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THE CHANGING FACES
OF CANADA:
NEWLY-IMMIGRATED
ETHNIC MINORITIES
AND THE CANADIAN
FOREIGN
POLICY-MAKING
PROCESS, 1984–1993

Canada's "faces", quite literally, have changed dramatically since the mid-1960s. Some 2.8 million immigrants arrived in the country in the 1968-1988 period. Whereas in the late 1950s, 84.3 percent of immigrants to Canada were born in Europe, by the late 1980s only 28.6 percent of arrivals were of European birth.¹ Such radically altered immigration patterns have had predictable effects on the face of Canadian society. In 1961, 3.2 percent of Canadians were Visible minorities'.² In 1986, according to the *Census of Canada*, Visible minorities³ constituted 6.3 percent of the Canadian population; by 1996, the figure was 11.2 percent.⁴

Significant growth in the number - and size - of visible minority communities could, plausibly, lead to new, different, even increased pressures on the Canadian foreign policy-making process. In the thirty years after formally assuming responsibility in 1931 for the conduct of its own foreign policy, relations with the United States and with Europe preoccupied Canadian decision-makers. In part, that was a function of the fact that the overwhelming majority of Canadians could trace their heritage to Europe. By the same logic, some of the focus of Canadian foreign policy must now inevitably be shifting to the developing world.

Many visible minority immigrants to Canada from the 1960s-onward arrived either as formal refugees or after fleeing tumultuous political situations in which their continued ability to pursue a livelihood - and perhaps even their personal security - was in jeopardy. Among their number are Armenians, Cambodians, Chileans, Guatemalans, Haitians, Iranians, Lebanese, Salvadorans, Sikhs, Somali's, Tamils, and Vietnamese. Members of these (and other) communities arrived in Canada often bearing an understandable measure of antagonism toward one or another foreign government - a hostility that some wanted reflected in Canadian foreign policy. Their demands ap-

proximate those made by Canadians of eastern European origin after the erection of the Iron Curtain. Securing changes to the precepts or the tenor of Canadian foreign policy, however, is much more difficult than obtaining *positive* action from the government (of the sort involved in creating a diplomatic presence and/or an aid program in their former country).

While there was often little of a tangible nature that the government could do to oblige the demands of Canadians of eastern European ancestry, the Cold War nonetheless provided a framework within which official policy largely embraced the rhetoric of activist immigrant communities. Canada's NATO membership implied treatment of the USSR as an adversary. For almost four decades, Canadian businesses were not significantly disadvantaged, relative to OECD competitors, by policies prohibiting many types of commerce with the eastern bloc.

For newer immigrants, no similar paradigm applies. With very few exceptions, Canada has sought to foster *warm* relations with developing country governments. Decades of involvement in the Commonwealth; more recent membership in La Francophonie, the OAS, and APEC; an extensive (and initially well-financed) aid program; rapidly expanding trade ties across the Pacific and with Latin America – together have provided Canada with more formal and informal linkages to developing country governments than any other G-7 nation enjoys.

That is the context confronting the foreign policy ambitions of many recent immigrants. Additionally, Canada's consistent international posture, sustained by governments of either political stripe, has been less judgemental – and certainly less intrusive – than that of the United States. Canadians regard themselves as “helpful” fixers, useful intermediaries, or as builders of multilateral coalitions. All, of course, depend on the maintenance of generally good bilateral relations.⁵

Accommodating the foreign policy desires of some recently-immigrated communities could necessitate a transformation of Canadian diplomacy – from the methodical building of ties and improving of relations, to a foreign policy that accentuates scolding, the application of pressure, and the tying of political and economic relations to the current (and in some cases historical) human and civil rights behaviour of developing country governments. Such policy goals are not easily accomplished – particularly when advanced by often insular communities not yet fully-integrated into Canadian society; by communities usually lacking the kind of sophisticated infrastructure

and networks thought necessary to influence foreign policy.

To test the extent to which visible minority communities are, indeed, pursuing foreign policy goals – and the nature of the system’s response – my research focused on the activities of three ethnic groups: Armenian-Canadians, Haitian-Canadians, and Sikh-Canadians. All three had achieved sufficient critical mass and geographic concentration (in electorally important major media centres)⁶ to have been able, theoretically, both to mobilize internally and to command a hearing – at least from politicians. For the period under examination, the leaders of each community were first generation immigrants, with the majority of the community’s adherents having come to Canada during the previous three decades. Each of the three communities has been confronted with sufficient external stimuli to provoke a keen interest in foreign policy, even if their members hadn’t arrived in Canada equipped with foreign affairs “agendas”.

The three communities are among the “toughest” cases – in the sense that each favoured initiatives that, at a minimum, would irritate traditional friends and allies of Canada and/or might jeopardize commerce (current or potential). Each wanted additional resources allocated to areas where Canada’s interests and profile historically had been limited and its prospects for exercising influence were dubious. And each faced “image-related” constraints on their potential to mobilize popular support. If these communities met some success in achieving foreign policy goals – and if their activity can be linked to outcomes – then paradigms conventionally used to describe Canadian foreign policy-making are likely no longer applicable in the rapidly changing Canadian polity.

The period of inquiry is 1984 to 1993. By the time that Brian Mulroney’s government took office in 1984, each of the three communities was of sufficient size and longevity in the country to have developed leadership able to pursue policy concerns beyond the “integrational” priorities that preoccupy new immigrants in the immediate wake of their arrival in a new country. “Official multiculturalism”, in place since 1971, was buttressed in 1982 by passage of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. Both encouraged policy activism by minority communities – who by the mid-1980s had begun to engage in “unprecedented” political involvement.⁷ Furthermore, Mulroney’s Progressive Conservatives had swept to power, for the first time winning many ridings that had significant populations of “new” ethnic communities. The party had come to govern-

ment promising to review and “open up” the foreign policy-making process. Implicitly, the PCs were less tied than their Liberal predecessors to existing policy. A hypothetical opportunity existed for the Tories to build an enduring connection with visible minority communities by showing sensitivity to their foreign policy demands.⁸

The analysis is based on census and immigration data, parliamentary debates and hearings, official statements from government and ethnic communities, polling data and media reports. Principally, however, it draws from 140 interviews conducted with: leaders of the three ethnic communities; government officials of various departments; ministers and political staff; Members of Parliament (of all parties) with functional and/or constituency interest in the three communities; and leaders of development and human rights NGOs, churches, and other potentially interested ethnic communities, academics, journalists and pollsters.

A THEORETICAL FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING ROLE FOR VISIBLE MINORITIES?

Statist theory predicts that “foreign policy will be explained by either external or governmental sources, or both”.⁹ By “external sources”, Nossal means global requirements or systemic exigencies – not domestic lobbies. Political scientists studying Canadian foreign policy generally defer to the explanatory power of statist theory. Kirton and Dimock conclude that in Canada, “perhaps more so than elsewhere, foreign policy remains the preserve of the state and its constitutionally embedded competitors, Parliament and the provinces, rather than of actors within society itself”.¹⁰ Goldberg regards the Canadian foreign policy-making process as “the area of Canadian public life least susceptible to interest group intercession”.¹¹

Nossal, building on earlier work by Stairs,¹² propounds a theory of “Modified Statism”, which concedes a role for society in defining “the bounds of acceptable actions”. Both “public opinion and influential interest groups” set “parameters” that constrain the power of the state. It bears emphasis, however, that according to the modified statist model, government still “wields substantial power”.¹³

Glazer and Moynihan concluded that U.S. foreign policy was responsive, *above all*, to ethnic lobbies: “Without too much exaggeration it could be stated that the immigration process is the single most important determinant of American foreign policy. This process regulates

the ethnic composition of the American electorate. Foreign policy responds to that ethnic composition. It responds to other things as well, but probably *first of all* to the primal facts of ethnicity” (italics in original).¹⁴ Canadian theorists, however, overwhelmingly take issue with this pluralist conception of the origins of foreign policy, especially insofar as ethnic groups are concerned.

Stanislawski finds that in “Canada, despite its model of an ethnic mosaic, there is a very limited tradition of pluralist practices”,¹⁵ while Nossal attacks the pluralist model for its “misleading assumption that all citizens have an equal opportunity to influence policy”.¹⁶ Nossal’s distinction is key insofar as visible minority communities are concerned.

The literature on policy advocacy in Canada distinguishes between “Institutional Groups” and “Issue-Oriented Groups”. To the former, Pross ascribes these characteristics: “they possess organizational continuity and cohesion; they have extensive knowledge of those sectors of government that affect their clients, and enjoy easy communication with those sectors; there is stable membership; they have concrete and immediate operational objectives; organizational objectives are generally more important than any particular objective”.¹⁷ To “Issue-Oriented Groups”, Pross ascribes “the reverse characteristics: they have limited organizational continuity and cohesion; most are very badly organized; their knowledge of government is minimal and often naïve; their membership is extremely fluid; they encounter considerable difficulty in formulating and adhering to short-range objectives; they usually have a low regard for the organizational mechanisms they have developed for carrying out their goals”.¹⁸

Research for this paper led the author to the inescapable conclusion that visible minority communities in Canada, when it comes to foreign policy advocacy, exhibit all of the characteristics of “Issue-Oriented Groups” and almost none of those displayed by “Institutionalized Groups”. It is little wonder, therefore, that even according to a “modified statist” paradigm, visible minorities have been poorly placed to influence foreign policy outcomes. One of the objectives of this study was to ascertain if, notwithstanding their lack of “institutionalization”, visible minority groups are proving capable – perhaps through resort to parliament and the political process – of securing their foreign policy goals. If so, the case for the applicability of pluralist theory strengthens.

An effort was made to isolate criteria that might govern ethnic community influence over foreign policy. Au-

thors in both Canada and the U.S. have tested and theorized numerous criteria affecting both community access and prospects for goal attainment. Somewhat arbitrarily, those criteria can be grouped in four categories:

- a) The Community's Nature: its size; degree of geographic concentration; extent of integration; cohesiveness; partisanship; independence from international actors; disposition to form coalitions.
- b) The Community's Objectives: whether limited or expansive; their consistency with Canadian foreign policy traditions and current policy; their "tenor".
- c) The Community's (lobbying) Activity: its timing; the degree of organizational activity (how "institutionalized"?; how well financed?); where it is targeted; using what levers?
- d) The Community's Image: whether positive or negative; the ascribed legitimacy of its demands; media propensity to accord favourable coverage.

Interview questions were guided by this typology, permitting within each case study an evaluation of process and outcomes against what the literature predicted would be the conditions-precedent to influence.

VISIBLE MINORITIES AND CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY: SOME THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS

Research for this paper supported the continuing validity of the statist model (sometimes only in its "weak" or "modified" form) concerning its power to accurately describe Canada's foreign policy "reality". Notwithstanding the growing number, size, and concentration of visible minority communities with acute foreign policy interests, foreign policy outcomes remain firmly within the prerogative of the Canadian government. Visible minority communities frequently are able to influence the *parameters* within which foreign policy choices are made; rarely are they able to set the *agenda*; almost never are they able to dictate precise policy *outcomes*.

The research affirms the applicability of statism's analytical framework. In none of the three cases presented was the state "policy neutral"; in each, policy ultimately reflected the state's own preferences - or was consistent with well-established policy traditions. Furthermore, evidence for a "bureaucratic politics" model is limited - principally by the fact that while certain government departments predictably oppose the objectives of many ethnic communities, there is virtually no countervailing advocacy (within

government for the foreign policy demands of ethnic communities). The foreign policy process remains remarkably centralized in the hands of the foreign and aid ministries plus, of course, the PMO/PCO.

This study confirmed that Canadian visible minority communities do have foreign policy agendas, and that to differing degrees are organized in pursuit of those agendas. It established, however, that notwithstanding pronounced changes to the face of Canadian society, tenets of pluralist theory still do not apply to foreign policy-making. Group competition appears absent from the process; foreign policy-making is largely disentangled from domestic politics; pronounced differences in institutionalization mean that ethnic groups do not enjoy equal opportunity to influence policy. The state, demonstrably, does not regard itself as the "passive agent of interest groups". Instead, it rigorously assesses community claims, judging them against a reasonably clear-cut notion of the "national interest". It believes it is supported in that course by public opinion - which appears unengaged by the particularistic issues concerning most visible minority communities and, indeed, is alienated at signs of "special pleading".

Judging from the experience of the Armenian, Haitian, and Sikh communities, it can be argued that recently immigrated visible minority groups:

- Demonstrate little organizational continuity and cohesion - except where structures with an historic pedigree have been recreated in Canada. Where structures are new, only a minority of the community is affiliated, membership is fluid, and confusion often exists (within and without the community) as to the leaders' representativeness;
- Have not put in place institutionalized apparatus to facilitate the pursuit of foreign policy objectives - and do not attach priority to creating a permanent Ottawa "presence";
- Make no efforts (or resist those that are made) to create, within their communities, single bodies with the mandate and authority to forge and enunciate a consensus view on vital foreign policy questions;
- Tacitly recognize the important role which officials play in developing policy alternatives, but nonetheless hold views of the bureaucracy ranging from mystification (as to how it operates) to resentment (alleging everything from standoffishness to bias).

Consistent with that framework, visible minority community contact with Foreign Affairs, CIDA, and Im-

migration officials – while much more frequent now than prior to 1984 – remains largely formal and event-driven, and generally does not approach the routine, easy communication enjoyed by institutionalized groups. Much warmer relationships appear to exist between ethnic communities and Multiculturalism officials – although no significant efforts have been made to involve Multiculturalism in foreign policy matters.

At the same time, “institutionalization” is not determinative (as a precondition to attainment of a community’s foreign policy goals). We have seen that the Haitians – the community (of the three studied) with the least “institutionalized” advocacy apparatus – saw far more of its goals realized than did better organized groups.

From the evidence already presented, it is possible to draw other inferences about the foreign policy advocacy climate facing newly immigrated visible minority communities. Those conclusions are presented in accordance with the format employed in the “case studies”.

The Community’s Nature

- Whether or not a community is united, ethnicity is a compelling organizing principle for foreign policy advocacy. Ethnicity, however, does not inherently promote unity;
- A community’s unity on objectives, and its geographic concentration, both seem to be more important variables than its absolute size;
- Better integrated communities enjoy enhanced prospects for success; asserting ethnicity can mitigate the “advocacy advantages” of integration;
- The degree of independence *from* foreign actors may, in fact, be less consequential to a group’s success than the amount of *opposition* elicited from foreign governments.

The Community’s Objectives

- Communities seeking a reversal of existing policy face high – but not insurmountable – hurdles;
- Consistency with decision-makers’ current (even undeclared) goals can overcome a community’s lack of institutionalization;
- The community with a single, over-arching demand risks total rejection, whereas those with multiple objectives across a variety of policy areas stand a much greater chance of securing some satisfaction;

- Those principally seeking to set policy *parameters* face better prospects than those attempting to secure precise policy *outcomes*;
- The community casting its appeal in human rights-promotion terms must satisfy elites that guilt is unambiguous and that abuses persist. Even then, its arguments will be trumped where accommodating them could jeopardize Canadian (possibly even US') geo-strategic interests;
- Communities whose objectives seem discordant with the "national interest" risk abject failure. National unity considerations rank just as high as geo-strategic factors in the hierarchy embraced by decision-makers;
- A community's objectives are more likely to be embraced if they constitute only a *limited* threat to existing (or potential) commerce;
- Silence from the business community - or even from potentially adversarial ethnic groups - can imply popular acquiescence, but is just as likely to indicate that the community's goals are regarded as unlikely to be embraced by decision-makers;
- Objectives cast negatively are much less likely to be embraced than those seeking "positive" action by decision-makers;
- Widespread and outspoken support from groups without a direct interest in the community's objectives can overwhelmingly boost its prospects.

The Community's Activity

- Timing and targeting are inseparable - and vitally important;
- A clear measure of a community's prospective influence is its ability to target sources of decisional authority;
- Early and regular intervention - depending on the nature and extent of a community's objectives - is often less important than an ability, during crisis situations, to mobilize fully and to secure ministerial and media attention;
- Obtaining the support of responsible ministers - most desirably of the Prime Minister - can substantially compensate for a community's lack of institutionalization;
- Resort to parliamentary committees, questions put by opposition MPs, and most particularly "Opposition Days", confirm a community's "alienated" reputation. While gaining attention for its issues, profile in those

fora can be counterproductive. Advocacy by government members, by contrast, often enormously enhances a community's influence;

- Political non-alignment can be as useful to a community as multi-partisan activity. Either facilitates achievement of its objectives more than active partisanship exclusively on behalf of opposition parties. Methodical, disciplined political activity by a community is certain to win decision-makers' attention to its goals, but high-profile hyperactive political behaviour can be counterproductive;
- Scope for ethnic communities to achieve influence through political contributions is probably limited to party nominations and pre-election periods at the constituency level;
- The *process* of coalition building may be as important as its achievement. The attendant internal compromise and ensuing discipline vitally increases the community's credibility in the eyes of decision-makers;
- High-profile techniques (like demonstrations) frequently backfire on ethnic communities, but in certain circumstances can be extremely useful in obtaining or sustaining media coverage.

The Community's Image

- The community must be seen as having a legitimate interest in the issues it is advancing;
- Leaders must be regarded as representative;
- Advocacy techniques must be considered appropriate;
- Communities divided on goals are prone to conduct their internecine disputes in the public domain, thereby damaging their popular image;
- Association with illegal (or dubious) activity, even by a small number of a community's members, must unequivocally be condemned by reputable community leaders. Otherwise, the community's objectives will be seriously jeopardized;
- Racist attitudes can hamper – but do not necessarily thwart – efforts to secure policy goals. Coalition formation appears the best antidote to the effects of racism;
- While important, an institutionalized capacity to cultivate strong media connections is less critical than the newsworthiness of the issues in which the community is interested. The absence of current images means groups with (extra-Canadian) historical grievances are extremely unlikely to attract media interest.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADIAN POLICY-MAKING

Asserting the continued explanatory power of “modified” statist theory (in the face of fundamental changes to Canadian demography and the nature of policy demands) has both policy and research implications. It underscores the probable enduring transcendence of state conceptions of the “national interest” insofar as policy development is concerned. However, it does not enable the analyst precisely to predict all policy outcomes. For example, Canada would not necessarily respond in comparable ways to future crises in Haiti; a threatened Armenia could evoke a policy response heartening to Armenian-Canadians; different demands by Sikh-Canadians in response to future threats to their brethren in India could elicit a more favourable reaction from decision-makers.

One criticism of Canada’s multiculturalism policy is that it helps entrench an “extra-Canadian focus” – maybe even an “extra-Canadian loyalty” – among recent immigrants. To be sure, multiculturalism has promoted the notion of Canada as a genuinely pluralist state. At the level of individual communities, it has encouraged internal cohesion, thereby increasing the potential for institutionalization. It may have stimulated community activity – but it appears not to have increased their influence (over foreign policy). The obvious implication is that multiculturalism has not “compromised” Canadian foreign policy.

Concerns about the integrity of Canadian foreign policy have also been cited by advocates of tighter restrictions on immigration to Canada. Critics of current immigration policies, levels, and flows, have argued that the selection process has no objective relation to declared foreign policy objectives, and that it yields “anomalies” that put sound foreign policy-making at risk. They note that with new countries continuously being “born in bloodshed”, the supply of refugees will be almost endless. They worry that Canadian policy-makers will be confronted by new immigrants with a succession of politically irresistible demands for foreign policy actions that are inconsistent with the national interest.

In reality, however, these concerns also seem misplaced. Newly immigrated visible minorities may prefer aggressive – even hostile – foreign policies. Currently, however, they are not mobilizing the resources necessary to ensure anything other than that they receive a hearing. There is every reason to assume, as the composition of Canadian society undergoes further change, that communities (ethnic and other) who would oppose actions advocated by

some visible minorities will themselves mobilize if they feel their interests are threatened. The product may be a *faux-pluralism*, in which the state retains full policy-making scope because domestic interests can be counted upon (or stimulated) each to cancel the other out.

Curbed resources will continue to constrain government's capacity to respond affirmatively to demands from visible minority communities. Canada rarely has the surplus capacity in the international system that would permit fully meeting ethnic community demands. Haiti was a rare case in which Canada was, indeed, a "principal power". Generally, however, massive cuts to budgets for defence and foreign aid, and severe personnel constraints at Foreign Affairs, mean that decision-makers' ability to respond tangibly to most community demands will remain severely limited.

On the other hand, the role that visible minority communities play in Canadian politics will only grow with time. Foreign policy objectives, undoubtedly, will motivate some of that involvement. Concentrated - and mobilized - ethnic communities may succeed in "capturing" a Member of Parliament (perhaps even several of them). It would take a significant (and unanticipated) transfer of foreign policy-making authority to parliament, however, for visible minorities to be able significantly to increase their influence via the political process. On current evidence, it is reasonable to project that "captive" MPs might be able to ensure that a community's demands receive a fair hearing by decision-makers. They may even be able to Veto' certain actions (e.g., the closing of an embassy or the reduction of Canada's aid budget to a particular country). Even the best-connected MPs, however, are unlikely to be able to secure policy change deemed inconsistent with the "national interest" (as defined by the state).

This is not to imply that visible minority influence over foreign policy is either insignificant or unlikely to grow. In fact, the opposite is true. The presence in Canada of a growing number of persons - from more and more countries - has already profoundly affected the foreign policy agenda. Relations (diplomatic and commercial - less frequently military) are becoming ever more sophisticated between Canada and virtually every country that has generated immigrants to Canada. As one of the world's inveterate "multilateralists", and as a member of more multinational "clubs" than almost any other country, Canada will increasingly value the breadth and depth of those ties. In almost all cases, however, the utility of those relation-

ships will be a function of their strength – and strengthening relations is often the obverse of what newly immigrated visible minority communities have in mind.

Unquestionably, policy-makers are now accustomed to soliciting (or otherwise receiving) the input of visible minority communities on foreign policy issues likely to be of concern to them. That feature of policy-making will only become further entrenched. When the objectives of individual communities command the obvious support of a broader audience (whether due to the communities' efforts or not) it should be anticipated that decision-makers will be inclined to embrace them. In that way, over time, "interests" previously thought peripheral increasingly will form part of the web of "national interests".

Generalizing on the basis of this paper's findings, it seems reasonable to conclude that visible minority communities should expect a full hearing for their foreign policy views, perhaps in an increasingly formalized fashion. An ability to situate their concerns within the broad framework of the "national interest" almost certainly will produce popular support extending beyond the community itself. On those issues – and in those circumstances – visible minority communities will frequently be able to set the parameters within which policy outcomes will be decided. They will thus contribute-to – but almost certainly will not dictate – Canadian foreign policy in the new millennium.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ T. John Samuel. 1990. "Third World Immigration and Multiculturalism". In: Shiva Halli, Frank Trovato and Leo Driedger, eds., *Ethnic Demography: Canadian Immigrant, Racial and Cultural Variations*. Ottawa: Carleton University Press. p. 384.
- ² Warren E. Kalbach and Wayne W. McVey. 1971. *The Demographic Bases of Canadian Society*. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Company of Canada Limited. p. 160.
- ³ "Visible Minorities" were defined in the *Employment Equity Act* of 1986 as "persons (other than aboriginal persons) who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour". Prior to the 1996 *Census*, data on visible minorities were derived from responses to the "ethnic origin" question on the *Census*, in conjunction with other ethno-cultural information such as language, place of birth and religion.
- ⁴ *The Globe and Mail*, February 18, 1998, A-1.
- ⁵ Howard Stanislawski (1981) contends that "the pursuit of its internationalist, 'helpful fixer' goals" ensured that from "1945 to 1975, Canadian foreign policy decision-making remained largely immune from any significant public or interest group pressure" ("Elites, Domestic Interest Groups, and International Interests in the Canadian Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: The Arab Economic Boy-

- cott of Canadians and Canadian Companies Doing Business With Israel". Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University. p. 102.
- ⁶ Pamela M. White and T. John Samuel found that Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, "while accounting for 35 percent of the country's population in 1986, were home to about 60 percent of the total immigrant population" ("Immigration and Ethnic Diversity in Urban Canada". *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 3 (Spring 1991). p. 70. According to Pendakur, the *concentration* of visible minorities is even greater: "In 1986 almost three-quarters of the visible minority population in Canada resided in five major cities: Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal, Calgary and Edmonton" (cited by Daiva K. Stasiulis and Yasmeen Abu-Laban, "The House the Parties Built: (Re)constructing Ethnic Representation in Canadian Politics". In Kathy Megyery, ed., *Ethno-cultural Groups and Visible Minorities in Canadian Politics: The Question of Access*. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991. p. 19).
 - ⁷ Stasiulis and Abu-Laban, "The House the Parties Built", p. 16. The same authors describe the 1988 federal election as a "watershed election for ethno-politics in Canada" ("Ethnic Activism and the Politics of Limited Inclusion in Canada". In Alain-G. Gagnon and James P. Bickerton, eds., *Canadian Politics: An Introduction to the Discipline*. Peterborough: Broadview Press Ltd., 1990. p. 584).
 - ⁸ Robert M. Campbell and Leslie A. Pal also point out that Mulroney's 1984 victory "coincided with international developments that had suddenly raised the profile of human rights considerations on the international agenda" (*The Real Worlds of Canadian Politics: Cases in Process and Policy*, 3rd ed. Peterborough: Broadview Press Ltd., 1994. p. 229).
 - ⁹ Kim Richard Nossal. 1989. *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 2nd Ed. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc. p. 10.
 - ¹⁰ John Kirton and Blair Dimock. 1983-84. "Domestic Access to Government in the Canadian Foreign Policy Process, 1968-1982." *International Journal* 39 (Winter). p. 69.
 - ¹¹ David Howard Goldberg. 1986. "Ethnic Interest Groups as Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry". Ph.D. diss, McGill University. p. 573.
 - ¹² Denis Stairs. 1970-71. "Publics and Policy-Makers: The Domestic Environment of Canada's Foreign Policy Community". *International Journal* 26 (Winter): pp. 221-248.
 - ¹³ Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, p. 117.
 - ¹⁴ Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds. 1975. *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 23.
 - ¹⁵ Howard Stanislawski. 1984. "Domestic Interest Groups and Canadian and American Policy: The Case of the Arab Boycott". In Robert O. Matthews, Arthur G. Rubinoff, and Janice Gross Stein, eds., *International Conflict and Conflict Management: Readings in World Politics*. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Inc. p. 143.
 - ¹⁶ Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, p. 90.
 - ¹⁷ Paul A. Pross. 1986. *Group Politics and Public Policy*, 2nd Ed. Toronto: Oxford University Press. pp. 114-115.
 - ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 117.