Panel 1: Ideology and attitudes to extremism

Correlation between fragmented political socialization and attraction to political extremism in the MYPLACE locations *(Zoltán Berényi and Istvan Muranyi)*

The objective of the paper would is to examine whether a correlation between the indicators of fragmented political socialization and the attraction towards political extremisms could be detected at the MYPLACE locations.

The concept of fragmented political socialization claims that when the *connection* between the formal, (that is, the family and the education system) and less formal (that is, the peer groups, the media, the various subcultures and political movements) agents of socialization is *weak, occasional and contradictory*, it significantly increases the level of ambiguity of the person towards politics. As a result, the theory claims, a person subjected to this kind of socialization is more likely to accept the simple narratives, simple explanations of the artificial reality, artificial memories, artificial past and artificial history offered for consumption by extremist political parties.

In the MYPLACE research, there has been no attempt to measure the respondents' actual attraction to extremist political parties and their ideologies in their corresponding countries. However, the collected data still allows for the identification of sets of attitudes that could be considered as a manifestation of political extremism: the level of xenophobia, the level of exclusionism, the level of welfare chauvinism, the level of preference to ethnic over civic nationalism, the level of belief in the use of violence as a mean of problem solving, the level of negative attitudes towards Muslims, Jews, Roma and other minorities, etc.

Building on the theory of fragmented political socialization the paper intends to examine the correlation between the level of personal interest, activity and attitudes towards politics; the level of diversity of media sources used in acquitting information about politics and current affairs; the level of discussion of political issues with key individuals (peers and family members); the level of interest towards public affairs and activity in voluntary organisations and associations and the level of various indicators of political extremism.

Determinants and understandings of young people's tolerance in Georgia, Russia and Germany *(Natalia Goncharova, Robert Grimm, Tamar Khoshtaria and Tinatin Zurabishvili)*

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the former socialist countries have gone through major social and political changes. For over twenty years now, the populations of these countries have struggled to find collective identities. This paper will explore young people's social, cultural and political values in Georgia, Russia and Germany. Although these countries share a socialist legacy, transitions took different forms and were constrained or facilitated by unique external and internal factors. Georgia is a comparatively small country located at the European fringe. Russia, in contrast, remains a global power albeit weaker than in the past. East Germany inherited West Germany's democratic institutions and became a member of the European Union as a result of re-unification in 1990.

While in Georgia and Russia old traditions and habits still play a significant role in everyday life, new, predominantly western values still have a serious influence on perceptions and attitudes. This is especially true for young generations who grew up in the 1990s and were – and partially still are - socialized in a highly unstable environment, where value systems are not fully established. The socialist past also continues to have an ambiguous legacy in Eastern Germany. However, because of re-unification with West Germany, as well as historically stronger liberal traditions, East Germany underwent an accelerated transition toward democracy. In this process of social, cultural and political change, the role of young people and their perceptions and attitudes towards the social environment they live in should not be underestimated. It is important to look at how open to and tolerant of new democratic values as well as the ongoing cultural changes young people are. The paper will explore the potential determinants of youth tolerance and compare these across the countries based on the MYPLACE project's WP4 (survey) and WP5 (in-depth interviews) data.

Specifically, the paper will focus on young people's:
- attitudes towards different ethnic, religious and sexual minorities and a derived index for their level of tolerance;
- perceptions of liberal (e.g., perceptions of homosexuality, abortion and the roles of men and women in a family) and democratic values;
- openness towards representatives of other nations;
- (and how the above are linked to) national identity and its importance.

MYPLACE data presents the opportunity to analyze the results quantitatively as well as qualitatively. Based on the survey data, the paper will look at the level of tolerance and identify its potential determinants for each country (and survey location) using a regression model. In addition, qualitative interviews will provide understandings, potential explanations and in-depth analysis of the results obtained through survey data analysis.

Panel 2: The role of the state: youth regimes and the political activism

Shaping youth participation. The meanings of political action strategies among young people in different European contexts *(Mariona Ferrer, Roger Soler, Sanjin Ulezic)*

In the last decades the interest in youth participation has increased in parallel to fast changes in the attitudes and practices of young people. Recent research in youth participation has focused, first, in the differences across time in political patterns of activism and, second, in interpreting the transformations of the relation of young people with the political sphere. However, little attention has been paid to cross-national differences in youth political participation patterns across countries and, particularly, to the contextual aspects that can explain this variation. In fact, data from the MYPLACE survey shows great differences in the levels and types of participation in different locations across Europe. In previous research using MYPLACE data, we show that an important part of these differences can be attributed to contextual effects like the youth transition models, welfare regime, the impact of the crisis or the density of associations (Soler-i-Martí and Ferrer-Fons, forthcoming 2015).

In this paper we will go in depth to analyse the individual mechanisms by which young people in different contexts interpret their social and political environment and how this influences their views of the political and their participation strategies. MYPLACE data offers an extraordinary opportunity to interpret contextual differences in different local environments combining quantitative and qualitative data. To analyse the effects of the context in the views of the political from youth and their participation patterns, we use a mixed methods approach. Survey analysis is used to describe the differences in political participation across Europe and to typify countries and locations according to the participation strategies of young people. Next, we analyse semi structured interviews (WP5) from young people in ten European locations from five different countries and Welfare State regimes (Finland, (West) Germany, Spain, Slovakia and UK) with different democratic traditions, welfare state and youth transitions models. In this analysis we deal with the discourses of formal activists, protesters and non activists in different contexts in order to comprehend their perceptions on the social and political environment (views on institutional politics, social expectations, mobilization agencies, etc.) and the combination of micro and macro mechanisms that lead to different participation strategies among young people in each context.

Doing so, we will be able to map the route by which young people internalise social and political context and understand how this shapes their conceptions of politics and draw different participation strategies.
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Soler-i-Marti, Roger, and Ferrer-Fons, Mariona, "Youth participation in context: the impact of youth transition regimes in political action strategies in Europe" (forthcoming, 2015) in H.Pilkington and G. Pollock (eds) *Radical futures? Youth, politics and activism in contemporary Europe,* Sociological Review Monograph Series, Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.

Hard and Soft Forms of Social Control of Youth: Russia and the UK compared *(Elena Omel'chenko, Guzel Sabirova, Mick Carpenter)*

In this presentation we will compare and contrast the youth policy regimes of Russia and the UK, and seek to understand how we can work from MYPLACE data, particularly the qualitative evidence provided by Working Packages 5, 6 and 7 to develop policy implications that connect common threads, while being sensitive to situational differences. In both countries there is a dominant neoliberal economic strategy with negative effects on many young people alongside marginalisation of their concerns within the political sphere. In both there are moral panics about the perceived youth negative tendencies towards drug use, violence, and 'extremism'. However beyond that there is a much stronger interventionist state approach to youth and a more pronounced repressive dimension in Russia. However, the shift to a 'repressive tendency' to youth can be discerned in both societies, particularly to groups seen as 'problematic' e.g. 'rioters', young Muslims, protesters, student activists etc. The difference lies perhaps in the way that dominant discourses in the UK seek to temper the concerns with at least formal acknowledgement to civil liberties leading to tensions between these and growing repression, whereas in Russia the state is more centrally interventionist in terms of conservative nationalist discourses under the banner of the 'great Russia' and the 'normal citizen' model of the traditional marriage with three children, alongside a homophobic intolerance. These involve both 'soft control' school programmes, media propaganda, pro-Kremlim youth camps and fostering of 'movements' such as Nashi and 'hard' repressive measures. In the UK there has never been a coordinated youth policy and the meagre state support for youth services (soft social control) is being rapidly abandoned in an age of austerity with a more singular reliance on 'hard' or repressive measures which seek to contain and deter. In both countries policy is driven by fears of the disaffection of the both the underclass and middle class 'educated' youth, especially if they show signs of linking together. In Russia policy arguably driven by concerns to prevent an imitation of the 'colour' revolutions in Georgia and the Ukraine which are seen as primarily generated by external US encouragement.

We will also examine the extent to which young people in the MYPLACE research perceived these issues, again looking for common threads and situational differences, e.g. economic challenges to emerging adulthood, lack of trust in political institutions, closing down of political spaces, etc. We will examine the extent to which young people are aware of official state discourses, and echo, resist or oppose them, seeking to place these ideas within their personal narratives and everyday lives. We will examine the extent to which patriotic discourses might figure among some sections of youth in ways that might foster backward-looking authoritarian ideologies hostile to 'the other'. While we will eschew simplistic policy responses, we will argue that policy makers need to listen more to the disparate voices emerging from youth, provide less controlling support, address the material concerns that may underlie them, and see the conflict of young people with their host societies as having potentials for social and political renewal.

Panel 3 -Engaged scepticism?: Political trust and activism

Between scepticism and support: a cross-country analysis of young people's attitudes towards Europe *(Mark Ellison, Marius Guderjan, Gary Pollock, Robert Grimm)*

Euroscepticism is a persistent phenomenon that has been gathering support during the last two decades (Usherwood and Startin 2013). The European sovereign debt crisis and austerity policies have further undermined public support for the European Union and the single currency. Negative sentiment towards Europe is not equally distributed throughout Europe such that attitudes towards the EU must be understood within national political, cultural and historic contexts (Hartleb 2011). Some literature suggests that support for European integration is largely driven by utilitarian rational choice and the question of what individuals or nations can gain through membership in the EU (Hix 2007). If so, attitudes toward the EU may fundamentally differ between established European democracies, new member states and countries seeking EU membership.

Across the EU, populist radical right anti-establishment parties gained substantial electoral support with 'hard Eurosceptic' programmes (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002) during the 2014 European Parliament elections. Euroscepticism is often used interchangeably with right-wing populism and it appears plausible that a strong opposition to European integration is a pan-European characteristic of the radical right (Hartleb 2011). Others (Mudde 2013) have questioned the link between populist radical right parties and Euroscepticism. While according to Mair (2007), Euroscepticism is closely linked with cynicism towards national institutions and modes of governance. The declining significance of democratic institutions and processes is part of a general depoliticisation that is characteristic for most Western democracies. Lack of opposition may either result in withdrawal from participation or a mobilization against the polity in form of opposition of principle (Mair 2007).

This paper is based on survey data from the MYPLACE research project which involved young people aged 16-25 in 30 locations across 14 European countries. Using survey measures of interest in issues to do with Europe and interest in the European Union, trust in the European Commission as well as the importance and benefits from membership in the European Union we firstly explore the fluidity of positions towards Europe among the respondents. Secondly, we explore the variation in attitudes towards the EU within the broader economic and political contexts of the specific locations where the survey data was collected in order to identify clusters which reflect these circumstances. Finally we test the hypothesis that there is an association between general satisfaction with democracy, trust in national political institutions and attitudes towards Europe.

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Political trust and protest activity - different contexts – different patterns *(Klaus Levinsen and Carsten Yndigegn)*

This paper explores the relationship between trust in political institutions and political protest among young people in different European contexts. Political distrust and disaffection with democracy is usually seen as significant predictors of individuals' engagement in political protest activities. However, according to the recent literature various forms of protest activities are also becoming more widespread and seen as part of a "normalized" and extended political action repertoire – especially among the younger generations. Based on survey data gathered as part of the FP7 MYPLACE project in six areas in three different European countries: Spain, United Kingdom and Denmark, we explore the relationship between trust in political institutions and political protest. Our preliminary results suggest that there are different patterns of protest behavior among young people (age 16-25) across these local and national contexts. In Spain we find a significant negative association between political trust and political protest, indicating that distrust and disaffection with the established political system is one of the major factors explaining young people's engagement in political protest. In contrast however, we find a positive association in Denmark, suggesting that young protesters have slightly higher levels of trust than the politically disengaged. Therefore, we believe that sociological understandings of protest behavior should take into account levels of economic and social deprivation and contextual factors such as political culture and the responsiveness of politicians and political institutions.

Panel 4: Forms of youth activism

Internet activism *(Airi-Alina Allaste and Marti Taru)*

Youth activism today is partly perceived to have transitioned into spheres of everyday activity that have previously not been considered 'political' in the conventional sense of the term. In this paper, we go in a way back to Carol Hanish's statement from the 70s and claim that personal is political, by using the contemporary approaches such as *everyday maker* and *subactivism*. The Internet facilitates communication and enables easy access to information, so personal matters, interest and beliefs are more easily connected to making sense of society and politics. On the other hand, recent debate about social participation on the Internet asks if it should be seen as virtual activism or rather *slactivism*, perceived as behaviour that makes activists feel good rather than addresses political matters and the decreasing level of (offline) participation. However, the key challenge here is how the participation is defined.

An in-depth micro-level analysis is based mostly on interviews with young people from Estonia, contextualised with data from other European countries according to MYPLACE survey. Compared to Western European countries, especially neighboring Finland and Denmark, young people in Estonia tend to be less active both in conventional participation and intentional grassroots activism. While in Finland 73% and Denmark 87% of young people belong to some organization, in Estonia the corresponding percentage in 58% which is closer to neighbouring Eastern-European countries (50% in Russia and 40% Latvia). According to MYPLACE survey in Estonia the number of young people who spend time in internet is relatively higher than in neighboring countries – while organizational and conventional activism was lower than in other countries, the online activism was roughly on the same level. On the other hand, efficacy of distributing political messages on social media sites to influence politics was rated rather low. While in Denmark 44% consider using social media sites to be effiective and in Finland 32%, in Estonia the respective figure is 24%. However, our claim here is that it is possible to interpret signing petitions, sharing, commenting or 'liking' as participating in public life and talking about politics as an *expressive participatory* act in itself. That topic should not be defined only in terms of which kind of effect Internet activity has on political participation with successful goals. It is part of diversification of how citizens take part in political matters, and this applies especially in the case of Estonia, where civic engagement has been low and 'activism' has had negative image, and where everyday social participation engages new people.

Youth, religion and socio-political engagement *(Alexandros Sakelleriou, Alexandra Koranaiou)*

Some would probably argue that young people tend to be less and less religious in contemporary globalised Western societies. In fact, maybe this is accurate if we take under consideration recent surveys and studies showing that young people are not very religious or at least that they are not religious in the traditional meaning of the term. However, and despite any contradictory data, a great part of young people in Europe still practice their religious duties and consider themselves as members of a religion, not to mention that due

to the newcomer Muslim population religion returned to the public domain in many ways. In addition, it is usually argued that young people are passive and not interested in socio-political engagement. But is this actually the case? This paper is based on the findings of the large scale research project MYPLACE-Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement, funded by the European Commission with the participation of 16 partners from 14 countries. Among qualitative and quantitative studies within the project a special attention was paid to specific religion-based groups in 5 of the participating countries. These ethnographic studies took place in each country (Latvia - 2 cases, Slovakia, Greece, Portugal and Georgia) and include almost all major religions (Christianity-Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, Islam and Buddhism). The studies were based on participant observation and semi-structured interviews, as well as on the analysis of secondary sources (e.g. internet material, publications, etc.). The purpose of this paper is to present the findings from the ethnographic case-studies following a meta-level of analysis and trying to cluster possible similarities and differences of young people who are members of religion-based groups and organisations in five European countries of different types and religious backgrounds. The main questions that are going to be answered based on the existing data are: Are young people of religion-based organisations active? What are the types of their socio-political engagement and activism? How do young people inhabit, interpret and own their organisation? How do young people understand and experience their own activism? What are young activists' perceptions of politics and the political? How are young people's activism, attitudes and everyday lives shaped by the past and the present? How are young people's activism, attitudes and everyday lives shaped by their religious convictions? Having in mind that it is not easy and proper to make generalisations based on small case studies, however, it seems important to find out if and in what way contemporary European youth participate in socio-political activities, which was one of the main themes of the MYPLACE project.

Panel 5: Austerity and the rebirth of politics

No Way Out of the Labyrinth *(Mick Carpenter, Marti Taru, Lorenza Antonucci)*

In this paper we build on previous theorizing (2 previous MYPLACE Papers by Marti and Mick) to explore the implications for policy of the increasing blockage of routes to 'adulthood' in an age of austerity, working from cross-national MYPLACE evidence as well as the wider literature. It is clear that the background of increasing austerity, though varying across MYPLACE countries, and across social groups within MYPLACE countries and locations, is a strong 'generative mechanism' shaping the political responses of young people, alongside national and European structures that 'block' young people's political expression. This is set against an imagined past where things were assumed to have been better, leading to what young people in MYPLACE findings often characterise as a 'depressing present' which thus might also be arguably seen as a 'theft of the future'. We develop an argument that we hope might be an introductory essay to a MYPLACE 'Special Issue' in a leading journal.

The dominant tendency within youth studies has until recently emphasized a more prolonged transition for many young people due to a variety of reasons that for: (a) middle class youth is linked to prolonged participation in higher education and debt accumulation, and for (b) marginalised youth without qualifications (so-called NEETS) is more linked to the increased exclusion or precarity in a neoliberal service-based economy, and additionally (c) Some young people are also said to be rejecting previous 'models' of adulthood, deliberately delaying assumption of (gendered) adult responsibilities, sometimes 'condemned' for an 'amoral' tendency, e.g. by Smith et al *Lost in Transition: The Dark Side of Emerging Adulthood*). However in a period when the economy was buoyant transition could be portrayed as a longer tunnel from which most emerged, increasing the situation of many youth might be better characterized as a 'labyrinth' from which, structurally speaking, whatever their best efforts, many will find it very difficult to escape, trapped more or less permanently within 'emerging adulthood'.

Many of the concerns of the European Union focus on youth unemployment and the flagship policy often chosen is a 'job guarantee' scheme. However this cannot be effective unless linked to a wider set of policies that shift away from a neoliberal trajectory, to challenge the increasing precarity of the labour market that particularly impacts on young people. The trend towards growing precarity   is something spreading from the bottom 'middlewards'.   The current situation at a European level is one of permanent austerity and limited democracy overseen by European institutions. In this situation the 'political disconnect' that MYPLACE found in many countries is very relevant, associated with disillusion with current institutionally entrenched forms of parliamentary democracy. In many developing countries discontent by young people (e.g. the Arab Spring) has arguably partly resulted from 'denied adulthood'. While youth are not the only discontented group affected by national and European level economic and political 'blockages', we argue that the implications of MYPLACE findings are that there needs to be a radical renewal of economic and political structures at local, national and European levels in which the 'youth dimension' is given central rather than peripheral consideration.

Youth, History and Crisis of Democracy: Perspectives from Croatia *(Ben Perasovic, Marko Mustapic and Renata Franc)*

Croatia is the youngest member of the EU, its past is marked by totalitarian legacy, the Homeland war (1991-1995) and painful process of transition. Low political participation, dissatisfaction with the political class and ambivalent attitudes to democracy are characteristics of most of the countries within the MYPLACE project; this paper explores relations, attitudes, responses and various positions of Croatian youth under specific political and historic legacy, in the present time of crisis, protests and new social actors. We analysed the whole spectrum of young people's reactions, from passivity to several forms of (anti)political action.

Our approach is based on the triangulation of data from the survey sample (N=1217 at two locations), the follow up semi-structured interviews with volunteers from the survey (N=61 at two locations), and the three conducted ethnographies (football fans as social actors, anti-fascist punk activism and student movement against commercialisation of education). On the basis of the survey data, we've identified three groups of young people regarding their relation toward democratic and non-democratic political systems: 'pro-democratic', 'anti-democratic' and 'without preferences'. We focused on differences between those groups with regard to socio-demographic characteristics, political sophistication, political attitudes (trust in institutions, attitudes toward politicians, satisfaction with democracy, political efficacy, approval of violence), history (interest in history, importance of commemorations, family transmissions) and war related losses. Although one part of the respondents showed no preferences for democratic or anti-democratic systems, the other two groups showed predictable logic and consistency in analysed attitudes. Interestingly, there is no difference between the groups according to their self-placement on the left-right scale. We found similar patterns in the qualitative data collected in the semi-structured interviews. Various statements of the respondents vividly illustrated tendencies already noticed in the survey data; from those without any interest in history or politics, to those manifesting several types of articulation of interest in history or politics. The traditional political notions of left wing and right wing definitely lost their validity (if not their meaning entirely) for our respondents, partly because most of them do not think or act according to those terms. Liberal – conservative dichotomy worked a bit better, but only in some cases. Influence and impact of family background is obvious for one part of the interviewed respondents; it is also supported by the survey data where those respondents with articulated attitude toward democracy (either 'pro' or 'anti') talk significantly more with their parents and grandparents than those respondents with no preferences regarding (non)democratic system. The interviews also show very low interest in (and knowledge of) history, although many respondents are aware that our past shapes our present and consider The Homeland War to be the most important and crucial event in the history of Croatia. The most widespread attitudes among our respondents are dissatisfaction with politics and the notion that all politicians belong to the same (corrupted) class. Even though those attitudes are shared by most of the participants in the three ethnographies, the latter, as opposed to the participants of the survey and the interviews, show more active attitude – i.e., suggest the rise of new social actors. The antifascist punk scene is a good example of subcultural scene with strong political (antifascist) orientation; importance of history is mediated through antagonistic relation to the 'other side'. Torcida (football fans of Hajduk

FC) is also a subcultural actor; they emphasise importance of history in a different, patriotic way, at the same time (unlike the antifa punks) succeeding in mobilising thousands of people in the struggle against the Croatian Football Federation. The core of the students' movement for free education also succeeded in mobilising thousands of people in the struggle against commercialisation of education, at the same time providing the social space for the 'new left', offering alternatives to the crisis of the representative type of democracy. While the antifa punks and the 'new left' reaffirmed the classical notions of left and right, Torcida (despite the self-placement of some respondents and the usual labels in the media) represents new actors on a social stage – those for whom the notions of left and right are neither valid nor sufficient.

Panel 6: History, engagement and ideology

Does history matter for young people's political engagement? Assessing the impact of past authoritarianism on young people's political identity and participation in Germany and Spain *(Britta Busse, Mariona Ferrer-Fons, Robert Grimm, Alexandra Hashem-Wangler, Jochen Tholen and Kevin Wolnik)*

The impact of national history on subsequent generations has been demonstrated repeatedly (e.g. Langenbacher, 2010; Müller, 2009) and is one of the focal points of the MYPLACE project. Particularly traumatic experiences like military conflicts and civil wars or totalitarianism influence collective identities (Alexander et al., 2004). Coming to terms with the past and reformulating a new progressive national identity that acknowledges but also differentiates present and future from past experience is always challenging. Moreover, different generations – those who lived through historical events and following generations who's knowledge of the past has been mediated through family narratives and official discourses - engage with the past in their own ways (Jozwiak & Mermann, 2006).

This paper explores if and how young people's views, political identities and engagement continue to be shaped by historic legacies and collective memories in Germany and Spain. On the one hand, the Third Reich and the Second World War are the most traumatizing periods in recent European history. They are also the pivotal points of reference for post war German state identity and West German democracy (Wittinger, 2010). Nearly 70 years after the demise of German fascism what legacy does this period have among young Germans? For East Germans, democracy only began in 1990 and twenty-five years after the fall of the Iron Curtain the memory of socialism is still fresh and ambiguous. In this article, we highlight how young East Germans who have been born after re-unification position themselves vis a vis socialism and whether their political identities continue to be shaped by it.

On the other hand, Spain (and Catalonia, in particular, as MYPLACE fieldwork focus on this region) is another study case with a difficult history. Spain experienced a traumatic Civil War (1936-1939), and a fascist regime (Franco Regime, 1939-1975), the last one similar to Germany. However, the transition to democracy did not make a clear break with the authoritarian regime. The memory of the Civil War and Francoism in Spain is conditioned in a certain way by how the political transition to democracy took place. One of the consequences of that is the underdevelopment of active memory policies in Spain. Nowadays, in a context of a heavy economic recession, political corruption and a high level of distrust towards political elites and institutions, the interpretation of Transition period as a successful past is being heavily contested among an important part of the population (youth generations, in particular). This makes an important difference with the German case, where active memory policies have been developed after the Second World War.

Against this the backdrop of the common experience of authoritarianism, we explore young people's perception of history and its influence on their attitudes towards politics and their civic and political engagement. Consequently, we emphasize similarities as well as differences between the three cases of Spain, East and West Germany. Empirically, the

paper is based on quantitative survey data (WP4), semi structured interviews (done to young people and experts) and intergenerational interviews (WP2 and WP5).

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Left or right... or maybe not? Exploring young people's subjective ideological positions in relation to actual attitudes *(Inta Mieriņa and Ilze Koroļeva)*

The subjective self-placement on the left-right political ideology scale is routinely used by social scientists to explore or illustrate popular attitudes. Yet, how well is this vague concept able to describe the complex attitudes of nowadays' youth? And what does it mean to young people themselves? Talking about parties, the *Manifesto* project positions them on the left-right scale based on their stance on two dimensions: values and economy. The *Chapel-Hill* experts use the grid-group framework, i.e., the position on i) social lifestyle (e.g. homosexuality) and ii) towards ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, using *Manifesto* data, Tavits and Letki (2009, APSR) have shown that leftist and rightist parties do not always act in accordance with what is commonly understood with the respective ideology. In this paper, using a new comparative dataset of 14 European countries, we demonstrate that a similar conclusion can be made as regards to individuals' self-placement on the left-right scale. First, young people in Europe, particularly East-Central Europe, often find it difficult to describe themselves in such terms. Second, analysis of self-placement on the left-right scale in relation to attitudes traditionally associated with right-wing views (attitudes towards minorities and imigrants, social conservatism, economic preferences) reveals that self-perceived political positions can mean different things to different people, and is not at all clear cut. Finally, we classify political parties in the 14 countries according to grid-group theoretical framewok by Douglas, and analyze which values and attitudes, if any, are linked to support for these parties. The analysis not only broadens our understanding of that being 'left' or 'right' means nowadays, but poses a broader question of the validity of this concept altogether.

Panel 7: Meanings of Activism

One big family? *(Elena Omel'chenko, Ben Perasovic and Hilary Pilkington)*

It is widely recognised that young people receptive to 'extreme right' ideologies are more likely to be active in social movement organisations or subcultural formations than in formally structured political parties, not least because they are disinclined to participate in formal political activities per se. However, there are few empirical studies that transcend the divide between political science studies of far right supporters and voters and sociological studies of, for example, racist skinhead or football hooligan groups, that consider the physical and emotional dimensions of support and participation.

This paper attempts to do this by exploring the meanings attached to activism among young people participating in 'radical right and patriotic' movements across Europe based on the analysis of ethnographic cases of nine such organisations in eight countries of Europe undertaken for the MYPLACE project (http://www.fp7-myplace.eu/). These cases include classic parties of the extreme and populist radical right such as Golden Dawn and The Finns but also a wide range of movements and forms of activism including nationalist and anti-Islamist social movements, patriotic cultural institutions, football fan organisations and anti-immigration discussion groups. Data are drawn from across the nine studies but particular attention is paid to three cases: Russian Run (Russia); Torcida (Croatia); and the English Defence League (UK). These three movements occupy the conceptual borderland noted above, displaying as they do classic subcultural characteristics in terms of their cultural practices (chanting, singing and music, ritual, use of symbols) as well as identifying to a greater (EDL) or lesser (Torcida) extent with classic tenets of extreme right ideology (anti-immigrant, anti-Islam, nationalist and ultra-patriotic views).

The paper argues that the rehabilitation of the notion of 'emotions' in social movement theory is a good starting point for understanding the meanings attached to activism in movements of the patriotic and radical right. It suggests also, however, that value can be derived from considering the theoretical tradition of 'subculture' and in particular recent work that highlights the centrality of affective bonds to youth cultural practices. This subcultural angle, it is suggested, may help us understand the affective ties and sense of 'family' as well as the complex relationship between activism and politics evident among these groups. The empirical findings explore the significance of emotions in the meanings of activism for the young people captured in this research through a discussion of two core concepts emerging from the cross-case synthesis: the 'buzz' of participation (at demonstrations, mass jogging events, matches); and the warmth, solidarity and sense of belonging to a 'family' that participation generates.

Feminist activism in the context of economic crisis and neo-liberalism *(Nickie Charles, Khursheed Wadia, Mariona Ferrer and Airi-Alina Allaste)*

In recent years there has been an upsurge in feminist and gender-based activism across Europe in response to the cultural and economic practices of neo-liberalism and, in particular, austerity measures resulting from the economic crisis. In Western Europe this upsurge has led to claims that a third or even fourth wave of feminism is in evidence. The wave metaphor is derived from social movement theory and refers to periods of intense social movement activity interspersed by periods when movements go into 'abeyance' and activities continue but in less spectacular, more institutionally-based forms (Tarrow 1994; Bagguley 2002; Mann and Hoffman, 2005). Its application to feminist activism is, however, contentious and has been criticised for being ethnocentric and overlooking the varying temporality of feminist movements in different parts of the world (Woodhull, 2003; McKay,

2011). Moreover, the term 'third wave feminism' is culturally specific: it was coined by black, U.S. feminists to distinguish their own feminism from both post-feminism and second wave feminism (Springer, 2002).

Commentators in the UK have hailed the current upsurge of feminist activism as a fourth wave distinguishable from its predecessors by its basis in digital culture (Cochrane, 2013; Munro, 2013; Knappe and Lang, 2004). It is argued that digital culture and the technological basis of contemporary social movements are creating new repertoires of action (Funke and Wolfson, 2014). In this paper we investigate whether this understanding of feminist and gender-based activism is relevant in different socio-political contexts by drawing on ethnographic studies of three organisations mobilising on issues of gender and sexuality - UK Feminista (UK), Feminist Indignants (Spain) and the LGBT movement (Estonia). We explore the extent to which new repertoires of action distinguish contemporary feminist and gender-based activism from earlier 'waves'; the importance of affect in feminist and gender-based activism as both a vehicle of action and an element of collective identity formation; and the importance of a collective feminist identity for young people's gender-based activism.

The case studies provide evidence that although social media, affect and feminist identities are vital to movement mobilisation in all three countries, repertoires of action and the issues that are prioritised differ. For young women in the Estonian LGBT movement identifying as lesbian and feminist is important and their political practice takes cultural forms with demands for recognition being expressed in artistic and intellectual arenas. Lesbian and feminist friendships and emotional ties cement solidarity within movement networks and contribute to the creation of a community of interests. In Spain Feminist Indignants have incorporated innovative features into their activism and organisation such as creative performances, online and offline protest actions, a philosophy of care among themselves and various mechanisms to encourage a plurality of voices. In the UK, UK Feminista is engaged in cultural politics, takes 'lad' culture as one of its targets, social media are central to its mobilisation strategies and passion and rage are integral both to mobilisation and to 'coming out' as feminist.

We conclude by drawing out the implications of our findings for understanding the temporality of feminist activism in terms of waves.
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Panel 8: Political heritage and socialisation

Mnemonic socialisation and intergenerational production of political heritage: perspectives from Britain, Russia and Spain *(Anton Popov, Elena Omel'chenko, Guzel Sabirova, Mariona Ferrer)*

The paper puts forward the argument that 'political heritage' needs to be interrogated in a similar way as cultural and or historical heritage that represent the field for contesting meanings of identity and power relationships in society. Heritage studies demonstrate that cultural and historical importance of heritage sites have become battle grounds for struggle over representation and re-negotiation of meanings of national identities. In a similar vein, political socialisation is not just a matter of transmission the views, values, ideas and practices from the older to younger generations but rather re-evaluation and re-interpretation of what is seen as national political heritage. This process is closely linked with mnemonic socialisation and is part of what Boyarin defines as 'politics of memory'. Drawing on intergenerational interviews with family members in Russia, Spain and Britain, the paper puts forward the argument that whereas political socialisation is ultimately context-dependent with both the national past and present socio-economic concerns (there three case studies are selected partly to exemplify these contextual differences), there are common aspects in how political heritage is transmitted, re-assessed, re-define and effectively re-produced intergenerationally across three countries. Family mnemonic culture plays central role in this process: remembrance and deliberation always frame the context of political socialization that is the act of receiving, enforcing, or reshaping ones political views. Nevertheless, our findings demonstrate that family memories rarely directly influence political participation; rather they are indicative of ideological and political socialisation processes that occur between family members and their wider societal circles. Sometimes, however, young people engage with family memories through borrowing symbols representing the past as they are more accessible and easier to relate to. These symbols (and ideas) are clichéd, adapted and adjusted to fit a contemporary political context. Finally, our research demonstrates that political views or even activism are not necessarily transmitted unidirectionally from older generations to younger ones. While young people co-produce the meanings of the past in the course of family mnemonic socialisation, older generations of respondents might re-interpret the political ideas and discourses they socialised in during their youth to accommodate the views of their children or grandchildren. In some situations, the political activities of young people might even lead to their parents becoming more involved with political issues that concern their children. In such contexts parents learn about the political values or patterns of engagement of their children. Thus political socialisation in the family has to be seen as a multi-dimensional process that implies that young people can also act as initiators of intergenerational transmission of political heritage.

Historical memory and its transmission in families *(Tamar Khoshtaria, Mariam Kobaladze, Natia Mestvirishvili and Tinatin Zurabishvili)*

Georgians usually attach high importance to ancient traditions and habits, and claim the history should be well remembered and old traditions should be followed. In this paper, we will analyze MYPLACE empirical data on historical memory with a two-fold goal: (1) to find

out to what extent does the reported importance of history translate into young people's actions that demonstrate such an importance on a behavioral level, and (2) to see whether the findings of three different MYPLACE work packages (WP2, WP4 and WP5) are in line, or contradict with each other.

The paper will compare data of qualitative (WP2, WP5) and quantitative (WP4) empirical work packages and draw possible parallels between the findings. While WP2 was specifically focused on transmission of historical memory in the families, WP4 and WP5 covered broader range of young people's lives. Geographically, we will focus on one of MYPLACE survey locations, a small historical town of Telavi with a population up to 20 000 and little ethnic diversity.

The main cross-work package themes and findings will focus on:
1. The importance of history and its transmission within families, with particular emphasis on the 'difficult past' and the 'good old days,'
2. The state-initiated "rehabilitation project" of the historical center of Telavi.

Among events of the 'difficult past,' the paper will explore the events that are named by the respondents of all work packages as the most important events of the recent past. These are the wars in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (1991-1993) and the loss of territories; the civil war in Tbilisi (1991-1992) and the *Mkhedrioni* militarized group; severe economic crisis through the 1990s; the 2008 war with Russia; and undemocratic rule of the United National Movement after 2007.

As for the 'good old days,' the paper will explore the events that are remembered positively by the respondents. These events include the independence of Georgia in 1991; the 2003 Rose Revolution; and the 2012 parliamentary elections.

The paper will also discuss the attitude of Telavi youth regarding the rehabilitation project, a large-scale reconstruction project, when about 70 historical buildings were renovated. Some applauded this reconstruction project, complaining about it being stopped under the new government and insisting that Telavi's progress and development must continue. Others, however, were not pleased with renovation and stated that some things should have been left untouched.

Findings of all MYPLACE work packages suggest that the interest in history is pretty high among Telavi youth. In respondents' opinion, knowing and remembering history helps to prevent mistakes in the present and future, as past mistakes should not be repeated. Therefore, both – positive and negative – events of the past should be remembered.