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OBSERVATIONS:
UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY –
YEAR 2000 AND
BEYOND, NATO AND
EUROPEAN ISSUES –
YEAR 2000 & BEYOND

Distinguished guests, as you would imagine any over-arching description of American foreign policy would have to be other than *static*, for American foreign policy is a principled-*dynamic*. It is a fluid process connected to, and serving, unchanging values. It evolves from interactions with the policies of other nations, but it never goes outside the orbit of its primary goal and guiding premise, which is to remain sovereign and free in a stable and peaceful world, with least risk to its lawfully-attained economic assets and political resources.

In other words, American foreign policy is a *dynamic* that is liberated by democratic principles. More specifically, American foreign policy is beholden first unto concepts and laws enabling freedom for itself with respect for sovereignty of all other nations and for universally-defined human rights. Though it has been accused of veering off course in recent decades, such behavior has not been the *norm*. American foreign policy is, for the most part, the world's leading model of democracy-advocacy within and across all international forums and activities.

Of course, to remain in a position of *grace* within the family of democracies and as a leader among nations, the U.S. has had to re-visit, recast and reinvigorate those principles “and intentions” upon which its foreign policy actions should be based. To do this, it is now debating many questions, among them: *What kind of nation must America avoid being characterized as in the 21st Century; in view of its primacy, and how can such perceptions be avoided? For instance - Unfair partner? Rich uncle? Benign Imperialist? Hardcore Imperialist? Reluctant Partner that can switch to Isolationism overnight?* These are difficult perceptions to avoid.

And: *Where can America's short term interests abroad interfere with its wishes and strategies for long-term global stability?*

So: Prestige, morality and pragmatism rank high for American diplomacy, separately and joined within the American foreign policy agenda.

America is also re-defining the meaning of Superpower-dom. In effect, it is asking, *“What is the real meaning and true value of our primacy in world politics, in a very fast-changing era of ‘globalization’?”*

Too, American diplomacy is recognizing a greater need to raise foreign policy endeavors to a higher level of concern among U.S. citizens, and to a higher level of knowledge among voters, as well. This is becoming evident in the usually early attention being given to foreign policy actions by both Democratic Party and Republican Party presidential candidate-hopefuls in their campaigns. Much of this has to do with the fact that so many foreign policy issues that were classified as items of interest for Washington bureaucrats only, are now also of the domestic variety that average American voters concern themselves with, for instance, jobs at home that are affected by global trade matters. Relatedly where enthusiasm among U.S. voters for certain diplomatic actions had always existed, there has not always been sufficient knowledge about the outcomes of desired options. Enthusiasm without enlightenment is always a dangerous prospect, therefore has been an increase in U.S. State Department, White House and even intelligence-community openness toward general and specific media and Internet access in America.

In addition, the U.S. government has learned the hard way in a post-cold War era that it must make quite clear to the rest of the world its policies regarding “conflict resolution” its criteria for when to enter into a military situation and when not to. This worked well against the former Soviet Union in the Reagan years when it was made quite clear to the Kremlin what the U.S. and NATO would do if provoked in Europe, but it was not clear in the early and mid nineties to Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic precisely what the U.S. would do in the Balkans, nor were U.S. pre-Desert Storm intentions ever properly understood by Iraq's Saddam Hussein.

Furthermore, America will continue to pursue the concept of multi-national military force-structures for reactions to unlawful aggression, that is, of balanced coalition military reaction for dealing with regional crises. Thus, there will be continued strong U.S. advocacy for NATO and the European Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, for the military-impacted aspects of the proposed southeastern Europe “Stability Pact”, for continuance of east Asia security agreements with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. This advocacy is, for American diplomacy, essential for many reasons: **First**, it engages those nations closest to related problems in ways “out of conflict”, thus to-

ward long-term regional stability. **Second**, the U.S. national *will* to operate with military force “unilaterally” may be politically impossible to obtain in the future. **Third**, the cost of unilateral U.S. military action has become so high fiscally and of such enormous drainage on military resources, U.S. diplomacy may be forced in the near future to increase the practice of – “*selective* unilateral intervention”.

Also, the U.S. foreign policy community will surely re-think the acceptance of low, even below-the-margin dividend outcomes from high-dollar U.S. investments overseas in order to help sustain bedrock for furtherance of democracy where it has floundered, where, as in Russia, it has gotten off to a very rocky start. While instead of being a steadily-growing democracy for ten years, Russia has been a fledgling democracy one year ten times, some of this due to early fears of investment-increases among U.S. providers (justified in light of early losses, unjustified in that specific U.S. regulatory procedures and specific U.S.-demanded corrective actions could have made a difference five, seven years ago).

Additionally, there is in the U.S. some steam behind efforts to help achieve speedier European integration, and not just as an *end* but as an interim-phase so that Europe can successfully go beyond regional integration toward more cogent, more robust “inter-regional” and “trans-continental” relations in the future – in a way that keeps pace with “globalization”. My personal observation on this, is that doing so will require a greater need for recognition in America of the strategic importance of certain nations within the subset of the family of European democracies that we have been calling, “*the new democracies*”, among them, Croatia, Romania, and of certain recast and reinvigorated democracies, among these, Greece, South Korea, and Chile. Croatia and Romania can serve most effectively as bridging and staging-area nations for the future's more likely conflict-resolution efforts that are needed to join further to core-Europe the Balkan and Baltic nations. Greece is a proper candidate-nation for bridging actions connecting not only southeastern Europe but all of Europe with an inevitably economically-stronger northern Africa, and Greece is also a necessary actor for the future likely possibilities of intensified and improved Euro/eastern Mediterranean and Euro/Middle East security and trade opportunities. In east Asia, South Korea remains America's most stable *operational*-security ally and therefore a key Euro-trade ally, and Chile, despite a recent recession and political moves characterized as center-left, re-

mains an advanced democracy+capitalism model for other Latin America nations to follow (Chile is already a strong U.S. and Euro trading partner).

Consequently, American diplomacy will probably continue to do all that it can to clear the playing fields for the aforementioned “inter-regional” and “trans-continental” values by seeking “closure” with regard to the world's hot-spot issues, for example, North Korea as spoiler, India versus Pakistan, China/Taiwan, Greece vs. Turkey, bringing a lasting peace to southeastern Europe. In doing so, it is likely that American diplomacy will not only recognize further the increasingly important influence of the United Nations and also non-government organizations (NGO's); it will seek to increase partnership-opportunities with select NGO's.

WITH regard to NATO and European issues, I believe:

(a) That NATO should reconvene an enlargement schedule at a rate commensurate with “globalization” and “advanced electronic information technologies”. NATO should act diplomatically to strongly influence the sharing of more advanced information technologies among member-countries, which will allow for the necessary military equipment modernization that enables “coalition security responses”, that is, allows “multi-national warfare and/or peacekeeping forces” to succeed. It makes no sense to have a NATO, or a PfP program, for that matter, that includes nations that cannot keep up with other NATO-member nations on “the electronic battlefield”. This is extremely important for U.S. policy, since the U.S. military can no longer always perform “unilaterally”;

And, (b) Formal Europe should state openly through all of its security-related forums (the EU, WEU and NATO among them), that it recognizes the proposed southeastern Europe “Stability Pact” as a necessary transition phase for greater European integration and for future Euro “inter-regional” and “trans-continental” participation, and not only as an entity for a general Balkans peace that is apart from such integration efforts;

(c) NATO should incorporate as quickly as possible the lessons learned during its 1999 anti-Yugoslavia military campaign, among these:

- Need for better HUMINT (Human intelligence);
- More consultation from friendly countries within “the crisis region”;
- Better understanding of Information Warfare (IW) Strategies;
- The fact that air campaign success must be determined less by the number of successful sorties and targets hit

but mostly from “quality-of-power” drained from the enemy and from drainage of the infrastructures related to an enemy's external as well as internal political power.

Moreover, NATO should rethink its policy regarding a post-Chechnya/more democratized Russia, if and when this ever comes about. While under present circumstances, Russia as a full NATO-member state seems inappropriate, maximum military NATO/Russia cooperation with regard to training and common security issues makes a lot of sense, and so does increased open Euro-trade with Russia. NATO has to keep in mind that it shares many security concerns with Russia, where no NATO/Russia conflicts exist and cooperation can be optimized, for example, Islamic extremism backing anti-Euro interests in the Middle East; proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; terrorism; illegal drug smuggling; petroleum distribution security.

As to final and over-arching observations, I suppose the best news about American foreign policy for Europeans, is that what may have seemed like “fast-creeping Isolationism” has reached a wall and will go no further than the silly rantings of politician-wannabe's who lack a necessary dimension for understanding what liberal democracy really means and how the U.S. can't have such and nurture it for itself without liberal democracy spreading and working viably elsewhere in the world. In fact, America will likely be just as involved as a political actor on the world stage as anytime in the past century.

Will America ever attempt to exercise control in an imperial fashion? This is most doubtful, for America is primarily in the business of self-liberation through economic, technological, political, cultural and social innovations within and beyond its own environs, and this cannot be accomplished optimally through even the most benevolent versions of imperialism, but it is always possible through effective partnerships upon a liberal political and economic playing field.