its rules. Archbishop Stadler, at the end of July 1909, founded another organization for Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croat Catholics, which he called Hrvatska katolička udruža (Croat Catholic Association). With this action, of course, the division among Catholic Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina only deepened.

Summary

Pilar came to Bosnia immediately after completing his studies of law in various European metropolises at a very crucial moment for its Croat Catholics, just at the time that their organized predominantly cultural activity under the leadership of Archbishop Stadler had an opportunity to develop into organized political work. But the newly elected, non-clerical leadership denied any value to their predecessor’s efforts, even holding Archbishop Stadler personally responsible for all of their setbacks, and concentrating of their political work on the winning over of Muslims to the side of the Catholics Croats. The leadership thought that to do this it was sufficient to use affirmative rhetoric and to suppress fully the religious features of Catholic members. With this kind of attitude in sway, it favoured an even more pronounced, open and aggressive anti-Catholic propaganda which was imported from Banian Croatia, and its direct target was the Archbishop of Vrhbosna, Dr. Josip Stadler. Since Pilar was young, he was sympathetic to this kind of propaganda, though he was also influenced by the political and ideological outlook of his elders. Stadler, on the other hand, judged that neither the desired goals nor any great advantage could be won with these kinds of methods, especially by the Catholics. In a society that was strictly divided on the basis of religion, it seems that Stadler’s judgment was more realistic. In any case, the result of these kinds of ideological and political confrontations was disunity and an even lesser efficacy on the part of the Croat Catholics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pilar contributed to this disunity in good measure. Yet, in contrast to others, with the passing of time Pilar became vividly aware of the real political situation of the Croats and at the next critical juncture was wholly in agreement with Archbishop Stadler. I do not know if this can be taken as a sign of genius and self-respect, but I am sure that with this he decided his own fate of being consigned to age-long silence.

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4455Ibid., p. 288. The author is relying on the Archive of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its cultural-historical collection, File IX.

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On the basis of scholarly literature, archival materials and available newspapers from the period, the author reconstructs the political activities of Dr. Ivo Pilar during the final years of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy’s existence. Pilar thought the “South Slav Question” should be solved in “Croatian terms,” that is to say the unification of all Croatian lands — Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina — in one independent administrative area contained within the existing dualistic system. Even though he formally remained within the framework of dualism, he was, in fact, advocating a solution which in its main outlines was a form of “veiled trialism.” The Hungarian politicians’ rejection of a solution of the “South Slav Question” in “Croatian terms,” that is, their attempt to attach Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Hungarian part of the Monarchy as a “corpus separatum”, caused additional dissatisfaction and deepened the already serious crisis into which the Monarchy had fallen. Recognizing that one of the consequences of the World War was going to be the irreversible disappearance of the time-honoured Habsburg state from Central European political stage, Pilar radicalized his position in terms of its internal reform, proposing that it be transformed — into a federation.

“Die habsburgische Monarchie steht im Süden vor schicksalsschweren Entscheidungen. Wer klar sieht, muss mit sich im Reinen sein, dass die Monarchie die strikte Wahl hat: entweder sofort ein Königreich Kroatiien mit ihr oder nach einigen Dezenien ein Königreich Grossserbien gegen sie”.

Ivo PILAR, “Das südslavische Problem im Habsburgerreich”, Kroatische Rundschau, Zagreb, 1/1918, no. 9, S. 124.

After the arrangement of the Austro-Hungarian Agreement of 1867, the Habsburg Monarchy was divided into an Austrian (Cisleithanian) part and a Hungarian (Transleithanian) part. According to the terms of the new constitutional framework, Dalmatia and the Croatian part of Istria, along with the Slovenian lands, entered the Austrian part of the Monarchy, while Banian Croatia, together with Vojvodina, the...

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The question of the status of the port city of Rijeka was solved by means of the “Rijeka scrap” to the advantage of Hungary, which the Croatian Sabor never accepted. The Croat-Hungarian Agreement erected a relatively long-lived constitutional system for Civil Croatia and established a stable and comparatively broad institutional framework for Croatian autonomy. Despite the many limitations that arose from the Agreement, it nevertheless enabled, by means of an autonomous legislature, a modernization of the by then largely antiquated Croatian institutions of government to take place.

On the basis of the decisions taken at the Berlin Congress (1878), the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy obtained the right to “occupy” Bosnia and Hercegovina, which were under the suzerainty of the Turkish Sultan. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was carried out by Imperial decree on 5 October 1908. The newly acquired territory, which was given the status of a co-domain, was administered by the joint Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Finance (1912-1918).

**Pilar and Stadler’s “Memorandum” to Pope Benedict XV (January 1915)**

The ominous shots fired in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, from the gun of the youthful Serbian assassin Gavrilo Princip marked a new chapter in the history of humanity. They were, indeed, the spark that set off the First World War (1914-1918). In this war, the largest in the history of humankind up to that time, four empires disappeared: the German, the Russian, the Austrian, and the Turkish.

After the start of the war, the Kingdom of Italy, the unreliable member of the Central Powers, remained temporarily neutral. The Archbishop of Vrhbosna (Sarajevo), Dr. Joseph Stadler, known as an individual favourable to the Frank’s (Pure) Party of (Croat State) Right orientation in terms of a solution to the situation of the Croatian lands within the borders of the Monarchy, had trustworthy information about the attempt of the Entente powers, that is Great Britain, France, and Russia, to win Italy over to enter the war on their side. Worried that the realization of this plan might change the balance of power between the two warring camps and lead to the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, on January 28, 1915 he sent Pope Benedict XV a “Memorandum” requesting him to use his influence toward preserving Italy’s neutrality in the world conflict. In the “Memorandum”, Archbishop Stadler stated that by directly appealing to the head of the Catholic Church he was

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not really going beyond his spiritual duties and entering into the political sphere, because, in his opinion, the preservation of the Monarchy as a state was very closely tied to the continued existence of Catholicism on its south eastern frontiers. Even if Archbishop Stadler composed and signed the “Memorandum”, its content was inspired by Dr. Ivo Pilar, Stadler’s onetime bitter political opponent. In his private letter to Dr. Pilar, Stadler said: “You would be pleased with me, because I wrote in your terms generally and sent it to a prominent personage”, i.e., Pope Benedict XV. The day before Stadler sent his “Memorandum” to the Pope, Dr. Pilar wrote a letter to the Archbishop of Zagreb, Dr. Antun Bauer, asking him to intercede with the Holy See to keep Italy neutral.

The Holy See supported the preservation of the Monarchy, because the Habsburg State was the largest Catholic state in Europe at the time, and this alone made it potentially the most reliable ally of the Papal state in the complex international relations of the early 20th century. Pope Benedict XV threw his considerable diplomatic influence behind the attempt to prevent Italy’s entering the war on the side of the Entente. In fact, he encouraged the Monarchy’s leaders to concede territory to its insatiable Adriatic neighbour. Negotiations between the two states were terminated the moment the Entente powers, under the terms of the secret London Treaties of April 26, 1915, guaranteed Italy far greater territorial concessions than the Habsburg State was prepared to make. The untrustworthy ally became a bitter enemy in the battlefield.

Pilar’s “Memorandum” to Archbishop Stadler (July 1917)

During the last two years of the World War I, Dr. Ivo Pilar made many attempts to find an optimal solution to the burning “South Slav Question”, that is the Croatian question, within the confines of the dualistic structure of the Monarchy and thereby guarantee its survival as a European great power in the Danubian basin and on the Balkan peninsula. After the death of Emperor and King Joseph I in December 1916, who had sat on the throne since 1848, Slovene, Serb, Croatian and Muslim (Bosnian) politicians began directing their politics toward demanding the greatest degree of independence possible for their lands, which in constitutional terms were divided between the two halves of the Habsburg state. They based their claims on “national principles,” that is, “the right to national self-determination” and “Croatian state right”. These two principles were emphasized by the members of the Yugoslav Club at the Imperial Council in Vienna, the parliament of the Austrian half of the Monarchy, and in the “May Declaration” (1917). The cryptically formulated “Declaration” could potentially be interpreted in many ways. To some, it was seen as the work of the Viennese court and an attempt at a “trialistic solution” to the “South Slav Question” within the Monarchy’s borders; for others, it was a matter of “necessary political tactics” in the conditions of war, which enabled the promotion of “Yugoslav ideas” and the “creation of a common state for all Yugoslav peoples,” besides the Bulgars, outside the Monarchy’s borders.

Among the first to realize that the “May Declaration” and its proponents had as their ultimate goal the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the creation of an independent Yugoslav state, Dr. Pilar handed Archbishop Stadler his “Memorandum on the Solution of the South Slav Question” (“Denkschrift über die südslawischen Frage”). Analyzing the geo-political situation and relating it to the “South Slav Question”, Pilar proposed, as the ”optimal solution,” the “unification of the South Slavic regions into one single administrative area” which would include: Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Hercegovina, Istria, Carniola, southern Styria to the Drava river, Gorica and Gradiška. For Trieste he envisioned a form of special status, by which this port would be directly subordinated to state authority. In this “Memorandum”, he showed particular concern for the future of Bosnia and Hercegovina. In Pilar’s view, Serbian politicians had succeeded in misusing the idea of “national unity” [narodno jedinstvo] of Serbs and Croats in the interests of their own expansionist politics: “If the Serbs and Croats are one people then it logically follows from this that the Serbs, on the basis of national principles, have the right to strive toward the unification of all South Slavic lands into one Great Serbian state.” Further, he believed that the United States of America, with President Wilson at its head, had accepted the idea that Bosnia and Hercegovina “must be torn” from the sphere of the Monarchy and on the basis of the nationality principle “turned over” to Serbia. Supposing that the unification of all the South Slavic lands of the Monarchy might lead to insurmountable problems, Pilar proposed a “minimal solution,” that is, the “unification of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, [and] Bosnia and Hercegovina.” This constitutional entity, in his opinion, had “the national, geopolitical, and economic preconditions for successful development”. Without the realization of at least this “minimal solution” it was impossible, argued Pilar, to find any solution to
The “Memorandum” of Stadler-Pilar political circle to Emperor Charles
(August 1917)

Concern for the survival of the Monarchy and the future of the Croat people who
had lived within its borders for centuries induced Archbishop Stadler and Dr. Pilar
into concrete political action. For this reason, the “Memorandum on the solution to
the South Slav Question” (“Promemoria über die Lösung der sdslawischen Frage”) to
Emperor and King Charles I (IV) was composed.

This “Memorandum”, which usually is called by Stadler’s or Pilar’s name, begins
with the assertion that in the period from the promulgation of the Austro-Hungarian
Agreement to the outbreak of the First World War the “South Slav Question” was,
for the Monarchy, the “most pressing aspect of the Eastern Question”, which affect-
ed the internal political life of the state in a “disastrous way.” Assuming that the
Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary) would achieve a military victory
over the Entente Powers and their allies, the author of the “Memorandum” did not
believe that this would lead to important changes which would reduce tensions and
enable the establishment of lasting peace in the international relations of the Euro-
pean continent. For this very reason, the moment had certainly arrived in which the
Monarchy, out of “a commitment to itself”, had to deal with the “South Slav Quest
on” in order that it “cease to be the Achilles heel of the whole state.”

The author of the “Memorandum” was aware of the fact that the solution to the “South Slav
Question” could not be tied to an “general reconstruction of the Monarchy” and
openly carried out as a “effort at trialism”, because at that time there were many im-
pediments to this. Thus, the “South Slav Question” had to be resolved in a way
that left the Dualistic structure of the Monarchy, to the largest extent possible, intact.

Starting from this position, the author laid out his plan for the solution of the
“South Slav Question” in nine points. The first point suggested: “Croatia, Slavonia,
Dalmatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are joined into one unitary administrative
area.” The comment attached to this point stated:

* ibid.
* OIP, R-5704b.
* In November 1917, the Archbishop of Sarajevo told the Hungarian journalist, Arpad Pastor, that the
  “[Memorandum] was not inconsistent with his interpretation.” (“Zagrebov ‘Az Estova’ dopisnik s nadbis-
kupom Stadlerom.” Hrvatska, Zagreb, 1917, no. 1892, p. 1.) In other words, the Archbishop hinted at the
  possibility that he might not be the author of the “Memorandum”. It is obvious that the “Memorandum”,
  even if it was written in the first person singular, was, more or less, the common product of Stadler’s
  political circle, in which Dr. Pilar’s ideas played a very important role.
* OIP, R-5704b, p. 1.
* ibid., p. 2.
* ibid.
* ibid.

* L. v. SÜDLAND [Ivo PILAR], Južnoslavensko pitanje. Prizor cjelokupnog pitanja, Zagreb, 1943., 398.

This point was further developed in the following manner: “Eventually Istria and Carniola. Because it is
doubtful that we could [now] get these from Austria I do not portray this as indispensably necessary to a
resolution of the Croatian question. Every means should be because of vital economic and transportation
reasons [used to] attach the Istrian islands Krk, Cres, and Lošinj. Without these islands it is hard to access
the Croatian Littoral [which is] without economic-transport value.” (Reproduced according to “Iz memo-
randuma dr. I. Pilara”. Hrvatska, 1917, no. 1893, 1.) OIP, R-5704b, pp. 4-5.
* Concerning Hungarian territorial pretensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina see: Hamdija KAPIPOVIĆ,
  “Austro-ugarska politika u Bosni i Hercegovini i jugoslovensko pitanje za vrijeme prvog svjetskog rata,”
  Ferdo HAUPTDMAN, “Kombinacije okoz državonaravnog položaja Bosne i Hercegovine,” in: Godišnjik
  mudrih političkih faktoa 1915. godine oko približenja Bosne i Hercegovine Ugarskoj” (Prilog
  proučavanju istorije Bosne i Hercegovine u prvom svjetskom ratu), Pratiši Instituta za istoriju, Sarajevo,
  15/1979., no. 16, pp. 103-145; L. DAKOVIĆ, Poljaj Bosne i Hercegovine u austrougarskim koncepcija-
* L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 399, OIP, R-5704b, pp. 5-6.
* L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 398, OIP, R-5704b, p. 4.
* L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 399, OIP, R-5704b, pp. 6-7.
In the sixth point, the likely contribution of the “unified administrative territory” to the common affairs of Austria and Hungary was laid out:

“The territory mentioned more specifically under [point] 1 takes part in the deliberations about common affairs, eventually by way of sending an equal number of delegates to each state from its own parliament. The quota, according to which the common unified administrative territory will pay its share of the expense for common affairs, should be determined according to § 3 of the law referred to under [point] 4, and in conjunction with the above mentioned points.”

In explaining this point, the author specifically emphasized that the means suggested for the “unified administrative territory” to cooperate in the common affairs of the Monarchy had to be “in conformity with the efforts to establish a new order in the south, protecting to the greatest extent possible the constitutional relations in the Monarchy.”

As regards the administration of customs and taxes, the seventh point of the “Memorandum” said the following: “The common area mentioned under [point] 1 will be accepted in the existing tariff zone of the Monarchy according to a special tariff convention. The collection and administration of taxes will be executed by officials of the above mentioned unified territory.”

In the eighth point of the “Memorandum” the author suggested an official name for the anticipated “unified administrative territory.” The territory, mentioned under [point] 1 will have the title: Unified Common Territory of the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Herzeg-Bosnia and it will be under the political leadership of the Croatian duke. The introduction of this title is justified in the following manner:

“The name is derived from the construction of this territory. Croatian leadership is imposed out of necessity, in order to grant the South Slavs one possible form of political and cultural fulfillment. It is impossible to carry out South Slav politics and deny any possibility of life to the South Slavs. Croats were always loyal to the Monarchy and dynasty, and in every difficult moment for the Monarchy they were a strong bulwark for the throne and the state. […] The new order in the south therefore can only be implemented in Croatian terms. This new order will be an element of strength and stability for the Monarchy in the south. […]”

[3333] L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 399; OIP, R-5704b, p. 5.


[3355] L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 400; OIP, R-5704b, 8.


[3377] L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 398; OIP, R-5704b, 8.

[3388] According to the designs of the author of the “Memorandum”, presented in the fourth point, the new unified administrative territory had to be “totally autonomous in all affairs”, excepting those which were common to the whole Monarchy as stipulated in the provisions of the Austro-Hungarian Agreement. This autonomy had to serve above all as “one means, to sustain [the Monarchy] in the south”, and the envisaged “united administrative territory” to enable its cultural and economic development.

In the fifth point of the “Memorandum” the anticipated powers of the Hungarian and Austrian prime ministers over the “unified administrative territories” were laid out:

“The prime ministers of both states of the Monarchy have the right, against unconstitutional laws brought forward in the common unified administrative territory, to enter a veto within a period of a month, in case something has been proposed contrary to the law. This veto is a prevention of the law entering into force. In the prescriptions of the constitution a means should be foreseen by which these kinds of conflicts can be resolved.”

In the accompanying explanation to this point the author called on the already existing right of “control” of both halves of the Monarchy over Bosnia and Hercegovina.

[3399] L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., p. 398; OIP, R-5704b, pp. 4-5.

[3400] L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., p. 398; OIP, R-5704b, pp. 4-5.

[3411] According to the designs of the author of the “Memorandum”, presented in the fourth point, the new unified administrative territory had to be “totally autonomous in all affairs”, excepting those which were common to the whole Monarchy as stipulated in the provisions of the Austro-Hungarian Agreement. This autonomy had to serve above all as “one means, to sustain [the Monarchy] in the south”, and the envisaged “united administrative territory” to enable its cultural and economic development.

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In the ninth and final point of the “Memorandum”, the author attempted to address a possible Hungarian complaint as regards their loss of unimpeded access to the Adriatic Sea: “in order to forestall Hungarian complaints, that the new arrangement removes their access to the sea, the Riyeka ‘corpus separatum’ will be surrendered to the Hungarian state in full sovereignty, and a constitutional guarantee will give them the right to take part in decisions regarding fees and administrative matters on the Gyekenyes-Rijeka railroad. Other railroads in Croatia and Slavonia naturally pass under the autonomous administration of the new unified territory.”

This point, according to its drafter’s opinion “[had] to help in overcoming the considerable difficulties in Hungary.”

The following is stated at the end of the “Memorandum”:

“The solution of the South Slav Question, which I am suggesting, would make the Monarchy a southern rampart, which would have the same value against its enemies in the south and south east that the Military Frontier against the Turks once had. Once the Croats are politically satisfied and unhindered in their progress, they will be a sure bulwark for the Monarchy. The bumbling and the foot dragging that has taken place up until now can no longer be defended. The sooner and the more fundamentally the Monarchy establishes order in the south, the more surely it can confront all international entanglements.”

According to the suggestions presented in the “Memorandum”, the existing dualistic structure of the Monarchy had to, at least formally, remain inviolable to the greatest extent possible. Yet the creation of a new “unified administrative territory,” in which, besides Banian Croatia and Dalmatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina had to be joined, and its constitutional arrangement as a common possession of Austria and Hungary, negated the dualistic system as it existed up to that point in important elements. In other words, the Stadler-Pilar political circle tried to carry out a reorganization of the Monarchy on the basis of a “veiled trialism” in the form of a co-dominion.

Dr. Pilar was not entirely in agreement with the final text of the “Memorandum”: “Even if I do not fully agree with the project, it is at least very close to my own notions, and I see in it a means to the solution of the problem.” To his mind, some of its points were “actually lacking”. Thus he was very critical of points 3. and 6. concerning the institution of a “Croatian duke” and of the problem of parliamentary representation. In spite of his objections, Dr. Pilar saw in the “Memorandum” the “road to the solution of the problems” on the south of the Monarchy, and that in “Croatian terms”: “With one of the fundamental points [of the Memorandum] I must register my unconditional agreement, with the eighth point. The new territory can only stand under the political leadership of the Croats and by its content it can be none other than a Croatian state. It is entirely clear, what I have in mind by Croatian state. The autonomy, which came about during an eight hundred year history of development within the framework of the Monarchy. Only this kind of solution conforms with the benefits of the Monarchy.”

On August 14, 1917, Dr. Pilar and Eng. Josip Vancas met with the Austrian Prime Minister, Ernest von Seidler; two days later, they met Stephan von Burián, the joint Minister of Finance. These discussions preceded their audience with Emperor and King Charles I (IV), which was granted by the Emperor’s Chancery at the request of Archbishop Stadler. During the half hour audience, Eng. Vancas explained the contents of the “Memorandum” on the reform of the Monarchy to the ruler. Pilar spoke of his objections to parts of the “Memorandum” to the ruler himself and he used the opportunity of the audience to present some of his own ideas about how he conceives of a solution to the South Slav or Croatian question. Charles was also interested in Pilar’s constitutional views.

The Stadler-Pilar “Declaration”

[November 1917]

The President of the Yugoslav Club and one of the signatories to the “May Declaration”, Rev. Anton Korosćec traveled to Sarajevo 31 August 1917. His intention was to acquaint himself with the current attitudes of key politicians and religious leaders in Bosnia and Hercegovina. What interested Korosćec the most was the opinion of Archbishop Stadler and his group to the political program of the “May Declaration”. Dr. Pilar explained the views of the Archbishop of Sarajevo and his adherents to the Slovene politician, repeating what had already been said in the “Memorandum on the Resolution of the South Slav Question”. In other words, this support of this political group for the “May Declaration” could not be expected.

Korosćec redeemed his failure in discussions with Stadler’s group by scoring a success with the Bosnian and Hercegovinian Franciscans, who, in the following months, gave their unserved support for the “May Declaration”.

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F. ĆULINOVić, op. cit., 146-151.
L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., 399, OIP, R-5704b, 5.
L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., p. 400, OIP, R-5704b, p. 9.
He has the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Italy in mind.
L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., p. 400, OIP, R-5704b, p. 9.
L. V. SÜDLAND, op. cit., p. 401.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
At the beginning of 1918, the situation on the European battlefields appeared more than favourable for the Central Powers: Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Indeed, on February 9, 1918 the Central Powers reached a peace with the newly established independent Ukrainian state. Three weeks later, on March 3, 1918, in Brest-Litovsk, they signed an advantageous peace treaty with the new Soviet (Bolshevik) government in Russia. Then Rumania, two months later on May 7, 1918, succumbed to combined German-Austrian military pressure and was forced to sign a separate peace. Some weeks earlier, the German General Staff, carried away by these successes, had launched the great spring offensive on the western front on March 21, 1918. Success was not absent. The Allied line began to give way in the face of massive German assaults. The German army approached to within 70 km of Paris. The Central Powers were almost certain of final victory. But the unexpected Allied counter-offensives under the command of Marshal Ferdinand Foch, halted the German advance. The fortunes of war passed to the Entente powers. Even if the collapse of the Central Powers seemed ever closer, the members of the Entente were still not in agreement as to the question of who was — “enemy number one”. For the Kingdom of Italy, without doubt, this was the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. To the other Allies — France, Great Britain, and the United States of America — this was Germany. None of these states had assumed in its war aims the total destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and its disappearance from the map of Europe. Even Italy was only interested in reducing its territory. This meant that the leading political circles in the Entente countries “approached conservatively and hesitantly all hypotheses and plans concerning the eventual division of Austria-Hungary and, consequently, the creation of a common Yugoslav state made up of some of its regions and the lands beyond its framework and the ruins of its framework.”

Even the Serbian government, which was still in exile on Corfu, had two solutions regarding the possible fates of the Monarchy — a “big” one and a “small” one. The “big” solution envisioned the separation — according to “ethnographic principles” — of territories from the Monarchy where “South Slav peoples” (Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs) lived, and their union with the Kingdom of Serbia, after it restoration to its prewar borders. The “little” solution was limited to the creation of a “Great Serbia,” that is, the kind of Serbia that in its borders would include all those parts of the Monarchy where Serbs, allegedly, had a “marked” or “predominant majority.”

Despite a relatively good diplomatic and political outlook, the Dual Monarchy’s internal crisis grew more serious with each passing day, primarily because of the dissatisfaction of its many Slavic peoples (Poles, Czechs, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, etc.).
but also because of disagreements between Austria’s two dominant nations, the Germans and the Hungarians. The crisis was most severe in the Monarchy’s south.

Emperor and King Charles perceived the importance of the “South Slav Question” to the Monarchy’s future rather early on. Attempting to save his state, the Emperor decided to entrust an important political “informative mission” to the former Hungarian prime minister István Tisza, still considered to be the most influential politician in Hungary. Calling Tisza from the southwestern front, Charles held an audience with him on September 7, 1918 where he gave him the task of travelling to the “South Slav lands” of the Monarchy in the capacity of a “homo regius” in order to try to find a life-saving formula to avert the danger threatening the Habsburg state.73

Tisza’s first stop in his political tour of the south of the Monarchy was Zagreb, where he arrived on September 13, 1918.74 Some days later, on September 13, 1918, general Sarkotić received a telegram from Tisza in which he asked Sarkotić “to meet him in Sarajevo on September 20”.75 In Sarkotić’s opinion, Tisza’s journey was “inappropriate,” but he met the Hungarian Count any way.76

In Sarajevo, Tisza met with many mainly Yugoslav oriented Bosnian and Herzegovinian politicians from all three ‘ethnic-religious’ communities (Croat-Catholic, Serb-Orthodox, and Bosnian-Muslim),77 among which were included on the recommendation of provincial chief Sarkotić, the anti-Yugoslav oriented Dr. Pilar and Eng. Váncaš.78

On September 22, 1918, Tisza met with Dr. Pilar for the second time.79 On this occasion he handed the Hungarian politician the “Memorandum” (“Denkschrift”),80 wherein he wanted to justify the “pro-Austrian orientation” of his political circle in

73 B. KRIZMAN, Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu, p. 251. Before Tisza’s mission to the Monarchy’s south, Hungarian politicians had envisioned a few possible solutions to the “South Slav Question”. The three following were mentioned most often: a) Bosnia and Herzegovina are united with Hungary as ‘separate corpus sacrae coronae hungariae’. b) Dalmatia is attached to Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina to Hungary. c) Croatia receives from Bosnia its western districts: Bihać and Banja Luka, and from Dalmatia the portion north of Split. The southern portion of Dalmatia with Dubrovnik and Boka Kotorska, Herzegovina, and the eastern part of Bosnia along with the Bosnia-Brod-Sarajevo-Mostar-Zenica railway as an axis would fall to Hungary.” (H. KAPIŽIĆ, “Austro-ugarska politika u Bosni i Hercegovini”, p. 43.)


75 B. KRIZMAN, Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu, p. 252.

76 Ibid.


78 B. KRIZMAN, Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu, p. 252, note 34.

79 Ibid., p. 259.

80 OIP, R-5710.

81 In the ‘Memorandum’, Pilar stated: “The Hungarians stand before the choice of defending the long Carpathian front or the long Adriatic front. They will always choose the Carpathian front, and we will stay with those who will settle with the Italians. In this Austria can help us more […] Our affection for Austria is the emotional expression of this understanding, though it has faded many times over.” (OIP, R-5710, [p. 3]; Z. GRIJAK, Politička djelatnost vrbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 553.)

82 OIP, R-5710, 1; Z. GRIJAK, Politička djelatnost vrbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, 552. In terms of his understanding of the extent of Croatian lands, Pilar referred to his book Die südlawische Frage und der Weltkrieg (Vienna, 1918) and to his second chapter in particular, pp. 140-232. (OIP, R-5710, p. 1; Z. GRIJAK, Politička djelatnost vrbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 724, note 2541.)

83 OIP, R-5710, p. 1. In other words, his interest in the ‘South Slav Question’ began around 1906.

84 Ibid. Z. GRIJAK, Politička djelatnost vrbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 552.

85 Ibid.

86 OIP, R-5710, pp. 1-2; Z. GRIJAK, Politička djelatnost vrbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 252.

87 OIP, R-5710, p. 2; Z. GRIJAK, Politička djelatnost vrbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 552.

88 OIP, R-5710, [pp. 3-4]; Z. GRIJAK, Politička djelatnost vrbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 553.

89 “We Croats could live well with the Magyars for 800 years, because they allowed our statehood to continue to live.” (OIP, R-5710, [p. 4]; Z. GRIJAK, Politička djelatnost vrbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 553.)
In his dissection of Croatian-Hungarian relations, Pilar expressed great wonder at Hungarian sympathy for the Serbs.\footnote{Ibid., Z. GRIJAK, Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, p. 553.} To him, these sympathies were proof that Hungarians understood “neither the aims nor the nature of the Serbs.”\footnote{Ibid.; Z. GRIJAK, Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa J. Stadlera, pp. 553-554.} Because according to him, “Serbian aims are the weakening and ultimate assimilation of the Bulgars and Croats, and the unification of the whole Slavic Balkans into a Great Serbia. The basis for this is their middle position between the Bulgars and Croats, their state-political and church-political tradition […], and the circumstance that they were the first South Slavs who were able to renew their state after the collapse of the Ottomans.”\footnote{Ibid.}

Without mincing words Pilar accused the Hungarians, by helping the Serbs, of contributing to the fact that “they have become so strong in the south, that they can contest the Monarchy’s possession of the South Slav lands.”\footnote{OIP, R-5710, [p. 4].} Then followed this direct accusation: “[…] 50 years of struggle for the idea of a unitary Hungarian state has shown as its only result, that now in the south the Serbian state idea is on the best path to victory.”\footnote{OIP, R-5710, [p. 6].}

Pilar did not doubt that the main role in bringing about the idea of a Greater Serbia state was allotted to the Serbian Orthodox Church: “The Serbian Orthodox national church is the instrument: it is more of a social-political warring and initiating organization than a religious community, and its power has not been sufficiently perceived for long.”\footnote{OIP, R-5710, [p. 5].} Warning Tisza of the complete disastrousness of the current politics toward Croatian aspirations, Pilar says: “The state is now in the position that it can not effectively confront the dangerous centrifugal forces in the south, namely Greater Serbia irredentism, which has been quietly at work since 1860, yet it has to support its natural enemies [Serbs] against its loyal elements [Croats]. This disastrous politics was carried out for so long that loyal Croats realized that loyalty is not at all helpful, that it in fact becomes disloyalty, and that disloyalty always is more effective.”\footnote{OIP, R-5710, [p. 4].}

Pilar warned Tisza that the state of affairs in the Monarchy’s south was such that “the Monarchy was going to lose the South Slav lands forever, if not in this war, then certainly in the next.”\footnote{Ibid.}

The unclear constitutional position of the Croatian lands led, according to Pilar, to the fact that Croats “today in large part prepared to accept as a substitute for a

\footnote{Z. Matijević: The Political Activities of Dr. Ivo Pilar on the Eve of the Demise…}
ister invited him to “come to Vienna, to present his position on the solution to the Bosnian question that is, the whole South Slav problem.”

In the somber atmosphere of the last weeks of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy’s existence, Dr. Pilar arrived in Vienna, where he gave two lectures to “Austrian political society.” Right at the start of his second lecture, aimed at the Austrian-German political public, he argued that the “urgency of the South Slav Question” stemmed from the fact that the war, which was “sparked by this question”, was threatening “the Monarchy with an unpleasant end”. In Pilar’s view, the Austro-Hungarian compromise was one of the main reasons for the difficult situation in the Monarchy’s south. Under its provisions Dalmatia, which indisputably belonged to Croatia, was reduced to a legal position which was ‘unique in the world’:

“[…] according to the December Constitution (21. XII. 1867) Dalmatia fell to Austria, but according to the earlier Compromise — to Hungary. This gave rise to that unfortunate, uncertain position in which Dalmatia, according to Austrian state right as well as de facto, belonged to Austria, and according to Hungarian state right as well as virtually — Hungary.”

Bosnia and Herzegovina were no less of a problem. Relations in that part of the state had become unbearable, in Pilar’s opinion, as a result of the political efforts of Gyula Andrassy, the first Hungarian Prime Minister in the Dual Monarchy:

“He occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to forestall the creation of a Greater Serbia Empire. Unfortunately, he had partly insufficient and partly incorrect information regarding the essence and strength of the Greater Serbia idea. Thus he wanted to break the Greater Serbia movement in Bosnia, but he did not allow, coming from a Hungarian perspective, the other possible solution — Croatian. He wanted, therefore, to create a national-political vacuum in Bosnia. This was a regime that from its very beginning was doomed to fail, and the result is now apparent in that the Greater Serbia idea is about to be realized at the Monarchy’s expense. This result will be realized because Andrassy organized Bosnia in such a way that Magyar influence would gradually be predominant; Bosnia was, hence, treated as if it were a Magyar area of interest. […] Together with Magyar influence Magyar serbophilism, which is the enemy of Croats, took hold, and soon the final result of this will become apparent.”

Owing to what he said above, and also some other errors, the entirety of the Monarchy’s politics, to Pilar’s way of thinking, had “wound up on the wrong track”. “Most ominous,” of the whole constitutional and political quagmire in the Monarchy’s south, was the fact that “the South Slav Question in its current balance

of relations between right and might, can no longer be solved at all in a legal way.” Despite this gloomy statement Pilar offered the following solution:

“The South Slav Question has to be solved. […] The solution can only be implemented within a general reconstruction of the Monarchy. The reconstruction of the Monarchy can only be successful and purposeful if it takes into account its nature. The Monarchy, in its historical development, is a conglomerate, a sanctuary for the remains of various states and peoples, who because of the violent assaults of the waves of history here in the transition zone between East and West were shipwrecked, finding shelter in the framework of the Monarchy. The Monarchy can fulfill its life’s purpose only if it continues to provide, to those states and peoples who are still alive, a sure sanctuary. Regrettably, the aged Monarchy has let this task go undone and thus must, in its contemporary [dualistic] form, experience collapse. […] Let us not delude ourselves! The Monarchy in its old form — is dead. […] I believe […] that the reconstruction of [the Monarchy] can only take place on a federalistic foundation. The existing Monarchy can now only be a federal state composed of several small national states. A single federative South Slav state will enter into the framework of this federative state.”

In Pilar’s opinion, the “South Slav federal state” could be built in one of two ways: 1. if the Croatian and Slovenian lands of the Monarchy were made into “two small federal states — Croatia and Slovenia”; and 2., if all the South Slav lands of the Monarchy were made into “a unified South Slav state [Südslavien]”. Pilar himself assumed that the second solution would be “real”, because “the first [Croatian] state would not be acceptable to neither the Entente nor the people in the south of the [Monarchy].”

Pilar concluded his lecture with words which in themselves carried the portent of numerous tragic historical events for the Central European region in the last century of the second millennium of the Christian era: “All peoples need the Monarchy on its present territory, and if they forget about it at this moment in time, they will soon learn to value it in the harsh school of life.”

Radicalizing his views about the possible solution of not only the “South Slav Question”, which was for him basically identical to the solution of the situation of the Croatian lands, but also for the survival of the whole Monarchy, Pilar gave up on “veiled Trialism” and openly took up the cause of federalization of the Habsburg state. The reform of the Dual Monarchy into a federal state would, in his opinion, solve all the constitutional problems of Croatia and the Austrian and Hungarian halves of the state. However, the efforts of Dr. Pilar and those people who shared his political views, to reform the internal political organization of the Monarchy in its final moments and save it from its inescapable collapse, but to also ensure Croatia

110077OIP, R-5172, p. 6.
An Overview of “The Struggle for the Value of the Ego” or an Introduction to “Pilar’s psychology”

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Pilar is, in the evaluation of analysts and critics of his works, a scholar (M. Starčević), a politician and publicist (J. Šidak), a politician and geopolitician, publicist, anthropologist, sociologist, and practicing lawyer (M. Šraba), a political publicist (D. Jelić), and so on.¹ Ivo Rogić (2001) attributes to him the characteristics of a “writer of dangerous books,” a “pioneer of historical sociology and political geography (geopolitics) in Croatia,” a “theoretician of the first Croatian modernization” and a “politician.”² The author of this work did not find among Pilar’s many professional attributions the title psychologist and social psychologist.

Concerning Pilar and his publications, the majority has been written by historians, sociologists and political geographers, a lesser amount by philosophers and literary figures. The author is not familiar with any critical text about Pilar written by a psychologist or any text in which Pilar has been ascribed the professional ‘image’ of a psychologist or a social psychologist. On the basis of a brief review of the Pilar texts which can be classified as ‘psychological,’ and a general review of Pilar’s Borba za vrijednost svoga ‘ja’ — Pokus filozofije slavenskog individualizma [“The Struggle for the Value of the Ego — an experiment in the philosophy of Slavic individualism”], as the key work in this category, this author will attempt, therefore, to argue and substantiate a general thesis concerning Pilar’s stature as a psychologist, or more precisely — a pioneer of social psychology in Croatia. The above-mentioned text sits at the center of this study because in it more than in any other, Pilar, viewed from the perspective of psychology, concerned himself with the investigation and analysis of the human, its character, identity and social behaviour. These are all subjects of psychological inquiry and analysis in the 21st century. This text is otherwise numbered among Pilar’s best; Jaroslav Šidak’s evaluation in particular testifies to