
Maja
ŠTAMBUK

Zagreb, Croatia

CROATIAN RURAL
SPACE: BETWEEN THE
MEDITERRANEAN AND
CENTRAL EUROPE.
A Few Keywords

The intention of this paper is to introduce Croatian rural space into a discussion on European integration, assuming that many integrative elements can be found in its features and present state. In the same manner, European influences, or, more precisely, from the Central European and Mediterranean circles, can be read in this space. The objective of this text is to explore a number of keywords and attempt to present some similarities and differences found in this part of Europe, which are, undoubtedly, a consequence of long-term political, economic, cultural, and other influences, as well as the geographic position of the country.

The identification of Croatia's affiliation with Europe can be classified at several levels. Prior to this, it is important to emphasize the heterogeneous character of Europe and in an analytical sense, the existence of macro-regions, that is, specific macro-regional qualities. Special attention shall be given to **rural areas and agrarian situations** in this paper. The following points mention some of them.

a. Comparison of geographic position,¹ which in a definite way influenced the marginal position of Croatia and the geographic special qualities (similarities between Mediterranean, Highland, and Pannonian landscapes²);

b. Comparing and standardizing macro-regions, regions, or states in view of **a group of syndromes** which mark the type and the attained level of rural area development (*modern life-pressure syndrome, rural decay syndrome, marginal areas syndrome*). By doing this, the direct influence of geographic position is disregarded, that is, it is understood as just an indirect factor;

c. Comparison of regions or states according to their cultural-historical affiliation and the specific qualities of their rural areas;

d. Comparison of regions or states with regard to their participation in recent and current political systems or integrations, that is, the former socialist countries' relationship toward the country and the peasant.³

The collapse of the East European political and economic system means that Croatia once again has had to search for its place with a dramatically changed political starting point (as an independent state) and within a framework of “new” cultural-economic developmental matrices. What do we want? What is available? To whom are we attracted to in a historical, economic, and cultural sense? Who needs us and why, and with which and what characteristics? Many questions need to be raised before occupying an appropriate place within one's “natural” socio-cultural environment.

Table I
 European Macro-Regions

	Population in 1989 (millions)	Percentage	Participation Value Added per Person (EU = 100)	Purchasing Power Standard (EU = 100)
Alpine Arc	54.7	16.5	127	122
Atlantic Arc	52.9	16.0	75	83
Northern Arc	41.4	12.5	109	104
World Capitals	99.8	30.1	116	111
Continental Diagonal	15.5	4.7	74	81
Central Mediterranean	31.0	9.4	58	65
Western Mediterranean	37.7	11.4	86	91
European Union	331.4	100.0	100	100

Source: Eurostat REGIO in *Cambridge Econometrics* (ERECO, 1992). Quoted according to: Andrej Gulič, Regionalni razvoj Slovenije - odziv na globalne in nacionalne spremembe: primer Pomurja, *IB revija*, 11-12/XXX, (1996), p. 18.

The regions at issue are large transnational areas. According to these indicators, Croatia as a space between the Central European and Mediterranean circles of influence belongs to two rather different macro-regions. With reference to European macro-regions, a much higher number of inhabitants belong to the Alpine in comparison to the Central Mediterranean circle, where the participation added value per person is more than double. In addition, the standard of purchasing power is also double in the Alpine circle. Thus, it is not difficult to explain why for decades Croatian political and economic strategies and plans have had difficulty or have almost failed to penetrate the permanent reserves of the Adriatic. The Mediterranean part of Croatia (although Croatia is a small country) has remained poorly linked to the rest of the country in terms of transport and electric power infrastructure, waterworks systems, commercial routes, etc. This part of the country has nothing attractive and developmentally interesting to

rely upon. Without major investments in infrastructure, a precondition for faster and stable growth, the southern part of Croatia, in particular, will remain a space that is referred to as having developmental potential. The international initiative for the Adriatic-Ionian highway is very important in that sense. This is because all the previously preferred European road and railroad routes have been leaving that part of Croatia at a dead end. We, ourselves, have not as yet been able to adequately support that orientation with continuous investment.

When we from Croatia want to be a part of Europe, we most often choose as a common denominator our belonging to a similar cultural-historical circle. In doing so, most of the Croatian arguments are drawn from the period of Austrian, that is, Austro-Hungarian rule, often omitting the French occupation of most of Croatia's territory that was in terms of modernization, a brief but significant period,⁴ and not to mention a further and deeper analysis of earlier history. Few are willing to attempt that, although every historian, even the amateur, knows the importance of history very well, and that even distant history leaves indelible marks in the historical memory.

Traces of the recent and distant past can be identified in today's connections or lack of connections between regions within a national community, or between particular countries, or groups of countries. They are visible almost everywhere. Historical cracks or, on the other hand, links, are a reality of every national, or especially, multinational state, or of a group of states. Examples of this include: the Italian Padania, the Spanish Basque region or Catalonia, Belgium split into a French and Flemish part, the new division of Germany into East and West, Scotland and Wales in Great Britain, Brittany, Corsica, Provence, Alsace and Lorraine in France, Voivodina and Kosovo in Serbia, North and South America, etc.

All these splits, cracks, and borders reflect in their own way differences in the state and organization of rural space.

The common features that link the formerly occupied states within Central European national spaces, for example, in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, or the states of the former Soviet Union or the Eastern Block should also be mentioned.

Since my interest is the country and rural space, I will discuss a few keywords relevant to Croatian rural space and its links with surrounding European spaces.

Modernization processes in Croatia, as an echo of European modernization, did not reach the same effects as in

Europe. Transformation from a pre-industrial to an industrial country in England was accomplished by the third decade of the 19th century. The lands of the “European Core” – France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland and soon afterwards by mid-century, Germany followed. The peripheral lands, such as the Scandinavian countries, Spain, Portugal, countries in the area of present-day Italy, the Balkans lands, eastern countries of the Habsburg Monarchy, and the Russian Empire “without their own spontaneous forces that would make them more competent for transformation in the spirit of revolution” gradually joined modernization processes.⁵ The peripheral position of Croatian space – viewed politically, temporally, and even geographically with regard to the center (core) of modernization, resulted in delayed industrialization and a specific type of industrialization in which production on the basis of the needs and demands of the core and in quantities that could not “disturb” the core prevailed. Industrialization started in Croatia as late as the third decade of the 20th century, that is, an entire century after the first industrialized countries.⁶ All that was built before that period was just the first railroads and a few roads opening some areas to industrial development.

Parallel, with the fast modernization of Western Europe, differences between the developed core and the peripheral circle were enhanced. There was a clear division at the level of total population.⁷ **The population growth was much higher** in countries that pioneered in the Industrial Revolution than in countries where industrialization started later.⁸ There were also essential changes within the demographic structure. Namely, in the core countries there was an accelerated decrease in the agricultural population and decline of agricultural income within the total income. Thus, peripheral countries engaged in most of the European agricultural production, which for a long period of time slowed down (and postponed) the heterogenization processes of demographic, economic and settlement structure. This was also true of all other modernization transformations (in education, health, nutrition, housing, etc.). Thus, what was more peripheral was more agrarian. In addition to agricultural products, the peripheral countries exported other raw materials. These were the two basic sources of their slowed down industrialization and gradual progress. Urban development was also slow. Moreover, third sector economic activity was slow to assert its role in social and economic systems.

Small country periphery communities in Croatia were peripheries up to the end of the 19th century until some of

their representatives and solitary “subsidiaries” of the public service linked up with the global society. Using their traditional supplementary skills and experiences, the peasantry composed (established) an acceptable social, economic, and cultural life. “The feudal characteristics of the first modernization” in Croatian regions under Austrian authorities prevented the systematic solution of peasants' problems. The possibility of land ownership was a particular problem among many peasants. A high percentage of peasantry also slowed down the process of industrialization and determined the character of parallel socio-economic phenomena. During the first modernization, serious differences emerged between Croatian countries and developed core countries. One may postulate that one of the causes for this lagging was the absence of a national state, and that this delay resulted in a “prolonged deadline” for the emergence of an independent Croatian state.

In servicing the modernization process, states behave in different ways. Some encourage the abandonment of the rural economy, some try to maintain it. Croatia, on the Austrian periphery, and further divided into Dalmatia and Civil Croatia, not to mention the Military-Border, a politically separate entity under direct Viennese rule until 1881, received little encouragement and space for modernization of its society and economy. As a consequence, its rural milieu remained rather preserved throughout the 19th century. The abolishment of serfdom and the final political settlement of serf relations (1848 and 1853) did not inspire more intensive changes. In any case, even on the eve of the Second World War, instances of colonate relations, a specific relationship tying the peasant to the owner of the land, were found in the southern parts of Croatia, in Dalmatia.⁹ It should be emphasized that through the Austrian administration in Dalmatia, the Central European economic-political concept was extended to the Mediterranean area. Its main features, in an agrarian sense, were products of market-oriented cultures so that market crashes of any one of them had markedly tragic consequences.¹⁰ The beginning of contemporary Croatian emigration occurred precisely in Dalmatia as a result of the insensitivity and thoughtlessness of the center for the specific qualities of Adriatic area development.

On the basis of their historical research, Berend and Ranki have concluded that it is possible to assume the existence of **a common pattern in the development of Southern European countries and all Mediterranean countries** due a stronger Eastern and weaker Germanic influence during the last years of the Roman Empire. In the

post-antiquity periods, the eastern “Asian” feudal influence was maintained by Turkish and Arab conquests (no private landowners, communal system of land lease, strong central power in an economic and political sense).¹¹ The total socio-economic crisis of Dalmatian Croatia brought about the Wine Crisis at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries as well as the already mentioned spread of some forms of (pre)feudal bondage of the Dalmatian peasant. The Adriatic part of the country, following a relatively successful sailboat period, was unable to generate the financial and technological means to switch to steamboats. Differences in historical development of various parts of Croatia necessitate, obviously even today, a conscientious effort to overcome the differences that is a consequence of this historical legacy. In a way, Dalmatia during recent history has developed as a peripheral area compared to the Northern Croatian “local” core. Or, more precisely, it can be stated that Dalmatia is more peripheral than Northern Croatia in relation to the West-European or Central European core. However, this is not a result of development potentials, but of the continual transport isolation.

Affiliation with Mediterranean civilization has left historical traces, but these have not been powerful enough for the inception of modern development actors.

Agriculture, in which self-sufficiency and extensive production prevailed, was also to blame for the slowed down transition to industrial society. As the agricultural population represented a majority **so its consumption pattern influenced overall consumption and significantly directed general commercial developments.**¹² M. Novak has shown how the rural population modernized their “industrialized” consumption patterns faster than their production ones.

The modernization period (like the period of transition from pre-industrial to industrial society) failed to take place in some Croatian rural milieus owing to different circumstances of development.¹³

Hardships (in terms of the population and economy) during the First and Second World Wars, as well as Yugoslavia in several regime variants and a socialist system is a short history of Croatia of the 20th century. All in all, they did not facilitate unhindered national development that is a prerequisite for the emergence of a self-confident modern entrepreneurial class. The contemporary national state, created under difficult conditions at the very end of the 20th century, has had an exceptionally difficult task to begin modernization processes and to redirect and complete under peripheral conditions. In addition, another task has

been to develop equally all areas of the state taking the inherited differences into consideration.

The countries of Central and South Eastern Europe, especially those which recently separated from multinational repressive state entities that subsequently changed their social structure (or “just” changed the structure) are faced with a very difficult period of restructuring agriculture and the process of recomposing the entire rural social space. Demands made by the European Union concerning the quality and (quantity), as well as the price of agricultural products, will make the process of transition of all agriculture in Croatia, and elsewhere, even more burdensome. As agriculture is not independent from other rural or global systems, changes within agriculture are connected with the entire transition project of the state, along with development, its plan, and objectives.

Transition, as a multi-layered historical project touches spheres of human activities and parts of (state or national) space with different intensity and nonsynchronously. The disharmonious relationship between urban and rural, historically unresolved and incomplete, resurfaces in this project. Moreover, it is recognized that there is a need to change the classic approach to this problem. On the other hand, possibilities for a better solution are available thanks to modernization processes, which weaken the traditional antagonism between agrarian and non-agrarian “civilizations”. The city, as a dense network of total life continues to emit insufficient transitional impulses in the direction of peripheral spaces and their demographic and economic resources damaging an even spatial distribution of progress. However, peripheral spaces can discover their own potentials even inside banked up social and cultural memory, so that they find the self-confidence necessary to speak up and place demands. Assistance can be obtained through a quality distribution of institutional and financial power between particular levels of government, which would reinforce the position of local self-government and increase the influence and responsibility for direction and intensity of the development processes. This has already happened in Europe.

During the sixties, Europe discovered its rural province, which had been gradually disappearing (quietly and commonplace for rural phenomena). Meanwhile, Croatian rural society has continued to decay. In some areas, social, demographic, and economic degradation is irreversible. The unwieldiness of Croatian industrialization as well as tertiary activities (just recall the enormous hotels along the coast and on the islands), inappropriate for smaller com-

munities, conditioned building exclusively in cities both smaller and larger. As a consequence, rural areas around industrial centers were vacated.

Europe's interest and care to sustain its living rural areas is also evident in much research that serves as a basis for every intervention in this socially, demographically, economically and spacially sensitive rural material. Along these lines and with the intention of analyzing the state of affairs in rural areas, L. Malassis¹⁴ developed the European economic-demographic model which takes into consideration a number of statistically available facts: demographic growth, a decrease in the agrarian population, an increase in the total population per active farmer, a decrease in total land surface used for agricultural purposes, and growth of land surface used by an active farmer.

This model is presented in the following table:

Table 2
 The European
 Economic-Demographic
 Model

Country	Used Farmland Per 100 Inhabitants (in hectares)	Number of Inhabitants Per Active Farmer	Used Farmland Per Active Farmer (in hectares)	Indicator of Internal Gross Product Expressed Through Purchasing Power	Average Used Land Per Farm (in hectares)
The European Ten	37.0	21.0	7.8	100.0	-
Belgium	14.0	63.0	9.0	102.0	14.1
Denmark	56.0	32.0	18.0	117.0	30.7
Germany	20.0	35.0	6.9	115.0	16.0
France	57.0	25.0	13.9	111.0	27.0
The Netherlands	14.0	49.0	6.8	107.0	14.9
The United Kingdom	33.0	78.0	25.7	104.0	65.1
Greece	93.0	5.0	4.5	57.0	4.3
Spain	71.0	12.0	8.6	72.0	12.9
Ireland	162.0	8.0	13.3	64.0	22.7
Italy	31.0	11.0	3.4	103.0	5.6
Portugal	43.0	5.0	2.2	53.0	4.3

Source: Louis Malassis, L'agriculture dans l'activité économique et dans l'espace: deux modèles d'interprétation, *Economie rurale*, 202-203 (1991), p. 7.

Countries with a large agrarian populousness, where agriculture plays a large role in the economy, with fragmented farms, and with unmodern agriculture are less developed and their gross product is considerably lower than that of the other countries of the Union. Thus, there is a Europe with high and a Europe with low values with re-

gard to those indicators. A fairly precise division into Northern and Mediterranean Europe is also possible. The conclusion is clear: for provinces to be alive they must diversify both socially and economically, and not only rely on agriculture in terms of development. A state with poor provinces cannot be a rich and progressive country.

On average, our "small-scale" agriculture has neither a quality work force, nor quality property, nor quality capital. All this decreases its role in and influence upon the total social dynamic of a rural society, which also decreases the general level of the dynamic.

The following table illustrates the agrarian structure of countries in the European Union. At first glance, it seems very heterogeneous.

Table 3

Total number of farms, average size of farm, and average number of work units on farms in some European Union countries (1979–80 and 1989–90), and in Slovenia and Croatia

Country	Total Number of Farms (in 000)		Growth Index for the Number of Farms	Farm Land (hectares per farm)		Growth Index of Farmland	Average Number of Working Units Per Farm	
	1979/80	1989/90	1989/79	1979/80	1989/90	1989/79	1979/80	1989/90
Greece	998.9	923.5	92	3.6	4.0	103	0.8	0.9
Italy	2832.4	2664.6	94	5.5	5.6	96	0.8	0.7
Belgium	115.1	85.0	74	12.3	15.8	95	1.1	1.1
The Netherl.	148.7	124.8	84	13.7	16.1	99	1.6	1.8
Germany	849.9	665.1	78	14.4	17.7	96	1.2	1.2
France	1255.3	1017.0	81	23.3	28.1	97	1.5	1.4
Denmark	122.7	81.3	66	23.8	34.2	95	1.4	1.2
Great Britain	268.6	243.1	91	63.7	67.9	96	2.2	1.9
Spain	1818.2	1593.6	88	12.9	15.4	104	0.8	0.7
Portugal	769.4	598.7	78	4.3	6.7	121	1.5	1.4
Luxemburg	5.2	4.0	77	25.0	31.7	97	1.8	1.6
Ireland	223.5	170.6	76	22.6	26.0	88	1.4	1.5
EU-together	9405.5	8171.2	87	12.4	14.0	99	1.1	1.0
Slovenia	192.1	156.5	81	4.6	5.5	97	1.0	1.0
Croatia	569.0	534.3	94	3.6	3.8	97	0.7	0.5

Sources: Eurostat. *Agricultural Statistical Yearbook*; 1994. *Statistični letopis Slovenije*, 1994. For Croatia the data refer to 1981 and 1991. See *Statistički letopis*, for these years, Zagreb, DZS.

Croatia is among the countries with the least property and an almost unchanged surface structure during the period in question. The group of countries with small-scale farming also includes Greece (4 hectares), Slovenia (5.5 hectares), Italy (5.6 hectares), Portugal (6.7 hectares). Need-

less to say, small properties are not the only barrier to rational and profitable agriculture. Likewise, a large holding in itself does not secure success. What needs to be emphasized in Croatia's case is that the customary dynamic links between the farm and family have been severed, so that some fundamental characteristics of the farm have not changed with changes in the family.¹⁵ However, this is not a case in which on the one hand, the family and on the other, the farm "becomes independent". If this were the case, many family farms would change ownership and their total number would dwindle. It mainly concerns non-economic reasons in which inherited land is firmly tied to a family, which has ceased to be agrarian. If this is not a profit consideration, at least it has certain romanticism. Therein it is worthwhile to look for footholds for positive moves in revitalizing rural space. An awareness of links between the family and land should be the guiding idea in any such concept of rural-agrarian policy, which will also stimulate cultivation of small areas. It is difficult to rely on rapid changes in this sentimental linkage, even if these are stimulated (or enforced).

The size of Croatian property is far from the European Union average of 14 hectares.

During the decade in question, Denmark had the largest decline in the number of rural farms, from 122,700 to 81,300 (index = 66). At the same time the average size of a farm grew from 23.8 to 34.2 hectares. **In countries with a property structure similar to that of Croatia, property transformation was in some places much slower, in others, faster.** The change index for Greece amounted to 92, for Italy 94, for Portugal 78, and for Slovenia 81. For Croatia it amounted to 94. The great change in the number of farms in Portugal is evidence of a dynamic agricultural policy within a dynamic development concept, which resulted in a change. It certainly seems that this example is well-worth studying. An average Portuguese rural farm grew from 4.6 hectares to 6.7 hectares in those ten years.

Differences in historical and political opportunities in which agricultural changes took place – stimulating changes in rural regions of Europe – are quite clear from the presented data. While considering them, attention should be drawn to the existence of "two Europes" a Mediterranean and a Northern one. According to the data from both tables (2 and 3), Croatia belongs to the Mediterranean agricultural circle. Most of the rural farms are within the lowest property categories. A similar situation can be found in Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and, of course, in Slovenia.

Croatian family farms of up to 5 hectares are occupied by 64% of all active farmers and include 54% of used farmlands.

Maja Štambuk
**Croatian Rural Space:
 Between the Mediterranean
 and Central Europe. A Few
 Keywords**

	Up to 5 hectares	5-20 hectares	More than 20 hectares	50-100 hectares	More than 100 hectares	Total	Total no. of farms (in 000)
Greece	77.8	19.9	1.9	0.3	0.1	100.0	923.5
Italy	78.8	16.2	3.3	0.9	0.5	100.0	2664.6
Belgium	37.8	34.6	21.9	4.8	0.9	100.0	85.0
The Netherl.	32.3	37.6	25.3	4.2	0.6	100.0	124.8
Germany	32.6	36.5	24.0	5.8	1.0	100.0	665.1
France	27.3	27.5	28.3	12.6	4.3	100.0	1017.0
Denmark	2.7	39.6	38.5	15.0	4.2	100.0	81.3
Great Britain	13.8	27.9	25.0	17.5	15.8	100.0	243.1
Spain	61.0	25.8	7.8	3.1	2.4	100.0	1593.6
Portugal	82.2	13.9	2.3	0.7	0.9	100.0	598.7
Luxemburg	25.0	20.0	27.5	25.0	2.5	100.0	4.0
Ireland	11.3	42.4	34.8	9.2	2.3	100.0	170.6
EU	60.0	23.1	10.9	4.0	1.9	100.0	8171.2
Slovenia*	64.4	35.7	-	-	-	100.0	156.5
Croatia*	84.6	15.4	-	-	-	100.0	534.3

* Data for Slovenia and Croatia are from 1991

Sources: Eurostat. Agricultural Statistical Yearbook, 1994, pp. 112-113, Statistični letopis Republike Slovenije, 1994, p. 264. Documentation, 894. Domaćinstva i poljoprivredna gospodarstva po općinama, Zagreb, Državni zavod za statistiku, 1996, p. 217.

Fordist agriculture, which was the final point of the modernization process in agriculture, entails a devaluation of traditional knowledge, destruction of peasant identity and social isolation of peasant society.¹⁶ In former Yugoslavia such consequences resulted from a totally different position of agriculture and a policy which with all its power tried to prevent progress, and even attempted to “phase out” the farmer and the private family farm. The farmer disappears not only in a highly urbanized and industrialized world as a result of rational modernization processes – but disappears because of a kind of resistance in similar conditions to our own when production is reduced and people move to the cities. Characteristically, the farmer who protests by not participating in such agrarian and general policies does not sell land. This is yet another reason why there are so many smaller and fragmented farms in Croatia.

Table 4

The structure of agricultural farms according to size in countries of the European Union, and in Slovenia and Croatia, 1989/90.

The modernization process that has been slowed down due to the long-term economic crisis, creation of an independent state, change of social system, but above all because of the destructive war and the enormous number of refugees and displaced persons, mostly from rural areas, will significantly slow down and even change the course of social changes in rural Croatia. During the Croatian War of Independence, the village was the worse hit in every respect. Moreover, return to and revitalization of war-devastated rural areas have been met with many problems.¹⁷

The agrarian structure and the rural social picture are the result of numerous factors outside of production so that their “balancing out” or adjustment and course toward contemporary development challenges is a very complex task, requiring interventions, coordinated measures, and instruments. Emphasis in this paper has been first and foremost that Croatia is a small country with an unusual shape, vast border areas, and different climatic zones; that politically and in terms of civilization it belongs to Central Europe and the Mediterranean, which has influenced the forms of property and production structures, as well as the types of community and characteristics of community networks. This is something one should definitely bear in mind when planning their revitalization.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Geographic position is important! If Croatia were located where Switzerland (regardless of any associations and integrations) or Lichtenstein are, nobody would dispute Croatia's place in Europe.

² For example, Dalmatia, the most southern region of Croatia, is a space with the most extreme rocky ground in the Mediterranean, which is a limitation and yet another reason for the fragmented quality and parcelization of cultivable land, one of the basic barriers to the successful development of agriculture.

³ All East European states, members of the East Bloc, had rather different “solutions” to agriculture and the farmer, and so that the current state of affairs in rural and agrarian areas of these countries differs. Following changes in the social system, and frequently borders, they came across very different problems in their provinces. For example, in Czechoslovakia, only 6.1% of agricultural land was in private ownership, while in Poland 77.9% was privately owned. The rural population in East Germany was 9.0% while in Romania it was 23.8%. Some were food exporters, some importers. In 1991, Hungary had about a million and a half family farms, but few were privately owned. In Poland, the average size of family farm was 6 hectares. In Bulgaria, family farms produced their produce on plots between 0.5 to 1.0 hectares. (Cited from M. and V. Tadić, “Promjene u poljoprivredi istočnoeuropskih zemalja”, /Changes in the agriculture of East European countries/ *Sociologija sela* 1-2 (1992), pp. 125-134.)

- ⁴ After the collapse of Venetian rule in Dalmatia in 1797, Austria briefly succeeded it. However, by 1805, Dalmatia belonged to Napoleon, according to the Treaty of Bratislava. The founded Illyrian Provinces remained under French rule for ten years. Namely, in 1815 (The Congress of Vienna) Dalmatia once again belonged to Austria and remained an Austrian province until the fall of the monarchy in 1918, more than a century later.
- ⁵ For more details see Ivan Berend and György Ranki, *Europska periferija i industrijalizacija, 1780-1914*, Zagreb: Naprijed, 1996 pp. 241; (Povijest i historija), pp. 24–30.
- ⁶ The Hungarian authors, Berend and Ranki in search of the origin of differences between states as well as why some during a certain historic period are the center(s) or core(s), while others are peripheral, explain the historical etiology starting with antiquity.
- ⁷ “Core” and “periphery” are in fact historical categories, and they refer to areas that incessantly change. Thus, some peripheral areas may catch up with more developed ones, while some parts of the core may break away and lose their “central” significance. Therefore, the term “periphery” is understood as an arena that is dependent on a “core” (op. cit., pp. 25–26).
- ⁸ M. Friganović concluded “Industrialization was the main cause of the population increase during the last 150 years or so... The population, therefore, even though it appears as a factor and modifier of social processes behaves at a given moment in time and space as a consequence of these processes.” M. Friganović, *Demografija: stanovništvo svijeta*, Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1990, p. 47.
- ⁹ The colonate relation existed in pre-feudal Europe. It was a private legal contract between a landowner and a free but poor citizen, often a former slave. It came into being during the disintegration of the Roman Empire, and it enabled landowners to keep their land cultivated. Following division of the land into many small plots, the landowner drew up a separate contract with each cultivator. A farmer rarely could afford to buy land if he was not subject to a serf out of necessity so he and his heirs depended on a landowner. In Croatia, the colonate relation existed in parts of the country, which used to be under the Roman rule.
- ¹⁰ An example of this is the “wine crisis”.
- ¹¹ Ibid. p. 29.
- ¹² On the agrarian sector as the core of peripheral industrialization see: Mojca Novak, *Zamudniški vzorci industrijalizacije. Slovenija na obrobju Europe*, Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče, 1991, p. 113.
- ¹³ An interesting example is Žumberak. See: *Žumberak: Baština i izazovi budućnosti*, Stari grad Žumberak: Odbor za proslavu 700-te godišnjice imena Žumberak, 1996, 323 pp.
- ¹⁴ Louis Malassis, L'agriculture dans l'activité économique et dans l'espace: deux modèles d'interprétation, *Economie rurale*, 202–203 (1991), p. 4. Collaterally, Malassis presented a European model of agricultural and food economy, which is not included here since it depends exclusively on economic parameters.
- ¹⁵ It also, quite surprisingly, depends little on the changes in the immediate rural social surroundings.
- ¹⁶ M. Sauer, “Fordist Modernization of German Agriculture and the Future of Family Farms”, *Sociologia ruralis*, 3–4 (1990), p. 267.

Maja Štambuk

**Croatian Rural Space:
Between the Mediterranean
and Central Europe. A Few
Keywords**

¹⁷ One of them is specifically agrarian-rural. An immense number of mines were scattered over fields, meadows, forests, and along the roads. Clearly, therefore reinstallation of the rural population does not depend on the people so much, but more on the speed and efficacy of the steps leading to their economic reintegration. Moreover, those who have returned or will return; who have chosen the village as the space of their life and work, are no longer the same. Experiences of war, persecution and exile will mark their return for a long time. Undoubtedly, it will take some time for rural communities to gain their lost identity due to everything that has happened from persecution until return.