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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

Just a year ago, the establishment of a new security architecture in Southeastern Europe seemed like a great challenge. Today, after the inauguration of the Stability Pact and the latest OSCE Summit in Istanbul, a need for such an architecture remains. Namely, this is an area where three layers of civilization are interrelated; bearing the heavy burden of a heritage characterised by ethnic chaos.

Ethnic chaos prevented most of the countries in Southeastern Europe from following the democratic processes of the European West. Today, when the problems of this region, and especially of the Balkan countries need to be expeditiously resolved by the acceleration of the European integration processes, Europe must be ready to accept this region and to allow for the security of each country. This would entail collective security, so that this region can become an inseparable part of the common security architecture. Any other path would turn the Southeast of Europe into an area susceptible to organized crime, religious and nationalistic terrorism, illegal trafficking, etc. Such an approach is the best alternative for this area, i.e., the Balkans, so that the negative associations it has endured throughout this century no longer burden it. At the same time, the ruling political elite would be forced to modify their overall political and cultural mentality. Moreover, the practices of exploiting one's own problems to serve narrow state interests would be terminated.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, or rather in the Federation of Bosnians and Croats, we think that a completely new defense and security architecture should be established in the Southeast of Europe. This is because both the present and future military threats are linked with a serious imbalance among the armed forces of the Balkan states. Moreover, in the event of ethnic and religious intolerance, this could acquire a regional dimension.

The peoples in the area of the former Yugoslavia experienced this in a most brutal sense. Thus, taking all limita-

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tions into account, we wish to commence with a construction of a unified security system in the Balkans and the Southeast of Europe. We would like to offer our assistance so that constructive potentials can be sought and designed. Since, we fear that particular states may end up in isolation that in the recent past was almost raised to an official level.

Evidently, the Dayton Accords stopped the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and ended ethnic cleansing and the destruction of material property. The Agreement was not voluntarily accepted by the warring states; it was a forcefully imposed solution that unfortunately did not permanently resolve the security issue of the peoples, entities, and entire state. It also involves the long-term presence of international military forces and an international administration that essentially hinders a long-term solution of lasting self-sustainable peace. My view is that the solutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as those being imposed in Kosovo, should be amended through the construction of a joint security policy.

The results or more precisely the minimum effectiveness of the Global Crisis Management Model tested in Bosnia and Herzegovina questions the very essence of such a concept in regional conflict management. Conversely, there are a growing number of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina who favor the so-called Dayton Europeanization. Namely, the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina are assuming their own responsibilities for the establishment of a sustainable security system, which could become an example or initiative for the establishment of a unified security system in the Balkans and the Southeast of Europe. Europeanization or the concrete application of European economic and security models does not exclude Washington, nor does it essentially change the peace agreement. A significant number of countries in the region are not part of the Dayton Agreement. The European solutions that these countries apply are based on confidence building and security consolidation and they presuppose control of arms and military activities. Bosnia and Herzegovina wishes to become precisely a part of this environment and process.

I am convinced that all of us here agree that establishment of a new security architecture or security system in the area of Southeastern Europe implies the leading role of NATO. Moreover, I understand that presently this is the best way to overcome local fears of modalities for regional co-operation as well as the best guarantee that the sovereignty of a particular country is not left to the mercy

of its former adversaries. NATO, besides other things, ensures standards that guarantee the protection of sovereign rights within a unified security system.

Most of the countries in the region are NATO members or on the right track to becoming members through the Partnership for Peace. Preparation of the countries in the region for EU or NATO membership is one of the more important objectives of the Stability Pact. In the Balkans, there are only three countries that are not members or partners in the Partnership for Peace. According to all indications, Croatia has clearly declared that its objective is to enter NATO. At present, Yugoslavia due to circumstances that are familiar demonstrates neither interest nor commitment towards NATO. Of course, in a long-term context this issue should remain open.

Here I would like to clarify the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina with regard to the establishment of a new security architecture in the area of Southeastern Europe. Evidently, a global model for resolving crisis points in the world is being tested in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfortunately, so far it has been a rather questionable experiment that has neglected dimensions of reintegration similar to those applied in today's Europe that tested and produced a reconciled nation and an integration model within a longer time frame. If we add to this their work and attitude towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, intentional or not, the international factors stimulate undesired dependency culture. Inevitably, the experiment could produce negative results instead of long-term stability.

As far as Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned we are in a specific situation because of NATO's major role in the implementation of the Dayton-Paris Accords. From this perspective, one can say that we are *de facto* a member of NATO in the context of regional security. However, the formal initiation of Bosnia and Herzegovina into NATO is a long-term issue, because of the unresolved internal constitutional and legal situation in the country, as well as in NATO itself.

Pertaining to the internal situation, and for clarification purposes, it should be emphasized that Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of two entities. These are the Federation of B&H (Bosnian-Croat Federation) and the Republic of Serbia, where neither of them has an international legal subject position. In B&H, there are two armies that differ in their force structure and standards with different weapons and equipment. In addition, they do not fundamentally differ in their concept from that of the entity's political leadership.

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Placing this into perspective, it becomes clear that only a state and not the entities it consists of can join NATO and Partnership for Peace. In a political sense, this should be preceded by the consensus of the respective constituent peoples. Such a consensus does not exist at present. Nevertheless, at the level of the state, there is a view that the relationship with NATO should be enhanced. However, to what degree, has not as yet been explicated. Through the "Train & Equip" program within the Military Stabilization Program, the Army of the Federation (AoF) has adopted standards, equipment, and weapons, policies and procedures that are compatible with NATO. By doing so, it *de facto* meets the terms; content and meaning of the transitional period represented by the Partnership for Peace. Hence, the AoF is absolutely committed to building a security system in the Balkans under the NATO umbrella.

I consider that the Stability Pact has taken the place of any other solution, and that the two entities in B&H will completely accept the described path as their political and security policy promptly. Simultaneously, this is the only way in regard to membership possibilities that fulfills NATO terms. Namely, just as the EU has its Copenhagen criteria for EU membership, NATO also has its criteria. Specifically, NATO accepts states, rather than armies or entities as members. In other words, it only accepts states with one army.

There is a long road ahead of us in B&H, before we can become a part of a unified security system in the Balkans. Therefore, we need to make our joint defense and security functions acceptable to both entities at least. This is sometimes not that simple. Until recently, we had three armies that according to the political elite barely accepted joint interests at the expense of giving up part of their sovereignty. However, if B&H fails to comply with these terms or it fails to resolve its internal problems, other models that will ensure our internal and external security will have to be sought. Does total demilitarization for the purposes of establishing a neutral state imply reliance on a strong defense alliance? Is this a feasible solution? Or is minimal defense potential such as in Austria, Switzerland and Sweden the solution? Unfortunately, these dilemmas are still prevalent in post-war B&H, along with different visions of its internal organization.

My opinion is that the establishment of a Southeastern European brigade that was recently promoted in Bulgaria would serve to support regional peacekeeping operations. This represents a positive sign for the creation of a

joint European defense and security policy that presently focuses on humanitarian activity, as in the so-called Petersburg missions. At the same time, this is a chance for all the countries in the region to join, i.e., to reintegrate into a process that could become an embryo for establishing and constructing a new, unified defense and security architecture in a wider region, e.g., in Europe.

Such an approach has great philosophical value for me, because in the event of disasters, especially if caused by war, it allows the joint security and defense system to intervene and rightly place itself above the supreme authority of a particular country. I am sure that the UN Security Council will always allow responses to this type of crisis. However, countries that tend to minimize Security Council authority, and by doing so the role of OSCE indirectly, represent a danger as well. Thus, "umbrella" as the key element for regional security and basis for overall future European security would be questioned.

Therefore, I am convinced that it is necessary to establish a new security architecture, complete with all its mechanisms and modalities so that it is capable to meet security challenges in such a complex region such as the Southeast of Europe. Such security presupposes urgent fulfilment of terms that countries in the region should meet, before we start to build this system with accountability.

Here I would like to single out the importance of balancing economic potential with the size and structure of each army as an important condition. The Stability Pact has set the groundwork for such an approach through multilateral co-operation between countries of the region. In my view, this can and needs to result in the establishment of a new defense and security architecture in the sub-region as well as a new balance of forces by a corresponding reduction in troops and heavy weapon categories. By accepting the principles and spirit of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, countries accept responsibility for the initiation of any conflict in their own territory or outside their borders, as well as the possible consequences of retaliation similar to those we had the opportunity to witness during the Kosovo crisis. By establishing a new unified security system in the Southeast of Europe, the settlement of any conflict would gain completely different dimensions. Moreover, this would finally facilitate peace in the Balkans, long due after all the bloody war experiences that have occurred throughout this century.

The institutional policy of European and European-Atlantic structures towards Southeastern Europe must come up with a formula of joint interests, a formula that con-

tains all that is positive as well as any sacrifice that each country must make. The integration of Southeastern Europe into the European-Atlantic political, economic, security structures that are of particular interest in B&H should represent a joint political choice in a process that has a determined set of rules as well as a clear and unambiguous objective. By accomplishing this objective, all the countries in the Southeast of Europe would join the zone of higher level security. This would also positively change the political and economic appeal of the region, and the region itself would simultaneously become a factor of security and stability in light of overall stabilization in the Southeast of Europe.