitution, which guaranteed equal treatment regardless of place of dwelling. The new government could not create two types of citizens, those who could vote and those who could not. Clearly, a new tactic had to be employed. The government could not prevent the diaspora from voting but they could make it more difficult. The new idea was that everyone could vote but only within Croatia. Thus, distance would prevent 99% of eligible Croats living abroad from voting. In addition, the seats reserved for the diaspora would be eliminated so that the diaspora vote could be diluted.

The disturbing aspect of this voting issue is the fact that Croatia is moving away from current world trends, which they had pioneered. Most countries in the world, which have democratic systems, allow their citizens the opportunity to vote and make it as simple as possible. As Croatia is attempting to eliminate parliamentary seats for the diaspora many European countries, such as Italy, Poland, the Ukraine and Portugal, are introducing them.

Opposition to the diaspora seats is based on the arguments that people living abroad should not have so much influence in domestic policies. In fact this argument is baseless. In 1995, CDU had 73 seats of a total of 127. Without the 12 diaspora seats they would have had 61 of 115,

still a clear majority. In the elections of 2000, the CDU elected 46 member of 151 (30%) and would have had 40 of 145 (28%) without the diaspora seats.

Now what

In order to rebuild the bridges and mitigate the damage done to diaspora relations the Government should immediately undertake some or all of the following measures:

A. Streamline the recognition of foreign diplomas and encourage education abroad as well as stimulate the repatriation and hiring (in the government and private sector) of Croats from abroad.
B. Streamline and reduce the cost of Croat citizenship for all Croats regardless of place of birth or residence.
C. Improve cooperation with various Croatian organizations abroad, such as: the Croatian World Congress, Croatian Soccer Federations, Folklore and other Cultural Organizations, Political Organizations, Church and all other groups. This improved cooperation and coordination should be channeled through Matica and diplomatic offices.
D. Institute financial reform creating a tiered banking system with various levels of protection for deposits. At least one government controlled bank should have a deposit insurance in the amount of $1 million, insuring the inflow of diaspora cash.
E. Implement a new election law allowing for mail-in votes and reserving at least as many seats in Parliament as minorities currently have.
F. Enact a new law on return, outlining various benefits, which will allow for the return and integration of the diaspora. This law should target specific groups based on their potential to improve the long-term stability of Croatia.
G. Finally and most importantly, undertake steps through the government controlled media in particular Croatian TV to convince all Croats (local and abroad) that the repatriation of Croats is in the long-term interest of Croatia.

CANADA

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THE CHANGING FACES OF CANADA: NEWLY-IMMIGRATED ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THE CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING PROCESS, 1984–1993

Canada's "faces", quite literally, have changed dramatically since the mid-1960s. Some 2.8 million immigrants arrived in the country in the 1968–1988 period. Whereas in the late 1950s, 84.3 percent of immigrants to Canada were born in Europe, by the late 1980s only 28.6 percent of arrivals were of European birth.[1] Such radically altered immigration patterns have had predictable effects on the face of Canadian society. In 1961, 3.2 percent of Canadians were Visible minorities'.[2] In 1986, according to the *Census of Canada*, Visible minorities'[3] constituted 6.3 percent of the Canadian population; by 1996, the figure was 11.2 percent.[4]

Significant growth in the number – and size – of visible minority communities could, plausibly, lead to new, different, even increased pressures on the Canadian foreign policy-making process. In the thirty years after formally assuming responsibility in 1931 for the conduct of its own foreign policy, relations with the United States and with Europe preoccupied Canadian decision-makers. In part, that was a function of the fact that the overwhelming majority of Canadians could trace their heritage to Europe. By the same logic, some of the focus of Canadian foreign policy must now inevitably be shifting to the developing world.

Many visible minority immigrants to Canada from the 1960s-onward arrived either as formal refugees or after fleeing tumultuous political situations in which their continued ability to pursue a livelihood – and perhaps even their personal security – was in jeopardy. Among their number are Armenians, Cambodians, Chileans, Guatemalans, Haitians, Iranians, Lebanese, Salvadorans, Sikhs, Somali's, Tamils, and Vietnamese. Members of these (and other) communities arrived in Canada often bearing an understandable measure of antagonism toward one or another foreign government – a hostility that some wanted reflected in Canadian foreign policy. Their demands ap-

proximate those made by Canadians of eastern European origin after the erection of the Iron Curtain. Securing changes to the precepts or the tenor of Canadian foreign policy, however, is much more difficult than obtaining *positive* action from the government (of the sort involved in creating a diplomatic presence and/or an aid program in their former country).

While there was often little of a tangible nature that the government could do to oblige the demands of Canadians of eastern European ancestry, the Cold War nonetheless provided a framework within which official policy largely embraced the rhetoric of activist immigrant communities. Canada's NATO membership implied treatment of the USSR as an adversary. For almost four decades, Canadian businesses were not significantly disadvantaged, relative to OECD competitors, by policies prohibiting many types of commerce with the eastern bloc.

For newer immigrants, no similar paradigm applies. With very few exceptions, Canada has sought to foster *warm* relations with developing country governments. Decades of involvement in the Commonwealth; more recent membership in La Francophonie, the OAS, and APEC; an extensive (and initially well-financed) aid program; rapidly expanding trade ties across the Pacific and with Latin America – together have provided Canada with more formal and informal linkages to developing country governments than any other G-7 nation enjoys.

That is the context confronting the foreign policy ambitions of many recent immigrants. Additionally, Canada's consistent international posture, sustained by governments of either political stripe, has been less judgemental – and certainly less intrusive – than that of the United States. Canadians regard themselves as "helpful" fixers, useful intermediaries, or as builders of multilateral coalitions. All, of course, depend on the maintenance of generally good bilateral relations.[5]

Accommodating the foreign policy desires of some recently-immigrated communities could necessitate a transformation of Canadian diplomacy – from the methodical building of ties and improving of relations, to a foreign policy that accentuates scolding, the application of pressure, and the tying of political and economic relations to the current (and in some cases historical) human and civil rights behaviour of developing country governments. Such policy goals are not easily accomplished – particularly when advanced by often insular communities not yet fully-integrated into Canadian society; by communities usually lacking the kind of sophisticated infrastructure

and networks thought necessary to influence foreign policy.

To test the extent to which visible minority communities are, indeed, pursuing foreign policy goals – and the nature of the system's response – my research focused on the activities of three ethnic groups: Armenian-Canadians, Haitian-Canadians, and Sikh-Canadians. All three had achieved sufficient critical mass and geographic concentration (in electorally important major media centres)[6] to have been able, theoretically, both to mobilize internally and to command a hearing – at least from politicians. For the period under examination, the leaders of each community were first generation immigrants, with the majority of the community's adherents having come to Canada during the previous three decades. Each of the three communities has been confronted with sufficient external stimuli to provoke a keen interest in foreign policy, even if their members hadn't arrived in Canada equipped with foreign affairs "agendas".

The three communities are among the "toughest" cases – in the sense that each favoured initiatives that, at a minimum, would irritate traditional friends and allies of Canada and/or might jeopardize commerce (current or potential). Each wanted additional resources allocated to areas where Canada's interests and profile historically had been limited and its prospects for exercising influence were dubious. And each faced "image-related" constraints on their potential to mobilize popular support. If these communities met some success in achieving foreign policy goals – and if their activity can be linked to outcomes – then paradigms conventionally used to describe Canadian foreign policy-making are likely no longer applicable in the rapidly changing Canadian polity.

The period of inquiry is 1984 to 1993. By the time that Brian Mulroney's government took office in 1984, each of the three communities was of sufficient size and longevity in the country to have developed leadership able to pursue policy concerns beyond the "integrational" priorities that preoccupy new immigrants in the immediate wake of their arrival in a new country. "Official multiculturalism", in place since 1971, was buttressed in 1982 by passage of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms.* Both encouraged policy activism by minority communities – who by the mid-1980s had begun to engage in "unprecedented" political involvement.[7] Furthermore, Mulroney's Progressive Conservatives had swept to power, for the first time winning many ridings that had significant populations of "new" ethnic communities. The party had come to govern-

ment promising to review and "open up" the foreign policy-making process. Implicitly, the PCs were less tied than their Liberal predecessors to existing policy. A hypothetical opportunity existed for the Tories to build an enduring connection with visible minority communities by showing sensitivity to their foreign policy demands.[8]

The analysis is based on census and immigration data, parliamentary debates and hearings, official statements from government and ethnic communities, polling data and media reports. Principally, however, it draws from 140 interviews conducted with: leaders of the three ethnic communities; government officials of various departments; ministers and political staff; Members of Parliament (of all parties) with functional and/or constituency interest in the three communities; and leaders of development and human rights NGOs, churches, and other potentially interested ethnic communities, academics, journalists and pollsters.

A THEORETICAL FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING ROLE FOR VISIBLE MINORITIES?

Statist theory predicts that "foreign policy will be explained by either external or governmental sources, or both".[9] By "external sources", Nossal means global requirements or systemic exigencies – not domestic lobbies. Political scientists studying Canadian foreign policy generally defer to the explanatory power of statist theory. Kirton and Dimock conclude that in Canada, "perhaps more so than elsewhere, foreign policy remains the preserve of the state and its constitutionally embedded competitors, Parliament and the provinces, rather than of actors within society itself".[10] Goldberg regards the Canadian foreign policy-making process as "the area of Canadian public life least susceptible to interest group intercession".[11]

Nossal, building on earlier work by Stairs,[12] propounds a theory of "Modified Statism", which concedes a role for society in defining "the bounds of acceptable actions". Both "public opinion and influential interest groups" set "parameters" that constrain the power of the state. It bears emphasis, however, that according to the modified statist model, government still "wields substantial power".[13]

Glazer and Moynihan concluded that U.S. foreign policy was responsive, *above all*, to ethnic lobbies: "Without too much exaggeration it could be stated that the immigration process is the single most important determinant of American foreign policy. This process regulates

the ethnic composition of the American electorate. Foreign policy responds to that ethnic composition. It responds to other things as well, but probably *first of all* to the primal facts of ethnicity" (italics in original).[14] Canadian theorists, however, overwhelmingly take issue with this pluralist conception of the origins of foreign policy, especially insofar as ethnic groups are concerned.

Stanislawski finds that in "Canada, despite its model of an ethnic mosaic, there is a very limited tradition of pluralist practices",[15] while Nossal attacks the pluralist model for its "misleading assumption that all citizens have an equal opportunity to influence policy".[16] Nossal's distinction is key insofar as visible minority communities are concerned.

The literature on policy advocacy in Canada distinguishes between "Institutional Groups" and "Issue-Oriented Groups". To the former, Pross ascribes these characteristics: "they possess organizational continuity and cohesion; they have extensive knowledge of those sectors of government that affect their clients, and enjoy easy communication with those sectors; there is stable membership; they have concrete and immediate operational objectives; organizational objectives are generally more important than any particular objective".[17] To "Issue-Oriented Groups", Pross ascribes "the reverse characteristics: they have limited organizational continuity and cohesion; most are very badly organized; their knowledge of government is minimal and often naïve; their membership is extremely fluid; they encounter considerable difficulty in formulating and adhering to short-range objectives; they usually have a low regard for the organizational mechanisms they have developed for carrying out their goals".[18]

Research for this paper led the author to the inescapable conclusion that visible minority communities in Canada, when it comes to foreign policy advocacy, exhibit all of the characteristics of "Issue-Oriented Groups" and almost none of those displayed by "Institutionalized Groups". It is little wonder, therefore, that even according to a "modified statist" paradigm, visible minorities have been poorly placed to influence foreign policy outcomes. One of the objectives of this study was to ascertain if, notwithstanding their lack of "institutionalization", visible minority groups are proving capable – perhaps through resort to parliament and the political process – of securing their foreign policy goals. If so, the case for the applicability of pluralist theory strengthens.

An effort was made to isolate criteria that might govern ethnic community influence over foreign policy. Au-

thors in both Canada and the U.S. have tested and theorized numerous criteria affecting both community access and prospects for goal attainment. Somewhat arbitrarily, those criteria can be grouped in four categories:

a) The Community's Nature: its size; degree of geographic concentration; extent of integration; cohesiveness; partisanship; independence from international actors; disposition to form coalitions.
b) The Community's Objectives: whether limited or expansive; their consistency with Canadian foreign policy traditions and current policy; their "tenor".
c) The Community's (lobbying) Activity: its timing; the degree of organizational activity (how "institutionalized"?; how well financed?); where it is targetted; using what levers?
d) The Community's Image: whether positive or negative; the ascribed legitimacy of its demands; media propensity to accord favourable coverage.

Interview questions were guided by this typology, permitting within each case study an evaluation of process and outcomes against what the literature predicted would be the conditions-precedent to influence.

VISIBLE MINORITIES AND CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY: SOME THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS

Research for this paper supported the continuing validity of the statist model (sometimes only in its "weak" or "modified" form) concerning its power to accurately describe Canada's foreign policy "reality". Notwithstanding the growing number, size, and concentration of visible minority communities with acute foreign policy interests, foreign policy outcomes remain firmly within the prerogative of the Canadian government. Visible minority communities frequently are able to influence the *parameters* within which foreign policy choices are made; rarely are they able to set the *agenda;* almost never are they able to dictate precise policy *outcomes.*

The research affirms the applicability of statism's analytical framework. In none of the three cases presented was the state "policy neutral"; in each, policy ultimately reflected the state's own preferences - or was consistent with well-established policy traditions. Furthermore, evidence for a "bureaucratic polities" model is limited – principally by the fact that while certain government departments predictably oppose the objectives of many ethnic communities, there is virtually no countervailing advocacy (within

government for the foreign policy demands of ethnic communities). The foreign policy process remains remarkably centralized in the hands of the foreign and aid ministries plus, of course, the PMO/PCO.

This study confirmed that Canadian visible minority communities do have foreign policy agendas, and that to differing degrees are organized in pursuit of those agendas. It established, however, that notwithstanding pronounced changes to the face of Canadian society, tenets of pluralist theory still do not apply to foreign policy-making. Group competition appears absent from the process; foreign policy-making is largely disentangled from domestic politics; pronounced differences in institutionalization mean that ethnic groups do not enjoy equal opportunity to influence policy. The state, demonstrably, does not regard itself as the "passive agent of interest groups". Instead, it rigorously assesses community claims, judging them against a reasonably clear-cut notion of the "national interest". It believes it is supported in that course by public opinion – which appears unengaged by the particularistic issues concerning most visible minority communities and, indeed, is alienated at signs of "special pleading".

Judging from the experience of the Armenian, Haitian, and Sikh communities, it can be argued that recently immigrated visible minority groups:

- Demonstrate little organizational continuity and cohesion – except where structures with an historic pedigree have been recreated in Canada. Where structures are new, only a minority of the community is affiliated, membership is fluid, and confusion often exists (within and without the community) as to the leaders' representativeness;
- Have not put in place institutionalized apparatus to facilitate the pursuit of foreign policy objectives – and do not attach priority to creating a permanent Ottawa "presence";
- Make no efforts (or resist those that are made) to create, within their communities, single bodies with the mandate and authority to forge and enunciate a consensus view on vital foreign policy questions;
- Tacitly recognize the important role which officials play in developing policy alternatives, but nonetheless hold views of the bureaucracy ranging from mystification (as to how it operates) to resentment (alleging everything from standoffishness to bias).

Consistent with that framework, visible minority community contact with Foreign Affairs, CIDA, and Im-

migration officials – while much more frequent now than prior to 1984 – remains largely formal and event-driven, and generally does not approach the routine, easy communication enjoyed by institutionalized groups. Much warmer relationships appear to exist between ethnic communities and Multiculturalism officials – although no significant efforts have been made to involve Multiculturalism in foreign policy matters.

At the same time, "institutionalization" is not determinative (as a precondition to attainment of a community's foreign policy goals). We have seen that the Haitians – the community (of the three studied) with the least "institutionalized" advocacy apparatus – saw far more of its goals realized than did better organized groups.

From the evidence already presented, it is possible to draw other inferences about the foreign policy advocacy climate facing newly immigrated visible minority communities. Those conclusions are presented in accordance with the format employed in the "case studies".

The Community's Nature

- Whether or not a community is united, ethnicity is a compelling organizing principle for foreign policy advocacy. Ethnicity, however, does not inherently promote unity;
- A community's unity on objectives, and its geographic concentration, both seem to be more important variables than its absolute size;
- Better integrated communities enjoy enhanced prospects for success; asserting ethnicity can mitigate the "advocacy advantages" of integration;
- The degree of independence *from* foreign actors may, in fact, be less consequential to a group's success than the amount of *opposition* elicited from foreign governments.

The Community's Objectives

- Communities seeking a reversal of existing policy face high – but not insurmountable – hurdles;
- Consistency with decision-makers' current (even undeclared) goals can overcome a community's lack of institutionalization;
- The community with a single, over-arching demand risks total rejection, whereas those with multiple objectives across a variety of policy areas stand a much greater chance of securing some satisfaction;

- Those principally seeking to set policy *parameters* face better prospects than those attempting to secure precise policy *outcomes;*
- The community casting its appeal in human rights-promotion terms must satisfy elites that guilt is unambiguous and that abuses persist. Even then, its arguments will be trumped where accommodating them could jeopardize Canadian (possibly even US') geo-strategic interests;
- Communities whose objectives seem discordant with the "national interest" risk abject failure. National unity considerations rank just as high as geo-strategic factors in the hierarchy embraced by decision-makers;
- A community's objectives are more likely to be embraced if they constitute only a *limited* threat to existing (or potential) commerce;
- Silence from the business community – or even from potentially adversarial ethnic groups – can imply popular acquiescence, but is just as likely to indicate that the community's goals are regarded as unlikely to be embraced by decision-makers;
- Objectives cast negatively are much less likely to be embraced than those seeking "positive" action by decision-makers;
- Widespread and outspoken support from groups without a direct interest in the community's objectives can overwhelmingly boost its prospects.

The Community's Activity

- Timing and targetting are inseparable – and vitally important;
- A clear measure of a community's prospective influence is its ability to target sources of decisional authority;
- Early and regular intervention – depending on the nature and extent of a community's objectives – is often less important than an ability, during crisis situations, to mobilize fully and to secure ministerial and media attention;
- Obtaining the support of responsible ministers – most desirably of the Prime Minister – can substantially compensate for a community's lack of institutionalization;
- Resort to parliamentary committees, questions put by opposition MPs, and most particularly "Opposition Days", confirm a community's "alienated" reputation. While gaining attention for its issues, profile in those

fora can be counterproductive. Advocacy by government members, by contrast, often enormously enhances a community's influence;

- Political non-alignment can be as useful to a community as multi-partisan activity. Either facilitates achievement of its objectives more than active partisanship exclusively on behalf of opposition parties. Methodical, disciplined political activity by a community is certain to win decision-makers' attention to its goals, but high-profile hyperactive political behaviour can be counterproductive;
- Scope for ethnic communities to achieve influence through political contributions is probably limited to party nominations and pre-election periods at the constituency level;
- The *process* of coalition building may be as important as its achievement. The attendant internal compromise and ensuing discipline vitally increases the community's credibility in the eyes of decision-makers;
- High-profile techniques (like demonstrations) frequently backfire on ethnic communities, but in certain circumstances can be extremely useful in obtaining or sustaining media coverage.

The Community's Image

- The community must be seen as having a legitimate interest in the issues it is advancing;
- Leaders must be regarded as representative;
- Advocacy techniques must be considered appropriate;
- Communities divided on goals are prone to conduct their internecine disputes in the public domain, thereby damaging their popular image;
- Association with illegal (or dubious) activity, even by a small number of a community's members, must unequivocally be condemned by reputable community leaders. Otherwise, the community's objectives will be seriously jeopardized;
- Racist attitudes can hamper – but do not necessarily thwart – efforts to secure policy goals. Coalition formation appears the best antidote to the effects of racism;
- While important, an institutionalized capacity to cultivate strong media connections is less critical than the newsworthiness of the issues in which the community is interested. The absence of current images means groups with (extra-Canadian) historical grievances are extremely unlikely to attract media interest.

Asserting the continued explanatory power of "modified" statist theory (in the face of fundamental changes to Canadian demography and the nature of policy demands) has both policy and research implications. It underscores the probable enduring transcendence of state conceptions of the "national interest" insofar as policy development is concerned. However, it does not enable the analyst precisely to predict all policy outcomes. For example, Canada would not necessarily respond in comparable ways to future crises in Haiti; a threatened Armenia could evoke a policy response heartening to Armenian-Canadians; different demands by Sikh-Canadians in response to future threats to their brethren in India could elicit a more favourable reaction from decision-makers.

One criticism of Canada's multiculturalism policy is that it helps entrench an "extra-Canadian focus" – maybe even an "extra-Canadian loyalty" – among recent immigrants. To be sure, multiculturalism has promoted the notion of Canada as a genuinely pluralist state. At the level of individual communities, it has encouraged internal cohesion, thereby increasing the potential for institutionalization. It may have stimulated community activity – but it appears not to have increased their influence (over foreign policy). The obvious implication is that multiculturalism has not "compromised" Canadian foreign policy.

Concerns about the integrity of Canadian foreign policy have also been cited by advocates of tighter restrictions on immigration to Canada. Critics of current immigration policies, levels, and flows, have argued that the selection process has no objective relation to declared foreign policy objectives, and that it yields "anomalies" that put sound foreign policy-making at risk. They note that with new countries continuously being "born in bloodshed", the supply of refugees will be almost endless. They worry that Canadian policy-makers will be confronted by new immigrants with a succession of politically irresistible demands for foreign policy actions that are inconsistent with the national interest.

In reality, however, these concerns also seem misplaced. Newly immigrated visible minorities may prefer aggressive – even hostile – foreign policies. Currently, however, they are not mobilizing the resources necessary to ensure anything other than that they receive a hearing. There is every reason to assume, as the composition of Canadian society undergoes further change, that communities (ethnic and other) who would oppose actions advocated by

some visible minorities will themselves mobilize if they feel their interests are threatened. The product may be a *faux-pluralism,* in which the state retains full policy-making scope because domestic interests can be counted upon (or stimulated) each to cancel the other out.

Curbed resources will continue to constrain government's capacity to respond affirmatively to demands from visible minority communities. Canada rarely has the surplus capacity in the international system that would permit fully meeting ethnic community demands. Haiti was a rare case in which Canada was, indeed, a "principal power". Generally, however, massive cuts to budgets for defence and foreign aid, and severe personnel constraints at Foreign Affairs, mean that decision-makers' ability to respond tangibly to most community demands will remain severely limited.

On the other hand, the role that visible minority communities play in Canadian politics will only grow with time. Foreign policy objectives, undoubtedly, will motivate some of that involvement. Concentrated – and mobilized – ethnic communities may succeed in "capturing" a Member of Parliament (perhaps even several of them). It would take a significant (and unanticipated) transfer of foreign policy-making authority to parliament, however, for visible minorities to be able significantly to increase their influence via the political process. On current evidence, it is reasonable to project that "captive" MPs might be able to ensure that a community's demands receive a fair hearing by decision-makers. They may even be able to Veto' certain actions (e.g., the closing of an embassy or the reduction of Canada's aid budget to a particular country). Even the best-connected MPs, however, are unlikely to be able to secure policy change deemed inconsistent with the "national interest" (as defined by the state).

This is not to imply that visible minority influence over foreign policy is either insignificant or unlikely to grow. In fact, the opposite is true. The presence in Canada of a growing number of persons – from more and more countries – has already profoundly affected the foreign policy agenda. Relations (diplomatic and commercial – less frequently military) are becoming ever more sophisticated between Canada and virtually every country that has generated immigrants to Canada. As one of the world's inveterate "multilateralists", and as a member of more multinational "clubs" than almost any other country, Canada will increasingly value the breadth and depth of those ties. In almost all cases, however, the utility of those relation-

ships will be a function of their strength – and strengthening relations is often the obverse of what newly immigrated visible minority communities have in mind.

Unquestionably, policy-makers are now accustomed to soliciting (or otherwise receiving) the input of visible minority communities on foreign policy issues likely to be of concern to them. That feature of policy-making will only become further entrenched. When the objectives of individual communities command the obvious support of a broader audience (whether due to the communities' efforts or not) it should be anticipated that decision-makers will be inclined to embrace them. In that way, over time, "interests" previously thought peripheral increasingly will form part of the web of "national interests".

Generalizing on the basis of this paper's findings, it seems reasonable to conclude that visible minority communities should expect a full hearing for their foreign policy views, perhaps in an increasingly formalized fashion. An ability to situate their concerns within the broad framework of the "national interest" almost certainly will produce popular support extending beyond the community itself. On those issues – and in those circumstances – visible minority communities will frequently be able to set the parameters within which policy outcomes will be decided. They will thus contribute-to – but almost certainly will not dictate – Canadian foreign policy in the new millennium.

FOOTNOTES

[1] T. John Samuel. 1990. "Third World Immigration and Multiculturalism". In: Shiva Halli, Frank Trovato and Leo Driedger, eds., *Ethnic Demography: Canadian Immigrant, Racial and Cultural Variations.* Ottawa: Carleton University Press. p. 384.

[2] Warren E. Kalbach and Wayne W. McVey. 1971. *The Demographic Bases of Canadian Society.* Toronto: McGraw-Hill Company of Canada Limited. p. 160.

[3] "Visible Minorities" were defined in the *Employment Equity Act* of 1986 as "persons (other than aboriginal persons) who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour". Prior to the 1996 *Census,* data on visible minorities were derived from responses to the "ethnic origin" question on the Census, in conjunction with other ethno-cultural information such as language, place of birth and religion.

[4] *The Globe and Mail,* February 18, 1998, A-1.

[5] Howard Stanislawski (1981) contends that "the pursuit of its internationalist, 'helpful fixer' goals" ensured that from "1945 to 1975, Canadian foreign policy decision-making remained largely immune from any significant public or interest group pressure" ("Elites, Domestic Interest Groups, and International Interests in the Canadian Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: The Arab Economic Boy-

cott of Canadians and Canadian Companies Doing Business With Israel". Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University. p. 102.

[6] Pamela M. White and T. John Samuel found that Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, "while accounting for 35 percent of the country's population in 1986, were home to about 60 percent of the total immigrant population" ("Immigration and Ethnic Diversity in Urban Canada". *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 3 (Spring 1991). p. 70. According to Pendakur, the *concentration* of visible minorities is even greater: "In 1986 almost three-quarters of the visible minority population in Canada resided in five major cities: Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal, Calgary and Edmonton" (cited by Daiva K. Stasiulis and Yasmeen Abu-Laban, "The House the Parties Built: (Re)constructing Ethnic Representation in Canadian Politics". In Kathy Megyery, ed., *Ethno-cultural Groups and Visible Minorities in Canadian Politics: The Question of Access.* Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991. p. 19).

[7] Stasiulis and Abu-Laban, "The House the Parties Built", p. 16. The same authors describe the 1988 federal election as a "watershed election for ethno-politics in Canada" ("Ethnic Activism and the Politics of Limited Inclusion in Canada". In Alain-G. Gagnon and James P. Bickerton, eds., *Canadian Politics: An Introduction to the Discipline.* Peterborough: Broadview Press ltd., 1990. p. 584).

[8] Robert M. Campbell and Leslie A. Pal also point out that Mulroney's 1984 victory "coincided with international developments that had suddenly raised the profile of human rights considerations on the international agenda" (*The Real Worlds of Canadian Politics: Cases in Process and Policy,* 3rd ed. Peterborough: Broadview Press ltd., 1994. p. 229).

[9] Kim Richard Nossal. 1989. *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy,* 2nd Ed. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc. p. 10.

[10] John Kirton and Blair Dimock. 1983-84. "Domestic Access to Government in the Canadian Foreign Policy Process, 1968-1982." *International Journal* 39 (Winter). p. 69.

[11] David Howard Goldberg. 1986. "Ethnic Interest Groups as Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry". Ph.D. diss, McGill University. p. 573.

[12] Denis Stairs. 1970-71. "Publics and Policy-Makers: The Domestic Environment of Canada's Foreign Policy Community". *International Journal* 26 (Winter): pp. 221–248.

[13] Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy,* p. 117.

[14] Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds. 1975. *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 23.

[15] Howard Stanislawski. 1984. "Domestic Interest Groups and Canadian and American Policy: The Case of the Arab Boycott". In Robert O. Matthews, Arthur G. Rubinoff, and Janice Gross Stein, eds., *International Conflict and Conflict Management: Readings in World Politics.* Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Inc. p. 143.

[16] Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy,* p. 90.

[17] Paul A. Pross. 1986. Group *Politics and Public Policy,* 2nd Ed. Toronto: Oxford University Press. pp. 114–115.

[18] Ibid., p. 117.

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SESSION – DIASPORIC INFLUENCE ON HOST COUNTRY DOMESTIC POLITICAL ACTIVITY: CROATIANS IN CANADA OR CROATIAN-CANADIANS?

The question I would like to begin with concerns the degree to which host country policies are affected by diaspora influence? The short answer would be: In those cases where the ethnic/diaspora group in question has some influence the answer may be yes, but there are few cases of this and is limited primarily to those sending countries where, in this case Canada, has either direct or indirect strategic or other interests. The answer to this question in the Croatian case, however, reflects a different reality. Since the January 2000 elections, the influence of the Croatian diaspora on homeland political and economic affairs has diminished considerably, particularly given the defeat of the HDZ which received over 60 percent of the diaspora vote. Measures have included: the closure of the Ministry of Return and Immigration; delays in the tabling of a Bill of Returnees (modelled on the Israeli Law of Return); the planned closing of some consulate offices in the United States, Canada, and Australia; and the parliamentary review of the special diaspora ticket[1] introduced by HDZ into the Croatian constitution in 1995. Initiatives on the part of the new governing coalition to eliminate diaspora representation in the Sabor (through the special diaspora ticket – have sparked outrage on the part of Croatian diaspora organizations such as the Croatian World Congress (Hrvatski Svjetski Kongres). The removal of Ante Beljo, a prominent returnee from Canada, from his position as executive director of the Croatian Homeland Foundation, the state-supported diaspora organization in Zagreb, also sent a strong message to the diaspora concerning their future role in homeland affairs. President Mesić, in an interview given in April 2001, made his position clear on the influence of diaspora in homeland affairs: "There are a number of Croats who come from Croatia, whose grandfathers and great-grandfathers were Croatians, but who are now citizens of other countries. They may be Croatian patriots, but they are first and foremost residents

of other countries, like the USA or Chile". The factors mentioned thus far, however, only reflect conditions as they appear at a macro-level. While this perspective is necessary, I would argue that it only provides a backdrop to the more important processes involving the lives, perceptions and practices of Croatians "on the ground".

The perspective I will take in this presentation is one that emphasizes a more localized view – one that looks at the political activity of ethnic Croats in Toronto and their response to and involvement in Canadian politics, both locally and nationally. Given their relatively small numbers vis à vis other ethnic groups in Canada (estimates range from 150,000–220,000), Croatians do not wield the kind of political influence of the more established immigrant or diaspora groups. However, their activities in the last 12 years demonstrate how the combination of circumstances (homeland independence), perseverance and a strong sense of peoplehood have made Croatians a group that Canadian politicians have taken note of.

I have been examining the activities of the Croatian-Canadian diaspora since 1992 and have noticed shifts that have changed the ways in which Croatians in Canada see themselves in relation to their compatriots in the homeland, co-ethnics in their communities and their fellow citizens in Canada. While Croatians have always maintained ties to the homeland over the years, I have found that they have also developed an enhanced awareness of the Canadian political environment and of their relationship to it as citizens, as stakeholders. While independence and the promise of a future free of communism has given Croatians an outlet for articulating nationalist sentiments and ethnic pride, it has also become a means of renegotiating the terms upon which a sense of belonging in Canada is based. In fact, during the homeland war (1992–95), many argued that Canadian citizenship gave them the right to lobby the Canadian government on foreign policy issues regarding Croatia. In addition, by publicly promoting Croatian state efforts to establish a pluralist society modelled on Western liberal-democratic traditions, many have felt that they not only affirm their loyalty to the new Croatian state but demonstrated their commitment to and stake in the traditions and values of Canadian political culture. International recognition of Croatia as a sovereign state also provides Croatians with a new sense of pride and pedigree as members of the new Croatian nation-state and not as just another ethno-national group officially lumped together with other nationalities from the former Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, Croatians have to con-

tinue to negotiate their identities as Canadians and Croatians (or both) on terms dictated by the Canadian state that has discouraged explicitly nationalist affiliations with homelands. Indeed, according to critics of Canadian multicultural policy such as Keith Spicer (1991) and Reginald Bibby (1990), homeland ties have the effect of ghettoising diversity by unravelling the fragile bonds holding Canadians together (Winland 1998). This position is exemplified by the influential social philosopher Charles Taylor, in his analysis of Canadian multiculturalism. In his widely read discussion of the politics of recognition diaspora societies are seen as problematic:

"Their porousness means that they are more open to multinational migration: more of their members live the life of diaspora, whose centre is elsewhere... the awkwardness arises from the fact that there are substantial numbers of people who are citizens and also belong to the culture that calls into question *our* philosophical boundaries". [1994:63, emphasis mine]

An alternative and, I argue more constructive view draws attention to the challenge of transnationalism for studies of multiculturalism (Vertovec 2001, Sassen 1998). The Canadian government has come to realize that the issue of transnationalism is not just a political but a social issue and therefore it can no longer stick to the commonly held view of the immigrant who simply uproots from her country of origin to settle in a new land. In an increasingly globalized world, characterized in part by exponential increase in access to telecommunications, cheap and fast travel and enhanced international commerce, immigrants have points of reference that take them beyond the borders of the host nation. People are connected to greater or lesser degrees, symbolically, politically, economically or simply through familial ties to their place of origin, putative or real. They can participate (where circumstances allow) in a more direct way in the internal affairs of the homeland.

Croatians in Canada: a Brief Overview

Like many diaspora groups, Croatians have maintained links to their homeland through kinship ties, but they have also always been deeply concerned about political developments back home. Because the homeland focus has always been a magnet of group identification, Croatians responded intensely to all political events beginning with those in monarchist Yugoslavia, especially after the assassination in 1928 of the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party,

Stjepan Radić, who became a folk hero for many Croatians. Political organization became a very important form of community activity for Croatians in Canada. At this time, many Croatian labourers joined the trade union movement in Canada, some becoming affiliated with the Communist Party of Canada. Involvement with these kinds of organizations was, however, frowned upon by Canadian government officials. Of course, over the decades, the ruling powers in Croatia had varying relationships with their expatriates from hostile to welcoming, followed by ambivalence and some even say rejection. For example, just as the Canadian government was interested in suppressing union radicalism and Communist Party affiliation, the Yugoslav monarchy under the reign of King Alexander that took an active role in the affairs of emigrants, was determined to stifle the development of dissident political movements overseas when they proved attractive to Yugoslav immigrants, particularly to Croatians. The Yugoslav government organized political clubs in diaspora communities in Canada working with Yugoslav loyalists and with the express purpose of gathering information about leftist and Croatian nationalist groups. It would then volunteer this information to the Canadian authorities, a move that frequently led to the deportation of Croatian community leaders, who were branded as radicals, and to the banning of Croatian-language newspapers. These and other actions led to abiding feelings of mistrust among Croatians, primarily because of the complicity of the Canadian government with Yugoslav authorities in discrediting and harassing Croatians in Canada. These actions ultimately forced Croatians to lose faith in government as a rule and to close ranks, relying on each other through Croatian networks and support groups.

Canadian federal government initiatives in the early 1970s to design and implement multicultural programmes were seized upon by Croatians. The establishment of "heritage language" programs and of Croatian music and folklore groups resulted from these initiatives. Many Croatian social clubs were gradually depoliticized in the 1970s and 1980s in order to detach themselves from negative political factionalism and to achieve cultural objectives (Rasporich, 1982). With the introduction of Canadian federal multicultural policies and initiatives in 1971, Croatian heritage language programs, music and folklore groups flourished. However, national origins form the basis for Canadian ethnic classifications and over the years, Croatians have responded in ways that reflect their acceptance, ambivalence for, or rejection of the terms under which

(ethnic, national, and so forth) recognition has been extended. Croatians have had to play the politics of recognition (Taylor 1994) on the basis of terms set by the Canadian state, foregrounding ethno-cultural traditions as part of the Croatian contribution to the (cultural) fabric of Canadian society conceived of ideologically as a multicultural mosaic (Fleras and Elliott 1992).

For example, until 1991, the Canadian census did not recognize Croatian identity as a separate category given that it did not refer to official citizenship, whereas Yugoslav was officially recognized. Many Croatians I interviewed concurred with the assessment that the community seemed to suffer from an "inferiority complex" arguing that this was the result of negative stereotypes and fear generated by years of monitoring of the Croatian expatriate community by the Yugoslav government. Yugoslav involvement in the affairs of Croatian immigrants in Canada since the early years of this century has left its mark on Croatians. To a certain degree, then, these suspicions and sentiments, generated both in Canada and in the mother country, reinforced insularity and insecurity in the Croatian community. In the 1960s and 1970s, Croatians in Canada were deeply distressed by accusations of Croatian terrorism by Canadian government leaders. The Croatian community responded by challenging what they regarded as unsubstantiated allegations of terrorist activity.[2]

Croatians and Homeland Independence

Croatians in Canada, who have thus historically kept a low profile, began in 1990 to assert their ethnic pride during the war primarily by identifying with the political cause of their kin in the former Yugoslavia. Regardless of their specific relationships to the mother country, they began to speak of their transformation as a people from what they represented as an historically repressed minority group in the former Yugoslavia to a proud, new nation that has successfully shrugged off the yoke of communist rule and asserted a new sense of purpose and pride. Narratives of renewal replace those of displacement and oppression. Such revitalization of discourses of Croatianness and the intensification of transnational links as a consequence of Croatian independence, have resulted in a movement to reclaim and redefine Croatian origins and affiliations. This diaspora was galvanized by the issue of Croatian independence in unprecedented fashion. For example, the community tirelessly mobilized support for Croatian relief through fund-raising and volunteering of services, such as

sending student brigades to rebuild war-torn areas and to serve in the military. The history of Croatian community in Canada is one which, regardless of its successes or failures, has been marked by numerous efforts to engage with the Canadian government, be it through political actions such as rallies and protests or most recently, lobbying the federal government for support of an independent Croatia.

The emergence of Croatian independence in 1990 has been the strongest catalyst for the revitalized self-image of Croatians of all ages, regardless of the strength of their ties to the mother country. This period, more than any other in the history of the Croatian diaspora, has changed the way in which Croatians see themselves. Virtually all Croatians encountered during the period of this research have been affected in some way by events in the former Yugoslavia. Among other things, transnational links have intensified and connections to the mother country have taken on new significance. The establishment of Bedem Ljubavi (Mothers for Peace), the Canadian Croatian Information Congress, and numerous other fundraising, political, and relief organizations facilitated communication and interaction among Croatians offering new opportunities for those who have seldom or never actively taken part in Croatian community life. More importantly it seemed to jolt the community into realizing the importance of forging ties with the federal government and making their voices heard. The new context of an independent (and democratic) Croatia has allowed for the emergence of positive public displays of ethnicity in Canada, thanks in part to the media attention generated by the war. It has given the community a visibility it never had before. While many of these efforts have been directed at the Canadian media, government and public at large, they have also provided some Croatians with an outlet for articulating nationalistic sentiments and ethnic pride. Independence and the war resulted in a flood of information and new avenues for transnational communication between homeland and diaspora Croatians, including among other things the establishment of news services, newspapers, the proliferation of amateur videos, numerous publications on the war (among them nationalist treatises and medical journals chronicling the human toll of war), and of web-sites on the Internet, some of which have come and gone.

At one level, Croatians were very active in supporting the move towards independence and indeed Croatian emigrants played a central role in the success of the present regime. According to Misha Glenny (1992), four million dollars was raised by the emigrant Croatian community

(primarily in Canada, the United States, and Australia) towards the HDZ political campaign in 1990. The importance of diaspora support was further evidenced in the steady stream of newly appointed Croatian government officials who are featured as keynote speakers at Croatian fund-raisers in Canada, particularly in Toronto. It soon became apparent just how central the Croatian diaspora was to the success of Tudjman's drive for independence and in this way he differed from his political opponents.

A residual effect of this period was the heightened awareness of the potential of Croatians to affect change through their political representatives at the constituency level and beyond. Several examples of Croatian participation in the Canadian political realm reveal the challenges in balancing loyalties and affiliations. For example, Janko Perić, currently a Liberal member of Canadian parliament, has made a point of foregrounding the cultural dimension of his Croatian ancestry (born, raised, and educated in Croatia; immigrated to Canada in 1968) as the first Croatian federal MP in Canada. He has also been actively involved in promoting Croatian-Canadian business and cultural contacts in Croatia. The response of the Canadian government to his efforts has been mixed.

The experience of John Šola, a Member of Provincial Parliament for the Liberal Party in Ontario differs from Perić's in several respects. Šola's case provides an interesting example of both how homeland events impacted on local Croatian politics and on the management of Croatian public image in Toronto. In 1987, John Šola was elected to office as a member of the provincial parliament in Ontario. He was well known for his vocal support for a free and independent Croatia, so much so that a reporter for a local Mississauga weekly newspaper commenting on the election results stated: "Voters in Mississauga East have elected a man who seems to think he's gone to Queen's Park to free his Croatian homeland" (Mississauga News, 13 September 1987). He enjoyed the financial and political support of Croatian community in both his Mississauga East constituency (which has a large Croatian population) and the Croatian community at large. During the war, Šola became more involved and hence visible in Croatian efforts for the homeland. He was present at many Croatian functions and fund-raisers in his capacity not only as legislative representative for his constituency but very clearly as a Croatian nationalist. For example, at a rally that I had attended in late 1992, Šola was seated at the head table with several prominent political representatives from the newly elected HDZ government. He first ran

into trouble in 1994 for his inflammatory comments about the war in Croatia when he stated: "I don't think I'd be able to live next door to a Serb". These comments provoked outrage from the Serb community in Toronto, some of whom lived in his riding. He was subsequently ousted from the Ontario Liberal Caucus by the then Liberal party leader, Lyn Macleod due to what was perceived to be inappropriate remarks and, in the view of some critics, crude nationalist invective. Šola was, however, undeterred. While sitting as an independent member of provincial parliament, Šola continued to make controversial remarks including those made at a speech to Croatian students at York University where I work in which he stated that Serbian-Canadians had shown that "they support ethnic cleansing, that they support mass rape, that they support mass murder". He was subsequently forced to leave the Liberal party caucus in 1994 as a result of these inflammatory remarks.

Diaspora Croatians I spoke to about these incidents had mixed reactions to Šola's displays of ethnic partisanship. While on the one hand, they felt that Šola did not exercise good judgement in making his feelings on the issue public, particularly given his political position, almost all were pleased that he had been "courageous" enough to put his opinion on public record. When he stood for re-election in 1995, the headline in the Toronto Star newspaper read: "Ethnic Loyalties Taint Election". The supporter of another candidate was quoted as saying that: "You can't get anywhere near the association executive unless you're Croatian". Šola lost his bid for reelection in 1995. After his defeat, Šola left provincial politics and has since been appointed as Consulate General of the Republic of Croatia in Chicago. He now goes by his Croatian name, Domagoj Sladojević-Šola.

While the circumstances of Šola's rise and fall are unique, the circumstances that gave rise to the series of events that followed are not. In an ethically diverse city like Toronto, there are many politicians from different ethnic and other backgrounds – Portuguese, Italian, Greek, Muslim, etc.[3] During times of change in the homeland – violent or not – members of ethnic communities will look to whatever resource they can. Desperate times call for desperate measures but these can sometimes backfire. In Šola's case, the government took notice of the problems inherent in taking political stances on the part of certain ethnic constituencies.

Independence also introduced a new set of concerns that reflected Croatian frustration and anxieties about

their public image in Canada. Comments made repeatedly by President Tuđman before his death in 1999 in essence relativized the genocidal aspects of the Ustaše past as part of the normal progress of war and the post-1990 process of ethno-national homogenization. These and other inflammatory comments by Tuđman exacerbated Croatian frustrations over their image in Canada. Some diaspora Croatians feared the iconography of the *kuna* as Croatia's official currency in 1994, since it has the same name as the money used by Croatia's collaborationist Axis-led government in 1941, confirmed the image of the new Croatia as a dangerously nationalist or proto-fascist state (and of Croatians as an inherently fascist people). Regardless of their political points of view, Toronto Croatians made it very clear that despite their overwhelming support for Tuđman, they did not want their newfound national identity to be associated with the taint of fascism, especially given the efforts of Serbians (both in the former Yugoslavia and in the diaspora) to link present-day Croatians to their Ustaše past. As a self-employed painter remarked: "Too many people still believe we are Nazis" (August 1993). Many Croatians expressed frustration with what they saw as exaggeration and an inordinate amount of emphasis on several isolated incidents of violence. Some still remember when Croatians in Canada were accused of terrorism by Canadian government leaders in the 1960s and 1970s. For example, in a 1975 speech, the Canadian Minister of External Affairs promised to control "the activities of right-wing groups opposed to the Belgrade government" ("Minister Takes Aim at Terrorists" 1975:A3). Reports in Toronto newspapers during the homeland war with such titles as "Neo-Nazis Deface Church" (MacDonald 1994:7), referring to Ustaše symbols and slogans spray-painted on a Serbian Orthodox church in downtown Toronto, also contributed to frustration and anger over the persistence of these images.

Conclusion

Most Croatians have been unified on one point: communism was bad for Croatia and independence is good. With some exceptions, they have always identified their common enemy as the Communist Yugoslav state. This consensus was articulated in diaspora narratives depicting a history of hardship and oppression punctuated with tales of catastrophes (a frequently used example is the Bleiburg Massacre of Croatian soldiers and civilians in April 1945), constructed so as to explain the separation between Cro-

atians and their homeland. The past constructed in these ways provided the foundation upon which Croatians have imagined and represented themselves for decades. Independence, however, has introduced new challenges for Croatians, the most important of which is how to redefine themselves to each other and to the state in which they live. It has also forced Croatians in Canada to re-evaluate and renegotiate long-held sentiments and narratives, not only of the mother country but of their identity as Croatians and as Canadians.

It has also had a number of repercussions for the ways in which Croatians regard politics in Canada. For some, Canada failed them, particularly in providing support for Croatia when it was at war. But it has also driven home the issue of being and belonging in Canada as well as the significance of homeland ties to their sense of who they are as Canadians and as Croatians. While I don't believe that any particular policies have been affected by the Croatian example, it is clear that the Canadian government is responding to the intensification of diaspora-homeland ties. This is presently being spurred on by security concerns, pressure from the U.S. to tighten up immigration/refugee controls and to monitor diaspora political activities such as those of Tamils, Sikhs, Muslim associations and others, particularly where the homeland is experiencing violent conflict and instability. My hope, however, is that the lessons to be learned will not only be applied in crisis situations such as those precipitated by the events of September 11, 2001, but will begin to permeate the sensibilities of politicians and policy makers still committed to anachronistic and bounded notions of ethnic community, multiculturalism and citizenship.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Article 45 of the *Law on Citizenship and Culture*, reserved twelve seats in the Croatian parliament for diaspora representatives.

[2] For example, Croatians were upset by a speech (in 1975) by the Canadian minister of external affairs promising to control "the activities of right-wing groups opposed to the Belgrade government" (*Toronto Star,* 19 Sept. 1975).

[3] Joe Mihevic, for example, is of Croatian ancestry and one of the best city councillors the city has seen in a long time.

ISRAEL

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PERCEPTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION AND THE VOTING PATTERNS OF IMMIGRANTS FROM THE FSU IN ISRAEL

Introduction

The political participation of immigrants in the city can be seen as part of the process of social integration in the new society. Previous studies of immigrants have dealt extensively with different aspects of their integration in the new society, including labor market incorporation (Bailey and Waldinger, 1991; Portes and Jensen, 1987; Sanders and Nee, 1987), language proficiency (Espenshade and Fu, 1997) and social integration (Zhou and Logan, 1989). Less research has been done on immigrants' political integration. In particular few studies have dealt with the political participation of immigrants in local issues. This lack of research is surprising given that the local government is responsible in most countries for very basic issues that are important to immigrants, such as education and housing. The goal of this study was to investigate the factors affecting the political participation of immigrants in local issues. More specifically the current study investigates the extent to which immigrants' perception of discrimination is related to the likelihood of immigrants' voting for an immigrant party in Israel.

Literature Review

In general immigrants' political participation appears to be low in most immigrant countries (Togeby, 1999; Fenema and Tillie, 1999). This lack of political interest and active involvement in political issues can be explained by their marginal political status. At the time of migration individuals face the urgent need to learn the language (Mesch, 2003), find housing and access to jobs. At least at the beginning of the immigration, these basic needs do not leave much energy to invest in political organization and action. In addition, this lack of political involvement may be related to the lack of a political opportunity structure that encourages the participation of immigrants in politics (Bousetta, 2000). Political parties do not much en-

courage the incorporation of new immigrants into their ranks. The result is that often immigrants report feelings of alienation from political institutions in the host country therefore increasing migrants' likelihood of avoiding participation in local politics (Diehl and Blohm, 2001). Anwar (2001) found that political parties do not do much to encourage the incorporation of new immigrants into their ranks.

When studying the political mobilization of immigrants in contemporary societies there is increasing evidence that ethnic affiliation is an effective instrument for social and political mobilization. Immigration flows are thought to be one major source for the development of ethnicity. Such streams may be the result of ethnic conflict in the country of origin, but they may also generate a new conflict with other groups in the receiving society (Al-Haj, 2002). After new immigrants are settled, their collective action may be aimed at creating a cultural community within the receiving state and at bargaining to improve their status and conditions.

Ethnicity can be an instrument for mobilization with the aim of increasing a group's access to economic, social and political sources, regardless of its location in the stratification system. In other words, ethnic mobilization can exist among both disadvantaged and well-established groups. Ethnic solidarity and mobilization may actually increase when there is an improvement in the socioeconomic standing of an ethnic group and a decrease in the ethnic division of labor. In this sense, ethnic mobilization is fuelled by a group's desire to improve its status and circumstances vis-à-vis other ethnic groups when new social and economic opportunities are introduced.

Alternatively ethnic mobilization may result from grievances about their disadvantaged status and their determination to pursue the group's political interests. This approach assumes a direct relationship between perceptions of discrimination and ethnic mobilization, where the disadvantaged group tends to form a segregated ethnic framework in order to change the rules of the game set by the center. Rejection by the dominant group and stigmatization encountered by the minority groups enhance the retention of ethnic identity. Hence the rise and decline of ethnic affiliation depends primarily on the policies of the dominant group.

Another approach argues that the type of political participation is related to acculturation factors emphasizing the role of integration variables that influence the political participation of immigrants (Back and Soininen,

1998). The main factors considered here are length of residence and language proficiency. Participation in politics is a time-dependent process that requires knowledge of the political system, the different political parties and the different tactics being used in the country for political influence (Junn, 1999). This learning process requires the knowledge of the language as a central tool for the understanding of documents, speeches and local laws. A study on immigrants' participation in Danish local elections indicated that voting was positively related to length of stay: the longer the immigrant has been in the country, the greater the likelihood of participation in local politics (Togeby, 1999).

It remains to be determined, however, whether ethnic mobilization among new immigrants is a reactive behavior, a result of low status or alienation, or a pragmatic strategy for the promotion of status groups, regardless of the extent of integration in the host society, or a temporary process that reflects low acculturation.

The goal of the present study is to address these approaches through an examination of the voting patterns among immigrants in Israel from the former Soviet Union in the 1998 local elections in Haifa. The research questions are:

1. Do immigrants from the FSU vote in the election according to ethnic lines?

2. Are voting patterns the result of immigrants' perception of discrimination or the result of acculturation processes?

The Israeli Context

Immigration from the former countries of the Soviet Union to Israel took place in two waves. The first was during the years 1968–79, when 150,000 Jews arrived in Israel. At that time, the Soviet government was hostile to the attempts of its Jewish citizens to maintain their Jewish nationality and culture in the Soviet Union. The result was a selective migration of cultural and political leaders of the Jewish community from the former Soviet Union. The current wave of immigration started after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the change in the regime there. Since then, it is estimated that 830,000 immigrants from the countries of the FSU have arrived in Israel.

Studies report a number of differences and similarities between the first and second waves of immigrants from the FSU. In terms of motivation, it appears that the immigrants in the 70s were looking to migrate to the Jew-

ish homeland, whereas the immigrants in the 90s were seeking economic opportunity and political stability (Lisak, 1995). A study that compared the two groups after 4 years in the country shows that both groups differ slightly in age and education. Immigrants in the 70s were younger than those that arrived in the 90s. The immigrants that arrived in the 90s completed, on average, more years of formal schooling than those that arrived in the 70s. Both groups have considerably higher levels of formal education than the comparable Israeli workforce. Whereas the immigrants of the 70s were more evenly distributed across regions in Israel, the immigrants of the 90s were more concentrated in the urban centers of the country. Both groups show high levels of labor force participation; 90 percent of the males and 80 percent of the females were able to find jobs after four years in the country. The data underscores considerable rates of downward occupational mobility in both periods. Nevertheless, the rate of downward mobility or occupational loss was much more pronounced in the 90s than in the 70s (Raijman and Semyonov, 1998). Despite these differences, it is important to note that immigrants from the FSU constitute the largest single country of origin group among the Jewish population of Israel.

Immigrants from the countries of the FSU have developed a highly organized community, both at the local and national level. Immigrants of the FSU are integrated in a highly dense network that includes family and friends. At the formal level, by the end of the 1980s a national umbrella organization representing the 42 immigrants' groups and voluntary organizations was created ("The Zionist Forum") and a national leadership was elected in democratic elections. The goal was to create a non-partisan national organization representing immigrant interest vis-à-vis the national government. As the national elections of 1996 approached, leaders of the organization realized that influence in the national immigration policy requires not a pressure group but a political party, with elected parliament members. The leadership of the Zionist Forum announced the formation of a national party of immigrants (Israel Be Aliyah). In the 1996 national election, the Israel Be Aliyah party won 7 of the 120 parliament seats, entered the government coalition and two of their leaders became the Minister of Immigrant Absorption and the Minister of Industry and Commerce. In 1998 the party decided to run in the local elections and in 20 large localities the party ran alone (Leshem and Lisak, 2000). This type of political organization is the result of a number of factors. First, the migra-

tion wave of the 90s is a migration movement motivated more by the aim to improve personal economic and political conditions. Second, the current migration is mainly of urban immigrants who are highly educated. The size of the immigration and its professional composition created a demand for mass communication media (newspapers and journals) in Russian. The Russian media contributed to the development of the community as they supported the community members' economic activity advertising immigrant establishments. Finally, a shift in the national migration policy from "bureaucratic absorption" to "individual absorption" contributed to the formation of an immigrants' party. The consequence of the shift in the national policy was a low level of governmental involvement and a reduction in the services provided by the national government. The shift made informal social networks, immigrant voluntary organizations and the local government very important in helping the immigrant to access housing, employment, language classes and health services. The decentralization of the immigration policy contributed to the formation of a highly organized immigrant community (Leshem and Lisak, 2000; Katz, 2000).

Since the beginning of the current wave of immigration, 53,000 new immigrants from the FSU have settled in Haifa and have caused a dramatic demographic change in the city and some of its traditional neighborhoods. Haifa is the third largest city in Israel, with a population of 255,300 residents. It is a culturally diverse city, where an urban secular Israeli population shares space with an ultra-orthodox Jewish religious population, new immigrants from the FSU, and Israeli-Arab residents.

Whereas in 1990 the immigrants and the Arab population each represented almost 10 percent of the population, by 1999 the non-immigrant Jewish population had decreased from 80 percent to 66 percent of the city's population and the immigrant element had doubled from 10 percent to 21 percent of the city population. The Israeli-Arab element increased somewhat, from 9.68 percent to 13 percent.

The spatial distribution of the immigrant population in the city is uneven.

Immigrants are residentially concentrated in three sub-quarters of the city: Hadar Hacarmel, Western Haifa and Neve Shannan. In these sub-quarters the percentage of immigrants is above the city average (21%) ranging from 30 to 37 percent. Of course, it is important to remember that these figures represent the distribution according to city sub-quarters. A sub-quarter is a relatively large residen-

tial area (50,000 residents), but examination of the statistical units (5,000 residents) shows that the concentration in smaller areas is much larger. In a number of statistical units in these three sub-quarters the new immigrants represent between 40 and 60 percent of the population (Mesch, 2002).

The concentration of immigrants is the lowest in the Carmel area, an upper middle-class area where a higher percentage of the residents hold professional and academic degrees. A relatively large percentage of the new immigrants are residentially concentrated in the Hadar Hacarmel sub-quarter. Before the arrival of the immigrants, Hadar Hacarmel was an inner city area rapidly declining on every urban indicator. Between 1972 and 1989 the population fell by 17 percent; average income and average education were below the city average. The proportion of the elderly residents in the area was higher than the overall proportion in the city, the proportion of minorities and ultra-orthodox religious groups in the total population was increasing, housing density was higher than in other areas of the city, and the proportion of homeowners was lower.

New immigrants become a new community, and the potential for conflicts with other communities arises. Housing immigrants in a declining and low-income area is problematic. Studies have shown that attitudes toward immigrants in Israel vary according to socioeconomic and employment status. People of low SES tend to have a more negative view of the FSU immigration than those of middle and high SES in the sense that they perceive the immigration as affecting their ability to secure better jobs, housing, and quality of life. Low-income people believe that the extent of the immigration should be limited and that conflicts are likely to arise due to scarcity of resources (Isralowitz and Abu Saad, 1992).

Two central policies have shaped the institutional arrangements of the immigrants' integration process in Israel. First, the national policy on immigration changed from "bureaucratic integration" to "direct absorption". Until the late 1980s, the Ministry of Immigration and Absorption typically provided housing, lessons in Hebrew, and job referrals for new immigrants. During the late 1980s, that policy changed to "direct absorption" shifting the responsibility for immigrant integration away from the government. Upon landing in Israel, immigrants now receive an absorption basket from the government, with a certain sum of money meant to last for a limited period of time. Immigrants are now expected to find housing and

jobs during their first months in the country through informal networks (Lipshitz, 1996).

The second policy change was privatization of municipal services. In January 1995, a non-governmental organization (NGO) was established with the goal to provide housing, employment, and educational services to the immigrant population. The NGO has a board of directors, headed by a former immigrant, representatives of different immigrant organizations, and representatives of local government. Only 40 percent of the operating budget comes from the local government.

In general, the very existence of such an organization creates tensions between the immigrant population and the host society. The role of the immigrant NGO in relation to social integration and ethnic identity has been questioned in several ways, and the NGO has been seen both as helping immigrants to integrate, through providing a community for them within the host society, and as creating a separatist environment. By means of regulating the relationship between the immigrant community and local government, this structure ensures that the needs of the immigrants are recognized, but it also means that the immigrant community's needs are coming increasingly into conflict with local government.

Local government is highly sensitive to the needs and importance of creating a working relationship with the immigrants from the FSU in Haifa. Naturally, one good reason is that they represent 20 percent of the population in any election. But there are more fundamental reasons. Haifa has suffered from a decline in population, and even negative population growth. The immigrants from the FSU represent one of the few sources of population growth for the city, and their contribution has been most important in the renewal of inner city schools and other municipal services. Local government is very sensitive to their needs and invests efforts in retaining this population. In terms of political representation, 20 percent of the local City Council members are from the FSU immigrant community representing the two different FSU immigrants' lists, in accordance with their representation in the population.

In sum, one of the main features of the settlement of immigrants in Haifa is their high residential concentration. A large number of immigrants are located in a relatively small area. The immigrant community is concentrated within a few blocks and is easily recognized. Their high concentration in the inner city area creates conflicts, as they share space with the ultra-orthodox religious Jew-

ish community and with the Israeli-Arab community. In addition, the new immigrants have shown a high level of political mobilization, reflected in various educational and political organizations that negotiate with local government over the allocation of financial as well as political resources to the ethnic community.

Their high concentration, as well as the potential conflicts with other communities, makes them an interesting case for exploration of the variables influencing political participation.

Sampling and Methods

The data for this study were collected from December 1998 to March 1999. The study population consisted of new immigrants from the FSU who had entered Israel since 1989 and resided in Haifa. Data were obtained through the Department of Strategic Planning and Research of the Haifa Municipality. This department keeps records on all immigrant households that apply for local tax reductions, for which they are eligible during their first three years in the country. From this population, a sample was chosen through a series of steps. First, following inspection of the city sub-quarters, those where new immigrants from the FSU resided were selected. Second, the percentage of immigrants residing in each statistical area was calculated and statistical areas were grouped in three categories: areas in which less than 10 percent of the population were FSU immigrants, areas in which 11–40 percent of the population were FSU immigrants, and areas in which more than 41 percent of the population were immigrants. In the next step, statistical areas were grouped into five larger areas (sub-quarters). From each sub-quarter, 200 addresses of immigrants were randomly chosen. Interviewers were sent to these 1,000 addresses to conduct face-to-face interviews. It transpired that at 110 of the addresses selected, the residents of the households were not immigrants; and at 210 apartments the interviewer could not contact the resident after two follow-ups. Some of the addresses of the immigrants were probably outdated. A total of 680 households were contacted and 512 interviews were completed. The questionnaire was administered in Russian and took about 40 minutes to complete.

Measures

This study is restricted to immigrants that participated and voted in the elections. In order to create the depend-

ent variable two items were used. Respondents were asked if they had voted in the last municipal elections in Haifa, and if the response was "yes" they were asked to indicate for which party they voted. For the analysis the variable was coded as a dummy variable. When the respondent indicated a vote for a Russian list the variable was coded 1, and other votes were coded 0. As the dependent variable had 2 categories a logistic regression analysis was used.

The most important independent variable of the study was the percentage of immigrants who lived in the respondent's neighborhood. The measure was obtained by matching the addresses of the respondents with the percentage of immigrants that resided in the statistical unit (residential areas with a population of about 5,000 residents), according to the 1995 Israel Census of Housing and Population. After a preliminary inspection of the variable 3 categories were defined: immigrants living in neighborhoods with 1–10 percent of immigrants, immigrants living in neighborhoods in which 11–40 percent are immigrants and immigrants living in areas in which 41–60 percent are immigrants. Two other items were used to measure social integration. Respondents were asked whether the closest individual that they would be likely to ask for help is a native Israeli or a new immigrant and whether the closest person that they socialize with is Israeli or a new immigrant. "Israeli" was coded as 1 and "new immigrant" as 0.

Acculturation was measured by a number of variables. One was length of residence in the country. Another was language fluency. This variable was measured with items that indicated the individual's ability to understand a question and to read a letter in Hebrew.

To measure the respondents' perception of alienation and discrimination two survey items were used. The respondents were asked to indicate the extent of agreement with the statements "I do not understand things in this country", and "Immigrants are discriminated against in Israel". Agreements with the items (strongly agree and agree) were coded 1 and disagreement was coded 0.

A number of additional independent variables were used in the study. Age and years of formal education were measured as continuous variables. Marital status was coded as a dummy variable with 1 indicating married and 0 other. Employment status was measured as a dummy variable with 1 indicating that the respondent is currently employed and 0 indicating unemployed. Home ownership was measured with an item that indicated if the respondent owned the home. "Yes" responses were coded 1 and "no" responses were coded as 0.

Findings

The respondents were on average 46 years old and 64.9 percent were married. Immigrants from the FSU represent a highly educated group as indicated by an average of 13.69 years of schooling. Almost half of them (48.7%) report that they had already bought a home although their average stay in the country was almost 6 years. The distribution of the respondents according to their residential concentration was quite even, about a third reside in neighborhoods in which between 1 to 10 percent of the population are new immigrants, 30.8 percent reside in neighborhoods in which 11-40 percent are immigrants and 36 percent reside in neighborhoods in which there is a high residential concentration of immigrants from the FSU.

The findings regarding political participation are important, as immigrants appear to participate in the same proportion as the general population. In the last municipal election of Haifa, 70 percent of the respondents reported that they had voted. Of the respondents that participated in the last elections, 64.8 percent voted for the lists that are headed by FSU immigrants.

As the percentage of respondents that voted for a Russian party is so large, it is interesting to find out whether they differ from the respondents that voted for other Israeli parties. First we explore the relationship between spatial and social concentration and the patterns of vote.

Table 1
Distribution of Vote According to Residential Segregation

Type of Vote	0–10	11–40	41–60	Total
Non Russian Party	44.3	28.7	27.0	100.0
Russian Party	23.3	33.0	43.7	100.0

Phi: .226 ($p < .00001$)

Table 1 presents the relationship between residential segregation and voting behavior. According to the table the higher the percentage of immigrants residing in the immigrant neighborhood the higher the percentage of respondents that voted for a Russian list. Of the immigrants that voted for an Israeli party 44.3 percent lived in a neighborhood with less than 10 percent immigrants, whereas 43.7 percent of the immigrants who voted for a Russian list resided in a neighborhood in which between 41 to 60 percent of the residents are immigrants. This relationship between voting choice and percentage of immigrants in the respondents' neighborhood was statistically significant.

In the next section we examine the relationship between the origin of closest friends and voting behavior.

Table 2
Distribution of Vote According to Social relationships (Socializing with an Israeli)

Type of Vote	Russian	Israeli	Total
Non Russian Party	45.4	54.6	100.0
Russian Party	59.0	41.0	100.0

Phi: .130 ($p < .021$)

Table 3
Distribution of Vote According to Social relationships (Asking an Israeli or a Russian Immigrant for Help)

Type of Vote	Russian	Israeli	Total
Non Russian Party	53.7	46.3	100.0
Russian Party	73.5	26.5	100.0

Phi: .200 ($p < .000$)

The results in Tables 2 and 3 show a similar pattern. The relationship between voting behavior and social support was statistically significant. A higher percentage of individuals that reported voting for a Russian party reported having an immigrant as the closest person providing social support in time of need and socializing with a Russian immigrant for fun. Individuals who reported voting for an Israeli list reported having more Israeli friends and fewer Russian friends. According to the results it is clear that spatial and social segregation of immigrants are related to their pattern of voting. A high percentage of spatially and socially segregated immigrants reported voting for an immigrant party in the last local elections. Apparently spatial and social segregation from the local population facilitate the mobilization of resources along to ethnic lines.

The next question to be explored is the extent to which voting according to ethnic lines is a temporal or persistent pattern. One way to explore this issue is by looking at the relationship between acculturation variables and voting patterns.

Table 4
Distribution of Vote According to Length of Residence in the Country

Type of Vote	0–3 years	4–7 years	7–10	Total
Non Russian Party	13.9	20.5	65.6%	100.0
Russian Party	28.3	28.3	43.4%	100.0

Phi: .218 ($p < .000$)

Table 4 shows clear differences according to length of residence in the country. Two third of the voters for an Israeli party were longer-term residents (between 7 to 10 years in the country). Although only 14 percent of the vot-

ers for an Israeli party were in the country less than 3 years, it is noticeable that 28 percent of the voters for a Russian Party were less than 3 years in the country. Overall it is clear that voters for the Russian Party tended to report less time of residence in the country than voters for the Israeli Parties.

Another measure of acculturation is language ability.

Table 5
Distribution of Vote According to language ability (understanding a question)

Type of Vote	Unable to understand	Able to Understand	Total
Non Russian Party	35.3	64.7	100.0
Russian Party	48.2	51.8	100.0

Phi: .124 ($p < .002$)

Table 6
Distribution of Vote According to reading ability (understanding a letter)

Type of Vote	Unable to understand	Able to Understand	Total
Non Russian Party	41.8	58.2	100.0
Russian Party	57.0	43.0	100.0

Phi: .145 ($p < .007$)

The results of Table 5 and Table 6 confirm our previous finding regarding length of residence. A majority of the voters for the Israeli Parties demonstrated better language ability. Close to 65 percent of the voters for the Israeli party reported being able to understand a question and almost 60 percent were able to read and understand a letter. Regarding the voters for a Russian list, less than half of them were able to understand a letter and half of them reported being able to understand a question. The results regarding length of residence in the country and language ability support acculturation theory. According to this perspective the vote for an immigrant party is temporary and represents the lack of understanding of the local language and lack of knowledge of local values and norms. As time goes by and immigrants become more fluent in the local language and local political issues and parties, their willingness to vote for an immigrant party should decrease.

The main hypothesis of this study argues that perceptions of discrimination create a general state of alienation that encourages vote for an immigrant party. In the next section the distribution of vote according to perceptions of discrimination and alienation are presented.

The hypothesis that the vote for a Russian party is motivated by perceptions of discrimination is not sup-

ported by the data. Almost the same percentage of voters for an Israeli and for a Russian Party report felt discriminated against.

Table 7
Distribution of the vote according to perceptions that Israel discriminates against immigrants

Type of Vote	No Discrimination	Discrimination	Total
Non Russian Party	56.0	44.0	100.0
Russian Party	54.0	46.0	100.0

Phi: .020 NS

Table 8
Distribution of Vote According to perceptions of alienation (do not understand the country)

Type of Vote	No Alienation	Alienation	Total
Non Russian Party	49.6	50.4	100.0
Russian Party	47.2	52.8	100.0

Phi: .022 NS

The hypothesis that the vote for a Russian Party can be motivated by perceptions of alienation was not supported by the data. About the same percentage of voters for a Russian and Israeli list reported feeling unable to understand processes and things in the country.

Multivariate Analysis

Although the bi-variate results provide a clear indication for the effects of social and spatial integration and acculturation in the voting patterns of immigrants, a multivariate analysis is required. In the next step we present the results of a logistic regression predicting the odds of voting for a Russian Party.

According to the results spatial and social segregation and acculturation variables are related to the voting behavior. The longer the immigrant is in the country the less likely he/she is to vote for a Russian Party. Each additional year reduces the odds of voting for a Russian Party by 19 percent. Having close friends that are Israelis reduce the odds of voting for a Russian party. Finally, the most important factor is residential segregation. The higher the residential segregation the higher the odds of voting for a Russian and not an Israeli Party. Consistent with our descriptive findings no relationship was found between perceptions of rejection and discrimination of immigrants and voting behavior.

Table 9
Regression Analysis Predicting the Odds of Voting for an immigrant party

Variable name	Model 1		Model 2	
	Parameter Estimate (S.E.)	Odds Ratio	Parameter Estimate (S.E.)	Odds Ratio
Age	–.003 (.012)	.997	–.001 (.12)	.999
Married	.638** (.302)	1.893	.625** (.323)	1.868
Employed	–.352 (.366)	.703	–.208 (.391)	.594
Length of Residence	–.160** (.062)	.852	–.147** (.066)	.863
Apartment Owner	–.197 (.323)	.821	–.570 (.363)	.565
Israeli Friend	–.412 (.289)	.662	–.154 (.327)	.857
Israeli for Support	–.576** (.295)	.562	–.836** (.325)	.433
Language Ablility	–.186 (.174)	.830	–.059 (.189)	.943
Israel Discriminates			.014 (.332)	1.014
Alienation			–.076 (.333)	.927
Percentage of Immigrants			2.943** (.850)	18.964
Constant	2.179** (.736)		1.165 (.850)	
R^2	.163		.232	

Discussion

The goal of the present study was to examine the voting patterns of immigrants from the FSU in Israel in the 1998 local elections in Haifa. Two research questions guided this research: Do immigrants from the FSU vote in the election according to ethnic lines? Are voting patterns the result of immigrants' perception of discrimination or the result of acculturation processes?

Regarding the first question our results show a clear tendency for the new immigrants to vote along ethnic lines and for the party that claims to represent the interests of the new immigrants. According to our results in the last municipal election, 70 percent of the respondents reported that they had voted. Of the respondents that participated in the last elections, 64.8 percent voted for the

lists that were headed by FSU immigrants. These results imply that this group of immigrants expressed a high interest for local politics and was highly involved in expressing their voice. These results probably reflect two different but related processes. First, the current group of immigrants is characterized by high levels of education. Education has been found to increase the political involvement of individuals. Second, the local election is of direct interest to immigrants. The shift in the policy of absorption from a bureaucratic model to direct absorption means that the local authority has a say in the provision of services to new immigrants such as help in finding housing, labor skills training, and language courses.

In the second step we explored three different explanations for voting for an immigrant party. The competitive approach holds that ethnicity is an instrument for mobilization with the aim of increasing a group's access to economic, social and political sources, regardless of its location in the stratification system. The reactive approach argues that ethnic mobilization is fueled by people's grievances about their disadvantaged status and their determination to redress it and pursue their political interests. The acculturation approach argues that the type of political participation is related to acculturation factors, emphasizing the role of integration variables that influence the political participation of immigrants. The main factors considered here are length of residence and language proficiency. Participation in politics is a time-dependent process that requires knowledge of the political system, the different political parties and the different tactics being used in the country for political influence.

Our results provide some support for the competitive approach. The positive effect of spatial and social segregation indicates some advantages of the ability to mobilize resources for political purposes. The number and concentration of the immigrants from the FSU are preconditions for creating an immigrant community able to develop communication tools, such as newspapers, community centers and non-governmental organizations. Social and spatial segregation facilitates the mobilization of resources necessary for political mobilization.

Our results do not provide any direct evidence for the reactive perspective. The results show a non-statistically significant relationship between perceptions of discrimination, isolation and alienation from the local society and voting behavior. Yet it is important to note that spatial and residential segregation might be providing some evidence for negative attitudes of the society. Sometimes im-

migrants choose to live in residentially segregated areas to avoid discrimination and negative attitudes of the society.

Finally, the results provide some indication that voting for an immigrant party might be a temporal process. Length of residence and ability to use the language were negatively related to the likelihood of voting for an immigrant party.

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TRAINING AND RETRAINING PROGRAMS IN ISRAEL

Since late 1989 over 1 million immigrants have arrived in Israel, 85% from the former Soviet Union (FSU) increasing the Israeli population of 1989 by almost 20%. Close to 40% of these immigrants arrived between 1990–91 (375,000). In 1998, the immigration rate was around 60,000 – a drop from around 75,000 in the mid nineties. In 1999, we witnessed an increase in immigration with a record of 78,000 immigrants arrivals. However, since then immigration has dropped annually by 30%. There were only 43,000 arrivals in 2001.

What was initially seen by many policy makers as an immigrant integration problem, with only marginal effects on the economy, has become a national challenge that has required substantial structural changes in the Israeli economy. Subsequently, this has already affected the direction of the development of the economy.

This paper will deal mainly with immigration from the FSU. However, I will also devote some attention to a completely different group of immigrants, those from Ethiopia.

There are two major attributes of immigration from the FSU related to labor force integration: labor force participation is high and the occupational structure of the employed immigrants is extremely professional.

During the last quarter of 2001, the rate of labor force participation of immigrants who have arrived since 1990 aged fifteen years and above was higher compared to non-immigrants (57.8% compared to 53.6%). The unemployment rate however was higher among immigrants (10.5% compared to 9.0%) in 2001. This is a sharp decrease from the unemployment rate among immigrants who arrived in 1990–91 38.5% in the last quarter of 1991. (However, the unemployment rate of 1990–1991 immigrants was lower in the final quarter of 2001 than for non-immigrants, 7.6% compared to 9.0%.) The immigrants comprised 18.8% of the employed during the last quarter of 2001,

when they were 18.0% of the population 15+. On the other hand, they comprised 21.6% of the unemployed.[1]

Over 60% of FSU immigrants were employed prior to their immigration as scientific, academic, technical employees or other professionals (there were proportionally very large numbers of scientists, engineers, physicians, nurses, technical workers and musicians among them). In 1989, prior to this wave of immigration, only 24.5% of the Israeli workforce were employed in these professions.[2] During the last quarter of 2001, only 24% of all immigrants were employed in these professions[3] while this figure in the total population increased to 28.4%.[4] From these figures we can note that only 40% of immigrants in these fields worked in their profession abroad or a similar profession though many experienced a downgrading process (e.g. engineers had to work as junior engineers or technicians, physicians had to work as nurses etc.).

The volume of financial and physical capital imports can relatively easily be estimated and planned. However, it is difficult to evaluate in a country like Israel, with its open immigration policy under the "Law of Return" (which guarantees the right of any Jew residing in the diaspora to immigrate to Israel and to automatically receive Israeli citizenship), the volume and composition of the human capital imports. The law does not allow the selection of preferred human capital. The employment absorption problem therefore cannot be solved by simply expanding the economy according to the preferences of local economic factors, since the necessary expansion must be directed in a manner that will conform as much as possible to the skills of the immigrants. Therefore, expansion of the economy has to be in those areas of the economy that are export orientated in those goods and services, which could utilize the human capital to a maximum. Consideration of the human capital structure of the immigrants is highly desirable from the viewpoint of the immigrants themselves. After all, most of them wish to retain the occupation in which they worked prior to their immigration.[5] Various studies carried out over the past years have shown that immigrants' satisfaction with their job in Israel is considerably higher among those immigrants working in their original occupation or in an occupation close to their original one. Studies also show a significant correlation between overall satisfaction in the country and satisfaction with their job.

FSU immigrants are familiar with a Soviet economic system where little emphasis is given to marketing and maximizing profits. Back home most of these people were

placed in jobs upon graduation by the government and consequently had no first hand knowledge or training in finding a job. In comparison, Israel is basically a free market economy. One is expected to look for a job independently. Even though the Israeli Government maintains a Labor Office, only about 20% of the immigrants are able to find a job by utilizing this service. The service mainly provides job seekers with a certificate indicating that they are jobless and therefore eligible to get a monthly unemployment payment from National Insurance.

In an attempt do prepare immigrants for the job market and to be able to fully utilize their human capital, the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption in conjunction and coordination with other Government Ministries, (mainly the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs) offers a wide variety of programs to help immigrants find a suitable positions in the labor market in Israel.

Hebrew: a Prerequisite

The first prerequisite is the *Ulpan.* The *ulpan* is a language acquisition program that is available to all adult immigrants for free. During the immigrants' first 6 months in the country they receive a subsistence allowance as part of the "absorption basket" grant so that they can attend the *ulpan.*[6] The goals of the *ulpan* are to enable the newcomer to learn sufficient basic words and grammar as quickly as possible so that the learner can have a simple conversation in Hebrew and also be able to read and write simple texts. *Ulpanim* (plural of *ulpan*) are located all over the country. The number of classrooms and their locations depend on the number of immigrants and their dispersal around the country. The basic *ulpan* is 500 hours of frontal teaching in class. The *ulpan* also offers trips around the country as well as lectures on various aspects of life in Israel. There is a day program for a 5-month period and an evening program over a 10-month period for those who work during the day. Studies have shown that only about 70% of the immigrants during their first year in the country take advantage of this opportunity to learn Hebrew in an *ulpan* and almost a quarter of those that begin their studies drop out during the course. During the immigrants' first half-year in the country they receive a subsistence allowance to enable them to study. Nevertheless, many prefer to bypass the *ulpan* and enter the workforce as soon as possible. Some employed persons attend the evening programs but others do not learn in any formal context. Therefore, this year it was decided that any person who immigrated

in 1990 onwards can attend an *ulpan* for only a symbolic fee to improve their Hebrew. We do not have any figures as yet with regards how many veteran immigrants are taking advantage of this opportunity.

For immigrants from Ethiopia, the *ulpan* program is longer and offers more lectures on various aspects of life in Israel and Judaism.

During the past year special *ulpanim* were organized for certain professions (engineers, physicians, para-medicals, construction workers etc.). In these *ulpanim* immigrants receive an additional 50–100 hours dedicated to the technical language of a specific profession along with basic knowledge on the use of computers. Evaluation studies initiated by the Research and Planning Division of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, have shown that in these specialized *ulpanim* the incentive to learn was greater, attendance and achievement was higher compared to the regular *ulpan*.

There are also special *ulpanim* in the college preparatory programs for immigrant youth that wish to continue their higher education in one of Israel's colleges or universities.

Educational Degree Recognition

Within the Ministry of Education there is a special unit that deals with post-secondary and university degree recognition. This unit learned a lot about the Soviet educational system during the immigration wave from the Soviet Union in the seventies. Some of the present workers in the unit were employed prior to their immigration in the Federal Ministry of Higher Education or parallel Ministries of various Republics. The immigrant who wishes to receive an "equivalency document" must present his or her diplomas and all other relevant documents to the unit. The unit checks if the documents are authentic and in accordance with the information gathered in the data base of recognized institutions of higher education. Then an equivalency document is issued. This document is mainly used in determining the grade given to workers in the public sector. The private sector and schools of higher education use these documents for general knowledge on the educational level of the immigrant and depend more on a personal interview and a review of the immigrant's work experience, publications and patents.

Preparatory Programs for Entering the Job Market

Immigrants in academic professions who are unable to find a job in or close to their original profession are eligible to attend a "Center for Employment and Counseling". This program lasts for 2 months, and provides additional instruction in Hebrew and in professional terminology, lectures on various topics, primarily concerning employment; job search workshops; professional site visits; job placement services and counseling with an occupational psychologist. In 1994 a three stage follow-up study to evaluate the effectiveness of this program began. Some of the participants were interviewed at the beginning of the course, at the end of the course and a year after completing the course. The follow-up study showed that the majority had found employment within one year after completing the program. Among the immigrants who were employed, those that went on to study in a vocational training course had found higher level jobs and were employed at a higher rate compared to those who did not. According to the immigrants' own reports, the Center's main contributions included an opportunity to improve their Hebrew, as well as information on vocational training courses and job search skills. Only a tiny proportion found a job with the assistance of the Center's staff.

As a result of this study, several changes have been implemented in the programs for learning Hebrew and for preparing new immigrants with higher education for employment. The main feature being outsourcing the organization to "man-power" companies who also have the responsibility for placement and therefore put more emphasis on the job-seeking aspects of the program. An evaluation study is planned to analyze the effectiveness of this new arrangement.

Training and Retraining Programs

The first type is the establishment of specialized *ulpanim* as described above. The second is the establishment of training and retraining courses that range between 200–300 hours with evening courses that include a job-searching workshop while encouraging the immigrants to take the first job they find. The purpose being that after completing an evening course, immigrants will be better prepared to search for a job in a field close to their original profession. In a few months, our Ministry will begin an evaluation study on the effectiveness of these evening courses.

Many immigrants continue to attend daytime training, retraining and vocational training courses offered mainly by the Ministry of Labor (these courses are open to the veteran population as well and are conducted completely in Hebrew). Certain courses are organized by the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, often in collaboration with the Ministries responsible for licensing. This is especially important in regard to the licensing of physicians, lawyers, teachers, certified public accountants, etc. In these courses, some of the elements are given in language of the immigrants and parts of the final exam can be written in that language.

The courses offered are of a wide spectrum and I will give a number of examples. For physicians who are unable to pass Israeli certification exams to be physicians there are courses to get licenses in alternative fields, such as a registered nurse, X-ray technician, medical laboratory technician or physical therapist. For those with a background in history, linguistics and teaching there are courses for tourist guides or other types of jobs needed in the tourist industry. Of course, many of the courses are in computer related subjects for job openings in Israel's hi-tech industries.

During the summer of 1992, a longitudinal study was initiated on the employment situation of immigrants aged between 20–64 who arrived from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) during 1989–1991. At the time of the study, only 30% of the immigrants had participated in some sort of training, retraining or vocational course. Among the men who worked in academic, professional, technological and managerial occupations in the FSU, 46% of those who had taken training courses were employed in these occupations in Israel compared to 29% of those who *had not* taken any course; the corresponding figures for women are 48% and 12% respectively.[7]

During the second half of 1995, a study was carried out among immigrant engineers aged between 20–55 who arrived from the Former Soviet Union 1989–1994. The study found that 40% of the engineers who participated in one of the above mentioned courses were employed in their original profession or in a similar profession. Only 15% of the engineers who *did not* participate in any course were employed in their original profession or a similar profession.[8]

These studies have shown that participation in a training course contributes positively to the immigrants' chances of finding employment. Likewise, the propensity to find a job in one's original occupation or close to it increases as a result of participating in a course.

The outlay in 2000 by the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption for the courses it runs is $8 million plus $4 million for a subsistence allowance paid to immigrants who are in the country for less than 2 years. Immigrants who have been in the country for a longer period receive a subsistence allowance through the Unemployment Insurance program of the National Insurance. There is no specific accounting for the cost of immigrants who attend courses run by the Ministry of Labor. I would estimate that the cost per annum, including subsistence allowance, is between $40–50 million for approximately 10,000–12,000 immigrants.

"On the job" training programs are also available to immigrants to fully utilize their human capital. In these cases, the Ministry subsidizes the salaries of the immigrants while they participate in these programs.

Programs for Immigrants from Ethiopia

For Ethiopian immigrants, employers in the business sector are able to receive an amount equal to one third of the minimum wage for a period of 3–6 months. About 300 subsidies as such are given each year to train them as skilled and semi-skilled workers.

In response to Ethiopian immigrants' modest educational background and limited employment experience, considerable resources have been invested in the development of vocational training courses and other programs aimed at improving their employment opportunities and therefore assisting their integration into Israel's westernized economy.

Between March 1993 and June 1995, information was collected within the framework of an evaluation study on 70 vocational courses attended by 1,250 Ethiopian immigrants who arrived between 3–6 years prior to their first interview at the beginning of the course. They were interviewed again when they completed the course and than once again 8 months later.

The courses for men were grouped according to the participants' level of formal education: courses for those with a relatively high level of education (9 years or more), such as tractor drivers or forklift operators; courses for those with an intermediate level of education (3–8 years), such as automobile mechanics or welding; and courses for those with very little or no formal education, such as plumbing and gardening.

The courses for women were also grouped according to the participants' level of formal education: courses for

those with a relatively high level of education (child-care aides and practical nurses), courses for those with an intermediate level of education (geriatric aides), and courses for those with no formal education (sewing).

The primary measures of success in the study were: 1) had the course graduate found any kind of job and 2) had the course graduate found a job in the specific vocation studied.

The most successful courses were those for practical nurses, forklift operators and jewelry finishing. The less successful courses were for tractor drivers, auto mechanics welding, sewing as well as forklift operators. Since some of the courses on the same subject were found in the most successful as well as the least successful, the question was asked what made a course successful. The common denominator of all the successful courses was that the organizers provided the graduates with some form of assistance in finding a job at the conclusion of the course – either by providing letters of recommendation and referrals to places of work or by actually finding a job for each graduate.[9]

On the Job Training

Academic professionals employed in certain segments of the public sector are able to receive a sum equal to the minimum wage for 6–12 months. This program has a limited budget for only 350 placements per year.

During 1994–1997, a special project was designed to encourage the employment of older engineers and immigrants. The subsidy was between 50%–100% of the minimum wage for a period of 6–18 months. The older the immigrant and the higher the level of the job the greater the amount of the subsidy and the longer the period of subsidization. About 200 immigrants were aided each year. This program was jointly funded by our Ministry and the Joint Distribution Committee-Israel, a branch of an American-Jewish NGO very active in the field of integration of immigrants in Israel and helping Jewish refugees all over the world.

The cost of these programs for the Ministry is aproximately $4 million a year.

Program for Professional Integration of Scientists

One of the major and most costly programs run as an inducement and "on the job" training for immigrant and returning Israeli scientists is organised by the Center for Ab-

sorption in Science, a unit within the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption.

The Center was created in 1973 in the wake of a relatively large wave of immigrants from the Soviet Union (75,000 from 1971–73). Many were scientists and R&D engineers. The purpose of the center was to help immigrant scientists to enter the workforce as quickly as possible in their field of training and experience and to enable them to learn and adapt to western methods.

Since 1989, approximately 15,000 immigrant scientists and R&D engineers have arrived. In 1989 only 8,000 scientists and R&D engineers were employed in the civilian sector of the Israeli economy, including the teaching and research staff of the universities. Out of the 15,000, almost 11,000 have found initial employment working in their professions and 9,300 were aided by the Center.

All of the professional staff at the Center have personal experience as scientists and almost all speak English and Russian. The services provided by the Center are:

- Aiding the scientist to prepare a résumé according to accepted practices in the West.
- Determining the specific professional profile of the scientist.
- Directing the scientist to potential employers and where necessary accompanying them to a job interview.
- When the immigrant gets a definite job offer: a staff member negotiates with the potential employer: employment terms; the research project the scientist will be working on; determines a mentor for the scientist from among the employer's scientific staff; determines the financial subsidy to aid in paying the scientist's salary and fringe benefits for a period of 1-4 years and the amount of money that will be allocated to cover costs of the research project in which the immigrant will be engaged. This program has to be approved by an internal committee of the Ministry.
- Follow-up visits with scientists and their mentos to determine their progress and where necessary to make changes in the program. In drastic cases, the program is discontinued and a new place of employment for the scientist is sought.

The average total aid package for one scientist is $30,000. The budget allocated in 2001 was $40 million not including another $45 million for funding in the year 2002 and onwards.

A study on the effectiveness of this program for 6,000 immigrant scientists who arrived during 1989–91 showed

that about a third of them had found initial employment as scientists by the summer of 1992, 80% with the aid of the Center for Absorption in Science. Very few had a permanent position and this uncertainty with regard to the scientists' future employment had a negative effect on their job performance. In a follow-up study in 1995 of those that were employed in 1992, it was found that 43% were employed full time and 3% part time in science but did not receive any direct Government support. 43% continued to receive Government aid to continue their employment and 11% were unemployed. Those that were employed without Government aid were more optimistic concerning their future than those still receiving aid.

Only 55% of the scientist respondents said they were very satisfied or satisfied with the services they received at the Center. However, 82% said that they are sure or think they are sure in light of their experience in Israel that they would immigrate again to Israel and 97% are certain or think they will stay in Israel. The latter two responses indicate optimism regarding the success of the Center's program, as well as of the integration process in Israel in general.[10]

Last fall, a study was begun to ascertain the long term employment of immigrant scientists that arrived during 1990–1996 from the FSU who received aid from the Center of Absorption in Science. Preliminary results show that 75% were employed, of them 60% in a scientific job (a third of those were still getting a Government subsidy), not necessarily in the same employment in which they started to work and received a subsidy. The remaining 15% were employed but not in scientific work. Among those that were working in the scientific field 60% expressed satisfaction with the Government policy on integration of immigrant scientists and the same percent expressed satisfaction with their personal absorption. Among those who were not working in the scientific field or were unemployed only 40% expressed satisfaction in these two aspects.

Encouragement of Employment

Following the arrival of a huge number of immigrants that arrived in 1990 (200,000) and the resulting high rate of unemployment (11% among the total population and over 40% among the immigrants), the *Law for the Encouragement of Employment* was passed in July 1991 that was valid for a three-year period. This law was enacted in order to encourage the employment of new immigrants and to

facilitate on the job training for finding work in the business sector. The incentives given in the Law were valid whether the employer hired newcomers or veteran residents. Employees were untitled to receving wage subsidies if the following criteria were met:

- The firm had added at least 5 workers to its roster during the reported quarter.
- The firm is not part of the public sector and not financed by the Central Government or a Local Authority by more than 30%.
- The additional worker has to be employed for at least a quarter of a year.

The subsidy was given for each additional worker for a period of up to two years. During the first year, it was equal to a third of the worker's salary but not more than $420 per month and during the second year a third of the wage but not more than the equivalent of $280 a month. The incentive was given through the National Insurance system.

In a survey of employers on the effectiveness of this program, 80% of the respondents said that the incentive had no influence on their decision to take on new workers. In 1994, the validity of the Law was lengthened for one year. However, in 1995 it was not extended and the incentives of this Law were discontinued.

Self Employment and Entrepreneurship

Many immigrants in their countries of origin became involved in specific professions or learned particular skills because of political reasons or pressure from their parents. Other individuals were in professions of their choice but somewhere along their professional career they felt like making a career change. After Soviet Union regime change some Jews used the opportunities available to them and became self-employed or business people. From these three groups we found that a certain percentage want to be self-employed or develop their own business in Israel. Some use their previous professional knowledge and experience while others decide to go into a completely new field.

To assist these immigrants and to help them succeed in these new endeavors the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption established an Entrpreneurship Unit that is responsible for the development of both infrastructural assistance and also of a supportive environment for immigrant entrepreneurs. It helps facilitate the efforts of these talented individuals to actualize their initiatives, to overcome

the difficulties inherent in starting to work in a new, unknown business environment, and to earn a decent salary in order to support themselves and their families. Quite often the business is a place of work for all the adult members of the family or for other immigrants mainly from the same country of origin. Many of the businesses are "ethnic" that is serving the specific needs of specific immigrant groups.

The purpose of the Unit is to discover the entrepreneurship potential that exists among newcomers. Achieving this goal is a long-term solution that will enable the immigrant entrepreneur to integrate into Israeli society. As they gain economic independence, they are also more able to contribute to the overall growth of the economy.

The services offered are:

- Exposing new immigrants to an acquaintances within the Israeli business world, and offering them the tools and monetary resources which will make best use of their entrepreneurship talents.
- Developing and advancing regional service centers – MATI (Hebrew acronym for Center for the Development and Maturation of Entrepreneurship).[11] These Centers provide counseling services, training courses and professional accompaniment to actualize immigrants' initiatives and give support to already existing businesses.
- Making recommendations to the Ministry to grant financial aid for the essential initial investment while taking advantage of available business opportunities.

The activities of the Entrepreneurship Unit have been expanded considerably since 1998. The criterion of defining a new immigrant has been lengthened to include all immigrants since 1990 and their activities have included the encouragement of immigrants from Ethiopia to be self-employed and open small businesses. One of the MATIs has developed special programs for this group.

In 2000 and 2001, some 500 loans were taken out by immigrants for each year. The annual budget for loans and the subsidization of the interest on additional loans available to entrepreneur immigrants from the banks is $2 million.

Conclusion

Israel has established a whole set of programs to facilitate and assist the Israeli economy to utilize the human capital of more than one million immigrants who arrived in the

last decade to a maximum. Some of these programs were very successful and effective, others were not. These immigrants together with the natural rate increased the labor supply on average by 3% per annum.

Other programs were initiated to increase the demand for highly skilled and educated immigrants. Some of the programs described above have elements that effect the demand curve but are mainly due to the effect of labor supply. Israel has developed a number of programs that have been enacted into the law to effect the demand curve. The effect of these programs needs a separate in-depth study and analysis. The names of these Laws are: the *Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investments* and the *Law for the Encouragement of Research and Development.*

FOOTNOTES

[1] *Labor Force Survey*, Central Bureau of Statistics, State of Israel, Press Release February 20, 2002.

[2] *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1990*, Central Bureau of Statistics, State of Israel, p. 358.

[3] *Labor Force Survey* cit. al. Feb. 20, 2002.

[4] *Labor Force Survey* C.B.S. *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2001*. Average for 2000.

[5] Flug K., Kasir N., Ofer G., *The Absorption of Soviet Immigrants into the Labour Market: Aspects of Occupational Substitution and Retention in Russian Jews on Three Continents - Migration and Resettlement,* Editors: Lewin-Epstein N., Ro'i Y., Ritterband P., Frank Cass-London, 1997, p. 434.

[6] A grant given to newcomers to cover basic needs for their first year in the country. The main elements are: a rent subsidy for a year, a 6 month subsistence allowance, bus fare for half a year to cover transportation costs to and from the *ulpan,* school expenses, and other minor items.

[7] Naveh G., Noam G., Benita E., *The Employment and Economic Situation of Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union - Selected Findings from a National Employment Survey in Immigrant Absorption in Israel,* Editor Noam G., JDC-Brookdale Institute, 1994, p. 79.

[8] Naveh G., King J., *The Absorption into Employment of Immigrant Engineers,* JDC-Brookdale Institute, 1999 (Hebrew).

[9] Lipshitz C., Wolfson M., *Follow-up Study of Ethiopian Immigrants Who Graduated from Vocational Training Courses - Summary Report*, JDC-Brookdale Institute, 1997 (Hebrew).

[10] Shai S., et al., *The Absorption of Immigrant Scientists 1992-1995 - Evaluation of Government Aid Programs,* Gutman Applied Social Research Institute and Megama Consultants, 1996 (Hebrew).

[11] MATIs (a Hebrew acronym) serve the whole population. Many of the services are geared specifically towards the various immigrant groups and some are given in the language of the immigrants.

MEXICO

Juan
HERNÁNDEZ

Special Advisor to the President for Mexicans Abroad
Government of Mexico

MEXICO'S DIASPORA AND ITS DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

It is a true honor for someone of my background to be here addressing the Metropolis Conference, for as many of you know, my training is not in the social sciences, but in literature. Nonetheless, today I will share with you my political analysis of the role Mexico's diaspora played in our recent democratic transition, and then I will read a declaration I have prepared, in which political and humanitarian impulses combine to treat the question of migrants' rights after September 11, 2001. We are people who are passionate about telling the world just how good the Mexican people in the United States are, and just how much they deserve their basic rights, and I hope to share that passion with you today.

Today, Mexico's public policies are more oriented than ever towards our citizens abroad. A lengthier paper detailing these policies was presented by my colleague Omar de la Torre at the Metropolis conference in Rotterdam last year. You can find it on the Metropolis website, but I will reiterate much of the information here. First, we have strengthened the network of state-level migrant attention offices of which Mario Riestra, here with us at this conference, is national coordinator. Second, the foreign relations agenda under Fox has been dominated, first and foremost, by the mandate to negotiate with the United States for an ordered and mutually beneficial migration program combining guest worker provisions, legalization of existing immigrants and bilateral border security measures.

And finally, the area about which I am most equipped to speak is the newly-created cabinet-level Office of the President for Mexicans Abroad, which I head. The office has two main functions: dignification of migrants, and bringing opportunities to their families and their communities of origin. But, even these two goals are really just one, for how can we separate the migrants from their communities of origin, the place where half of their fami-

lies continue to live, and which receive a significant portion of their wages? The better-off the migrant, the better-off the community of origin; and the better-off the community of origin, the better-off the migrant.

As far as the first goal is concerned, I take weekly trips to the United States to meet with local, state and federal legislators regarding the need to better serve migrants, including undocumented migrants. What I seek is a radical change in thinking and discourse in our neighbor country – the country, I might add, where I was born to an American mother and a Mexican father. I seek a framework in which immigrants are recognized for the contributions they make to the economy, and are not accused of 'draining' the economy; I seek a discourse that acknowledges that people who cross the border for better wages are not criminals, but rather, good people trying to do the best for their families; I seek to develop an idea of partnership with Mexico that takes into account the fact that migrants' remittances and continued transnational ties with their sending countries are *positive* developments, not threatening ones, and that they will only enhance the well-being of the entire hemisphere. In short, I seek to remind people: the United States is a country of immigrants. Mexican migrants must be treated not like criminals, but like the productive members of U.S. society that they are.

The work of dignification occurs on our side of the frontier, too: We work to stop the corruption that has long plagued migrants at customs' houses on the border, and together with the Health Secretariat, we just launched the first *bi*national health program in Mexico's history. We work to change the way people think in Mexico, too. In a country that had an unfortunate tradition of viewing emigrants as traitors, we promote the idea that they are heroes, and as I mentioned before, we seek their political and citizenship rights to participate in building a new Mexico. We tell them we do not just want their participation, we need it.

As for the second main goal, that of bringing opportunities to migrants' communities of origin, my office has identified 90 microregions where migration and poverty combine, and is targeting these communities for development efforts, ranging from infrastructure improvements to direct investment to facilitating the exportation of locally-made products. Specifically, we hope to attract capital to Mexico from those Mexicans and Mexican-Americans for whom the so-called "American dream" has become a reality. Just as the Jewish diaspora "Thinks Israel", so we

want the Mexican diaspora to "Think Mexico". Omar de la Torre and Mario Riestra will address this in further detail in their presentations today.

Additionally, we have taken an example from a program that exists in certain Mexican states, called three-for-one, and made it national. Three-for-one matches money that clubs of migrants want to donate for development projects in their communities of origin three-for-one. Again, Omar and Mario will address this further in their presentations.

So, as you can see, the reality of the new Mexico is a reality in which our citizens abroad are being incorporated as an integral part of the agenda, and this inclusion is both partly responsible for, and largely the result of, Mexico's transition.

After all, while the bare-bones of our transition is the idea of multi-party rule with clean and free elections and complete freedom of political expression, these bones will dry out before long if they are not surrounded by the muscle of our own people. Participation in this democracy is, without question, the most basic of our goals. Thus, we cannot leave out the sixth of Mexico's population that lives abroad, these 23 million people – and, in particular, we cannot leave out the nine million of them who were born in Mexico, most of whom continue to live in Mexico in so many ways, whether or not they have physically set foot in the territory in recent months or even years.

That is why, while most agree that democratic transition was not a one-day affair beginning and ending on July 2, the landmarks people name in the development of this transition often leave out one important date, in my opinion: March 20, 1998. This was the day Mexicans became permitted to hold dual nationality. Those Mexicans who had given up their nationality when they obtained U.S. citizenship could now go to their nearest consul to recuperate their Mexican passports; and Mexicans who have become citizens of another country, usually the United States, since March of 1998 have not been forced to give up their Mexican nationality in the process. The right also extends for one generation: U.S.-born children of Mexican-born parents also can claim Mexican nationality. By the end of the year 2001, 42,251 people had recuperated their Mexican nationality – a small number when one considers there are millions of Mexican-born people in the United States, but an important beginning nonetheless.

The dual-nationality policy allows Mexican nationals who are also citizens of another country all the political rights that other Mexicans enjoy, with the one exception

that they cannot hold elected public office. If they want to vote, they must maintain a current Mexican residency. Mexicans abroad, such as those I mentioned in the delegation, have been seeking greater political rights, and my office is seeking them too. In other words, within the very list of goals I presented to the President for the Office of the President for Mexicans Abroad, is securing these citizenship rights for Mexicans abroad. This involves working with legislators and the three major political parties in order to evaluate various proposals for the nuts-and-bolts of the issue.

As Mexico strives to deepen our democracy, to make that civic spirit a part of every Mexican, the inclusion of Mexicans abroad will be a necessary component of our efforts. We want to include Mexicans abroad, but also, we need to: first of all, they have earned their place at the table, because without their help, this change may never have occurred in the first place. And, secondly, because as they often remind us, we cannot speak of democracy if we leave one sixth of our nation out of the equation. Mexicans abroad are one sixth of ourselves. They are our husbands, our wives, our sons and our daughters, our brothers and sisters, our financial support, our Christmas vacation, our weekly phone call, our greatest worry when we heard of the September 11 attacks. They must be a part of our democratic project.

We have learned from the experiences of other countries and diaspora groups as we have put these ideals into practice, and we hope others will learn from our experience as well. When we first conceived of the Office of the President for Mexicans Abroad, we never could have expected that the events of September 11, 2001 would change so radically our mandate and our mission – both because many Mexican families are distraught from the loss of relatives in the twin towers, and because in the United States and throughout the world, new security regimes have had devastating effects on immigrants, particularly undocumented immigrants.

The United Nations, the International Organization for Migration and the International Labor Organization have important treaties proclaiming the rights of migrants; yet the documents that receiving countries have revered since September 11 are the driver's licenses, passports and visas that establish people's identities and their right to be in the country. If we are truly an office for Mexicans abroad, we must believe that the problems these measures cause Mexican migrants are our very own problems as well. We have drafted a declaration which I would like to

read to you today, and which we will continue to share and revise with the international community in the coming months. This declaration speaks not only to the urgent need to protect migrants' rights in the post-September 11 world, but also to the ways in which sending and receiving countries share the rights and responsibilities for migrant protection. Sending and receiving countries must hold one another accountable for their actions, and must not let one another demand that any individual sever their ties with the other. Dual belongings and transnational relationships are alive and well in the lives of migrants like the ones that came to Mexico in March demanding the right to vote; we must keep them alive in our policies as well.

We hope you will take a copy of this declaration with you, and will consider the ways in which these ideas apply to the situations of your countries, whether they be sending countries, receiving countries, or both. We hope you will share your commentaries and disagreements with us, will work with us on revisions, and will help us to persuade your governments and others that these truly humane principles, principles based on the human experience itself, are worthwhile.

In Mexico, attention to this issue and the elaboration of this document are an integral part of our national agenda. Our health as a nation depends *very much* on our ability to defend the rights of Mexicans migrants – both the rights the United States must afford them and the rights Mexico must afford them.

When Vaclav Havel addressed his fellow Czechs and Slovaks on New Year's Day 1990, just months after he led Czechoslovakia in its democratic transition, he said:

> Let us make no mistake: the best government in the world, the best parliament and the best president in the world cannot achieve much on their own. And it would be wrong to expect a general remedy to come from them alone. Freedom and democracy require participation and therefore responsible action from us all.

In Mexico, "us all" means all of us Mexicans, those who live within Mexico's borders as well as those that do not. The United States, quite frankly, would not be the United States without Mexican migrants; and Mexico, we know, cannot be Mexico without them any more. For them, please allow me to present this declaration, which I stress is still in its early stages of development.

Sending and Receiving Countries in a World of Migration

WHEREAS throughout human history, economics, politics, and family ties have caused people to move from one land to another, and this movement of peoples has only become more accelerated as globalization has increased the exchange of goods, capital and travelers around the globe,

WHEREAS questions of citizenship, loyalty and belonging in the societies where the world's 150 million migrants[1] live have become among the most hotly contested of the day, their urgency heightened by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,

WHEREAS migrants have, and continue to, seek opportunities to participate socially, culturally and economically in more than one country,

WHEREAS migrants enrich the cultural and intellectual lives of both sending and receiving countries with each others' ideas and values,

WHEREAS the valorization of these multiple belongings is not based on political agendas, but rather, is the creation of millions of people throughout history for whom multiple and transnational belongings have been the essence of daily life,

WHEREAS sending countries have had, to date, limited ability to protect their co-nationals abroad,

WHEREAS receiving countries historically have overlooked the rights of migrants,

WHEREAS migrants are among earth's most vulnerable human populations, and among them, women and children are particularly vulnerable,

WHEREAS the international community has established minimum standards for the protection of migrants and their families, and among these are rights which pertain to all migrants regardless of legal status, and which include, but are not limited to the rights: to basic labor protections, from harmful work environments, discrimination, wrongful termination, and workplace harassment, whether sexually or ethnically based;[2] to receive basic health services;[3] to education for migrants' children;[4] to freely associate, in unions and civic groups;[5] to maintain their language, religion and culture;[6] to family reunification;[7] to freedom from arbitrary expulsion.[8]

We Propose the following principles to guide sending and receiving countries

THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM does not in any way lessen the claim of immigrants, both documented

and undocumented, to the same human, civil and labor rights that other human beings possess, as outlined in treaties advanced by the United Nations, the International Labor Organization and the International Organization for Migration among others.[9]

THE TERRORIST ACTS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 do not delegitimize individuals' pursuits of dual belonging and dual citizenship. Human beings are capable of displaying their loyalty to two or more countries. Recognizing that immigrants can be productive members of two societies – both their country of origin and their country of residence – does not compromise national security. Rather, the two are mutually reinforcing.

TRANSNATIONAL BELONGING, dual nationality and multiple nationalities are not destructive to the process of nation-building for "receiving countries". Rather, immigrants are more likely to participate in their new country when they know that doing so will not be at the cost of their relationship with their "sending" country.

MIGRANTS HAVE PROVEN TO BE CRUCIAL ACTORS in the economic development of "sending countries", and their remittances have the potential to reduce the need for migration in the future.

MIGRANT SENDING AND RECEIVING COUNTRIES will have the following rights and responsibilities:

1) Receiving countries should realize that the legalization of migrants whose status is irregular builds a society where "black markets" in identity need not thrive, where border control is both economically and socially feasible, and where immigrants participate actively in the host society, rather than hiding in its shadows.
2) Countries of origin and receiving countries should work together to create reliable and well-established systems for those who live abroad to establish their identities for security purposes, including the distribution of mutually recognized documents.
3) Sending and receiving countries should work together to ensure the speedy, safe and inexpensive transfer of remittances from migrants to their families and communities in the countries of origin.

   In their words and their policies, receiving countries should not treat these remittances as a "drain" on their economies; rather, they should recognize that immigrants contribute more to their economies than they take out.
4) Countries of origin should enable their citizens to integrate politically into the countries where they reside

without fearing the loss of connection with their country of birth, by allowing for dual or multiple nationalities and citizenships, and the ability to vote from abroad.

5) Sending countries that have a significant percentage of their populations living outside their national frontiers should include the concerns of these diasporas in their framework for creating and evaluating public policies.

   Such countries should establish offices at the highest levels of the Executive and Legislative branches of government to maintain relations with these citizens abroad, integrating their needs into the national agenda.

6) The consular protection rights guaranteed in the Vienna Convention are only the beginning of sending countries' responsibility to protect their co-nationals abroad.

   Sending countries should create registries to account for those who leave to work abroad, in order to aid in the work of migrant attention.

   They must send representatives to ensure that all the basic rights guaranteed by the international community,[10] particularly health, educational and labor rights, are enjoyed by their emigrants.

   Receiving countries must recognize these sending-country representatives as legitimate political actors with a justifiable interest in protecting not only the persons but also the basic rights and dignity of these co-nationals.

7) The obligations established above also apply to the relationship between sending countries and countries of transit, in order to ensure these transit countries respect the basic rights of those migrants who pass through their territory.

8) Both sending and receiving countries should reexamine their citizenship policies. Opportunities for dual citizenship, multiple belongings and migrant economic and political participation in more than one country should not be invalidated. Instead, they should become valid ideals to which our governments aspire.

FOOTNOTES

[1] International Organization for Migration.

[2] Declaration of the Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in which They Live (U.N. 1985), Article 8; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families, Articles 11, 25.

[3] Declaration of the Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in which They Live (U.N. 1985), Article 8; Universal Declaration of Human Rights (U.N. 1948), Article 25; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families, Article 28.

[4] Universal Declaration of Human Rights (U.N. 1948), Article 25; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families, Article 30.

[5] Declaration of the Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in which They Live (U.N. 1985), Articles 5, 8; Universal Declaration of Human Rights (U.N. 1948), articles 20, 23; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families, Article 26.

[6] Declaration of the Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in which They Live (U.N. 1985), Article 5; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families, Articles 12, 31.

[7] International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families, Article 44, applies only to migrant workers in a regular migratory situation.

[8] Declaration of the Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in which They Live (U.N. 1985), Article 7; Universal Declaration of Human Rights (U.N. 1948), Article 9; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families, Articles 16, 22.

[9] The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families (U.N.), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, International Convention on the Rights of the Child, ILO Migration for Employment Convention, ILO Migrant Workers Convention, ILO Forced Labour Convention, ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Rights to Organize Convention, ILO Equal Remuneration Convention, ILO Discrimination Convention, ILO Minimum Age Convention, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, among others.

[10] Ibid.

Mario
RIESTRA
VENEGAS

National Coordinator of the CONOFAM, Mexico

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

On behalf of the twenty five Mexican states that I represent, as the national coordinator of state offices for Mexicans abroad, I would like to thank Metropolis, Marin Sopta, Howard Duncan and dr. Juan Hernández, coordinator of the Presidential office for Mexicans abroad, for inviting me to be part of this very important event.

It is a great honor, and great pleasure to be in a city where history decided to stay forever.

Before I focus my speech on remittances, I would like to mention some important issues that we should think about. I would like to make some remarks.

Million Mexican-Americans live in the United States.

9 million of them, are Mexican born. 4 million of them, are undocumented. We share with the United States a 3,000 kilometer border. 1 million people cross this border coming and going everyday with formal documents. 80% of them cross the border at 7 specific points or cities. But, three thousand undocumented people cross the border everyday – through rivers, deserts, climbing border walls, risking their lives.

At least one thousand of these undocumented Mexican migrants, reach their destination everyday and stay on to work in the United States, they don't come back to Mexico for at least two, three or four years. Consequently, at least three hundred thousand Mexican undocumented migrant workers stay in the United States every year. The first fact that we must recognize, in order to be able to establish some measures to support migrants is:

Migration cannot be stopped since its causes are binational in character and cannot disappear.

a) in Mexico, there is unequal economic development, in many regions of the country; opportunities for work do not exist.
b) in the United States, a large demand exists for labor in some sectors of the economy, such as: agriculture, agroindustry, building industry, and services which is

not met by the U.S. workforce and requires an external labor force.

c) Mexican migration is a circular migration coming and going, going and coming with all the effects that this entails.

By not accepting these three facts, it is very difficult to find total solutions, to solve the problems created by the migratory phenomenon.

Since we are dealing with a binational problem, today more than ever we must offer solutions that involve both countries, the United States and Mexico.

It is important to recognize that many people receive many benefits from migration: those who work; those who employ migrants; those who benefit themselves with what Mexicans produce and consume in the United States.

It is very significant to say that the United States is receiving the benefit of 240 billion dollars of Mexican purchasing power from Mexican-Americans and Mexicans in general.

In the same way, Mexico, and many American companies, are benefitting from the remittances migrants are sending home from their earnings. During the past decades remittances have grown in scale and impact. The International Monetary Fund's balance of payments report for 1999, shows that worldwide, the flow of remittances exceeds 100 billion dollars per year, with more than 60% going to developing countries.

In 2001 Mexico was at the top of the list. It received more than 8.9 billion dollars in remittances. The state of Puebla, my home state, received directly 10% of this amount. We receive more than 800 million dollars (in my state), every year. 200,000 money orders are paid monthly. In one single city, Izucar de Matamoros with a population of 50,000 inhabitants, more than 500,000 dollars is exchanged everyday, and you can find 22 money exchange offices in this little town. The total amount of the remittances received last year in Mexico is more than the income generated by tourism in Mexico and represents more than a half of Mexico's direct foreign investment.

Remittances will most likely continue to grow in size, as international migration continues to grow. It is a fact that economic integration is fueling the migratory phenomenon and some migrants are getting better jobs. On the other hand, according to studies conducted by the Interamerican Development Bank, the Central Bank of Mexico and the National Population Council, Mexico's fertility rate is falling. This fact, combined with modest economic growth rates, efficient coordination by

CONOFAM with federal, state and municipal governments involve in promoting development projects, are creating opportunities that will result in the creation of new jobs, a compeling reason to stay home.

Migration has become a cultural behavior factor among some of our citizens.

CONOFAM is promoting educational, cultural, health and sports programs aimed at strengthening the ties between potential migrants and their communities to persuade them to stay in Mexico or to come back to others.

To this end, CONOFAM, and the Presidential office for Mexicans abroad, are working very hard to bring into play remittances, as a resource for development.

The recent investment of about 25 million dollars, by a Poblano (mr. Jaime Lucero, President of Casa Puebla in New York) is an example of how this will generate 7,000 jobs in his community of origin in three years. 2,000 are already working. This is part of President Fox's program: "adopt a micro-region" that we the Mexican states are making a reality.

In 2001, more than 350 small businesses mostly run by women were opened in high emigration areas, in my home state, as a result of migrants' remittances.

It is important to mention, that at least 75% of remittances in Mexico are received by women – a mother, a wife, a sister, or a daughter of a migrant.

More than 600 Mexican clubs that we have in the United States have promoted social projects in their origin communities. About ten years ago, they started supporting the whole project, then, the state governments decided to contribute 1 dollar for each dollar a migrant or club of migrants put in a project.

6 years ago we started with the 2-for-1 program, including municipality governments; and 3 years ago it became 3-for-1 program with the participation of the federal government.

This year for the first time, the 3-for-1 program is an official program of the federal government, and it supports not only social projects, but productive projects for small businesses in migrant origin communities, too are rebuilding their houses with better raw materials and modern services.

Some clubs in the poorest areas have invested in electricity in their communities.

Drinkable water supply is also a priority. We provided this in a small town this year, where the 20% of the cost was supported by the Mixtecos of Brooklyn club.

Inside homes, it is now common to see televisions, refrigerators, sewing machines...

These Mexican clubs in the United States also help to construct schools, health clinics, sport centers, roads and bridges. This year we have inaugurated a very important bridge, 80 meters long, with the Axutecos of New Jersey iniative who contributed 25% towards the cost of the project. In many municipalities we are opening the house of the migrant, connecting people through free video conferences, giving them the opportunity to see and talk with their relatives in the United States.

Many migrants are also investing in restaurants, different kinds of stores, bakeries, factories, etc. Some Mexican migrants that have succeeded in business, have become entrepreneurs in their homeland.

The king of the tortilla, who produces and distributes more than 5 million tortillas daily in New Jersey and New York, decided to invest in his origin state. This is an investment of 5 million dollars, processing jalapeños peppers for the Mexican market in the United States. This market is called the "nostalgy market" and it is growing and growing. Others are producing fried beans, different Mexican sauces, and processing cactus leaves in Mexico, all of this for the "nostalgy market" in the United States.

The municipality government provides migrant investors with free land. The state government provides free training programs for the workers they are going to hire. In addition, we pay these workers a minimum wage, while they are involved in the training program.

And now with the support of Mexican Development Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank, we will finance studies for migrant projects in their homelands, at no cost, in order to help them to make the right decisions.

We have, for the first time, projects that involve Poblano migrants of three different states in the United States, New York, Illinois and Texas that are expected to create 1,000 jobs and to export also to the United States. So we are also coordinating their efforts in the United States.

There are still unmet objectives, but I am sure that by working in coordination with the federal government – specially with the Presidential office for Mexicans abroad, and all other related agencies and international institutions we will solve some of the most important challenges.

Given choices, some will decide to stay, but believe it or not, many will choose to send their families back to Mexico, reducing many of the pressures felt today by the increasing number of families joining workers there.

That is why we are very motivated to participate in designing solutions for migrants' problems and exchanging experiences with all of you.

There is still too much to be done, but we are working very hard!

Omar de la
TORRE

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Julie
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THE FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION OF MEXICO'S DIASPORA AND RELEVANT GOVERNMENT POLICIES

The beaches of Mexico, the hotels of Cancun and the nightlife of Acapulco are known throughout the world, bringing crucial income to Mexico's economy. Indeed, in 2001 Mexico's economy received 8.4 billion dollars from tourism.

But last year, for the first time, the money Mexico received in remittances from its migrants abroad surpassed the figure for tourism. Mexicans abroad sent 8.9 billion dollars to their families in 2001 – and those are just the dollars we know about. In 2001, remittances were third only to direct foreign investment and petroleum on the list of Mexico's top sources of foreign revenue.

There is no way to overstate the importance that remittances play, and have played, in the economic life of Mexico. The National Population Council, CONAPO, estimates that one in every ten homes in Mexico relies on remittances as its main source of income. Hundreds of villages and even certain states rely on remittances as their economic lifeline. Furthermore, some researchers indicate that every "migra-dollar" that enters Mexico raises economic production in Mexico by three times the original amount, because these dollars are spent either on investment or on consumption, which in turn stimulates production.[1]

The Office of the President for Mexicans Abroad has taken the position that the defense of migrants' rights, as outlined in Juan Hernandez' presentation, takes place independent of the economic benefits that migrants bring Mexico. "That fight is ours", says the OPME, even if the flow of remittances is cut off tomorrow. In fact, the obligation to dignify Mexican migrants in the United States is conceived as interrelated with the remittances issue: if one treats migrants and their families as one unit, one cannot consider the well-being of the migrant without considering the economic welfare of his or her family in Mexico.

The Office of the President for Mexicans Abroad considers that remittances take three major forms: 1) so-called "family remittances" sent directly from one family member to another, 2) community-level remittances in which migrants from a particular town who have resettled together in the United States put together the funds for public works projects in their town of origin, and finally, 3) the office believes that investment and trade dollars from successful Mexicans abroad and Mexican-Americans should be considered within the remittances framework.

According to Mexican government studies, those who consider themselves settled in the United States tend to send 15 percent of their income back to Mexico. Those who consider themselves temporary migrants send between 40 and 60 percent of their income home.[2] These are people for whom remittances are the single greatest expense they have. Naturally, the second group tends to include mostly undocumented immigrants.

Yet, every time we think we have the dynamics of remittances figured out, we discover that we are wrong. For example, after September 11, which had such a strong impact on the service and tourism industries in the United States, and hence on Mexican immigrants, many predicted that remittance amounts would take a nosedive. Yet, the third quarter of 2001 brought more remittances to Mexico than the second quarter had. And, while remittances went down five percent from the third quarter of 2001 to the fourth, that fourth quarter of 2001 still saw 24 percent more remittances than the fourth quarter of 2000 had. The relationship between overall economic indicators and the amount of remittances sent to Mexico, then, remains unresolved.

So much, in fact, about the remittances issue remains unresolved, and in many ways has long been surrounded on all sides by negative discourses: Some in the United States have claimed that remittances "drain" the U.S. economy; in Mexico, some development experts have maintained that remittances just make Mexico more dependent on the United States, and lament that at least two thirds of remittances are spent on basic consumption like food and clothes, rather than productive investment.

More recently, however, researchers and policymakers on both sides of the border have started to realize the positive potential that migrants and their remittances represent to both economies. On the United States side, top economists right up to Alan Greenspan have pointed out that migrants have, overall, a very positive effect on the U.S. economy.[3] And on the Mexican side, government

policymakers and academics have begun to point to the positive effects of remittances on local economies in Mexico, which include stimulating production, providing start-up capital to families with no access to credit, and building public-works projects in marginalized towns.

What is clear to everyone, however, is that remittances have the potential to do much more for the development of Mexico than they currently are. Today, I would like to discuss the steps Mexico is taking to maximize the potential of remittances.

Mexico has developed two key public policies that seek to ensure that the potential of remittances is maximized: 1) Lowering the cost of sending what we call "family remittances" back to Mexico, so that the maximum number of dollars actually reaches migrants' families. And, 2) Increasing the productivity of remittances, and in particular, the number of new jobs that remittances create.

First, there is the task of lowering the cost of sending remittances. When Vicente Fox took office a year and a half ago, if a Mexican in the United States sent 300 dollars home, he or she was charged 18 dollars for that transfer. Today, that cost is down by 20 percent, in large part because of Mexican government policies. In March of 2001, the OPME held a meeting with the major companies migrants use to send remittances to their families. The message at that meeting was that while the Mexican government would not take measures to legally regulate the cost of remittance-sending, it would make every attempt to encourage competition among the firms.

The OPME has worked with Mexico's Consumer Protection agency to post lists, updated each month, in Mexican consuls in the United States, which enumerate the costs and exchange rates of all available money transfer services. OPME believes that this effort at promoting competition, along with the personal outreach efforts the office has made to the money wiring firms, has helped to lower the costs of sending remittances, ensuring that each hard-earned dollar sent by a migrant translates into as many pesos as possible for his or her family.

The other effort OPME is undertaking is a push to encourage banks in the United States to allow undocumented immigrants to open bank accounts. When a person has a checking account, they can deposit money into that account, and anyone else with a copy of their bank card and personal identification number can withdraw that money anywhere in the world that is connected to the ATM networks. The cost of each 300-dollar transaction is usually three dollars or less. An increasing number of

Mexicans in the United States are using this method, particularly those whose families in Mexico have access to ATM machines in municipal centers or cities. We also know this is an excellent way for Mexicans in the United States to prove their credit-worthiness to U.S. financial institutions, thus opening a host of other financial options. So, the OPME has been meeting with banks and credit unions in the United States, pointing out to them that 8.9 billion dollars a year is no small change. So far, several major banks in the United States have given undocumented immigrants the possibility of opening certain types of savings and checking accounts, and have started advertising campaigns specifically aimed at Spanish-speaking customers – and, in many cases, their messages are tacitly aimed at the undocumented. And, on the Mexican end, a rural development bank is being established to serve rural communities, making financial transactions in these migrant-sending regions more accessible.

Most of us here at this conference probably feel that we have complete access to our money wherever we go – but I must stress that for Mexican immigrants in the United States, the physical money transfer process remains a truly complicated matter. To this day, a lot of money is sent to Mexico outside of official channels – through relatives and friends, and sometimes even by putting cash in the mail. I know of one community that has pooled together to hire its own messenger. He physically shuttles money from the United States to the town of El Trapiche in the state of Oaxaca on a monthly basis. Yes, in the technologically advanced 21st century, we have somehow managed to leave immigrants so far behind that this community felt it had to hire its own messenger while the rest of us just insert our ATM cards into a machine anywhere in the world to access our money.

These efforts at lowering remittance costs represent the Mexican government's major intervention into the 8.9 billion-dollar-a-year flow of "family remittances" from the United States to Mexico.

The second main policy focus of the Mexican government with regard to remittances is the effort to make sure remittances can become a part of the solution to the very poverty in Mexico that created labor emigration in the first place. There are three main areas in which the Mexican government works to achieve this goal: so-called 3-for-1 matching programs for emigrant-funded public works projects, structured programs to invest in productive projects, and donations collected for infrastructure improvements.

Mexico's flagship program for emigrant-funded public works projects is the 3-for-1 program. I wish the government could take credit for thinking up such an innovative program, but it cannot. The program took its lead directly from migrants themselves – and in order to explain how it began, I must take a brief detour into the sociology of U.S.-Mexico migration. While we have seen increasing migration from large cities over the past decade, the majority of migrants still hail from small villages, or *pueblos*. Logically, migrants go to places where they have family and friends, and once in the United States, they tend to re-establish social ties with people from their own community. Hence, we find that in Tacoma, Washington lives a significant portion of the population of Tzintzuntzan, Michoacán and that in Owensboro, Kentucky, people from the town of Comalapa, Chiapas work alongside one another in warehouses.

Beginning about a decade ago, Mexicans in the United States started forming hometown clubs, with names like "The Association of Citizens of Yatzachi El Bajo, Oaxaca" in Los Angeles, and the "Help, Respect and Friendship Club of Granjenal, San Luis Potosí" in Irving, Texas.

Long before there was an Office of the President for Mexicans Abroad – long before Mexico's leadership was comfortable associating itself with migrants, in fact – these hometown clubs began getting together to pool their money for development projects in Mexico. They built soccer fields and junior high schools in their hometowns. They put in new water pipes, built health clinics, and sponsored drainage systems.

Beginning somewhat in the previous administration, but increasing rapidly in this one, Mexico's government has played an active role in promoting the use of remittance dollars for community projects. State governments and now the federal governments have implemented three-for-one programs, in which the municipal, state and federal governments each provide one matching dollar for every dollar a hometown club invests in its village of origin. Together with the Secretary of Social Development, OPME has instituted a collaborative process in which the three levels of government work together with representatives from the hometown club to determine which projects would be of most benefit to the community. Since many of these decisions are taken at the state-level, the participation of CONOFAM, the network of state-level offices for attention to migrants, has been crucial in the implementation of these programs.

The next two policies of the Mexican government to encourage the productive use of remittances are both related to one overarching program: the program to target the 90 microregions where poverty and migration combine.

Mexico's social development strategy for the past 20 years has sought to focus on the country's poorest and most marginalized areas, and has not taken migration into account except as one of many factors determining these regions' well-being. OPME believes that focusing development efforts on poor communities that also have high migration levels can multiply the benefits of development, because it can give Mexico an opportunity to stop losing its most capable people to the United States. And so, OPME set out to compare Mexico's map of poverty with its map of migration.

The selection of the 90 microregions resulted from the careful comparison of two lists: the Development Secretariat's list of the poorest microregions, and lists compiled by the Census and the National Population Council (CONAPO) of areas with high indexes of out-migration.

There were many areas of high out-migration that did not also appear on the list of the poorest micoregions, and vice versa. That is because in some regions, social and cultural motivations – most notably, the fact that large numbers of relatives already live in the United States – are so strong that they continue to pull migrants to the USA despite a comparatively higher level of development in those regions. And in some desperately poor places, migration has not become a tradition and a solution. However, in 90 microregions, marginalization and migration are combined. On OPME's list are microregions in states like Guanajuato and Zacatecas, which have been sending migrants to the USA for nearly a century, as well as microregions in states like Puebla, where migration is about two decades old, and states like Veracruz, where migration is less than one decade old.

OPME also collaborated with CONOFAM, the state-level migrant assistance network, in the selection of these 90 microregions. CONOFAM officials, along with mayors and federal social development representatives helped determine the list of projects OPME will focus on completing in these microregions.

Among these are two types of projects: job-creating productive projects, and infrastructure projects. OPME is supporting residents of the microregions who want to invest remittance dollars in small businesses in their towns, hoping that more microregions to follow the example of

El Trapiche, a town in the largely indigenous state of Oaxaca. This is a town where fully 70 percent of the population lives in the United States – the town I mentioned earlier, that hired its own money messenger to physically bring remittances back from the United States. Our stereotypical image of a migrant-sending community like this is a community full of lonely women, children and senior citizens, unable to do anything except wait for their next money transfer to arrive. But in El Trapiche, the opposite is happening. Families who receive remittance dollars are investing those dollars in small business that dozens of families have founded together. They have built greenhouses and begun an exotic flower business. The town is full of women who are taking the capital available from their husbands' migrant labor and successfully investing it without leaving home.

OPME also seeks to provide an export market of Mexicans abroad and Mexican-Americans for the products manufactured in these small towns. Mexico Trade Centers located in five cities in the United States, promote export-quality products produced by small businesses in these microregions. MTC's focus is to target the Mexican and Hispanic market in the United States with the foods and products they are nostalgic for, thus encouraging yet another form of diasporic economic flow into the neediest regions Mexico.

The second type of investment OPME's program encourages is investment in social development and infrastructure in the 90 microregions. In most cases, these communities are so marginalized both physically and educationally that any improvement in Mexico's macroeconomy is unlikely to reach them – or, will reach them decades after it reaches the rest of the country. These places need roads to connect them to regional centers of economic and political power. They need junior high schools, high schools and technical training to enable their residents to find better-paying jobs. They need access to state and regional universities to train their leaders and capacitate them to work as partners with state and federal officials for the development of their own regions.

The funding of these projects is an integral part of OPME's long-term development strategy for Mexico, which seeks to begin a philanthropic tradition of "thinking Mexico" among Mexicans abroad and Mexican-Americans.

OPME is targeting the public, private and non-profit sectors as well as individuals to invest in the microregions. In the area of public support, encouraging investment in

these microregions is included as one of the founding goals of the Partnership for Prosperity, in which Presidents Bush and Fox pledged to work together to increase development levels in Mexico, thereby contributing to the overall well-being of the hemisphere.

In the area of private and non-profit support, businesses and foundations in both Mexico and the United States have committed to investing in the microregions as well. Fundamex welcomes all contributions and investment from Mexicans and friends of Mexico. However, in this case the fundraising strategy itself is a key policy: OPME seeks to cultivate the involvement of Mexicans abroad and Mexican-Americans in the development of Mexico. The foundation receiving these funds is called Fundación Mexicanos en el Exterior (Fundamex) – the Foundation of Mexicans Abroad – because these are the people we want thinking about Mexico, giving to Mexico, investing in Mexico. These are the most logical bridge between Mexico and the United States.

The relationship between Mexico and Mexicans abroad that OPME hopes to create through this strategy is a relationship akin to that between the Jewish diaspora and the state of Israel. Of course there are countless historical differences between Jewish migration and Mexican migration, but it is that sense of tie to the homeland – the sense of transnational inclusion in the process of nation-building, both politically and economically – that OPME seeks to emulate. The Mexican-American who today donates $10,000 to repave a plaza has invested himself, both financially and personally, in the well-being of Mexico. He has strengthened his identification with Mexico. Ten months or ten years from now, he is much more likely to "Think Mexico" when his business looks to expand internationally, when he wants to purchase imported products, when he wants to donate more. He is more likely to bring his children to Mexico to visit, in turn instilling the same ethic in them. OPME envisions Fundamex on the scale of the major organizations that encourage diaspora Jews to invest in Israel, and envisions Mexicans abroad as partners in the development of Mexico to the same extent that diaspora Jews have played a role in the development of their "homeland" state.

To recap, the two major tasks of the Mexican government with regard to its diaspora's remittances are: 1) increasing the amount of remittances that actually arrive to migrants' family, and 2) seeking ways for these remittances to be put to more productive use. Three-for-one programs, small business development, and fundraising among wealthy

Mexican emigrants and Mexican-Americans are the three key ways OPME has sought to utilize the diasporic economic connection to increase levels of development in Mexico's poorest regions.

The remittances issue is a central aspect of the Mexican government's new philosophy of including Mexicans abroad and Mexican-Americans in the national agenda – and it exemplifies the change in consciousness Mexico hopes to effect, in which migrants are seen and treated not as the problem, but as the solution. An integral approach to the remittances issue must include both sending and receiving countries, with receiving countries seeing and speaking of remittances not as an "unfair drain" on their economies, but rather, as a productive investment in the future development of the sending country.

Again, OPME maintains that if Mexico could have its 23 million Mexicans abroad and Mexican-Americans back – if the country could put their vast talents to use and offer them the opportunities they deserve, it would gladly do without those 8.9 billion dollars a year in remittances. But in the meanwhile, one of OPME's major goals is ensuring that these remittance dollars are used to create opportunities so that future generations will not see migration as their only choice.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Jorge Durand, Emilio Parrado and Douglas Massey. "Migra-dollars and Development: A Reconsideration of the Mexican Case". *International Migration Review* 3:2, 423-444.

[2] "The Importance of the Ones that Left the Country and Their Re-encounter with Mexico." *El Mercado de Valores* July-August 2001.

[3] Alan Greenspan, "Technological Innovation and the Economy", remarks before the White House Conference on the New Economy, Washington, D.C., April 5, 2000; "The Revolution in Information Technology", remarks before the Boston College Conference on the New Economy, Boston, Massachusetts, March 6, 2000.

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INTEGRATION OR RETURN? TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE EMIGRATION POLICY AND PRACTICE FOR A NEGLECTED DIASPORA: THE CASE OF THE PORTUGUESE EMIGRANTS

Introduction

Thank you for the opportunity to be present at this conference. Today, I would like to talk a little bit about the Portuguese emigrant diaspora.

The historical movement of the Portuguese from their homeland to other nations in Europe, the Americas, Africa and Asia has been highly significant in world history, particularly in the sphere of European transatlantic migration. Yet, Portuguese emigrants, along with the communities which they have established throughout the world, have received relatively little attention on the part of both scholars and policy-makers. This is, no doubt, due to the unusually disadvantaged socioeconomic and educational profile of most Portuguese emigrants, which has left their communities with little political or economic power within their host countries. This same lack of political and economic clout has also led to a concomitant lack of an effective and coherent policy regarding the emigrant communities, on the part of the Portuguese government, particularly with regards to the return of these migrants to their homeland.

I will illustrate these points by covering three major areas: Firstly, I will provide a very short historical introduction to Portuguese emigration and the Portuguese diaspora throughout the world; secondly, I will discuss some of the characteristics of the Portuguese community in Canada, as a way of profiling common patterns; lastly, I will discuss the policies and practices of the Portuguese government regarding these expatriates.

Portugal

Portugal is a small nation located on the most westerly point of southwestern Europe. It is comprised of continental Portugal, as well as the regions of the Azores and Madeira. The Azores, are an archipelago of 9 islands in the Atlantic Ocean, located about 1,300 km (about 800

miles) west of Continental Portugal (See Figure 1). The Madeira Islands (a group containing 2 inhabited islands) are located about 1,100 km (about 700 miles) southwest of the European Continent. Both Madeira and the Azores are politically autonomous regions of Portugal.

Figure 1
Map of Portugal

At roughly 800 years of age, Portugal is also one of the oldest nations in Europe (with historically contiguous borders). Yet, Portugal's survival has not been easy. Historically, the Portuguese nation has found itself sandwiched between the vast Atlantic ocean to the west and by the kingdoms which eventually formed modern-day Spain to the east and north (which at various times have threatened to annex this nation). A further barrier for the Portuguese has been the presence of a fairly large expanse of unfertile, hilly terrain to the northeast, which has made large-scale agriculture in that region very difficult. For these reasons, Portugal has – throughout its history – found itself politically, economically and geographically isolated from the rest of Europe.

Southward expansion of this nation into the northernmost regions of the African continent was also effectively blocked with the defeat of the Portuguese in 1578 at an important battle in Alcacer-Kibir (in present-day Morocco), where Portugal's young King D. Sebastião also disappeared.[1] Thus, historically, the only possible avenue for expansion for the Portuguese nation has been to travel overseas to other countries and to the New World.

As a response to its isolation, during the 15th and 16th centuries, Portugal initiated a great number of voyages of exploration, trade and conquest, to Africa, Asia, North and South America. Under the tutelage of Henry the Navigator, the Portuguese became the first Europeans to explore the African coast and to begin searching for a sea route to the Indies. This precipitated nearly 100 years of exploration, which made Portugal one of the world's most significant colonial powers, from the 1400s to the middle of the 20th century.[2]

Yet, after the age of the Discoveries, Portugal soon found itself with a vast empire, stretching from Asia to South America, and Africa, but with a population, which at roughly one million to three million people by the 1800s, was too small to control these regions.[3] In addition, as a protection against the annexationist tendencies of its Spanish neighbours, Portugal also entered into a series of alliances with the English crown, many of which ensured that this nation would become a colony to English economic interests (including the 1386 treaty of Windsor, a treaty of friendship, which is one of Europe's oldest accords). The historian E. Bradford Burns described the effects of one important treaty between the Portuguese and the English, as well as the role which Brazilian gold played in perpetuating this dependent relationship:

> "It has been observed with some sagacity and a little exaggeration that the Brazilian gold mined by African slaves financed English industrialization. In 1703 Portugal had signed the Treaty of Methuen with England, agreeing to buy British manufactured goods, in return for English importation of its wine and agricultural products. The balance of trade quickly tipped in England's favour, and Brazilian gold paid the growing deficit. Freely spending Brazilian wealth, the Portuguese let the Industrial Revolution bypass them, and the influx of gold masked for some generations the unfortunate consequences of this position: economic stagnation, thwarted development, and dependence on the English."[4]

Thus, after the Discoveries of the late 1400s and early 1500s, a brief period in which Portugal had tremendous wealth and influence in world affairs, the Portuguese Empire slowly crumbled over the subsequent 400 years, while its domestic economy stagnated, to the point that it became a virtual non-player in later European matters.

In this fashion, by the 1800s, few economic opportunities existed for many Portuguese young people to remain in the country, and the nation became a net exporter of people. Thus, two of the constant aspects throughout

Portuguese history have been this nation's isolation, as well as the ongoing emigration of the Portuguese people.

The Twentieth Century

From the beginning, to the middle of the 20th century, Portugal came under the rule of a dictatorship, led by Antonio Salazar (the longest-running dictatorship in recent European history). Salazar's administration, which came into power in 1932, initiated what was called the "Estado Novo" or "New State," which was a corporative state with a planned economy. Salazar's rule was also heavily influenced by the dictator's personal religious beliefs, in which the virtues of poverty and the dignity of manual labour (particularly the lifestyle of the poor rural peasantry) were publicly lauded as worthy spiritual goals for the entire nation. In this fashion, the Salazar administration continued – and in some ways exacerbated – the isolation and stagnation of Portuguese economic and social development.

The result was widespread underdevelopment, rural poverty and unemployment. Up until the early 1970s, many Portuguese, particularly those in the rural and mountainous areas, were still living in conditions which more closely resembled those of 18th century Europe, than those of a modern Western European nation. For example, compulsory education in Portugal was only 4 years in 1960, and 6 years in 1967.[5] Even this was often difficult to enforce in most of the rural areas and many people who were born prior to the 1950s never went to school.[6] In 1967, only 1.4% of Portugal's gross national product was being applied to education, as compared to 8.3% in Canada. As a result, in 1968, Portugal had the highest illiteracy rate in Europe, over 30%.[7] In a similar fashion, many services such as telephone lines, electricity, paved roads, water distribution, medical services, sewage treatment, etc. only reached many rural areas after the 1960s and – in the case of thousands of villages of fewer than 100 people – only after the late 1970's, when the government was forced to provide these services as a result of its application for entrance into the European community (and after it was provided E.U. development funds to assist in these activities).[8]

This generalized underdevelopment, coupled with a lack of economic and educational opportunity meant that the majority of Portuguese young people, from the beginning of the century to the late 1960's, had little prospect of ever earning a reasonable living in rural Portugal. The country's lack of industrialization and opportunities for

education left few options available to those in the rural areas.

Even those who wanted to remain on the land were not guaranteed a livelihood. In traditional, rural Portuguese families, it was quite customary for the eldest son to inherit all of his parents' lands, or for land to be subdivided amongst children, into increasingly meagre plots. One son might also choose to enter the priesthood. The remaining children in these rural families had precious few other options, except marrying into property or emigrating.[9]

As a result, since the early 1800s, the Portuguese who have traditionally emigrated from Portugal have originated disproportionately from amongst the poorest and least educated segments of Portuguese society, mostly from the ranks of agricultural and unskilled workers.[10] The only exception to this was the one-time emigration of better-educated and skilled returnees from the former African colonies, following the decolonization of the late 1970s.

The Portuguese Diaspora

Thus, there has been a historical movement of millions of Portuguese out of their country. It has been estimated that, from 1855 to 1973, approximately 4,233,000 Portuguese emigrated both legally and illegally from the country, (3,174,000 legally and 1 million illegally)[11] (See Figure 2).

Figure 2
Portuguese Emigration Levels



Source: Baganha, M. I. (1998). "A Emigração Portuguesa e as Correntes Migratórias Internacionais (1855–1974) – Síntese Histórica" [Portuguese Emigration and the International Migratory Currents (1855–1974) – Historical Synthesis]. *Estudos Migratorios LatinoAmericanos, 13*(38), pp. 29–54.

Although this does not seem like a significant number, when compared to the exodus from larger European countries, in Portugal's case, this occurred in a nation whose population until the 1800s varied from 1,000,000 to 3,000,000 people, and which only reached 10,000,000 in the mid 1970s.[12] From 1960 to 1979, over 1.4 million Portuguese left the country. In fact, from 1960 to 1969, the absolute population of Portugal actually decreased, as a result of the massive waves of emigration.[13]

Roughly 400,000 of those people emigrated from the Atlantic islands of the Azores and Madeira alone; these regions, even today, have a population that is smaller than most small cities in the world. For example, the 1991 census pegged the total population of the Azores at only 237,800 people.[14] In fact, by the 1990s, more Azoreans resided in North America than in the archipelago.[15] Thus, Portugal became, proportionately, one of the highest migratory exporting countries in Europe. Only Britain has had a comparable proportion of its population emigrate over the years.[16]

The traditional destinations of the Portuguese have been Brazil and the United States (see Figure 3). However, in the second half of the 20th century, immigration to Brazil began to lose its appeal, and immigration to places like France (62%), Canada (6%), and other European destinations, such as Holland and Germany, began to predominate.

This mass movement of people has created a massive, world-wide Diaspora. Today, Portuguese emigrant commu-

Figure 3
Destination of Portuguese Emigrants 1901–1967



Source: Almeida, C. & Barreto, A. (1974). *Capitalismo e Emigração em Portugal.* [Capitalism and Emigration in Portugal] Lisboa: Prelo, p. 312.

nities are found throughout the world, with the largest being found in France, South Africa, Brazil and Venezuela.

Figure 4
Map of Portuguese emigrant distribution



Table 1
Numbers and locations of Portuguese emigrants in the world

Nation	Emigrants
France	920,000
South Africa	660,000
Brazil	620,000
Venezuela	350,000
U.S.A.	318,000
Canada	210,000
Germany	110,000
Argentina	60,000
Other Non-European countries	35,000
Australia	30,781
Luxemburg	28,000
England	27,000
Spain	26,000
Switzerland	24,000
Zaire	20,000
Holland	17,000
Belgium	12,000
Zimbabwe	11,629
Sweden	2,000
Bermudas	2,000
Other European countries	1,500
Italy	1,000
TOTAL	**3,485,910**

Source: Arroteia, J. C. (1983). A emigração portuguesa – suas origens e distribuição [Portuguese emigration – its origins and distribution]. Lisboa: Ministério da Educação, Instituto de Cultura e Língua Portuguesa.

These communities could conceivably form the basis of a powerful and influential lobby, with respect to the Portuguese government, as well as within their host countries. Unfortunately, these Portuguese immigrant communities are often disempowered by virtue of their humble origins and the low-status socioeconomic role which their members continue to occupy in their new lands.

Portuguese Immigrants in Canada

Because of their commonality in origins, by and large, Portuguese emigrants throughout the world share many similarities in terms of their economic, educational and social situation (except those in Brazil, where emigration is much older and where the emigrants share the predominant language and cultural affinities). I will use the example of Canada to profile the socioeconomic situation of one of these communities.

Portuguese-Canadians first began arriving in Canada in large numbers in the early 1950's.[17] Today, they comprise approximately 350,000 people, or about 1% of the total Canadian population.[18] They are concentrated mainly in Ontario and Quebec, where they make up the 5th and 11th largest ethnic group in the Toronto and Montreal Metropolitan Areas.[19] However, there are proportionately large Luso-Canadian populations in regions as diverse as: Vancouver, Prince George and Kitimat (British Columbia); Halifax (Nova Scotia); Sudbury, London and Kingston (Ontario); and Quebec City (Quebec).[20]

The vast majority of the people in these communities have found stability and overall economic security. This is reflected in the fact that the Portuguese in Canada are generally underepresented amongst the ranks of those living in poverty and the unemployed.[21] They also have very high rates of home ownership.

Yet, despite its 50-year presence in this country, the Luso-Canadian community faces a series of unique problems. It is characterized by disproportionate numbers of people with exceptionally low education levels. In fact, Portuguese-Canadians have the lowest education levels of any minority group in Canada, with the exception of the Aboriginal and Innuit populations.[22] Luso-Canadian youth also have one of the highest dropout rates of any minority in the city of Toronto.[23] In consequence, Portuguese-Canadians are disproportionately concentrated in unskilled and low-skilled occupations and underepresented in professional or management positions.[24] They have lower average income levels than other groups, and are second only

behind Aboriginal Canadians (and equal to the Black/Caribbean community) in the low proportions of individuals who earn above $60,000 a year.[25] The community also has a negligible (in proportion to its size) class of professional individuals, with the knowledge and skills to seek the resources to address its problems.[26] Portuguese youth are further disadvantaged in not being a designated group within the Federal Government's Employment Equity Act.[27]

As a consequence, Luso-Canadians have traditionally found themselves socially, politically and culturally isolated from the affairs of their adopted country, and often from those of modern-day Portugal.[28] Their community today continues to project a minimal political, economic and cultural profile within mainstream Canadian society, while their language, as well as their cultural and economic activities continue to be largely ignored by most Canadian business, educational and media institutions.[29] Consequently, they remain largely underserved and underepresented in this country's social and political structures. This is particularly the case with Portuguese from the Azores, who – while they comprise approximately 60% to 80% of all Luso-Canadians – are underepresented to an even greater extent, than those from mainland Portugal. This isolation has resulted in a tendency towards "clannishness," a turning inwards towards the family, and has even given rise to a negative image of the Portuguese in Canada.[30] In 1997, Edite Noivo, a Luso-Canadian sociologist stated:

> ...after twenty-five or more years in the "land of opportunity" the overall socioeconomic conditions of Portuguese immigrants remain well below the national average. Moreover, this longstanding situation does not appear to be changing, as this group is not represented in Canada's political, cultural, or economic platforms, and shows minimal participation in mainstream society.[31]

The situation of the Portuguese in Canada should not be overstated. This community has made a great deal of progress over the past decades, by integrating into the many facets of mainstream Canadian life. Nonetheless, community members themselves have recognised that much more needs to be done, in order to improve this situation. For example, one common fear of people in a 1998 national study was the low educational achievement of the community's youth and how this is bringing about the social reproduction of Luso-Canadian young people, in the same low-status socioeconomic roles of their parents.[32] This sentiment was also echoed by Noivo, in her study of Portuguese immigrant families in Montreal.[33] In

recognizing the need to confront the community's marginalization, one community participant in the 1998 national study declared:

> "There is a very great need to really assert our presence; or, in other words, to say 'we are living, we are here, there is much which has to be done.'"[34]

With the exception of Brazil, the Portuguese emigrant communities throughout the world share much of the same profile, and many of the same handicaps, as the Portuguese in Canada; ostensibly as a result of their common origins and emigratory profiles, but also because they occupy similar socioeconomic roles, in their host nations. Indeed, the situation of Portuguese immigrants in countries like the United States and France is very similar to that of Canada.[35]

The limited educational and economic capital of these communities, is also accompanied by relatively low levels of political influence, in both their host countries and with respect to the Portuguese government. In a speech to the Council of the Portuguese Communities, Jorge Sampaio, the Portuguese President of the Republic in 2001 stated:

> "The Portuguese have always known how to become well-liked in the societies where they have been received. By their sobriety, by their capacity for work, by their civility. But, it has only been slowly and with some timidity that they have been affirming themselves socially and politically in these societies. Through you, I would like to send an appeal, to all the Portuguese who live in foreign countries: organize yourselves, participate in the political and social lives of the societies in which you're living, make your voice be heard, so that your contribution may be valued and recognised."[36]

The Policies of the Portuguese government

Yet, despite the President's concern with the lack of political involvement, the politics of successive Portuguese governments towards emigrants have themselves reflected the realities of this marginalization and their lack of political clout. Successive governments have often glorified the emigrants as ambassadors of the Portuguese culture. For example, the Secretary of State for the Emigrant Communities, José Cesário has called emigrants involved in community life the "representatives of Portugal..." who "...maintain alight the flame of the Lusiad Culture."[37] Similarly, Jorge Sampaio, the 2001 President of Portugal has praised "...the important contribution that [Portuguese emigrants] provide in providing prestige to the name of Portugal, throughout the world."[38] Yet, the political rhetoric about the important role of its diaspora communities has

masked the reality that the policies of Portuguese governments, from the beginning of the dictatorship to the present day, have done little to promote or support the maintenance of the Portuguese language and culture amongst the emigrant communities, or the relocation of emigrants back to their homeland.

The Salazar Regime

In 1947, the Salazar government created the "Junta de Emigração," ostensibly in order to assist and regulate emigration. However, the statutes of the "Junta" illustrate that it occupied itself very little with the protection of the emigrants. Its main function was to police the emigrant flow. It is reported that there were delegates of the PIDE (secret police) amongst its ranks, whose main function was to ensure that young men of draft age did not emigrate to escape serving in the army.[39]

In fact, the Portuguese dictatorship found itself in a contradictory position, with regards to emigration. The continuing massive movements of young Portuguese to other countries was an embarrassment for the Fascist government, which tried, at times to curb its flow. However the government was dependent on the remittances of emigrants, and on the outflow of excess labour to forestall domestic unrest.[40] So the officially-controlled media, as well as the centralized education systems, began to portray emigration not as a consequence of economic or political conditions in the homeland, but rather as a natural, historical vocation of the Portuguese people.

The Importance of Emigrant Remittances

Subsequent Portuguese governments have historically had a similarly high stake in maintaining the emigrants in their countries of residence, as they have also benefited quite importantly from the remittances of these emigrants, to cover their external trade deficit. During the wars of liberation in Portuguese-controlled Africa of the 1960s and 70s, the remittances of emigrants guaranteed the foreign exchange necessary to stabilize the value of the Portuguese currency, the escudo, and to make up for the lack of growth of the agricultural and industrial sectors.[41] Following these colonial wars and the 1974 Portuguese revolution, remittances also helped to make up for the gap in domestic savings, which the country needed for economic development, and to compensate for the country's consistently negative trade balance.[42] In fact, Portugal was unique

amongst many of the labour exporting countries in the world, in having the highest remittance to Gross Domestic Product ratio of any other labour-exporting nation, throughout the 1960s, 70s and 80s (See Figure 5).[43] The ratio of remittances in the early 1980s was approximately 12% of Gross Domestic Product, a level that was unmatched even by countries like Pakistan, Yugoslavia and Turkey.

Figure 5
Chart of Remittances versus GDP, From Chaney p. 95



Source: Chaney, R. (1986). *Regional Emigration and Remittances in Developing Countries: The Portuguese Experience.* New York: Praeger, p. 94.

Emigrants' remittances were particularly important in sustaining regional development or – better stated – in forestalling regional decline. For example, in 1979, these remittances represented approximately 30% of total household income in the rural, interior and northern regions of Viana do Castelo, Bragança and Guarda, 25% in Vila Real, and 20% in Castelo Branco and Viseu.[44]

Remittances dropped off substantially during the years after the Portuguese revolution. However they rose substantially once again after Portuguese banks opened offices in the emigrants' host countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Interestingly enough, many Portuguese banks had not understood the importance of emigrant remittances to their business, and had opened up these branches to capture foreign investment.[45]

After a small drop in the beginning of the 1980s, remittances skyrocketed once again in the late 1980s, from

$2 billion to $3.5 billion in 1989.[46] However, the effects of these remittances were lessened in the 1990s by money transfers for regional development from the EEC. More recently, Portuguese emigrant remittances totalled approximately 3.7 billion Euros in 2001, and represented 3.7 per cent of Portugal's Gross Domestic Product.[47]

The Lack of a Policy on Emigration and Return

What have been the effects of these remittances upon the politics of subsequent Portuguese governments towards its emigrant populations? The evidence indicates that the 1970s, 80s and much of the 1990s were characterized by the lack of a coherent policy regarding emigration and particularly concerning the return of emigrants and Luso-descendants. One author, Luis Miguel Seruya, stated this position more clearly, when writing about Portuguese emigration policy of the 1970s:

> "In other words, the total absence of an emigration policy constituted, in fact, the real political attitude of the Portuguese authorities... With the 25th of April of 1974 [the Portuguese revolution which overthrew the Salazar dictatorship] this situation did not change. On the other hand, the great wave of returnees to the mother country following decolonization, the increase in unemployment, the lack of a significant absorption of new emigrants on the part of European countries, the return of emigrants who had previously emigrated, all of these have contributed to the maintenance of the basic attitude of the Portuguese authorities with regards to emigration – the official policy translates itself, in practical terms, as the absence of an emigration policy, reflecting in this equation, the decisive influence of short term considerations."[48]

Seruya described how the main focus of government policy towards emigrants in the 1970s was the signing of various bilateral accords between Portugal and the host countries. Before the revolution of the 25th of April 1974, these accords centred around the recruitment, placement and transport of Portuguese workers overseas. The accords signed after the 25th of April focussed on assuring that Portuguese emigrants and their families would be afforded the same rights and privileges as the national workers of the host country[49] (ex. regarding pensions).

Many of the accords which were signed after the 1970s continued this trend and were intended to facilitate the continued residency of Portuguese emigrants in their host countries, as well as to preserve cultural, linguistic and economic links with the mother country. For example, this included such measures as: A Dual Nationality law with Canada, in the early 1980s; agreements regarding

pensions; cultural programmes; scholarship opportunities for Luso-descendants; summer seminars in Portuguese universities; and Portuguese government support for the teaching and maintenance of the Portuguese language in Europe.

Absent from these accords was the lack of a concerted policy towards the reintegration of return emigrants into Portuguese society. For example, a 1983 study examining the return of emigrants to mainland Portugal pointed to the absence of a policy to assist returning emigrants in their integration into Portuguese life, as one of the major problems to be overcome.[50] The politics of the Portuguese government concerning the return and reintegration of Portuguese emigrants during the 1970s and 1980s may be summed up by a comment made by Dr. Manuela Aguiar, the 1984 Portuguese Secretary of State for Emigration, in a Conference on return emigration:

> "...one of the top priority sectors must be support for the emigrant workers and their families in what concerns their return and reintegration. It is not a question, as I have stressed, of deliberately encouraging their return. Such an approach would not be in general [...] a very realistic one, considering the present economic situation of Portugal and the difficulties which that situation is causing in every sector of the Portuguese society. On the other hand, our policy is not to discourage their return. It is, however, considered essential to give the emigrant complete, exact, correct and always updated information, and this is one of the main principles of the whole action of support to the Portuguese emigrants."[51]

Indeed, during the late 1970s and 1980s, many critics of the government charged that government officials would often speak forcefully to emigrant gatherings about Portugal's need for the return of skilled emigrants and Luso-descendants (ostensibly to help modernize the country) yet do nothing to bring about the conditions necessary to promote the return of working age migrants. For example, in a 1981 Conference organized by the CGTP-IN (one of the largest Portuguese labour unions), participants described how the Portuguese economy was not producing new employment at the level which was needed to promote the return of many emigrants. It was estimated by the CGTP that it would be necessary to create 40,000 jobs a year, simply to allow for the employment of each new Portuguese worker entering the workforce (not counting the returning emigrants).[52] However, the government's own figures for this period showed only 5,000 new posts created.

Similarly, regional investment in infrastructure for industry, public services and public infrastructure was at a

very low level, until the entrance of Portugal into the European Economic Community. This constituted a particularly grave impediment to the return of the immigrants since Portuguese returnees tend to return to their rural villages (unlike in other countries, where returning emigrants settle in urban areas).[53] Those emigrants returning to their village, during the 1970s and 1980s were thus returning to the very same conditions from which they had emigrated to escape. They also condemned their foreign-born, urbanized children to a rural lifestyle which was totally alien to them.

Another problem in dealing with the issue of emigrant reintegration has been the lack of reliable statistics and studies showing the exact number of emigrants who have returned, as well as their demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.[54] In commenting on an IED report on Return Emigration and Regional Development in Portugal, Porto mentions how, despite the enormous importance of emigration to this country, both emigration and the return home have not been given the attention that they both deserve, by Portuguese researchers.[55]

The available information indicates that return migration has not reached the levels which had earlier been forecast. It is estimated that approximately 182,000 emigrants returned to continental Portugal, between 1974 to 1981.[56] Indirect assessments have shown that there was a constant increase in the return of these emigrants to mainland Portugal, from the 1960s to the 1980s (7,000 yearly in 1960, to 13,000 in 1970, and reaching approximately 60,000 in 1980).[57] However, these numbers were much lower than the earlier estimates of 32,000 to 64,000 per year, for the period 1971–75.[58] Many of these were individuals who were returning to retire in Portugal. However, an unknown number of former Portuguese child emigrants and Luso-descendants also appear to be returning to their parent's homeland, to find work in multinational corporations, or in Portuguese industries where knowledge of a second-language is an asset.

Government Policy at the Turn of the Millennium

The 1990s and 2000–2001 saw the development of a more coherent approach to the emigrant diaspora, on the part of successive Portuguese governments. In the latter years of the 20th century, Portuguese politicians ceased their public appeals for the return of skilled emigrants and Luso-descendants (ironically enough, at a time when unemployment hit its lowest point in decades, and when

the need for foreign-trained individuals rose higher than ever). They also became much more straightforward in verbalizing that the central goal of their diaspora policy was the promotion of the integration of emigrants into their host countries. In fact, by 2002, the Government of Portugal had explicitly spelled this out in their foreign policy document:

> "Portugal will undertake actions which will promote the social, political and civic integration of Portuguese citizens in the countries where they reside. Linkages to these communities will be reinforced and valued, particularly between the Luso-descendants and Portugal, through the teaching of the [Portuguese] language, promotion of the culture, and valorization of the heritage and support to the means of communication directed towards Portuguese citizens living abroad."[59]

Thus, the policy of this government has centred around such aspects as: The preservation and promotion of the Portuguese language and culture (through granting support to the teaching of the Portuguese language); the protection of the rights of Portuguese in their host countries; improvement of consular services and a lessening of bureaucracy; maintenance of linkages to the communities; promoting Portuguese associations; and maintaining links to Luso-descendants.[60] In the early 1990s the Government also created the "Instituto Camões," to advance the study of the Portuguese language, mainly by supporting its teaching in foreign universities. Also of note was the inauguration of the world-wide television and radio networks, RTPInternational and RDPInternational, to link communities together (although the former is now facing the spectre of looming budget cuts).

Recent administrations have also initiated a limited number of programmes that are designed to support the economic reintegration of returning emigrants in Portuguese society. These include such things as apprenticeship programs, incentives to emigrant entrepreneurs, youth (first employment) programs, etc.[61] Because of the lack of information on emigrant returns, the impact of these measures is difficult to gauge. However, in a 2001 Conference of Luso-descendants, it was reported that the 2000 program "Estagiar Em Portugal" (Internship in Portugal), which provided support and incentives for young Luso-descendants to work temporarily in Portugal, received 1380 applications for 1,000 positions.[62]

As the Portuguese communities have grown in economic and political importance, and as direct foreign investment in Portugal by groups of emigrant entrepreneurs have increased, some attempts have also been initiated to better include the emigrants in the political and economic

decisions of Portugal. One of these, was the creation of the Secretary of State for the Portuguese communities, (Secretaria de Estado das Comunidades Portuguesas) a government department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the responsibility to liaise with the immigrant communities, and implement the emigrant-relevant policies of the Portuguese government.[63] Another measure was the establishment of four parliamentary seats, which were assigned specifically to represent the Portuguese communities; two seats for European representatives, the remaining two for the other regions of the world. Finally, in early 2001, Portuguese emigrants were also allowed to vote directly for the President of the Republic.

The Council of Portuguese Communities

In 1996, the Portuguese government also created an elected body called the "Council of Portuguese Communities".[64] This is a consultative body, which advises the Portuguese government and Parliament on national and regional policies concerning the emigrant communities, and which promotes closer ties between Portugal and the emigrant communities.[65] The 1996 body replaced an earlier, government appointed Council, which did not receive much support from the emigrant communities.

Over the years, the Council has struggled to make itself better known to the Portuguese in their own constituencies. The mandate and activities of this body are still not very widely understood by the emigrant populations at large and interest in Council elections is often quite low (as is interest amongst emigrants in voting for the Portuguese parliament, in general, particularly in North America).[66] The Council also faces problems with political infighting amongst its European representatives, who mostly align themselves along Portuguese party lines.[67] For example, after the opening plenary session and election, a court challenge was raised which led to the need to hold a second election.

A more serious problem appears to be that Portuguese politicians and government officials do not appear to be consulting this body, in formulating decisions concerning the emigrants. For example, the North American representative to the Council related how, at a dinner to proclaim a new law directing Consular services, the Portuguese Ambassador to Canada had jubilantly presented him with the ratified law, apparently oblivious to the fact that it had been drafted and passed without any consultation with the representative or the Council.[68] In a Portu-

guese-Canadian newspaper article, this same representative (who is a Medical Doctor) glibly wrote about his "first consultation", (i.e. the first time that he had been formally consulted by the Government on any matter). In addressing the Secretary of State for the Portuguese Communities he wrote:

> "It was for me a pleasant surprise to witness that, after five years and one month, as a member of the Council of the Communities, a 'consultative organ of the government' I was finally consulted. We are, at last, at the end of our mandate, consultants who are consulted.
>
> As you must have been informed by the officials at the Secretary of State, the counsellors in Canada have, throughout the years, manifested their opinions about many matters of relevance to our community, in the form of various documents, numerous letters and even consultations undertaken in the Portuguese communities, from Vancouver to Quebec City, passing through Winnipeg, Southwestern Ontario, Toronto, Montreal and Kingston.
>
> As I have publicly affirmed, as much in my weekly column in the newspaper VOICE, as in numerous interviews to other newspapers and various radio and television stations, the dialogue which the Canadian counsellors have tried to establish with the Secretary of State has never happened, such that the only response that we have received has been silence.
>
> I hope that the fact of the Secretary of State finally consulting the Council of the Communities will be the harbinger of a new era of dialogue between the Counsellors and the Portuguese authorities."[69]

Conclusion

There can be no doubt that the recent Governments of Portugal have been following the path of greatest expediency, in focussing on the integration of Portuguese emigrants into their host countries. A small nation like Portugal would have much to lose by the return of massive numbers of working-age emigrants. Not only would the government forfeit a great proportion of the emigrant remittances, but also the need to integrate large numbers of people into the nation's social and economic structures would pose difficult problems for the country's economy. This was evident in the unemployment and housing problems which plagued Portugal's largest cities, following the movement of hundreds of thousands of refugees, from the former African colonies, after the decolonization of the late 1970s.

However, with the passage of time, and with a greater integration of the subsequent generations of Luso-descendants into the host countries, the prospect of massive

numbers of emigrants returning, en-masse, to live and work in Portugal has greatly diminished. This has made this particular aspect of the government's foreign policy less relevant and has allowed it to focus on openly promoting the integration of the diaspora communities into their host societies, without the fear of appearing to be rejecting the emigrants' return to the homeland. In focussing openly upon the promotion of integration, the Government also seems to be reflecting the feelings of community members, who have named the lack of integration as an important problem to be overcome (for example, in the 1998 Portuguese-Canadian national study).[70]

Yet, although recent Portuguese administrations have shown a vast improvement in effort over those of Governments in the 1970s and 80s, these have yet to mobilize significant resources to achieve their declared goals. For example, although one of the government's stated aims is to support emigrant associations, one of the major complaints in the 1998 national study in Canada was the lack of support of the Portuguese government for the maintenance of the work of community associations.[71] Similarly, their support for the teaching of the Portuguese language is still woefully inadequate, particularly in North America, where this language has a very weak presence in secondary schools and universities (and where it is often not considered a qualifiable language of instruction), even in comparison to less spoken languages.[72] Moreover, the government's inability to effectively consult and liaise with the elected Council of the Portuguese Communities illustrates both the Portuguese government's lack of experience in utilizing such grass-roots organizations, as well as the continuing weak political influence of the diaspora Portuguese communities.

Yet another problem now looming for the government is how to promote a better inclusion of the Portuguese emigrants into their host societies while simultaneously attempting to preserve their Portuguese language, culture and socioeconomic ties with the ancestral homeland. With the passing of the first generation, and the decrease in Portuguese emigration, in the past decade, Luso-descendants have taken on an increasingly significant importance in perpetuating the diaspora communities. In fact, recent years have seen an increasing focus of government activities directed towards Luso-descendants, (ex. yearly conferences, attempts to bring young people to the front of Portuguese community organizations, etc.). How well the Portuguese government can negotiate this paradox could very well determine the future of the diaspora com-

munities, as well as the nature of the ties of the Luso-descendants to the ancestral homeland.

Unfortunately, there are few indicators that the Portuguese government has developed either a plan, or a vision, to chart their future relationship with the Luso-descendants. With the exception of the support for the teaching of Portuguese language in Europe, the government's activities and supports to this population seem piecemeal, at best. Furthermore, it is still not entirely clear what part, if any, the Portuguese language, culture and homeland will play in the lives of Luso-descendants, whether these will continue their parent's practice of making deposits in Portuguese banks, or even if they will invest in the Portuguese domestic economy.

These issues point to the need to conduct more research on the phenomenon of Portuguese migration. In particular, there is a great need to conduct research on the children of emigrants and their contributions to Portuguese society. Such an increase in research will hopefully lead to more knowledge about the benefits which Portuguese emigrants have brought to their host societies, and to the Portuguese ancestral homeland. This will hopefully also lead to a more effective and responsive policy, on the part of the Portuguese government and to a new relationship with the Diaspora.

FOOTNOTES

[1] This defeat led to 60 years of Spanish rule over Portugal, the seizure of many of this nation's overseas possessions, by Spain's enemies, and precipitated the eventual decline of the Portuguese influence in the world.

[2] Microsoft Encarta Encyclopaedia (1996). *Portugal*. Microsoft Corporation & Funk & Wagnalls Corporation.

[3] Canny, N. (1994). *Europeans on the move: Studies on European migration, 1500-1800*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 269-270.

[4] Burns, E. B. (1993). *A history of Brazil*, (3rd edition). New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 68-69.

[5] United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (1973). "Public Expenditures on Education," *Statistical Yearbook, 1972*, Paris: Unesco. Cited in Anderson, G. & Higgs, D. (1976). A Future to Inherit. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, p. 141 (note 1).

[6] My own mother, for example, received only 2 years of schooling, and only because her father believed that it was important for women to learn to read. This attitude was not shared by many men in rural Portugal at the time.

[7] Anderson & Higgs, *A Future to Inherit*, p. 141, (note 1).

[8] For example, my grandfather's village, in the centre-northeast of continental Portugal only received electric service and a gravel road lead-

ing into town, in the late 1970s. As for water supply, the villagers themselves had to collectively run a pipe from a local spring to communal taps, at their own expense.

[9] Durães, M. (1987). "Herdeiros e não herdeiros: Nupcialidade e celibato no contexto da propriedade enfiteuta" [Inheritors and non-inheritors: Marriage rates and celibacy in the context of emphyteusic property]. *Revista de História Económica e Social*, 21, 47–56.

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[11] Serrão, J. (1972). *A Emigração Portuguesa*, pp. 37–38.

[12] Canny, N. (1994). *Europeans on the move*, pp. 269–270.

[13] Chaney, R. (1986). *Regional Emigration and Remittances in Developing Countries: The Portuguese Experience*. New York: Praeger, p. 80.

[14] Microsoft Encarta Encyclopaedia, (1996). *Azores.*

[15] Microsoft Encarta Encyclopaedia, (1996). *Azores.*

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[19] Pendakur, R. & Hennebry, J. (1998). *Multicultural Canada.*

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[25] Nunes, F. (1998). *Portuguese-Canadians From Sea to Sea*. pp. 10–11; Ornstein, M. (2000). *Ethno-Racial Inequality in the City of Toronto.*

[26] Nunes, F. (2000). "Portuguese-Canadians: A profile from the 1991 Canadian Census." *Gávea-Brown, 21*, pp. 80-107.

[27] Employment Equity Act (An Act Respecting Employment Equity). (1995). § c. 4, Government of Canada. Cited in http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/E-5.401/43300.html.

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[31] Noivo, (1997). *Inside Ethnic Families*, p. 33.

[32] Nunes, F. (1998). *Portuguese-Canadians From Sea to Sea.*

[33] Noivo, (1997). *Inside Ethnic Families.*

[34] Nunes, F. (1998). *Portuguese-Canadians From Sea to Sea*, p. 1.

[35] Ex. see Neto, F. (1985). *Jovens Portugueses em França* [Young Portuguese in France]. Porto: Jornal de Psicologia; Vincente, A. L. (1998). *Os Portugueses nos Estados Unidos Da América*. [The Portuguese in the United States of America]. Lisboa: Fundação Luso-Americana para o Desenvolvimento.

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[65] The Council is composed of 100 members, who are elected for a term of 4 years by the people registered in the Portuguese consulates throughout the world. Every 4 years, the council meets in Portugal, in a plenary session.

Within the council are also 5 regional Sections. One each for: Africa; Asia & Oceania; North America; Central and South America; and Europe. These meet on a regional basis approximately once a year. The regional sections are further subdivided into national and local (ex. regional or municipal) sections, according to need.

The Council also has a Permanent Council of 15 members, (maximum 2 from each country) who meet yearly, and who liaise on a regular basis with the Government and the Assembly of the Republic (The Portuguese Parliament) to undertake the ongoing business of the Council. This Permanent Council, includes a President and Vice-President, who along with the other 15 members, are elected at the plenary sessions, from amongst the members of the wider Council, by these members. The Council is funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the division of the funds are apportioned by the Council members themselves at each plenary session.

[66] This disinterest is rooted in the low education levels of most first-generation Portuguese emigrants, as well as in the legacy of the dictatorship. The older generations have little tradition of political involvement and voting in elections, while the younger generations are not attuned to the issues of their ancestral homeland.

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CLOSING REMARKS

We have covered a lot of ground in these two days of meetings on diaspora, and it will be difficult in the few minutes I have to summarize, let alone synthesize and draw sharp conclusions from the diverse material that we have encountered. Looking at the phenomena of diaspora from the points of view of both the homeland and the country of destination has been revealing, and I believe that we have all gained insights into diaspora, whether these insights concern social or economic relations, the causes of diaspora, the motivations behind return, or the political relations between the homeland and host country.

Let's begin this modest recapitulation with the concept of "diaspora" which has been our focus. When we think about the term "diaspora" it immediately suggests to all of us a kind of dispersion, often a forced dispersion, of a people from a homeland. And when we use the term "home", there is an immediate inclination to think about the question of return or, if not the question of return, at least the question of the relations between those in the homeland and those in the country of destination. We regard these relations as integral to the concept of diaspora, as distinguishing diaspora from other forms of international migration where relations to the country of origin or the idea of a homeland may be far less-pronounced. Our discussions of return have inclined me to wonder whether return is in the natural order of things, that it is perhaps the anticipated end result of the processes by which diasporas are created.

Behind our discussions has been the question of how and *whether* governments should manage the relations between the homeland and country of destination that diaspora produce or make possible. We have seen that, in some cases, these relations can be for the better, in some cases for the worse, and we take it that governments, if they are to have a role at all, will want to manage diasporic re-

lations for the overall betterment of those in host societies and for those back home. But again, the fundamental question for us has been the extent to which any of this should matter specifically to policy. The issues clearly matter for those intimately involved, but should they also matter to policy? What are we to do as policy makers or as decision makers about the facts that we have been exploring these last two days?

Let's just note a few of these things. We have learned that the issue of return is very complex, that in some cases people do not want to return although the homeland might wish that it happens, that in some cases the homeland does not want their emigrés back and that when people do return they are not particularly welcomed by their homeland. We have found in some cases that it is to the advantage of the homeland that those who are dispersed remain dispersed because of the economic advantages that they can provide to the homeland so long as they remain outside. We have learned a great deal about the difference that diaspora can make in terms of home country conflict and, more happily, in the terms of homeland reconstruction. This has been especially apparent from the experience of Croatia about which we have heard so much.

We have learned about the contributions that members of the diaspora can make to the homeland's economic, social, and political development. These issues strike most of us forcefully. As I asked on the first day of this conference why the policy maker should care about diaspora, I am now inclined to think that part of the answer has to do with helping the diaspora contribute to homeland development. Ideally, policy could facilitate this. Some of you have eloquently urged a set of recommendations for the international community to consider, recommendations about the rights and responsibilities of both source countries and the countries of destination, recommendations for managing international migration for mutual benefit. It is clear to me that we are soon going to see a considerable amount of discussion on the international stage about multilateral agreements with respect to migration. There is now a notable impetus in a number of regions in the world for bilateral or multilateral agreements that would secure an overall increase in the benefits of migration to both sending and receiving societies and to mitigate the harm that mis-managed migration can create. Some of these measures, certainly, would affect diaspora.

Implicit in some of these discussions and in the proposals that we have been offered is that the migration game is a game that can produce mutual advantages and that

we ought to drop the frequently invoked but misleading assumption that migration must be a zero sum game, that it cannot be otherwise than a zero sum game. The recommendations that I referred to a moment ago would require, for their success, that we get beyond, get away from regarding migration as a zero sum game and focus in a practical way on how we can manage the phenomena of diaspora for mutual advantage. The hope must, then, be that policy can do so, can successfully promote and enable an active diaspora for purposes of economic, social and cultural development, for purposes of helpful political activity, for purposes of reconstruction and peace-making. Or if not actively promote, at least remove barriers from.

But let us step back for a minute and remember that international migration is something that individual human beings, perhaps with their families, embark on. It is often a brave and difficult decision to leave one's home and we ought to exercise some restraint in imagining policies for managing the relations that diaspora make possible because this will often come down to managing the activities and lives of individuals. To what extent ought governments let individuals who have migrated run their own course? Should, rather, governments step back from trying to manage migration and its impacts, step back from managing the relations between the host and sending society? To what extent do these relations need managing by governments?

Being from Canada, I am from a traditional immigrant receiving society whose government is strongly involved in migration management, from an initial selection of many of our immigrants, to their settlement, integration into our society and eventual citizenship. Our governments are involved in preventing potential conflicts which can arise with respect to receiving large numbers of immigrants into our society and promoting the positive aspects of multicultural diversity that we all talked about during last two days. In other words, I am predisposed to seeing the hand of government in managing migration. I came to this conference thinking that diaspora matters a great deal and that governments should be highly involved in managing the various phenomenon we have been discussing, managing them for the benefit of one's society if not for mutual advantage. But, to go back to my speculations about the diaspora process, if we think of strong relations between the homeland and the country of destination as being in the natural order of things, if we think of return as being in the natural order of things, what is the-

re for a government to do specifically on diaspora? On what should a government intervene?

This idea of the naturalness of the links between homeland and host country has impressed itself upon me a great deal, immersed in them as we have been for two days. The naturalness and powerfulness of the ties are such that perhaps governments should rather step back and manage only at the extremities where problems of a certain threshold present themselves. I am less sure now of how and why the policy in a country of destination should spread its hand over the issues of diaspora relations, of why a homeland government should feel that it can make demands upon those who have left. But if governments are to restrict themselves to managing only at the extremes to protect their societies or to remove impediments to diasporas functioning in ways that will bring mutual benefits, their realm of influence is decidedly smaller, except in unusual times, such as with civil strife.

Questions of the appropriate level and occasions of government interference in the functions of a diaspora apply to both homeland and host governments. To what extent should a homeland government impose a duty upon those who have left to assist those back home? To what extent are they to be left alone to manage their own affairs? Should homeland governments tax remittances for community or national development, should expatriates be made to feel an obligation to return to aid their home countries' social, political, or economic development? Should a government in a host country force a member of a diaspora to choose between competing allegiances, reject former interests in the political life of the home state, turn one's back on family and community? The inherent nature of the diaspora make these unrealistic. Members of a diaspora are, and this is nearly definitional, members of an active international community. Recent history has shown that attempts to control or eliminate the natural ties across the diaspora, can in the worst of cases result in horror.

I leave you with these questions about the appropriate role for policy, where its limits ought to be set, where policy can make a positive contribution or prevent harm, and where governments ought to leave well enough alone.

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