EUROPEAN INTEGRATION FOR THE 21st CENTURY

Bibliotheca ZBORNICI, Book 13

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION FOR THE 21st CENTURY

Edited by:
Vlado Šakić
Ljiljana Kaliterna Lipovčan

At the end of the 20th century many research and cultural institutions, as well as particular intellectuals, tried to assess the past century and predict either the "local" or "global" future. Analogous to these efforts, scholars at the Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar decided to organize an International Symposium on European Integration at the end of 1999. Invitations were given to a number of scholars in Croatia, Western Europe, and the U.S. who have incorporated various aspects of the "globalization perspective" into their professional work. Most of the Croatian and North American invitees, as well as a smaller number of European scholars accepted our invitation. Altogether, twenty speakers participated at this Symposium entitled "European Integration for the 21st Century" that was held in Dubrovnik from 1–3 December 1999. It also included a round-table discussion on "The Stability Pact" chaired by the former Croatian Ambassador in USA, Miomir Žužul. In addition to the plenary sessions, the Symposium featured three thematic units under the theme "European Integration": "Foundations and Perspective", "Aspects of Security and Stability", and "A Croatian Perspective."

Given the current importance of the topic, the enviable professional level of the participants, and public interest, we have decided to publish the proceedings of the Symposium as a volume in the Institute's series of Proceedings. In this publication, we have retained the thematic structure of the Symposium, as well as the order of papers. The opening speeches by the former Minister of European Integration and Vice President of the Croatian Government, as well as a representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appear at the end of the volume.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank all the participants for allowing us to publish their papers. The Ministry of Science and Technology of the Republic of Croatia, and the Croatian Catholic Charities, Hodart,

4. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: CROATIAN PERSPECTIVE

OPENING ADDRESSES

I.

PLENARY
ADDRESSES

Norbert
LESER

Vienna, Austria

EUROPE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALISATION

Europe in the age of globalisation – this would be the outcome of a conference involving all the enlightened spirits of our continent, but also of other continents affected by European history and dependent upon it.

However, who is not affected by European history?

Interestingly, the maps of Europe have been turned by 90 degrees in recent surveys of European history. In contrast to common usage, Scandinavia is not the North Pole of Europe. Europe is shown as a peninsula, as an extension of Asia, with England and Spain, as fingers of a hand, stretching out into the Atlantic.

Looking from the East to the West, Europe is a complicated arrangement of states, located in a very complex arrangement of minor peninsulas, at the edge of the gigantic Asian landmass. It is no wonder that the Mongolians decided to conquer "the rest of the world" in the midst of the 13th century.

Let us now return to the world-view of the Ancients, as well as the Middle Ages. From a European point of view, the Mediterranean was the axis of the world. This was not only European ethnocentrism, but also the world-view of adjacent nations. Until the 16th century, European identity was defined by an internal border: Christianity and feudalism, whereas the outer border was defined by the struggle against the Islamic forces. As Fernand Braudel taught us: The combat over the Mediterranean Sea was replaced by the conquest of new Continents in the West. So Europe was left to its devastating wars, which resulted in a delicate balance-of-powers policy, unable to suppress nationalistic forces inside, or the over-stretched imperialistic aspirations toward other continents. These forces were, of course, not imposed upon Europe; these were indigenous forces, brought forth by the long-lived political and religious controversies from the beginning. The great Austrian historian, Friedrich Heer did not call Europe the "Mother of Revolutions" in vain.

13

CONSIDERATIONS AT THE END OF THE OLD MILLENNIUM AND AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM

The 20th century was in many ways an age of catastrophes for Europe. Eric Hobsbawm writes in "The Age of Extremes": "The decades from the outbreak of the First World War to the aftermath of the Second, was an Age of Catastrophe for this society. For forty years, even intelligent conservatives would not take bets on its survival… It was shaken by two world wars, followed by two waves of global rebellion and revolution, which brought to power a system that claimed to be a historically predestined alternative to bourgeois and capitalistic society."[1]

FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE EUROPEAN STATE OF MIND AND EUROPEAN CITIZENS, INCLUDING THOSE WHO ARE SOCIOLOGICALLY AND PHILOSOPHICALLY TRAINED

There is no doubt among European citizens, that the actual state-of-affairs is beneficial to an overwhelming majority of people: An invisible prosperity is taken for granted. European integration is widening and deepening. Despite many drawbacks and disappointments, the course of measures to ensure this unification has been accepted. However, one should not underestimate the controversies.

There is an interest among the well-established nations to open up the European community to nations eager to get rid of their Communist past. Although they are still incompatible to the forces of the common market and have unsolved minority issues, which affect the integrity of a nation-state, there is, above all, insecurity about the boundaries between the so-called "Social Welfare States" and the free-flowing forces of modern capitalism. There is a promise that these forces can benefit the masses in a better way than a protective system – in the long run, at least.

However, who can foresee insecurities for this length of time? A thoughtful article in the *Economist* quotes the French Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin: "Yes to the market economy; no to the market society." He continues: "Continental Europe, under the leadership of a majority of centre-left governments, is not clinging unthinkingly to old ways. The political boiler plate is deceptive. In fact, something more subtle is taking place: the gentle, growing, if sometimes reluctant, recognition by Europe's left that reform of the social model they did so much to develop is necessary."[2]

I am quoting this insightful and interesting article for one reason: Is it not the task of the social philosopher, to observe long-term developments and to discover the transformational forces, which bind together the fate of individuals and collective bodies, then dare to make a prognosis about both of them, taking care not to make judgments based on a momentary point of view.

Many social philosophers have spent a great part of their lifetime analyzing and interpreting the failures of their colleagues: the so-called concept of "Social Engineering", and many other related concepts have attempted to reduce the human being to an agent of a perfect society or to a bundle of instincts, bound together by the drive of survival. However, any social philosopher has to clarify what are "enlightened interests" to the subjects of his/her inquiry as well as to him/herself. In my opinion, the individual – common citizens as well as social philosophers – have to reflect on how to combine their daily interests that safeguard survival in this society. Reflection should also be on projects leading to a better understanding of their life cycles and promoting their life chances as well as that of their companions that lead to a deeper interest in "society". While doing this, they will use the accumulated wisdom of their experience, that is, in the words of Austrian sociologist, Alfred Schutz their "stock-of-knowledge".

Let us pay homage to the prominent teacher Hans-Georg Gadamer, who celebrated his 100th birthday this year. In an attempt to understand our traditions, a merging of horizons ("Horizontverschmelzung") takes place. It is not an idealistic concept, trying to unite different points of views, but a result of a never-ending quest for truth. I think that the background of social thinking on the continent, combined with the hermeneutical approach of Hans-Georg Gadamer and the integrative theory of Anthony Giddens in Great Britain is a sound basis to pose the following question:

What is the hermeneutical basis to pose the right questions for Europe's future identity?

MY THESIS IS THIS

All the bitter experiences of European history have been in vain, if Europe is henceforward regarded as a playground for international capitalism and as a mere conglomerate of economic resources and options, linked to the human potential of a workforce, which only follows the directives of an ever-growing market. It is insufficient to stress the influence of the system of state-guaranteed so-

cial security to preserve a sense of European identity. It is inadequate to subsidize certain cultural activities in a protectionist way so that they do not become victims of cheap mass-media politics. It is not enough to bemoan the fragile role of intellectuals in our society.

All European experiences must be reflected upon: Not only in terms of their **adaptive function, but also in terms of their transformational power.**

All those who reflect upon Europe's millennium agree, that a re-writing of European history must start with an analysis of components, which – taken together – form a history. By detecting its hidden forces, a future course can be deciphered. Thus, our aim is not wholly different from all the others who, by analyzing the past dared to make projections of the near future, if not of the distant one. This sense of transcendence can be seen as illegitimately trespassing the boundaries and limitations of human intelligence. On the other hand, it can be seen as an "unending quest" – not just to ensure a legitimate struggle for survival, but also to reach out for visions – for a better understanding of all humankind, true to all idealistic traditions as well as religious ones.

I think that we have to reflect upon the actual situation in light of the European catastrophes. This entails viewing our society with a need to detect its transformational potential and to develop a vision, which can subsequently develop its identity.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COHERENT EUROPEAN IDENTITY UNDER THESE AUSPICES

The great European traditions – Liberalism, Socialism and Christianity must be redefined within the context of globalisation and its challenges. The easiest way, if not trivial, to redefine them would be in terms of liberalism. Essentially, liberalism that promotes free trade and is enhanced by the spirit of competition seems to be a way that would lead to the unification of humankind. I doubt that this program can enhance benefits for all, if those benefits are not supported by a concept of mutual help. I think that the liberal classics should be re-read: They do not recommend the program of "Enrichissez-vous", but are keen to promote a balance between common and individual interests.

The role of the state has been over-emphasised by the Marxist tradition. "Social Engineering" became the guiding principle of Stalinism, which led to an alienation of humanity, surpassed in modern history only by the atroci-

ties of the Nazi regime. An enlightened socialism certainly knows about the need to secure life and knows something about the pursuit of happiness as it seeks a balance between them.

Why is this balance so insecure?

First, I will attempt to give a simple answer, but my thesis does not rest on this.

In my opinion, the insecurity of European consciousness is due to its Christian heritage. The Judeo-Christian heritage demands openness toward history – a history, which cannot be foreseen. The shape of history is a result of the will of God and the work of human beings – provided that the will of God can be understood and translated into terms of government. This deep insecurity has led to a "fear of freedom" (Erich Fromm), so that Christians were all too eager to understand the government in sacral terms. This "sacralisation" has remained virulent in different forms of secularisation. As a driving force, Christianity is present in the aforementioned movements, often in a secularised form, sometimes in coalition with them. The impact of Christianity is the conviction, that person is left with total responsibility to this world, which he/she can transform for better or worse, according to his/her destiny. To shape this destiny, they need guidance. The institutional form of this guidance is a projection of their aspirations and wishes, be it the market or the state or a political party.

Institutional Christianity has undergone the same learning process as liberal and socialist movements. It should have understood its "structural sins" – and it has hopefully learned from them. The present Pope reminded the public that Christianity is "the soul of Europe". I subscribe to this statement. "Soul" in the Biblical tradition means the vitality of an organism. In our context it means transformational power. Christianity in European history certainly was and is a power, which transformed society – not only through adaptive virtues, but also through its ability to use this adaptiveness for further developments. Like Liberalism and the Marxist tradition, Christianity has the same problem: while simultaneously readjusting claims of responsibilities and redefining its goals to make a contribution to social development.

Like liberals and socialists, Christians have become victims of a misinterpretation with regard to their origin. They committed the fatal error of confounding the final realisation of the Kingdom of God with the present state of affairs.

17

Like a shadow, this fatal error has followed the progress of Christianity throughout the centuries. However, equally important is the protest against it, which gave birth to numerous reform movements. Each of them generated a new culture and each of them sought coalitions with social and cultural movements.

Hopefully, the process of European integration will strengthen the dialogue-oriented members of the big European churches – and vice versa – as ecumenism can contribute to a better understanding of the European spirit.

The secular European society – in itself a product of secularisation – needs a body which represents its collective memory. Churches are certainly not the only witnesses of a history, which must be constantly re-interpreted to become an agent of the future. However, churches are in one respect of utmost importance to the European spirit: no church member can steal away its history – a history of trial and error, of shaping concepts as well as mutilating concepts of human dignity.

Ecumenism cannot be a unifying concept, if it denies the differences between various religious experiences (these are worldly experiences as well). Ecumenism can only be productive, if the appreciation of different religious identities is seen as an enrichment of one's own life-world. Historian, Friedrich Heer, noted the bridge-building function of intellectuals from the 16th century onwards, that is, men and women, who, while staying loyal to their own tradition, developed a culture of attentiveness and respect for their opponents in otherwise hostile camps ("Die dritte Kraft – The Third Power"). Hopefully, the time has come to make these voices heard and understood in European society. It goes without saying that this attitude is a farewell to any sort of Eurocentrism. Moreover, it is a sign of resistance to all the forms of religious and political fanaticism, which threaten our world.

TO RE-DEFINE EUROPEAN IDENTITY

We must reconsider the history of success and failure. Europe can be a model of enlightened pluralism. This pluralism cannot be maintained by a laissez-faire attitude or by an ideology of consumerism. Pluralism, in this sense, is the fruit of a constant endeavour to understand oneself by using the world-view of the other, even that of the opponent, so as not to become a foe. This experience teaches us, how hostilities and adversities can be transformed into modes of co-operation, not by embracing the opponent, but by inventing rules of communication. Consider how

religious differences can be made fruitful to each other. Consider how continental and Anglo-Saxon attitudes of philosophizing can provoke each other and overlap and how different life forms can enrich each other in daily life. Thus, the European model without an imperialistic attitude can contribute to a world society. However, this can only be achieved if there is an awareness of its origin and history. Values cannot be super-imposed on any society. A community of values means a community of constant exchange and development of values. The assumption (or postulation) of such a community is in itself a supreme value.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Eric Hobsbawm: *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991.* London, 1994, p.7.

[2] The Economist. London, Feb. 12th 2000.

Thomas Patrick
MELADY

Washington, D.C., USA

TRUST AND RESPECT: FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Dubrovnik, where this historical city state of centuries ago actively developed the consultative process of discussion and consensus, is an appropriate and beautiful location for a discussion of European Integration for the 21st century. Now in less than 30 days the world will welcome a new century. We are here at a historic moment.

The 21st century will be a new era. We exit from a century that was full of difficult, tragic years for the peoples of Europe and the world. Two world wars and almost 50 years of an oppressive Communist domination left its imprint on our cultures and peoples.

Integration must be sensitive to the past century of experiences for the peoples of Europe.

The end of the last decade of the 20th century, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall, witnessed the end of the communist empire in Europe and the dignity of independence at long last occurring for the peoples in Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe. We can celebrate these recent historic developments and look to the new era. It will be here in 3 weeks and a few days.

New eras bring new opportunities, different responsibilities. Great distances have disappeared; instant communications to all parts of the world are available to most of us. Several decades ago, The British writer Barbara Ward predicted a "world village" where the people of the world would be next-door neighbors. Her prophecy, ridiculed by many, is today a geopolitical reality.

This is the world as we meet in Dubrovnik on the eve of a new century.

CHALLENGES FOR THE INTEGRATION IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE

We examine, in Eastern and Central Europe, situations that would have seemed impossible a decade ago. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Slo-

vakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, and others are now independent sovereign states. The often predicted claim that Soviet communist control would "bury" the west has faded into the history books. The soviet empire lasted 74 years.

The sweep of independence that fundamentally changes that situation for these peoples also altered the world's power structure. The disappearance of the Soviet Union from the world's scene leaves the United States, as the world's only significant world power.

The Western Europe powers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany are the major powers on the European scene. The geo-political reality of the 21st century is the special position of the world's significant (USA) and the major powers.

They have a unique challenge in the process of integration to exercise leadership and judgment.

Their leadership should be **nature, magnanimous,** and **caring**. Despite being ruled by outsiders – in some cases like Croatia – for centuries, these countries preserved their cultures, language and traditions. It is a credit to the strength of these cultures that peoples, especially after the pain of the Communist dictatorships, arrived at long last as sovereign, independent states with cultures preserved.

This did not always happen with countries that were dominated by other states with another language. My Irish Grandparents, for example, had little or no knowledge of their native Irish language. They, like most of their countrymen, lost their language which is an essential factor in a country's culture. All efforts to reestablish the original Irish language as the contemporary language of the Irish people have not been successful.

SPECIAL CHALLENGE TO THE U.S.A.

The peoples of Europe and the Euro-Atlantic Community are committed to the core principles involving democratic government, religious freedom, civil society, and human rights. While the overall commitment to these values is strong, the governments and leaders of the European and Euro-Atlantic communities should eloquently and forcefully confirm these commitments.

Significant world power status places a special burden on the United States. For over two decades the U.S.A. has issued an annual report, evaluating from the American perspective, the status of human rights in the world.

Inspired by President Jimmy Carter, the purpose of the annual evaluation was indeed noble; to advance the cause of human rights throughout the world.

The history of the past several centuries teaches us that any "big power" should be careful about the public perception of its role when commenting on the activities of other states.

As a private American supporting the purpose of the annual evaluation, I would urge that greater care be given to the tonal quality of the document.

As Americans, we recognize that our country has not been perfect in these matters. There is no question that the U.S. leadership in human rights has been superb, but there should be no arrogance.

There are some historical facts in the 19th century that most Americans would prefer had not occurred. Most recently many Americans are troubled by the number of African-Americans who fall victim to a tragic life style that leads in some cases to capital punishment.

Only recently the U.S. government started to examine allegations of the killing of civilians in Korea by the U.S. armed forces. While still only an allegation, it is a source of some embarrassment.

Americans can not – should not – be arrogant as we judge other states on their human rights records. Now is an appropriate time as we enter the new century, with an emphasis on greater cooperation with the new states of Eastern and Central Europe, to assure that the tonal qualities of U.S. statements on human rights are carefully written. All tendencies toward self righteousness should be avoided.

TRUST AND RESPECT: BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS

Trust and respect should be the cornerstone of relationships between government in the 21st century. Here the significant and major powers should be careful about the perception of promoting their core beliefs in the smaller states of Europe. They must avoid giving the appearance of becoming involved in internal matters unless there is, as recently seen in Yugoslavia, a severe ongoing violation of human rights. In the more moderate, internal cases where the human rights situation does not meet the expectations of the major powers, the governments concerned should engage in dialogue and persuasion.

This procedure, rather than public criticism of the small states governments, on non-urgent matters will be more conducive to development of respect and trust between the states.

This meeting taking place in Dubrovnik in 1999 could not have happened between 1939 and 1991. What a

change that we can celebrate today in this historic city. In that period all of the countries of Eastern, Central, and Southeastern Europe were controlled by oppressive communist dictatorships. The government of the west through this period maintained the rights of the peoples of these countries to democratic governments. The western states built up a great reserve of respect for what they did in that long period of suffering for the peoples from Estonia to Macedonia.

THE PEOPLE IN THE FUTURE

With this historical backdrop, a sense of understanding and respect can be developed among all states of European and North American communities.

While there is no question about the important role of governments we should in the 21st century, put greater emphasis on the role of people. It was only a decade ago that unfriendly governments energized the natural contacts between the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe and with the peoples of North America.

Now the walls have disappeared. As next door neighbors without impediments we are free to be in contact with one another.

Contacts between people, rooted in respect and dignity should be encouraged. Students and young people are already leading the way.

Professional groups, labor leaders, Church official, farmers groups are all encouraged to visit one another across boundaries.

President Eisenhower, before leaving office as President of the United States, founded the people-to-people international movement. In the dark days of the Iron Curtain period, the people-to-people movement encouraged people to write letters to the peoples in Eastern Europe. Letters in the 1960's was about the only way that contact was permissible.

Now the gates are wide open and the free movement of people – in the 21st century should be a major factor in the integration of our societies.

UNIVERSITIES AND YOUNG PEOPLE

The strong cultures of Eastern and Central Europe produced some of the great universities of the world. It is even more remarkable that during the period of almost 50 years of communist dominance the universities remained basically committed to their historic values and culture.

I have had the privilege of visiting many of them from the Baltics to Croatia. We should recognize this heritage and in the 21st century take steps that will facilitate greater exchange between the young people – many will be future leaders – of the European and North American universities.

One semester, a year or even more of study in another culture will lead to greater respect and understanding of the global environment of the 21st century.

Young people are generally more open to the other point of view and to other cultures. The mosaic of varying cultures is one that we wish to preserve; the respect for one another. Teen age athletes, cultural groups and others with the enthusiasm of young people can be the foundation of a new world order. Our governments should encourage and facilitate these exchange programs. This will be a rewarding road to greater integration.

PRESERVATION OF DIFFERENT CULTURES

While the 21st century should place a greater focus on integration, it should also be sensitive to preserving their respective cultures especially those of Eastern and Central Europe that survived decades of oppression.

Integration should mean a respect of the mosaic and not for a weakening of the differences in traditions.

Differing histories have resulted in different sensibilities. The major powers should be especially careful not to ignore the impact of these cultures and histories on the morale of the peoples of the smaller states.

Patience, dialogue and persuasion should be the characteristic of the relations in the 21st century between the major powers and the smaller states.

FORGIVENESS AND RECONCILIATION

We should begin the new century with a spirit of reconciliation. During the Nazi, Fascist and Communist periods there were crimes against humanity; violations of human rights and other oppressive acts.

There has been considerable success in identifying and bringing to trial the major personalities who engaged in these obscene crimes. There should be continued vigilance in bringing to trial any of the major culprits that have not yet been identified.

During this same period there were minor characters in three oppressive regimes of the Nazi, Fascist and Communist periods. They gave into pressure and for selfish reasons cooperated with these cruel forces.

27

But now our respective governments should consider an act of **forgiveness** and **reconciliation**. Do we want to cloud the new century with continued investigations, trails of a few older citizens who committed a minor crime during the Nazi, Fascist or Communist eras?

Judeo-Christian and other religions traditions have recognized the benefit to everyone when there is forgiveness. Once this occurs there will be a healing and reconciliation.

Here in Dubrovnik we should signal our support for forgiveness and reconciliation as contributing to the trust and respect that we wish to have fully integrated into our communities.

SUMMARY

The 21st century for the first time in history gives that states of Europe and the Atlantic communities the opportunity to enjoy a framework of similar values in democracy, civil society, religious freedom and human rights. This has been made possible by the convergence of the end of oppressive communist domination in Eastern and Central Europe with the end of great geographic distance and the arrival of instant world communications.

The 21st century mosaic should include the varying cultures in all their original vibrant design; part of the community rich in democratic values.

Trust and respect for one another will enhance our relationships.

What a magnificent opportunity for all of us.

Želimir
PULJIĆ

Dubrovnik, Croatia

EUROPE OF THE THIRD MILLENNIUM: DON'T STOP PRAYING

Nowadays, the media often uses the word EUROPE. Entry and acceptance into Europe as well as the conditions for this entrance and reception are talked about. What sort of Europe is being talked about? Which Europe do we want to build? On what kind of foundations do we want to build Europe and with which goals in mind? Are there any signs that we can recognize amidst the great number of offers in the contemporary "free market"? Are there any outlines from which we can conclude that this is "that new society", "the new Europe"! These are the questions that unavoidably impose themselves at this point of our national history. For this reason, our answer makes a difference. Moreover, the kind of Europe we imagine, want and dream about matters more.

Europe is a somewhat larger peninsula of Asia. Why aren't we then called "Asians"? On what basis did this peninsula acquire its name and identity? Europe has not always existed. It came into being on the basis of some historic event. The defence of Greece in the face of Darius' conquest at Marathon 490 B.C. and Salamis 480 B.C. marked the beginning of the "European ethos". It was a confrontation with the strongest empire of the time. At the beginning of the fifth century B.C., Persians conquered without difficulty in the East and the West. However, during the conquest of western countries a number of paradoxical things occurred marking the birth of "Greek culture", and, by the same token, of Europe. If this had not happened, Europe would be one of the provinces of the large Asian continent like India or Indochina.

In 490 B.C., Darius' army consisting of 25,000 soldiers and 220 ships set out to conquer Greek cities. In the face of this military danger, many Greek leaders believed it would be preferable to draw up a "contract" entailing political and economic subordination to Persia by becoming the 21st satrapy of the powerful Persian kingdom. However, there were also those who thought differently: that it

31

pays to fight for a free Greece. A sense of pride and consciousness was aroused among the Greeks. Ten thousand hoplites led by Miltiades confronted and defeated 25,000 well armed Persian soldiers at Marathon. This event determined the future of Greece. This is fact the beginning of Europe. The Aegean Sea was different after this battle. Some chroniclers have seen, in this historical war, a clash between "Greek civilization and Asian barbarity".

In this climate of freedom successfully defended, human beings started to ask questions about their origin: from where, why, where to? They encountered "reason", and inaugurated "the profession of philosophy" and became the archetype of a European person, who thinks, concludes and bases everything on reason. Conversely, there is the "Asian" type, who bases everything upon myths in the form of some "fantasies", "theogonies" and "arational conceptions". Thus, it can be concluded that the battles at Marathon 490 B.C. and at Salamis 480 B.C. signify the defence of human beings and their freedom. They enabled the Greeks to discover within themselves the seed of "logos", the seed of reason that liberates from fear and the illusory freedom of myth, and makes all spiritual adventures in the field of being and existence possible. The study of order and harmony, goodness, beauty, ethics and aesthetics, physics, metaphysics, logic, and ontology were to become a constituent part of both the Greek and European "ethos".

JOHN PAUL II AND EUROPE

"European Ethos", that is, European culture came into being during the millennial process of evangelisation of various barbarian peoples, who came to this area from various directions. Europe is, in fact, a unique amalgam of Greek (philosophical) genius, Roman administrative wisdom, and the spirit of Christian love. ATHENS – ROME – JERUSALEM – the three symbol cities are the "architects" of that unique European process, "European ethos", and European identity.

However, it is also true that the Europe of the 20th century, after Jalta, became a divided servant of two powerful centers. "The Iron Curtain", embodied visibly in the "Berlin Wall", became the symbol of that division in its "spirit, mind, and heart". It is no wonder that Europe felt "lost" between the "two Big Brothers", winners in the Second World War. Moreover, the Berlin Wall, "a wall of shame and lawlessness" became "a tombstone for the 'deceased' Europe".

Since 1945, nothing significant has happened in Europe that has not been branded by the myth of Jalta. The Hungarian uprising (1956), the naive "Prague Spring" (1968), the rebellions of Polish workers (1956 and 1970), and "Croatian Spring" (1971) changed nothing in the political sphere or in the consciousness of the people. The best proof of that is the hypocritical attitude of the West towards those rebellions and uprisings in the East. It was reduced to ordinary expressions of "sympathy with those poor brothers behind the Iron Curtain", as well as soothing one's own conscience by declaring that "nothing can be changed".

The first genuine infraction upon Jalta occurred in October 1978, when cardinals in Rome elected Karol Wojtyla, a citizen of Poland, a bishop from the Eastern Block, Cardinal of Krakow, as Pope. That was not politics, but the work of the Holy Spirit. That choice demonstrated that the Church can transcend all divisions, and that it cannot be forced into any kind of mould. After October 16, 1978, Europe and the world could not remain the same. It is no wonder that the great and powerful centers that supervised and controlled Europe ("Big Brother is watching over you") were not overly satisfied with this choice. The spirit of Jalta was buried that day, along with the phantom of "Big Brother". Why?

A man from the border of the Eastern Empire, with a sense of history that would restore belief in the people and reawaken nostalgia for lost unity arrived at the center of European Christianity and Europe and said: "Therefore I, Pope John Paul II, son of the Polish people, Slavic among the Latin, and Latin among the Slavs; I, successor to St. Peter and shepherd to the entire Church, cry to you, old Europe, with love from Santiago: "FIND YOURSELF! BE YOURSELF! REDISCOVER YOUR ORIGIN! REVIVE YOUR ROOTS! RETURN TO LIFE!"

These words spoken by Pope John Paul II, on November 9, 1982, are not some proclamation or program. No, they were an EVENT. The dream about the resurrection of Europe was no longer the domain of visionaries, poets, and philosophers. It became a living reality. Likewise, in Croatia that defended its freedom, culture, and identity with its own blood and sacrifice demonstrated its place in the mosaic of Europe and its unique diversity. The dream about the resurrection of Europe was a reality that occurred at the Second European Synod, where the indefatigable Karol Wojtyla exclaimed: "Europe of the Third Millennium: Don't stop praying!" With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the process of liberation and exit from catacombs

33

started for many nations of Europe. Great hope was born. Many barriers and walls cracked, and borders were opened. "Worldly messianism caved in, and a thirst for new justice was born in the world."

This was the atmosphere in which the Pope announced the "Second" European Synod on June 23, 1996, in Berlin: "From this renowned city which has, in a special way, experienced the destiny of European history of this century, I would like to announce to the entire Church that I intend to call a second special synod on Europe." The goal of the synod was to analyse the state of the Church in Europe, and, in the light of the coming Jubilee, stimulate an authentic religious and any other kind of renewal.

WHAT IS THE SYNOD?

The synod is a lasting institution founded by Pope Paul VI by the apostolic letter "Apostolica solicitudo" of November 15, 1965 with the intention of maintaining and spreading an authentic council spirit. It is a gathering of representatives of the Catholic episcopate whose task is to advise the Holy Father on the management of the Church. In the above mentioned apostolic letter, Pope Paul VI says: "After careful consideration, and out of respect toward Catholic bishops whom we wish to give the opportunity to cooperate with us as efficiently as possible to the benefit of the entire Church, by this 'motu proprio' and by our authority, we hereby establish, in this esteemed City a permanent Council of Bishops, which we will call the *Synod of Bishops*." The word "synod" is of Greek origin and means a gathering, a council. Canon-law defines synod as "an assembly of bishops elected from various parts of the world who meet at a specific time to promote close cooperation with the Bishop of Rome. Their advice helps him in the protection, growth, maintenance and strengthening of faith and morality.

Since 1967, when the first synod was held, until 1999, when the second European synod ended in October of that year, nineteen synods of bishops have been held: nine general regular synods, two non-regular, and eight special synods (two out of which were about Europe).

THE SECOND EUROPEAN SYNOD

The Second European Synod was held from 1-23 November 1999. It included 238 participants – 174 synodal fathers, 16 expert theologians, 38 observers, and ten repre-

sentatives from other churches. The Serb Orthodox Church declined the invitation to be present at this synod. Along with five Croatian bishops, there were two Croatian female observers: a nun and a student.

The synod was a confession of faith that "Jesus, who lives in His Church, is a source of hope for Europe". It opened with a solemn Eucharistic celebration in St. Peter's Basilica, where the Pope said: "The Lord wants to send a call of hope to the Christian pilgrim peoples from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains. The Lord of Covenant knows the heart of His children. He knows the trials and tribulations of the European peoples in this difficult and tormented century. He, Emanuel, God is with us, was crucified in concentration camps and Gulags. He knew the sufferings during bombardments and in trenches. He has suffered wherever people have been humiliated, exploited, and dishonoured, in wars and conflicts that have bloodied European soil."

By the power of the Lord, the Church repeats its words to present-day Europe: Europe, do not lose heart. Do not succumb to the ways of living and thinking that have no future because they are not founded on an enduring certainty of the Lord's word. On this occasion, the Pope also publicly proclaimed the new patron saints of Europe: Edith Stein, Brigitte of Sweden, and Catherine of Siena.

SOME INTERESTING THEMES AND AN ATTEMPT TO DIAGNOSE THE SITUATION IN EUROPE

Among other things, the social and spiritual "weaknesses" of the old continent were discussed at the synod. Many "diseases" plaguing Europe at the threshold of the third millennium have been diagnosed: materialism, consumerism, ethic and spiritual anemia, intellectual agnosticism, individualism, and unrestricted pluralism. This subsequently leads to the "weakening of thought" and rejection of the holy, that was called by Cardinal Eyt of Bordeaux "a light apostasy of faith". In addition, it was noted that the history of Europe was marked by a triple division within the course of two thousand years: first, by a split between the East and the West at the beginning of the second millennium in 1054, followed by the Protestant schism during mid 16th century, and finally by "the third ideological split" in the 19th century, which led to a "rift between faith and culture", because it juxtaposed reason and faith. These divisions have had significant repercussions during this century, and have been marked by three totalitarian

ideologies – Communism, Fascism, and Nazism. Moreover, Cardinal Schonborn stated that fascist and nazi crimes have been fully studied and analysed, whereas those of the communists have not.

The contemporary world, it seems is losing its sense of sin and does not understand the importance of mercy and forgiveness. It was said that Jesus would "redeem people from their sins". Do present-day believers realize that the Eucharist is a celebration of sacrifice, offered for the reconciliation of our sins: Here is the Lamb of God, who takes away the sins of the world. Is this theme present in our sermons?

A "Social Catechism" has been announced, which would explain the Church's teaching about justice, peace, solidarity, and subsidiarity, and be presented publicly in the Holy Year at the assembly of workers in Rome on May 1, 2000.

The participants were warned against "the powerful forces of evil", and it was emphasized that it is inadequate to observe peculiar phenomena from the perspective of psychology and sociology, when the presence of the devil's activity is at issue. Christ authorized the Church to have power over the forces of darkness.

The Romanian Eastern Orthodox bishop, Josif publicly apologized for the injustices inflicted upon Greek-Catholics in Eastern Europe, especially in Romania (this is the first time an Eastern Orthodox bishop has ever apologized for this). Namely, by a state order in 1948, the Greek-Catholic church was banned in Romania, and its property was assigned to the Romanian Eastern Orthodox church.

Many participants warned of the so-called "sacramentalization", which creates among Christians a climate of "let that be done as well", rather than a climate of a personal meeting with Christ and life through faith. It was pointed out that youth issues are often not given enough space in our pastoral, and that they should not be just told about "hope", but be addressed "with hope".

CROATIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE EUROPEAN SYNOD

Five bishops, a nun and a female student from Croatia participated at this special European synod. They all spoke about "gladness and hope, sadness and anxiety" of the Church among Croats.

Cardinal Puljić reminded the participants that the Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina has had to walk the "Stations of the Cross" ever since the 15th century when Turks occupied the area. He recalled the decimation of

Catholics during the recent war years as well as the "remains of Israel" that are fighting to survive while healing wounds of the horrible violence. Thanks to "the school of the cross" believers have learned to live in hope offered by the Resurrected.

Archbishop Bozanić, recalling the brave testimony of Cardinal Stepinac, emphasized the importance of the education of conscience. Stepinac was and remains a great teacher and educator of Christian conscience in the memory of his people.

Bishop Srakić pointed out that "the path of ecumenism is the key to true evangelical activity". He emphasized that the war in Croatia was not a "religious war", because representatives of the Catholic and Serbian Orthodox churches met both at home (twice) and abroad (several times) through the mediation of the CCEE and KEK.

Bishop Komarica thanked God that he survived the horrible sufferings of his diocese. He reminded the synod of the martyrdom of six priests, a monk and a nun. He also pointed out that in spite of apparent peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina the "power of the strongest" is still prevalent. The right to a homeland and possessions is being denied, as well as the right to work and pay, religious freedom and health insurance. He called this shameful for Europe at the end of the 20th century.

I spoke about my participation at the First European Synod eight years ago, where I informed those present of the "cry of pain" brought about by Serb and Montenegrin aggression against the diocese of Dubrovnik. Contrastingly, my presentation was then marked by words of "sorrow and desperation", whereas this time I addressed my colleagues with words of gladness: "Democracy, freedom, culture, as well as human and religious values have been successfully defended in Dubrovnik and in Croatia in the face of the barbarity of our century." I also expressed hope that the blood of innocent victims unified with Christ's sacrifice on the Cross would guarantee human suffering with sacramental and eternal fertility.

Sister Kornelija highlighted the "role of convents" in the creation of contemporary Europe, and Sanja Horvat, a twenty-five year old theology student from Sarajevo, the youngest member at the Synod, spoke about youth problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

At the end, the bishops addressed everyone with the following message: "We gladly witness the Gospel of hope in Europe." Although it seems that hope is becoming weaker every day, devastated by so many forms of suffering, anxiety and death, the bishops believe that, with "humble perseverance", hope is possible for all. "Man cannot live without hope. His life would be deprived of meaning and would become unbearable."

Our confession of hope, the bishops state, encourages us to take a special look at Europe, as a complex, but cultural and geographic reality, the past of which is closely linked with the history of Christianity. Therefore, we ardently desire that the process of European unification guarantee priority to ethical and spiritual values. Bearing this in mind, the bishops invite believers to be confident Europeans who are prepared to contribute to present-day and future Europe. At the end of the Message, with sincere pastoral love, they encourage and call on those who have responsibility towards the future of our continent at institutional, political, and cultural levels: "Don't be silent, but raise your voice when the human rights of individuals, minorities, and nations are violated. Human life from conception to death and family based on matrimony are the foundations of our common European structure. Courageously, continue the process of European integration wisely harmonizing historical and cultural differences."

"Inspired by the certainty that God remains faithful forever, and that He rules the history of humankind, we repeat our call: Europe, be not afraid! Churches of Europe, do not be scared! The God of Hope will not abandon you. Believe in His Love that brings salvation. Trust His mercy that forgives, renews, and restores life. Put your trust in the Lord, and you will never be ashamed!"

II.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: FOUNDATIONS AND PERSPECTIVE

Lorna
HAHN

Washington, D.C., USA

NATIONAL AND REGIONAL IDENTITIES: THE NEEDED BALANCE

It is common today to speak of "the global village", and with good reason. Instant communications and rapid transportation quickly inform us of, or bring us to, everything that is happening anywhere and everywhere. Linked by the Internet, CNN and jets, people the world over share the latest information and technology. Clad in Mexican-made jeans, Macedonian-made shirts and Indonesian-made athletic shoes, munching Kentucky Fried Chicken as they groove to rock music on their Malaysian-made radios carried in Chinese-made handbags, people the world over also share fashions, food and entertainment.

But does the fact that we share knowledge or products mean that we are to meld together into one homogenous mass of humanity? Should we lose those qualities that mark someone as a Croat, a Frenchman, and a Hungarian? As we contemplate regional integration in the economic and political spheres, and as we strive to end old nationalistic antagonisms, does that also mean that we should shed national cultural qualities and identities? I think and I hope not.

Globalisation of information or goods should not mean the homogenisation of people. It should not lead to attempts to destroy or dilute the particular gifts or constellations of positive characteristics that make each human being and each nation special. To the contrary, if a regional grouping is to be truly beneficial to its member states and peoples; if it is to grow and flourish; it will be because each member nation is drawing upon its special national achievements, and contributing them to enrich the large grouping. Furthermore, larger political arrangements will not be able to function with any efficiency unless the member nations are governed by political arrangements that suit their particular circumstances. When discussing closer ties among nations, therefore, we should seek forms of cooperation that build upon basic values

43

and goals that are shared by all, but which take full account of the particular values and customs, the past and recent histories, of all participating nations.

As we consider the role of Croatia and neighbouring countries within a larger framework, we should bear in mind experiences of the European Union. Thanks to the vision of statesmen like Jean Monet, countries that were once mortal enemies not only work together today for common economic benefits, shedding trade barriers and now sharing a common currency: they also depend upon one another for their security. The fact that these nations are more consciously and more closely interdependent, however, does not mean that they are any the less nations, or that their national characters no longer exist.

The geography of a nation, for one basic example, does not change very much, and neither do many of the by-products of geography. Thus the soil, the sunshine and other factors, which make France produce superb red wines, and southern Germany, produce great white wines, remain. Let us hope they always do, and that there are no attempts to produce European wines which would lack the special qualities that make French reds and German whites so desired.

Geography is produced by nature, something we human beings can still do little to change. But let us now look at language, something which may be slightly influenced by nature, but which is essentially something we human beings have created ourselves. Each nation's language evolved over many millennia, and reflects the history, the struggles, the values, the aptitudes, the aspirations of the people who evolved it. Let us take, for one simple example, the way in which several western peoples, who share many cultural similarities, express "you are correct". We English speakers say "you are right", suggesting moral correctness – a major cultural value of ours. Germans say "Sie haben recht", implying legal correctness. And the French, who greatly cherish reason, say "Vous avez raison" – you have reason.

National languages, and the literatures they have produced, are thus national treasures, reflecting the very souls of their people, and the different nuances in the ways in which different people deal with the basic human condition. If these languages were to disappear, or be somehow blended into one pan-European language, we would lose valuable insights into the human condition – into other people whose somewhat different ways of dealing with the world could give us valuable lessons as to how we should act in our own environments.

One must also wonder whether Shakespeare, Moliere or Tolstoy, Descartes, Locke or Kierkegaard, could have produced their masterworks if their creativity did not spring from a particular culture. And one must remember that great works often lose something in even the best translation. This is why, for instance, Sigmund Freud learned Spanish so that he could read Don Quixote in the original, and why those seeking to truly appreciate Islam learn Arabic in order to read the original Koran.

Protecting one's national language against the invasion of foreign words and grammatical structures – particularly American English terms and slang – has been a concern of many European countries, particularly France. I think there is good cause to be concerned, but I do not think one should respond by trying to ban foreign terms. Instead, each country should strengthen the teaching and appreciation of its own language and literature, and then try to share it, intact, with others.

We may also recall that certain languages have predominated in certain fields, and been accepted worldwide as predominant in those fields, with no loss of national identities of honour in the process. Rather, there has been an addition of clarity in communication. Italian, for example, has for centuries been the universal language of classical music. Children learning "allegro" and "andante" with their piano lessons become no less well educated in their native tongues and cultures. Instead, they gain an introduction to, and appreciation of, Italian language and culture and the ways they can enrich their own lives. Similarly, French has long been the official language of diplomacy, and many a diplomat has been grateful for this elegant set of tools. Perhaps American English can be the language of international business and computers, or simply used in ways that do not appear threatening to the proper usage of other languages.

While cherishing their languages and literature, nations should also preserve other aspects of their culture, such as music and dance. Music is a universal language, but most of the greatest composers have reflected the cultures which nurtured them. Thus Verdi is primarily and recognizably an Italian composer, Dvorak a Czech and Liszt a Hungarian, all employing traditional folk songs or idioms as well as modern instruments. The late American composer Leonard Bernstein once observed that much contemporary music sounds alike, whether it is produced in America, France or Japan. Yes, atonal and serial music, composed by mathematical-like formulae, has no national characteristics. And usually, it also has no soul. Like math-

45

ematics, it speaks in an international tongue, but one that tells little or nothing about the speaker, and often conveys little to the heart of the listener. We should have this music; there is certainly a place for it. But it should not displace music that springs from the soul of a composer of the culture which shaped him or her.

The character and experiences of a people are fairly clearly reflected in its literature, music and arts. They are also reflected – or should be reflected – in a country's political system, if the majority of citizens are to accept it and participate in it and make it work.

Today, almost every political leader or government claims to be democratic. The concept that democracy is desirable has been fairly well globalised, and as an American and as a human being I am very proud and happy about this. But even if a leader or party is very sincere about wanting to build democracy where it has not existed in recent years, the form the democracy takes should depend upon the particular situation.

There is no one-size-fits-all form of democracy that will suit every people. Rather, the form should depend upon the history and recent experiences, the values, the resources, the needs and the hopes of the people concerned if genuinely workable democracy and stability are to take root. Developing such a responsive and responsible system of government is the major task of all the countries which have lived until recently under communist tyranny, and which have the added challenge of incorporating national minorities. The challenge is particularly great for the countries of ex-Yugoslavia, which are recuperating from the physical and emotional devastation of war.

Well meaning foreign observers, exhorting countries in this region to be multi-party, multi-ethnic democracies as they know them, often overlook or misunderstand some special factors here. And they sometimes forget that American and British and French democracies did not spring full grown from the brows of constitutional lawyers. Democracy is not a product, it is a process, and one which must actively involve the ordinary citizens, in their particular circumstances.

Thus observers should remember that what they sometimes criticize as fervent nationalism is also, particularly in this region, often mixed with a long-repressed, popular desire for freedom from oppression by people of another nationality. Leaders and parties which represent nationalism and freedom are thus apt to be particularly popular; and the fact that the party which led the fight for freedom dominates does not, therefore, necessarily mean

that the country is not building democracy. To see whether it is, look around at the people: do they feel free to criticize their leaders? Are they creating a healthy civil society? If I look at Croatia, for example, I see people openly voicing their opinions on all subjects, and forming all sorts of political, human rights and other organizations. This means democracy is growing from the ground up, as it should. And so long as new institutions include ethnic, religious and other minorities; so long as everyone shares the rights and duties of citizenship, and has equal protection under the law; so long as everyone works together to build a new democratic Croatia; you will have every reason for national pride.

As Croatia and other countries of this region become further integrated into western economic and political organizations, and as their people exchange ideas and learn lessons from older democracies about how their system function, democratic institutions here will expand. And they should be strengthened as cooperation with western liberal economies brings further investment and entrenches rule of law. These developments, in turn, should facilitate the integration of returning refugees and other minorities, and render past sources of conflict outdated as people – particularly young people – contemplate the possibilities of a better future. Given the resources – particularly the human resources – of this region, the future can be bright indeed.

Laura
GENERO

Arlington, USA

A NEW KIND OF VIRTUAL REALITY: THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ON EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION

It is an honour to be here and to participate in this forum on integrating Croatia into the nations of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. In this symposium, we will hear a lot about a key issue for the 21st century: globalisation.

Today, I'm going to talk about one of the most powerful forces driving globalisation in the 21st century: the digital revolution. Specifically, information technology and the Internet.

It's a cliché to say that the Internet is taking over the world. But sometimes clichés are true.

In fact, it's my opinion that Croatia must have an information technology strategy in order to achieve its goal of full integration into the Euro-Atlantic alliance.

Why? Because information technology, the Internet and knowledge-based industries are becoming indispensable parts of western economies, culture and even politics. These technologies are fast creating a global digital divide. Those without access to the digital tools necessary to plug into 21st century commerce and communications will be left behind. There's no reason why Croatia should be in this category. In fact, Croatia's position as a novice in this area may be an advantage – as other European countries in transition have discovered.

THE DIGITAL ECONOMY TAKES OFF

It's easy to underestimate the importance of the digital revolution because it's so recent and has developed at such remarkable speed. Radio was in existence for fifty years before 50 million Americans tuned in. It took television thirteen years to achieve an audience of this size. But it took the Internet just five years – from 1994 to 1999 – to grow from three million to 100 million users. That's right, today more than half of the entire U.S. adult population has access to and uses the Internet regularly.

Laura Genero
A New Kind of Virtual Reality: The Impact of Information Technology on Euro-Atlantic Integration

Individual users accessing the world wide web at home, school or work are just part of the reason for its importance in the U.S. economy. Information technology and the Internet have become critical tools for U.S. business growth and productivity, as well.

AN IMPORTANT BUSINESS TOOL

Today American companies invest 45 percent of their total equipment budgets in information technology – and for a good reason. The digital economy has done far more than create new products – such as ATM network banking, on-line stock trading and new forms of entertainment. Every major corporation uses computerized networks to form instant communication links between workers to enhance productivity. These networks also track procurement and inventory, cut costs and deliver goods more quickly to consumers. In fact, the savings generated by on-line inventory control has become so important that the two largest U.S. auto makers – Ford and General Motors – are in the process of moving their entire supply operations to the Internet. With this new system, Ford and GM can deliver customized products to consumers within days instead of weeks. Both companies believe an online supply operation will save them one billion dollars in the first 18 months alone.

Examples like these show why it will be increasingly difficult for U.S. business to partner overseas with companies lacking competence in information technology. Not only does information technology make the physical distance between a company and its subsidiaries irrelevant. But, it helps to ensure direct control in overseas environments where quality-control management techniques may lag behind. That's why Asian manufacturers working for U.S. clients are adding computerized networks to their operations. They're preparing for the day when their preeminence in the offshore labour market is challenged by the new WTO agreement with China. They plan to stay competitive by building in technology-based quality control and logistical support that will add tremendous value for their clients.

The spread of the Internet is creating another business revolution unheard of just five years ago: e-commerce, or the selling of goods and services over the Internet. This year the Internet economy, including e-commerce, generated $507 billion for the U.S. economy – up 68 percent from 1998. That means businesses related to the Internet generate more revenue in the U.S. than telecommunications and the airlines.

What's remarkable about e-commerce and the Internet economy is how much they've stimulated the growth of small businesses in the United States. It costs far less to put up a web page than it does to open a traditional store. With a web site, any business of any size can have the world as its market, instead of just the neighbourhood.

Laura Genero
A New Kind of Virtual Reality: The Impact of Information Technology on Euro-Atlantic Integration

IMPACT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY

It's no surprise that the U.S. government reports that information technology was responsible for one-third of our economic growth during the last four years. In fact, the government tells us that information technology lowered our rate of inflation by one full percentage point in 1998.

It's even affected age-old immigration patterns. For the first time in our history, for example, Irish immigration to the United States has reversed itself – thanks, in part to information technology. That's because the economy of Ireland is experiencing the highest rate of growth in Europe, largely because of exported white-collar technology jobs and new technology businesses started by returnees. Now, more Irish return to Ireland each year than leave for other countries.

It's just one example of what many believe will be a new labour paradigm in the 21st century. Just as the late 20th century was characterized by the export of manufacturing jobs abroad, the 21st century will be characterized by the migration of white collar jobs abroad to more competitive, but technology-ready, labour markets. We're seeing it already. In the last several decades, large U.S. corporations have moved their back office functions such as payroll, accounting and credit card processing out of big cities to more competitive labour markets in the rural Midwestern and Southern United States. Now they're looking for venues in other countries for some of these processes.

REINVIGORATING PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE DIPLOMACY

The importance of information technology and the Internet, however, goes beyond economics. It's having a profound impact on society and politics. The Internet allows individuals located at great distances from each other to interact with tremendous efficiency, speed and impact at relatively low cost. But it's real power is giving individuals access to mass audiences – something that only television could previously provide to the select few who made it onto the airwaves. Today, through the Internet, the words

53

of non-celebrities can echo around the world and influence events with equal or greater force than television.

Let me give you two examples.

– The 1997 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to an American woman who organized an international campaign to ban the use of land mines over the Internet from her cabin in Vermont. She had no office and no staff. Yet she managed to create a worldwide network of supporters, who influenced the decision of governments, solely through the use of e-mail and Internet-produced information.

Here's another example closer to home:

– When Kosovo was under siege by Yugoslav forces, the U.S. public got a look at what was happening inside that city from e-mail sent to a California high school student by a 16-year old Albanian girl. Her messages about the dangers of her everyday life, read by millions of Internet users and re-broadcast over CNN world news, helped galvanize American support for U.S. military action in Kosovo.

The impact of both of these efforts points to a new era of powerful, people-to-people digital diplomacy. Individuals can easily get around national boundaries to send written, voice and video communications anywhere in the world. If you can't get a telephone line connection to dial into the Internet, you can do it wirelessly through a cell phone or through a satellite uplink – outside your country, if necessary.

While some may worry about where this will lead, I believe this kind of connectedness is a good thing. It's a powerful integrating force. It's like moving in next door. Part of the reason the Albanian girl I mentioned above made such an impact is that she became a virtual next-door neighbour. Through her first-hand accounts, Americans got to know her personally, to befriend her, to care about her. For this reason, the Internet can be a powerful tool for developing mutual understanding, respect and concern between people in different countries and cultures. Through the Internet, Croatia can invite the people of the United States into its living rooms, classrooms and workplaces.

DIGITAL DEMAND RISES IN EUROPE

The digital revolution is important not only in the United States, but in Europe.

Studies report that one-fifth of Europeans use the Internet but that ratio is expected to grow significantly. In

fact, some analysts predict European Internet use will equal that of the United States by 2003 and that the European e-commerce will grow to $430 billion by that year.

If these predictions are correct, the change won't happen by accident. Many European governments, aware that they are playing catch up to the Atlantic side of the Alliance, are creating policies to encourage Internet access. In September, the German government announced a national technology strategy aimed at giving 40 percent of the German population, or 32 million people, online access by the year 2005. Italian Internet use has jumped from 400,000 people to nearly three times that in the past year alone because of a concerted effort by telecommunications companies to offer free Internet access over mobile phones. And one quarter of the British population is regular Internet users. These are just a few examples of how pervasive the Internet is becoming in Europe.

NEW BREAKTHROUGHS MAY LOWER COSTS

Many people believe the Internet revolution is not for everyone because it requires the sophistication to operate a computer and the money to buy one. While it's true that the Internet is PC-based in the United States, in Europe it is fast becoming linked to the mobile, wireless phone. Europe is way ahead of the United States in mobile phone use because it adopted one standard – GSM technology that works everywhere. Voice activated technology is being developed so that mobile phone owners can dictate e-mail to send over the Internet without using a keyboard.

And soon there will be a third way to access the Internet – via a digital box on top of your television set. In fact, it's becoming clearer and clearer that in the 21st century access will not be the problem it is today. People will be able to access the Internet through whatever technology they can afford – television, telephone, or personal computer.

But the computer will always be important for complicated business uses. And soon even computers may cease to be cost prohibitive. Researchers in the U.S. are aggressively working to create digital computer circuits built around chemical reactions at the molecular level. It would be much less expensive to produce computers built around this concept than electronic circuits etched on silicon chips that have to be manufactured in billion-dollar clean rooms. This development alone could someday make the personal computer as cheap and commonplace as the telephone or the calculator. And this is not a

pie-in-the-sky projection. Major U.S. corporations in partnership with universities are funding this work, which is progressing faster than originally anticipated. The New York Times recently reported that experts predict such computers could become available within the first decade of the 21st century.

DIGITAL PROJECTS TO FURTHER INTEGRATION

Now that I've laid it all out and told you how important and pervasive the digital revolution is – what do we do with it? How can Croatia use these developments to its advantage? How can this technology help Croatia integrate itself into a closer alliance with Europe and the United States?

First of all, the fact that Croatia – like other European countries in transition – has a technology infrastructure gap has some advantages. Take the Y2K problem. The United States and Europe are faced with a huge technical remediation problem because of the inability of some computers to distinguish between the year 2000 and the year 1900. It's a problem that will take literally billions of dollars to fix.

Croatia and other countries without extensive high tech infrastructure can expect the problem to be much less severe. A recent report by Andersen Consulting, entitled "Reconnecting Europe", points to other benefits of the technology deficit in European countries in transition. Because information technology is more pervasive in the West, we are saddled with many older telecommunications infrastructures that are on the verge of becoming obsolete. For example, the streets and backyards of America are being dug up right now to add fiber optic wires to existing underground copper telephone cables. Telephone lines need this extra capacity to carry the huge amount of digital information required when telephones, televisions and computers merge. But Croatia is coming into the digital revolution at just the right time – at the birth of convergence technology. You can "leapfrog" over the West and acquire state-of-the-art infrastructure, ready for the 21st century, in the first instance. Andersen Consulting, in its excellent report on "Reconnecting Europe", surveys several eastern European countries in transition that are doing just that with great success.

Here are some suggestions for ways to use information technology to help Croatia integrate itself into the United States and Europe:

■ **Build closer ties to U.S. educational institutions through distance learning projects.** More than 800 American universities now offer for-credit college courses online. One Canadian University offers a full graduate degree in business administration online and others have plans to follow. Major corporations, such as Cisco, are creating online courses specifically designed to teach workers located anywhere on the globe information technology skills.

Online partnerships with universities and corporations could help Croatia in many ways. Most immediately, it could assist in the development of advanced information technology curriculums for Croat secondary schools and universities. Distance learning could make American university courses available to Croat students who could not otherwise afford to travel to the United States. And information technology could provide Croat universities with an opportunity to create and participate in joint research projects with western universities without actually leaving home.

■ **Build closer ties to U.S. information technology companies, the highest growth industry in the United States.** In particular, you should make it a goal to acquaint U.S. technology companies with the high level of academic standards, particularly in mathematics, in your schools. It is an unfortunate fact that many European children have far greater math skills than American students – particularly at the gymnasium level. It's not surprising to me that a team of Croat students who recently participated in a nationwide U.S. computer science competition nearly won – despite the difference in their technical resources. The high level of academic skills of your gymnasium and college students is a real advantage in the international competition for skilled knowledge industry workers.

■ **Participate aggressively in the lucrative market for information technology professionals.** As robust as the information technology sector is, its growth is being hampered worldwide by a shortage of professionals trained in information technology. The U.S. projects a shortage of 850,000 technology workers by 2002, and Europe will have a projected shortage of one million information technology professionals by that year. In fact, the number of U.S. students pursuing high technology degrees is declining, while our needs are increasing. Through corporate and academic partnerships, Croatia could help fill this gap in IT professionals by encouraging its students to study these subjects, which

57

offer the promise of immediate employment after graduation. Some of these graduates will go abroad to work in technology companies. But some will undoubtedly use their education to set up their own ventures here.

■ **Assist enterprises to reorganize production and modernize technology infrastructure.** As I mentioned above, American business invests in technology because it is crucial to remaining competitive and cutting costs of production. In "Technology as an Enabler of Transition", Andersen Consulting charts the success of businesses in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and other transition economies that are using technology to reorganize production and become competitive. One of their case studies is the Polish ship building industry, which was on the verge of bankruptcy in 1990. By 1995 this industry had turned itself around, which management attributes to a qualified workforce and the acquisition of leading-edge technologies. I know that shipbuilding is an important industry to Croatia and information technology could help you establish a competitive edge in that field.

■ **Spur the growth of an information technology industry within your own borders by developing legal protections for intellectual property.** Many analysts believe the lack of such protection in many of Europe's transition economies is a major barrier to developing more homegrown software and hardware entrepreneurs.

■ **Encourage the growth of local Internet service providers**. Let me mention one example of how strong the market is for this kind of service, even in the most difficult of circumstances. The Boston Globe reported on a young Albanian man who opened an Internet cafe in Pristina, Yugoslavia just two months ago with the help of an American partner located in Douglas, Massachusetts. The American partner provided the capital and flew over the satellite uplink facilities to get the Pristina Internet connection up and running. Now – despite frequent power blackouts – this Internet cafe is thriving. I know from my own searches on the Internet that there are many Croats already on the worldwide web. But Croatia might consider following Germany's lead and develop a nationwide strategy to ensure even greater Internet access that encompasses rural, as well as urban, populations. This could be accomplished in many ways, including public access through libraries, kiosks in municipal buildings and many other venues. This is particularly important if you want to grow an e-commerce industry. A recent study by International

Data Corporation of 28,000 Internet users in 80 countries found that interest in the purchase of goods and services over the Internet is surprisingly widespread. Even in less developed countries like China and India, 25 percent of survey respondents had purchased something online in the three months surveyed. With its ability to cross national boundaries, e-commerce could help Croat businesses open up new markets in a cost-effective manner.

■ **Reinvigorate people-to-people diplomacy in a cost-effective manner through the Internet.** Student, athletic and cultural exchanges are a time-honoured way of promoting contact and understanding between nations. But they can be expensive and difficult to arrange. Internet exchanges, on the other hand, are relatively inexpensive to sponsor and have a multiplier effect because they can reach many people simultaneously. I envision, for example, Croat school children adopting classes of American e-pals and corresponding with them over the Internet on a regular basis. This dovetails with the U.S. government's strategy to put computers into every school in America. I might suggest, as a practical matter, that a state like West Virginia would be a good place to start this project. That state is well on its way to putting computers into every classroom and teaching every elementary school student how to use them.

CONNECTIVITY: A 21ST CENTURY GIFT

These are just a few practical suggestions on how to use information technology and the Internet to further the process of integrating Croatia into Europe and the United States. As I mentioned in the beginning of this paper, information technology is becoming an indispensable part of western economies, cultures and politics. It will be impossible to plan a strategy to integrate Croatia with the West without taking this force into consideration. In fact, digital information technology is already at work integrating our economies, cultures and politics – whether we like it or not. My recommendation is to acknowledge this process and get out in front of it, devising ways to use this technology to enhance productivity, create economic opportunities and encourage positive ties between our two countries.

President Tudjman implicitly recognized the importance of the digital information revolution when he noted in a 1997 economic report to the nation that, "We live in

59

Laura Genero
A New Kind of Virtual Reality: The Impact of Information Technology on Euro-Atlantic Integration

a world where knowledge is increasingly playing a key role in every field. Therefore, investing in people becomes as important as investing in any other field, if not more so." That's what the digital information revolution is all about. At it's heart it's not about circuits, but about individuals. It removes the final barriers of distance between individuals and empowers them to communicate, teach, learn and engage in commerce with one another on a worldwide scale.

This new era of connectivity is a gift. It gives us a powerful new tool to learn about one another. I believe we should seize that opportunity. Over time, as we get to know each other better, I believe that our mutual understanding and respect will grow. I look forward with great enthusiasm to the deeper bonds that information technology will help forge between Croatia, the United States and Europe.

Thank you.

Acknowledgements

The following sources provided invaluable information for my presentation:

The U.S. Digital Economy and Its Impact:

l. U.S. Department of Commerce, Digital Economy Conference, May 25, 1999, Washington, D.C.

2. Strategis Group, November 10, 1999 research report on U.S. Internet use.

3. "Internet Indicators", a study conducted by the University of Texas and sponsored by Cisco Systems, Inc., released October 27, 1999.

4. "Auto Giants to Migrate Supply Chains Online", Financial Times, November 9, 1999.

5. American Electronics Association, August 26, 1999 report on decline in students pursuing hi-tech degrees.

6. "Web Set for Online Education", News.com, June 4th, 1998.

7. "Net Could Change Education", Reuters, June 1, 1998.

8. "Cisco's Chambers: e-learning will help us control our destinies", ZDNet, November 18, 1999.

9. John T. Chambers, CEO of Cisco Systems, Inc., speech before November 1999 Comdex convention, Las Vegas, Nevada.

10. "U.S. Activist Receives Nobel Peace Prize for Land Mine Campaign", Washington Post, October 11, 1997.

11. E-Mails from Kosovo, Parts I-V, CNN Special Report, 1998.

European Digital Economy & Information Technology Impacts:

l. NUA Internet Surveys, September 1999.

2. "Free Access Boosts Internet in Italy", Reuters, October 21, 1999.

3. "Germany Aims to Have 32 Million (Internet) Users by 2005", Reuters, September 24, 1999.

4. "One Fifth of Europeans Use the Internet", Cyber-sc@n, October 22, 1999.

5. "One Quarter of Britons Are Regular Net Users", CommerceNet/Nielsen Media, October 28, 1999.

6. "Reconnecting Europe", Andersen Consulting special report, September 1999.

7. The Economic and Social Impact of Electronic Commerce, OECD report, 1999.

8. "Entrepreneur Brings Net Access to Pristina Through Mass. Link", Boston Globe, November 12, 1999.

Global Digital Economy:

1. "Global IT Skills Shortage Set to Intensify", International Data Corporation, September 23, 1999 report.

2. Project Atlas™: The World's Largest Web Survey, November 1999, International Data Corporation.

61

Vlado
ŠAKIĆ

Zagreb, Croatia

THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND THE NEW EUROPEAN ORDER

INTRODUCTION

The entire western world, founded on the tradition of Graeco-Roman culture, Christianity, and Judaism, is anticipating the new millennium with a newfound optimism and old fears. Rome, Paris, London, New York, Sydney, and other "capital cities" of western civilization are preparing for glamorous celebrations and fireworks that will mark the beginning of the new millennium. However, on the margins of western civilization, at the end of this millennium, the last years have been "celebrated" using a different type of fireworks that have not entertained the participants. Instead it has destroyed their lives, homes, as well as those cultural and religious monuments that witnessed the presence of the above-mentioned civilization in those areas. Let us recall Dubrovnik, Sarajevo, Vukovar, and Erevan. Since such "fireworks", on a much larger scale marked the beginning and the middle of the 20th century in Europe and subsequently throughout the world, issues of the blame and responsibility of Europe for those conflicts, and its responsibility in the new world integration have been raised. The latter may end up as "the end of history", according to the utopian, optimistic vision of F. Fukuyama (1992), or as a "coming of anarchy" according to the catastrophic vision of R.D. Kaplan (1994). Why do we insist on "blame" and "responsibility"? For many nations and people from other continents, Europe is not only the "cradle of western civilization", but also a synonym for colonial expansion, slavery, racism, economic exploitation, cultural dominance, and ecological irresponsibility. While we easily accept Europe's "glamour", it is difficult to accept its "misery". Unfortunately, what has been reproached by others as historical guilt is present in part if the current situation in Europe is analysed, that is, European North-South and West-East relations.

In such a context, it seems interesting to analyse some theoretical paradigms or models, in an attempt to forecast the main patterns of the world's future. In particular, the

future of western civilization, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, that is, the disappearance of the strictest block division in the history of western civilization. Since those theoretical paradigms also deal with conflict stemming from the collapse of Communism, this analysis will mainly focus on the impact of those conflicts on new European and world integration. Such an approach is appropriate because most of the authors of these theoretical paradigms emphasize the importance of solving and preventing conflict in Europe, as a prerequisite for new integration which in turn would guarantee a more stable Europe than that of the 20th century. Moreover, conflicts and their impact have mostly determined European integration and division during the 20th century. Empirical support for these conclusions will be drawn from studies related to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, and the conflicts linked to that process. The basic reason for this is not because I come from Croatia; rather, it rests on two other facts. The first is that most of the authors of paradigms and models, that will be examined in this paper, have shown a tendency to use European space and the events that took place there during the 1990s as examples to corroborate their fundamental assertions. The second one relates to historical experience linked to this area, in particular, the First World War, which broke out after the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo. This served as a warning that a major conflict could happen again at the end of 20th century due to unresolved or unjustly solved relations between actors of the conflicts in that area.

THEORETICAL MODELS AND PARADIGMS

Three theoretical paradigms and models that deal with global developments and the future of the world after the collapse of Communism and block division in Europe will be examined in this paper. These particular paradigms and models were chosen because they represent different views based on various dominant factors for forecasting European and world future. Moreover, in their examinations they use conflict as a crucial factor of their predictions.

In other words, the basic intention behind this choice is not connected to an evaluation of these paradigms and models in relation to others (which, by the way, have increased in recent years), but by the amount of public attention they have attracted and because they are most closely related to the topic of this study.

In his book, *The Clash of Civilizations*, S. Huntington (1993) explains his views on a global, planetary future. The most interesting part of the book is where he explains that a clash of civilizations could determine the global future of our planet. In doing that, Huntington has borrowed a definition of civilization from the English historian and sociologist, Toynbee (1889–1975), i.e., that civilizations are in fact societies, which are born, and have their course of life. They come into being within some certain territory and spiritual framework, which is primarily determined by religion. Within this context, Huntington writes about the clashes of civilizations as an act depending on power. According to both Huntington and Toynbee, a central feature of a particular civilization is religion. Moreover, in addition, certain values that determine a civilization may include some cultural values among which language holds an important place. Thus, according to Huntington, western civilization includes classical civilization, Catholicism, Protestantism, European languages, secularism, government rights, parliamentarianism, and individualism. Huntington claims that western civilization is at the peak of its power compared to other civilizations, which, according to Oswald Spengler means that it has a tendency to deterioration and gradual impoverishment. The Asian and Islamic civilizations are, on the contrary, "dynamic civilizations of the last quarter of the 20th century", expanding and growing. The end of the Cold War, according to Huntington, caused a new grouping of states along civilizational divides. In particular, he considers the divide between the West and the East, claiming that Europe ends "where western Christianity ends, and Islam and Orthodoxy begin". This divide, in a European context, stretches along the border between Finland and Russia, the Baltic countries and Russia, and then cuts across Belorussia and the Ukraine (separating the more Catholic western Ukraine from the Orthodox eastern part). Then it turns westward separating Transylvania from the rest of Romania, and subsequently crosses through the former Yugoslavia almost exactly following the line that divides Croatia and Slovenia on the one side, and the rest of the states in the former Yugoslavia on the other.

Huntington considers clash defined as such and developed civilizations as a "mini-clash of civilizations" and "clash of civilizations". The former is related to clashes

within western civilization related to specialized weaponry, human rights and democracy, as well as immigration which is a consequence of "a global immigration crisis". The latter is related to a "clash at a global level", or an intercivilizational clash. A clash at the global level may occur at a local level and along the divides between neighbouring states of different civilizations, or between groups of different civilizations within a complex state such as the former U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia. In particular, a clash between the West and Islam is possible, as exemplified by the Gulf War. Huntington is ambivalent about the future of our planet. In other words, if clashes between civilizations are dominant then the future is pessimistic; whereas if coexistence is dominant, then it is bright.

SECOND PARADIGM –
Social-Liberal Theory of World Development
by A. Tausch and F. Prager

In their book, *Towards a Social-Liberal Theory of World Development* (1993), Tausch and Prager see the foundational future of world development in the development of the social liberalism idea. That idea, in the European context consistent with left social-democrat theory, was theoretically developed by Marxist revisionists, especially the Austrian Marxists, and applied in political and economic practice by Swedish and Austrian social democrats.

In their theoretical approach to world development, Tausch and Prager advocate a new version of democratic humane socialism. They highly value the "theory of dependence", i.e., an approach typical of the Latin-American perspective, which is directly opposed to the theory of modernization in which the modernization of the so-called "Third World" is carried out in the interest of developed countries, the owners of capital. In other words, Tausch and Prager are opposed to the future of a world development based on directing the industrial and economic development of the Third World in such a way that it remains undeveloped and permanently dependent. They claim that this would be a continuation, rather than a prevention of different types of conflicts at a world level caused by uneven economic growth, and resulting, at a political level, in new forms of neo-colonialism.

Kaplan, in his book *The Coming Anarchy* (1994) developed a paradigm of political and economic world development at the beginning of the new millennium. In contrast to Fukuyama's theory (1992), he sees the future of the world in chaos, anarchy, ethnic and racial uprisings and wars, disease and epidemics, ecological catastrophes, as well as social and national disintegration. In other words, according to Kaplan, in the next century, widespread chaos and madness awaits us on our over-populated planet. He maintains that a minority of the world population will live in cities and suburbs in a well-cared environment, where ethnic hatred is restrained by bourgeois prosperity. While the rapidly growing majority will remain locked in the past, living in huts, and their efforts to rise out of that misery, cultural decay and ethnic conflicts will be marred by the lack of drinking water, fertile land and living space. In developing countries those traumas will force people to make a political choice between totalitarianism like for example in Iraq, pro-fascist mini-states, like the Serb creations in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as highway bandits, like for example in Somalia.

DISCUSSION

The basic objective of this discussion, as stated in the introduction, has been to examine the relations between different types of conflict in the contemporary world, especially in Europe, and the directions of the new world and European integration of the 21st century after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Prior to an analysis of the basic tenets of the presented theories of conflict, it is necessary to point out some systemic factors that burden this type of analysis and make them less precise than microanalysis.

1. It can be noted that the tendency toward "globalist theories", within the framework of western civilization is more characteristic for authors from the United States, than from Europe. Kaplan, for example, has pointed out the "Eurocentrism" of such theories, two of which are mentioned in this paper, and claims that this is the drawback of these theories. This tendency may point to a twofold conclusion. First, that the U.S. has proficiently solved issues of internal or in Huntington's words, "intracivilizational" barriers to global integrations in a better way than Europe. Second, that the U.S.

69

is more interested in and is more eager to approach issues of global integration.

2. Different globalist paradigms, as evident from this analysis, emphasize the dominance of one factor over another, in discussions of their influence on future world integration. Specifically, Huntington emphasized the significance of religious and cultural factors, whereas Tausch and Prager paid attention to economic ones while Kaplan accentuated demographic, economic, and ecological factors.

3. All the authors of these paradigms in regard to the future of world development, discuss the relationship between the center and periphery of civilizations. According to their interpretations, this is an important factor. First of all, their definitions of center differ. For example, for Huntington, the center is mainly defined by religious and cultural value orientations, whereas the center is primarily determined by the wealth and geopolitical position of particular countries in the other two models. However, in the case of western civilization, regardless of the different approaches used to define center, with few exceptions, authors agree that in a territorial sense the U.S. and Western Europe constitute the center.

Thus, in general, religious, value, cultural, or economic-population factors should mainly determine our future. Predictions range from utopian visions of the "end of history", and a victory of "liberal paradise" in which we will be all happy and rich, to world catastrophes that remind us of "Doomsday". It is not difficult to conclude that this is the basic reason for this kind of diametrically opposing viewpoint of global levels from which the world's future is considered. We can use, in this sense, an analogy. It is well known that that the further we fly up into the air in an airplane, certain realities of the Earth's surface assume new meanings since they can be interpreted in different ways. For example, a road may be confused with a river or a mountain may appear as a mere hill. The objects on the Earth become smaller and they are less visible from higher levels. At a certain point they totally disappear from sight. In other words, our total perspective of "down below" is determined only by the bulkiest realities. Moreover, as the example of the road and the river shows, the total perspective cannot be correctly perceived.

This analogy may be applied, within the context of the above mentioned theories, to a discussion of dominant and less important factors which according to the authors of the mentioned paradigms determine world and

European future with regard to the relation of the center and periphery. With regard to the criteria for the territorial formation of a civilization, Huntington has ascribed an important role to religious factors "supported" by some cultural ones. He draws supporting material for his basic hypotheses from conflicts which are based on the differences of those factors between states or ethnicities at the margins of civilizations defined in this way.

It is a fact that at the margins of these civilizations there were conflicts, not only after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but throughout history. For example, during the breakdown of Yugoslavia, which Huntington often uses as his favorite example, members of the Orthodox and Islamic civilization, as called by Huntington destroyed hundreds of churches and cultural monuments of exceptional value that belong to the heritage that Huntington calls Western Christianity. This happened in front of the centers of western civilization. They did not see the clash the way Huntington did; because if they had, that conflict could have been prevented or the outcomes could have been less devastating. However, Huntington gave no importance to some factors which, independent of his views, also had a decisive influence on the conflict, and which could be used as support for the Tausch-Prager paradigm. Namely, it is well known that neither the first nor the second Yugoslavia came into being as a manifestation of the political and democratic will of different peoples of its former territory. They were established on the basis of global and some European interests and world circles as well as the will of different national or ideological distinctive elite. Thus, the will of citizens from populations to which they belonged was not a decisive factor when making decisions about joining the union. For this reason, both Yugoslavias were marked by totalitarianism as the dominant political and ideological paradigm based on repression and economic exploitation. In contrast to the Tausch-Prager analysis, economic exploitation or a colonial relation in the former Yugoslavia did not come from the West and spread toward the East. On the contrary, its direction was from the East to the West. Since the centers of western civilization viewed the conflict "from high above", it was easier for them to explain it away as a religious and cultural conflict, according to which the categories of blame were applicable to all. The West failed to recognize that the crisis has deep roots that are related to the exploitation of one "intracivilization" over another in the context of a common state. The center of that "intracivilization" was in Belgrade, in the east of the former Yugoslavia, that today still has not come to terms with the fact

that it has lost the possibility to exploit using the totalitarian model of authority, but continues under new state circumstances to engage in conflicts. For example, the current clash between Serbia and Montenegro over issues of Montenegrin independence can also test the importance of economic factors in the social-liberal theory. The religious and cultural factor, in a Huntingtonian sense, cannot be recognized as the dominant factor in the Montenegrin desire for political independence since aggressors from this area destroyed Dubrovnik. The dominant factors are linked to the neo-colonial position of Montenegro in the new-old union. The example of Macedonia can be added to this. Although it is situated in the east and belongs to the intracivilization that is similar to the present Yugoslavia, it separated from the former Yugoslavia as soon as its citizens could do this in a democratic way.

This kind of logic also confirms our conclusions concerning the relationship between the center and periphery in the former Yugoslavia in terms of economic exploitation. The same context helps to explain why Croatia and Slovenia, the most developed western republics of former Yugoslavia were the most motivated to leave the old union. This is also the reason why "the center", of economic exploitation using Yugo-institutions in the country and abroad, tried to keep by force, at least, Croatia as the most economically developed and culturally "the most western" republic in that structure.

However, it is more difficult to apply the same logic in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this case, it seems to be easier to confirm Kaplan's and Huntington's theories, as opposed to the social-liberal one. Namely, the intensity of the conflict, its nature, the number of sides in the conflict, motives of the clash and the difficulties the international community has encountered in its attempt to impose a lasting peace, indicate that the international community did not recognize the true nature of the conflict on time. In addition, the international community cannot predict the conflict's outcome regardless of the political measures and economic initiatives. Yet, it would be a mistake to oversimplify and talk about a tribal conflict in Huntington's, or ethnic conflict and population expansion in Kaplan's sense. Namely, a more thorough historical, political, and geopolitical analysis seems to indicate that one may, albeit with more difficulty than in the case of the entire former Yugoslavia, recognize a division between the West and East in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At that level of observation, the clash can be explained in terms of Huntington's theory more precisely than the clash that occurred in the entire

former Yugoslavia. Huntington himself has failed to do so, since his map of western civilization does not include any part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Naturally, if we view the center of Europe from this type of perspective, the same theories may lead to similar conclusions. Who could deny, in such a context that similar logic may be applicable to the relationship between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, Basque country and Spain, Northern and Southern Italy. Of course, such conclusions in imaginary situations can only be drawn if a clash within those European countries occurred and that some of the mentioned regions have achieved a certain type of internationally recognized state sovereignty. Undoubtedly, it can be assumed in the context of the mentioned theories, that authors from Northern Ireland, Basque country, and Southern Italy would draw similar conclusions.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

This analysis has led to three general conclusions:

1. Theories of "global destiny" have been proposed in an attempt by their authors to bring more light and order to the globalisation process. However, the fact that these theories are positioned along a continuum that range from extremely optimistic to extremely pessimistic, is valid evidence against their significant scientific validity with regard to a more precise prediction of dominant factors that determine global world development.

2. The theories have used almost the same group of events that occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall to substantiate their credibility. However, the way these events have been interpreted points to two types of fallacies. One stems from "the height of the plane from which the author predicts global developments", and the other is related to the positionality of the author considering the "inter" and "intracivilization" criteria of interests to which he/she belongs.

3. A view from the "periphery" used as an example of support to theories of global development seems to indicate that, on the basis of objective indicators, each of the mentioned theories can be both justified and refuted. Moreover, an imaginary example of possibilities applicable to these theories in any part of Europe has also been set up. This could be also done for all the other continents.

European integration and conflicts, as a part of world integration and conflicts will depend; it appears, equally on cultural, religious, economic, population, ecological, geopolitical, historical, and other factors in the future. Moreover, it seems that dominance of some factor in conflict or integration will depend on two criteria. The first one is related to the real situation in the area of conflict or integration, and the other relates to the interests of the actors in the conflict or actors of the integration process. As conflicts most often occur at the margins of civilizations (in the sense of some of the mentioned theories), and integration models stem from the centers of the same civilizations, it can be generally concluded that integration processes stand a better chance than conflict and chaos, insofar as the integration actors while establishing peace in the margin regions do not proceed from their own interests and have "an airplane" view of the margin areas. This means that they should proceed with an analysis of the real causes of conflicts as well as investigate the consequences, which imposed models of conflict solution, consistent with integration actors' interests may bring about in the near future. For this, "a view from an airplane that flies low over the periphery" is of more use than "a view from an airplane that flies high over the center of a civilization" that does not differentiate roads from rivers, mountains from hills and people are seen as a reflection of the interests of the "intracivilization" to which they belong. Presumably, in this way, a paradigm could be established in which "coexistence between civilizations" is more probable than total anarchy. Moreover, the dominant principle would be the principle of equal justice whereby the relationship between the center and periphery is based on interest(s) and within a context of characteristic features based on religious and cultural factors. Needless to say, it seems that such a paradigm, just like those of both Fukuyama and Kaplan, has utopian, rather than real character.

REFERENCES

Fukuyama, F. (1992): *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1993): *The Clash of Civilizations*? A Foreign Affairs Reader, New York.

Kaplan, R. D. (1994): *The Coming Anarchy*. The Atlantic Monthly, New York.

Kukoč, M. (1995): Globalne promjene i nove paradigme svjetskog razvoja, (Global Changes and New Paradigms of World Development) *Društvena istraživanja*, 4, No. 1, pp.5–23.

Tausch, A. & Prager, F. (1993*): Towards a Socio-Liberal Theory of World Development*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Mislav
KUKOČ

Zagreb, Croatia

MULTICULTURALISM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Although multiculturalism has existed as a phenomenon since the beginning of the development of global culture, it has only recently become a topic of theoretical debate and an object of social research.[1]

Multiculturalism became an issue with the growing emancipation of previously marginalized national and ethnic minorities and immigrant communities and was heralded as an effective tool against cultural assimilation by the dominant majority culture. As such, the issue of multiculturalism arises as a theoretical and practical problem primarily in Western Europe, Canada and Australia where it is established as a model for preserving the cultural identity of the newly arriving immigrant communities, mostly through education.

On the other hand, the "birth of a nation" in the United States based on the "melting pot" principle, came about through the genocide of native American Indians and the racist oppression of colored and other immigrants, particularly those who were racially and culturally distant from the dominant WASP group.[2] From the melting pot doctrine, the dominant Anglo-Saxons contrived assimilation and amalgamation as policy paradigms for the purpose of dealing with minority communities. Under assimilation, minority communities were expected to gradually lose their distinctiveness and acquire the values and behaviour patterns of the majority. Implicit in the ideological version of assimilation was the view of the superiority of Anglo-Saxon culture.[3]

However, even in the U.S., multiculturalism has recently transformed social consciousness and has become the basic characteristic of "political correctness" and "cultural sensitivity".[4] Under the influence of these changes the old definition of the American nation as the "melting pot" has been replaced by a new metaphor – the "mixing bowl", or "salad bowl". It implies that there are various ingredients (cultures) in a big bowl (state), which never lose

their original identity and never fully blend to form one substance. This euphemistic multiculturalism has introduced new "politically correct" terms for Americans: "African-American", "Asian-American".[5]

The problem of multiculturalism in the Postcommunist world is quite different.

The breakdown of Communism, the dissolution of the former Soviet and Yugoslav states, the formation of new, independent states and the building of a democratic order – these major social transformations in the life of society have changed many tenets of the social structure within which the problem of multiculturalism should be investigated and understood. This means that the position of multiculturalism in the age of communism and of post-communism in Central Europe, particularly in the regions of the former U.S.S.R. and the former Yugoslavia is essentially changed. However, the change from a totalitarian to a democratic system necessarily implied changes in the nature of multiculturalism. In multinational states like ex-Yugoslavia and the ex-U.S.S.R., multiculturalism was strangled under a totalitarian monoculture. The collapse of that system released many centrifugal forces in some regions of those multinational states, but also created some necessary preconditions so that the problem of multiculturalism could be faced freely at all levels: from international and national to sub-regional and local levels.

The problem of multiculturalism in all its aspects – cultural, political, economic, conceptual, educational, etc. – seems to be one of the major concerns in any investigation of social structural changes. This is even more true of societies, like Croatia and other new nation-states, and, more generally, of societies that have only recently started to build (and rebuild) their principal social, economic, and cultural institutions according to the new principles of a democratic order.

Communism has been characterized by the ideological urge to form supranational states, like Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, in order to provide equality and unification among different societies. The functioning of these quasi-multicultural states was only possible through the use of a repressive political apparatus. Communism provided both: an ideological umbrella and a direct instrument of control and hegemonic domination. Taking into account a certain social inertia, it is very important to explain the means and functions of national manipulation within these supranational states, as to be able to draw conclusions and comparisons for, and from, the present-day situation.

In the communist context, multiculturalism was understood as something occurring only within Yugoslavian and Soviet state borders, and the structure of these artificial multinational states was preferred as the only possible framework for multiculturalism. Other rich intercultural relations, which during the past centuries had built deep foundations for different forms of multiculturalism, were severed by the Iron Curtain and ignored by the official ideological discourse. This is the reason why multiculturalism was understood only within Yugoslavian or Soviet borders. On the other hand, the present-day concept of multiculturalism in the postcommunist states, such as Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.... is based on the stronger civilizational, social, ethnic and historical links with other nations of Central Europe and its concept of multicultural regionalism. The breakdown of communism and the political independence of these countries make a radical reconceptualization of multiculturalism possible.

Changes in the nature of multiculturalism in the Postcommunist world correspond with Samuel Huntington's paradigm, which he calls the clash of civilizations. Huntington predicts that the fundamental source of the global conflict in the next century will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic, but in the first place cultural. That means, "the clash of civilizations will dominate global politics", and the "fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future".[6] However, the global conflict between ideologies, according to Huntington, ended with the Cold War, i.e., with the historical breakdown of Communism. The clash of ideologies – social, political, philosophical, and world-view systems – of the 20th century was historically preceded by national conflicts, which were the basic global conflicts of the 19th century. As the ideological conflict was not the first global conflict in world history, it will not be the last one. The future global conflict of the next 21st century will be, according to Huntington, the clash of civilizations.

During the 20th century, through its technology, and its ideas of Marxism and liberalism, Western civilization has reached the peak of its power and become the master of the world. At the same time, however, as a form of resistance to Western influence, a return to the roots is taking place among non-Western civilizations. This includes recent trends toward a turning inward and "Asiation" in Japan and "Hinduism" in India, then the failure of Western ideas of socialism and nationalism and hence "re-Islamization" of the Middle East, and finally a debate over

liberal Westernization versus an Orthodox Christian Russianization of Russia.

The end of ideologically defined states of Central and Eastern Europe has reactivated traditional ethnic and religious identities. Differences in culture and religion create differences over policy issues. Geographical propinquity gives rise to conflicting territorial claims, such as in the former Yugoslavia. Decreasingly able to mobilize support and form coalitions on the basis of ideology, particular states will increasingly attempt to mobilize support by appealing to a common religion and civilization identity. In that sense, Bosnian-Moslems have tried to mobilize support from the international Islamic community, while Serbs found sympathy and support in Russia and other East European Orthodox Nations.

Huntington takes the war in the former Yugoslavia, particularly the war in Bosnia, as an argument and evidence that the clash of civilizations has already begun. Religion, i.e., confession is one of the most important factors of national and cultural differences between conflicting sides in the former Yugoslavia. This is the reason why Huntington finds the beginning of the future global civilizational conflict precisely in the war in ex-Yugoslavia. It is obvious that cultural differences between various civilizations will be increasingly important in the coming decades. The cultural differences between Croatia and Slovenia, as parts of the Central European and Mediterranean culture, on the one hand, and Serbia, which belongs to the East European, Orthodox, Byzantine and Balkan culture, on the other, are really basic and fundamental. Those differences were the essential reason for the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, as a historically unnecessary, artificial state, without any chance of being established as a lasting and prosperous democratic community.

The communist regimes in the U.S.S.R. and Central Europe did not fall because of nationalism. They were ruined by a multiplicity of historical circumstances, with nationalism merely filling the vacuum left by the absence of other serious ideological and political trends. It is only to a small extent that classical nationalism caused uncertainty, risk, and conflict during the early years of postcommunist national independence.

The authoritarian administrative command mechanisms which kept the communist model functioning and the very model have been completely discarded by Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, by the Baltic states as well as by Slovenia and Croatia, the most developed republics in the former Yugoslavia. These countries may be

said to have identified quite definite tendencies of transformations, which clearly bring them closer to the West and create a new geopolitical situation in Central Europe. A similar situation, burdened with lasting foreign-policy implications, arose in the former Yugoslavia, where the more advanced Slovenia and Croatia initiated the federation's dismantling and turned towards the West, not only to solve their ethnic issues but also to internally accelerate their socio-economic reforms.

The complex form of multiethnicity in most new states constitutes not only a problem of internal integration but also an essential element of geopolitical uncertainty in the region as a whole and in the strategic perspectives of individual states.

Since the 19th century, Russia has been involved in an unending debate between Slavophiles and Westernizers. While the "Westernizers" have seen Russia as a part of Europe, the "Slavophiles" comprehend Russia as the spiritual guardian of the "Third Rome", destined to create and lead a new, more spiritual, non-European, pan-Slavic civilization. This trend reflects widespread xenophobia and "anti-Westernism". In that sense, the Russian political scientist, Emil Pain concluded "Russian nationalism in its mass manifestations is nothing but degenerating Soviet consciousness".

Although nationalism is not the basic source of the collapse of communism or the disintegration of the former communist multinational states, it is nevertheless a very serious problem in all postcommunist states. Nationalism may be instrumentalized in two ways. First, from within, for the sake of the particular goals of a certain élite, particularly the ruling élite. This ruling élite often presents its own particular interests as the common national interests, just as the old communist *nomenclature* used to do before, presenting its own interest as the common interest of the working class.

There is also the second way of instrumentalizing nationalism. It is instrumentalization from without: the claim that certain societies, particularly the postcommunist societies, are nationalist as such; and their striving for national freedom, independence and sovereignty is seen as nothing but mere nationalism.

Ethnopolitical relations in the postcommunist world of Central Europe are complex and far from uniform. The newly independent states strive for equality with the leading nations of the world; nationalities and ethnic groups strive for their national and ethnic self-determination and self-expression.

The former Yugoslavia was an artificial association of peoples, each with centuries-old problems. The South Slavs had every right to regard themselves as ethnically related but historically distinct ethnic entities with different traditions and cultures. After the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the establishment of the sovereign Croatian state, Croatia is now seeking the way to European integration processes by restoring traditional multicultural ties based on historical links with the Mediterranean and Central European countries. For centuries, Croatia was in union with the Habsburg monarchy. On the other hand, the southern parts of Croatia, such as Dalmatia and Istria were under Venetian rule and cultural influence. The independent Republic of Dubrovnik developed within the ambit of the Mediterranean culture as well. With such legacy, as well as in terms of its interests, Croatia is now trying to find its place in the Western, i.e., Central European and Mediterranean, multicultural circle.

However, the idea of multiculturalism and Huntington's civilizational paradigm are usually seen as quite different, even as opposite approaches. In that sense, certain ideological stereotypes are used, particularly by Huntington's opponents who usually label his paradigm as conservative, reactionary, racist, and Eurocentric, compared to the multicultural paradigm that is progressive, liberal, tolerant, pluralistic, etc. Namely, multiculturalist criticism of Huntington's pro-Western exclusivism, Eurocentrism, even racism is also a product of ideological misinterpretation. On the contrary, Huntington has sharply criticised Western hegemony and imperialism.

There is a delusion, which is broadly spread, in Western civilization. This is a delusion about a universal world civilization, which shares mutual common acceptable human values. Which values? Democracy, liberty, rule of law, equality, social and political pluralism, individualism – all those values belong to the Western civilization. However, the concept of a universal civilization is a distinctive product of Western civilization, which helps justify Western cultural dominance of other societies. Universalism is the ideology of the West for confrontations with non-Western cultures. The non-Wests see as Western what the West sees as universal.

However, non-Westerners do not see human rights and democracy as universal human values but as distinctive Western values, which have been used, as the source of Western hegemony. Concerning these values, hypocrisy and double standards are a lasting characteristic of Western behaviour, i.e., gaps between Western principles and

Western action. Examples: Democracy is promoted but not if it brings Islamic fundamentalists to power; non-proliferation is preached for Iran and Iraq but not for Israel; human rights are an issue in China but not in Saudi Arabia; aggression against oil-owning Kuwaitis is massively repulsed but not against non-oil-owning Bosnians. The war in Kosovo, committed by NATO with the purpose of preventing Serbian genocide against Kosovo's Albanians, is an exception which proves the rule. The Kosovo war is proclaimed as the first war in human history that was not fought for the selfish interests of a belligerent side, but for the sake of human rights.

Huntington is against multiculturalism only in the United States because it must, as the Western core state, preserve vital interests of the Western civilization. But, on the other hand, he pledges for global multiculturality. From this point of view, the New World order must be re-shaped in a way to admit equal rights to each civilization.

Like Huntington, some other scholars have a similar ambivalent approach to the problem of multiculturalism. They believe in the principle of multiculturalism, but are not happy with the methods and approaches used by multiculturalists to achieve their objectives. Amitai Etzioni claims that there is no dialogue between those who favour multiculturalism and those who oppose it because the camps are polarized. He suggests that an approach that appeals to values shared by all, without giving up on the political mobilization of previously disadvantaged groups, is much more likely to serve the quest for social justice. Therefore, "the key to forwarding the canonical debate surely is not attack and counter attack, but rather the search for mutual understanding, respect, recognition of differences and the quest for unifying forces".[7]

Some authors believe that multiculturalism is a fashion, a fad that will come to pass. Lewis Feuer likens multiculturalism to similar movements in ancient Greek civilization when the Roman-Hellenic culture swept through the Mediterranean region. Then, as now, "a hundred or so Christian anti-intellectual sects arose, each claiming that their theological revelations encapsulated a truth higher than that of the Greek science practiced at the library and museum in Alexandria". The multicultural movement has parallels with the Greek era, according to Feuer, because it comes at a time when American-English language, its literature, its motion picture art, and its democratic political culture have engulfed the world. Since the "cultural relativists" did not survive scientific and rigorous inquiry in Greek civilizations, the call for multiculturalism today will

also wither and eventually die off.[8] However, not only have those "cultural relativists" disappeared throughout history, but the ancient Greeks and Romans together with their civilizations which are "buried in the sands of time" have also disappeared.

Finally, some difficult theoretical and practical problems concerning the clash of civilizations and cultures have also occurred among liberal thinkers who undoubtedly supported ideas of multiculturalism, pluralism and toleration. Multiculturalism becomes a problem for liberals when conflicts between groups about values or their interpretation cannot be conformably accommodated within a particular society. Two such examples relate to education and the limits of free speech. It is agreed that all children should achieve certain minimum standards of education and that free speech is an important value, which should be protected by the law. However, on the other hand, Muslims living in the European multicultural community are concerned that the education of Muslim girls should reflect their place in Muslim society rather than the values of secular liberalism. While Muslims have been outraged that "free speech" should permit the vilification of the most sacred beliefs of an already socially disadvantaged group, as Salman Rushdie did in his novel *Satanic verses,* liberals have been similarly scandalized that many Muslims have been prepared to support the *fatwa* which condemns a man, the same Salman Rushdie, to death for writing a novel.

The practice of toleration is indispensable to any modern society marked by ethnic pluralism, and especially to a multicultural society. The ideal of toleration has traditionally been one of liberalism's principal values. The debate on the Rushdie case has shown the limits of toleration. Can the idea of multiculturalism justify the *fatwa* against Rushdie, who is, by the way, a British citizen? If not, is liberalism, as argued only to be tolerant towards cultural and religious communities which are in substantial part microcosmos of the larger liberal society; i.e., those which are themselves liberal, or in other words, those which have been transformed through assimilation and absorption in a liberal Westernized community?[9]

FOOTNOTES

[1] Etienne Verne, "Multicultural Education Policies: A Critical Analysis"; in: *Multicultural Education*, Centre for Educational Research and Innovation, OECD, Paris, 1987, p. 54.

[2] Joel S. Kahn (1995) *Culture, Multiculture, Postculture*. London: SAGE Publications. "Cultural pluralism ... discourse of cultural alterity,

multiculturalism ... replace the 19th century language of civilization, the temporal anteriority of the other, and the emancipation of human beings as autonomous subjects... (15) 19th century ideas of America as a cultural "melting pot": urban society as a racial hierarchy, headed by a white Anglo-Saxon majority in which racial inferiors had as their only option conforming to the values of that majority" – "assimilationism" was the policy of "Americanization". (106–7).

[3] Michael A. Burayidi (Ed.) (1977) *Multiculturalism in a Cross-National Perspective*, University Press of America, Inc., Lanham, p. 18.

[4] Joel S. Kahn (1995) *Culture, Multiculture, Postculture*, London: SAGE Publications. Randolphe Bourne: "America's national character lay not in the legacy of Anglo-Saxon institutions, but in the future creation of a multicultural society." (109)

[5] *Multiculturalism Issue*, "http://www.mindspring.com/angleym"

[6] Samuel P. Huntington (1993) *The Clash of Civilizations?* A Foreign Affairs Reader, New York. (1996) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

[7] Amitai Etzioni (1991) "Social Science as a Multicultural Canon", *Society*, Nov/Dec, p. 16.

[8] Lewis S. Feuer (1991) "From Pluralism to Multiculturalism", *Society*, Nov/Dec, pp. 19–22.

[9] See John Horton, Ed. (1993) *Liberalism, Multiculturalism and Toleration*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

REFERENCES

Burayidi, M. A. (Ed.) (1977) *Multiculturalism in a Cross-National Perspective*, University Press of America, Inc., Lanham.

Etzioni, A. (1991) "Social Science as a Multicultural Canon", *Society*, Nov/Dec.

Feuer, L. S. (1991) "From Pluralism to Multiculturalism", *Society*, Nov/Dec.

Horton, J. (Ed.) (1993) *Liberalism, Multiculturalism and Toleration*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1993) *The Clash of Civilizations?* A Foreign Affairs Reader, New York.

Huntington, S. P. (1996) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Kahn, J. S. (1995) *Culture, Multiculture, Postculture*. London: SAGE Publications.

Kukoč, M. & Polokhalo, V. (Eds.) (1997) *Ukraine & Croatia: Problems of Post-Communist Societies*, Croatian Commission for UNESCO, Zagreb, 1997.

Multiculturalism Issue, "http://www.mindspring.com/angleym"

Polokhalo, V. (Ed.) (1995) *The Political Analysis of Postcommunism*: Understanding Postcommunist Societies, Political Thought, Kyiv.

Verne, E. (1987) "Multicultural Education Policies: A Critical Analysis" in: *Multicultural Education*, Centre for Educational Research and Innovation, OECD, Paris.

Benjamin
TOLIĆ

Zagreb, Croatia

WHAT IS EUROPEAN IDENTITY?

Europe is the only continent that has spent most of the modern age developing and contemplating theories about itself.

There are several reasons for this. First, in addition to all other contradictions, Europe also contradicts the notion of *terra continens* – that is, a large and continuous mass of land completely surrounded by water. Europe is surrounded by sea on three sides, while on the fourth there is a controversial land border with Asia. The most frequently quoted one follows the Ural Mountains, the Ural River, the Manic Plain, the Black Sea and Constantinople Straits. The "continent", together with adjacent islands covers 10,531,000 square kilometers (about 8% of the globe's surface). It is home to 728 million people (13% of humankind) dispersed throughout 44 sovereign countries. The data are impressive but too vague for a clear and far-reaching conclusion.

Those who hailed the second "Springtime of the People" (1989–1990) from the Baltic to the Adriatic did it with the slogan: "Back to Europe." They had a very clear picture of what Europe was in their mind. However, that image has, in the meantime, become murky. The eastern political border of Europe has remained even more controversial.

Ever since the Russian Federation became a member of the Council of Europe, Europeans have been asking: "What is Europe?" The Council of Europe's answer obviously is: "From the Azores to the Kurils." Inasmuch as this may appear to be an exaggeration to an ordinary European, it is not debatable from the point of view of the OSCE and American global strategy. Thus, one cannot blame Strobe Talbott, the American Deputy Secretary of State when, in an article in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (May 26, 1997) entitled "Our Common Task", while advocating Turkey's admission to the European Union, he claimed: "Ever since the 16th century, Turkey has

been a part of the European system." Or (*ibid.*): "Secretary of State, M. Albright... will use her term in office to encourage Europe to define itself in a most inclusive, comprehensive, and spacious way." Within this scope one should also consider what was recently reported in the *Financial Times*. The Prime Minister of Kirghizstan, a land at the eastern end of Central Asia that borders China, declared: "We are dreaming about becoming a part of Europe."

Such statements may sound bizarre, but they should not come as a surprise. They are legitimate within any context of European integration in the 21st century. In a more bizarre way, some member-states of the European Union, have usurped the name of the entire "continent", such that distinction between countries is made by saying, for example, "in France and in Europe", or "in Germany and in Europe", etc. Similarly, some Central European countries, such as Croatia and Hungary "want to join Europe", not just Asian or mainly Asian countries such as Turkey or Kirghizstan. These bizarre features of the political language force us to ask ourselves: "What is really Europe?"

This question that focuses on establishing the *quidditas* ("whatness") of Europe calls for a definition. A vague answer would not suffice as *omnis definitio determinatio est,* every definition is determination. An answer, obviously, cannot be found by looking for controversial geographic borders of the "continent". Searching for it in the realm of geopolitics or geo-strategic projects would also be futile. Hence, I strongly believe that a cultural and historical examination of Europe's identity would be fruitful.

The "continent" was named after Europa, a mythical daughter of the Phoenician King Agenor. Zeus, who abducted Europa, assumed the form of a white bull and took her to Crete. The silver coin of the future common European currency, which one can see broadcasted on German Television, is a contemporary memory of the Greek myth. The reverse side of the coin bears the name of the currency – "Euro" – while the top side shows the figure of a bull.

This old, classical myth has engendered new, modern ones. Some of them have been subject to damaging criticism by historians and philosophers of history. Arnold Toynbee maintains that "Europe is an inconceivable field of research". "Europe" is, according to him, "a cultural misuse of a nautical concept". He does not see Europe as a cultural and historical whole, and favours the scheme proposed by Oskar Halecki that outlines so-called European history as follows: 1. The Mediterranean Period (until 950

A.D.); 2. The European Period (950 through to 1950); and 3. The Atlantic Period (after 1950). Advocates of this theory may add nowadays: The Global Period (after 1989).

Such critical assessments are not unfounded. If we pose questions concerning space, time, and active agents – that are fundamental questions in any historical study – each of these questions leads to a dilemma in the case of European history. First, the very name of Europe may have been a frequently used synonym for the "Christian World" among scholars ever since Charles Martel's victory over the Arabs at Poitiers in 732. Further, it was generally accepted only after the French Revolution (1789). Second, in terms of space, as noted when the geographic concept is examined, Europe's eastern border still seems rather poorly defined. Third, with regard to time, our feeling in general opposes the boundaries set up by Halecki, or any such boundaries at all. Fourth, the active agents, synchronistic or diachronistic, are unstable and varied. They include the empire builders to the "crumbs of history", from weak nations that died out to the long-lived and tenacious ones.

However, inasmuch as we should respect theoretical criticism, we must not forget that one of the foundations of our civilization, a permanent struggle for form, is *mythos*. During the course of history, *myth* engendered *logos*. Any offspring, even the scientific logos, bears the marks of its ancestor. Moreover, every Westerner with just a little bit of true concentration will easily discover in his or her personal life an equal presence of *mythos* and *logos*, if not a preponderance of the former. Thus, in spite of desperate attempts by the hypercritical philosophy of history, which sees Europe only as a "battlefield", the practical *logos* will easily establish that Europe is not just a "regulative idea", but a cultural-historical entity, the *quidditas* of which could be quite precisely defined.

Two hundred years ago, one of the founders of German literary Romanticism, Friedrich von Hardenberg, better known under his pen name of Novalis, entitled one of his essays "Christenheit oder Europa" ("Christianity or Europe" 1799). At that time, such a title was not questioned. How do we react today, after two centuries of secularism, to Novalis's title?

How many people in the today's world, including Croatia, think of Christianity whenever Europe is mentioned? However, as such "notions without perception" (*Begriffe ohne Anschauungen*) are empty, scholarship cannot neglect that fundamental cultural and historical fact. In contrast to politics, it wants to "see" the *quidditas*, the

identity of Europe. Moreover, it sees it through the essential determinants that constitute Europe as a particular cultural-historical entity, or as a "continent". These determinants are:

– Classical heritage – primarily Greek philosophy and Roman law, as well as the Greek and Latin languages;
– Christianity – at first Catholicism, later Catholicism and Protestantism in the West, Orthodoxy in the East;
– European languages – the three branches of the Indo-European language family: Romance, Germanic, and Slavic;
– Universities – the establishment of autonomous places of teaching and research at the beginning of the 12th century;
– Dualism of spiritual and secular power;
– Social pluralism;
– Representative bodies;
– Individualism;
– Enlightenment;
– The National State;
– The rule of the law;
– Specific stylistic formations. In the arts, European expression has been deeply influenced by the classical heritage. It was not difficult to see a constant battle between the two classical super-styles: *Atticism* and *Asianism,* in modern terms, between Classicism and Mannerism. Results of that struggle have been embodied by a sequence of stylistic periods bearing such names as the Romanesque, the Gothic, the Renaissance, the Baroque, the Rococo, Classicism, Romanticism, Realism, and other less important "isms".

Taking into consideration the concentration of these determinants, the cultural-historical landscape of Europe reveals three clearly defined macro-regions: Western, Central, and Eastern Europe.

– *Western Europe.* For all of those who "want to join Europe today" (either as individuals from Africa, Asia, or Central and Eastern Europe or as designers of a political future in their countries) Western Europe is the "True Europe". It stretches from the Atlantic to the eastern provinces of Germany. Mummified Western Christianity (both Catholic and Protestant) and the secular values that stem from that Christianity characterize it. Moreover, they presently function as value elements in a contemporary democracy.
– *Central Europe.* The name bears a heavy political and historical burden. It was first coined by Friedrich Naumann

in his book *Mitteleuropa* (1915), written within a framework of greater-German goals during the First World War. The "Habsburg myth" and the literary utopias of Joseph Roth followed it between the two World Wars. From the Second World War until the fall of the "Iron Curtain", Russian imperialism, by suppressing the cultural and historical identity of the region made any European integration impossible. During that period, the East kept silent about Central Europe. In the West, and especially where German was spoken, one usually spoke of an East Central Europe (*Ostmitteleuropa*), about a Middle Europe (*Zentraleuropa*), about an In-Between Europe (*Zwischeneuropa*), or about the Danubian Region (*Donauraum*). Both sides sought to avoid unpleasant political reminiscences.

Central Europe is characterized by great political atomization, the late arrival of nation states, and a thriving Western Christianity. The considerable cultural contribution of non Indo-European peoples such as the Hungarians and Jews should also be recalled.

The borders of Central Europe, in particular in the West, have been hotly debated in the research literature. Most recently, a consensus that Central Europe includes the eastern provinces of Germany, Austria, and Northern Italy at the western end was reached. As far as the eastern borders are concerned, there is almost a unanimous scholarly agreement. Historians, political scientists, and political leaders of the region agree that the eastern borders of Central Europe coincide with the eastern borders of the former Christian West. The cultural and historical border follows, from North to South, the eastern borders of Finland, Estonia, and Latvia, which then crosses Western Belorussia, and then the Ukraine, separating its western Greek Catholic areas from the eastern, Orthodox ones. It subsequently meanders through Romania separating Catholic Transylvania from the rest of Romania which is Orthodox, then cuts through Voivodina to the eastern border of Croatia, crosses into Bosnia and Herzegovina where it separates Croatian from Serbian and Bosnian communities, and ends at the shore of the Adriatic. Considering the cultural and historical characteristics of the region, one could say that Central Europe is a Western, Petrian, Europe thwarted in its development.

– *Eastern Europe.* This region includes the area between the eastern border of Central Europe and the land border of the European "continent". This area has been strongly influenced by Byzantinism and Islam. Typical cultural and historical features of the "true" Europe – classical

tradition, Latin language, and social pluralism can only be found in small traces. Collectivism prevails instead of individualism. With regard to art, there is also an absence of some historical styles such as the Romanesque, the Gothic, the Renaissance, and the Baroque in this region.

The three European macro-regions have their North and South, their Protestantism and Catholicism, or their Orthodoxy and Islam. They are all integral parts of Europe.

The combination of these fundamental features clearly and eloquently defines Europe as a specific cultural and historical entity, i.e., as a complex, precisely defined system of differences. This should serve as a warning to the architects of the new Europe of the 21st century to expect success only if they stand up for this system of differences. Charles de Gaulle proposed this in an almost forgotten project entitled "Europe of Nations". Otherwise, under the "terror of economy" they may not create a Europe, but something completely different that would be fatal to European identity.

Joachim F.
WEBER

Hamburg, Germany

MITTELEUROPA/ CENTRAL EUROPE – FACT OR POLITICAL HALLUCINATION? A German Geographer's Viewpoint

For quite a while "Mitteleuropa" has been one of the most disputed regional units of Europe among historians, geographers, and politicians. The last time it drew significant attention was in the mid eighties. This was when the initial agony of the Soviet Empire slowly gave way to more discussion about the past and future prospects of countries under eastern hegemonic rule. Kundera's (1985) frequently quoted article about the tragedy of Central Europe ("Die Tragödie Mitteleuropas") symbolizes this debate. Since then, the revived discussion about "Mitteleuropa" has never ceased, although it is not getting all that much public attention at the moment. So what is "Mitteleuropa", does it exist or did it exist in the past, what are its borderlines and is there a difference between the German term "Mitteleuropa" and the Anglo-American term "Central Europe"?

These questions cannot be answered easily due to the nature of this topic. Since it is very obvious that discussions about Mitteleuropa/Central Europe/Middle Europe cover the same region, the term should just be seen as different word formulations in different languages for the same thing. Answers to the following questions can be approached in many different ways. Does this "Mitteleuropa" exist or is it just a hallucination or a construction for the purpose of certain political aims? One needs to go back into history and study the changing perceptions of "Mitteleuropa" as well as when the term itself came into use (Ruppert, 1995; Schultz, 1997).

It has been used in the scientific literature, that is, in German geography and public speech since 1808 (Zeune). However, the term itself as well as a common perception of the word are probably even older. For these reasons, it seems that among German speaking people, Europe's largest ethnic group and culture, a concept of a unit with characteristics of its own has been present for about two centuries, making it a relatively long-lasting concept. It

Joachim F. Weber
**Mitteleuropa/Central Europe
– Fact or Political
Hallucination? A German
Geographer's Viewpoint**

can still be found in almost any Atlas published nowadays. For example, Diercke's newest edition *Weltatlas* (1996) that has been printed for generations in hundreds of thousands of copies and used in all German high schools, has an introductory chapter on Europe that focuses on the physical characteristics, economy, and geology of "Mitteleuropa", although the area's exact borders remain undefined. (The map shows in the east-west direction a region between the Netherlands and the western Ukraine and in the north-south direction it includes an area between southern Denmark and a parallel running approximately along the Bergamo-Zagreb-Hermannstadt line.)

Of course, a German perception will not answer the question "objectively". However, the problem is that *no* answer to this question regarding whether this area exists or not, will be objective. It is a construction as well as a perception. If someone wants its presence, it can be proved. However, if someone wants to prove that it does not exist, it would not be too difficult to provide proof in support of this opinion.

Consequently, is "Mitteleuropa" completely a figment of subjectivity? Without a doubt, many people have different standpoints about what should be included in this "Mitteleuropa". For example, the Central European Initiative (CEI), coordinated in Vienna by an initiative of the Austrian government, includes Central European countries (e.g., the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland), as well as countries such as Albania, Moldavia, and the Ukraine in its roundtable discussions, yet Germany is not a member. Only a small minority of informed people would consider those countries to have been an integral part of Central Europe in the past; on the other hand, Germany is not a part of this. Times may change, but the example of the CEI quite clearly shows, that certain actors at specific times come up with various concepts for different political aims, thus defining "their" Central Europe. In all probability, this is not the way to shape a long-term idea of Central Europe, be it within or even outside the continent.

Another example can be found in the work of Kundera and other writers and essayists that constructed their own "Mitteleuropas" in the second half of the eighties. In their constructions, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary were seen as a unit worthy of the label "Mitteleuropa". Suffering for 40 years under an unjust Russian (i.e., Eastern) occupation seemed to be the criteria used here, as these lands have never been a part of Orthodoxy, that is part of Eastern Europe. While these countries

were never an integral part of the Orthodox Europe, the suffering due to the tragic results of World War II was not their exclusive "privilege".

The idea of this 4 state-unit of "Mitteleuropa", which is known in German as "Ostmitteleuropa" (Eastern Central Europe), faded away soon after its birth: "*The Springtime of Nations* of 1989 ironically ended with the defeat of the idea of Central Europe and of the intellectual group which propagated it" (Czyzewski, 1997, p. 21). After it became clear that there was a chance to join the process of western/developed European integration, i.e., the EU, talks about a future unity of these countries were seized by urgent attempts to become a part of that prosperous Europe to the west of the former Iron Curtain.

These examples have been given to demonstrate that concepts or constructions of different "Mitteleuropas" were rather short-lived and hardly convincing. They came and went, as political ideas or goals emerged or were replaced by others during a particular period of time. On that account, is any perception of "Mitteleuropa" purely artificial? Not necessarily so – and a number of reasons will be given to create a more precise idea of a durable perception, resulting from a combination of facts, and some rather normative values or matters of perspective. Acknowledging again that there cannot be any really "objective" concept of "Mitteleuropa", it can be said that this is a problem "Mitteleuropa" shares with all the "facts" defined by the Humanities.

Physical geographers, being natural scientists, are able to prove within a minute or two to anyone who is interested that there is, according to objective criteria, no "Europe" either. A traditional geographer's definition of "Europe", ending at the Ural Mountains, has been much disputed, and for good reasons, since the twenties. Physically, what we call "Europe" is just the western part of a huge continent of Eurasia. So the notion of a "Europe" is purely a cultural and subjective thing. It is there, if people agree upon this, and it is not there if people want to disagree. Most of us want to agree – the reason being a number of historical developments. In principle, it is the same with "Mitteleuropa", the only difference being that there are more participants with different interests and "geopolitical codes" that want to participate in the discussion.

Entering the scene from an alternate angle, it is very interesting to note that most people – frequently those who deny the existence of "Mitteleuropa" – also take for granted that there is a Northern Europe (mainly the Scandinavian Peninsula), a Western Europe (Spanish Penin-

sula, France, and Britain), a Southern or Mediterranean Europe (Italy, Greece, etc.), and an Eastern Europe (the Great Plains of the European East). Isn't there quite a high likelihood that there is something in the middle, where all the peninsulas and other peripheral parts stick together? (Who has ever defined or proven, that the north of the south begins immediately where the south of the north comes to an end, changing abruptly along a sharp line and without transition?) There is no clear-cut definition of anything, but a matter of basic thinking and common sense, which should be applied to all regional divisions of Europe, or to any place in the world. It cannot be easily defined whether Spain is a part of western or southern Europe. Probably both, with undefined border regions inside the peninsula, where one cultural landscape slowly fades into the other. The same problem is also applicable to Belgium, Denmark, etc.; such that problems of defining the unit of "Mitteleuropa" are not isolated.

Therefore an attempt to define Central Europe is as legitimate as defining Europe or any other sub-unit as well. Traditionally, different definitions have been used. Sinnhuber (1954) classifies them into four groups according to the criteria applied:

i) A topographical or positional term

ii) A physical region, based on one or more criteria of physical elements (compare Dorn, 1960)

iii) A historical or political concept (e.g., Naumann, 1915)

iv) A geographical region based on both physical and human elements.

In practice, perceiving "Mitteleuropa" as a unit of its own involves a combination of these criteria. Moreover, it can be shown that a definition based upon the fourth criterion has been in use for a very long time. Old encyclopaedias, e.g., the "Brockhaus" from 1830 or hundreds of quotations in literature support this. Evidently, since early 19th century the understanding of "Mitteleuropa" as an area in the core of Europe has existed and was defined by human elements or criteria that mainly focussed on German culture and language. Hence, wherever German was spoken and wherever Germans lived or ardently influenced science, literature, culture, and/or politics among their eastern neighbours, there was "Mitteleuropa". Historically, it was a "Germany-plus", an area which was settled and developed by Germans, the "Ostsiedlung" or Eastern colonization of the Middle ages; an area, where cities were founded under German law, resulting in the presence of widespread German ethnic groups.

As a result of their numbers, Germans that subsequently came under the Habsburg rule often held high-ranking positions in the cities. Moreover, this refers to an area called "Mitteleuropa" that was promoted by Friedrich Naumann, in his book "Mitteleuropa" (1915) more than a hundred years later, as a political union. Consequently, many have claimed that Naumann was the founder of the "Mitteleuropa-idea", brought about by the developments before and during the course of World War I. The mistake here is obvious, because the concept of "Mitteleuropa" had already been existent for quite a long time before Naumann published his book. He simply added, under challenging auspices, a plea for the political unification of the area under discussion, which at that time, was still divided between two empires consisting of a number of smaller and larger nations.

Naumann envisaged "Mitteleuropa" in 1915 as an area of the German and Habsburg Empires, "a federation of sovereign countries that would join voluntarily as equal partners on the basis of mutual treaties" (Sinnhuber, 1954, p. 27). This was an area where German was the *lingua franca* and simultaneously an area under German control or influence, combined with the political power of the governments in Berlin and Vienna. This was by no means a truly imperialist concept, but, rather, it reflected a factual state of affairs prior to 1914 in Europe. Considering the Habsburg and German defeats and the Versailles treaty, etc., which completely changed the political map of Europe, one cannot tell if the (later independent) Habsburg countries would have voluntarily joined such a union.

Therefore it is very clear that "Mitteleuropa" can be seen as a unit of Europe that existed at least until World War I. Furthermore, it is debatable whether or not it came to an end as a result of World War I or World War II. Criteria for position and topography did not change, nor did the physical features (see Machatschek, 1925; Schenk, 1995; Ruppert, 1995; Schultz, 1997) nor did most of the cultural artefacts. Most importantly, identification in German speaking countries with "Mitteleuropäer" still seems to be there, so there is no need to preclude "Mitteleuropa" as one of the key units of Europe. It is certainly true that the simplifying, politically based division of Europe into the West (the EU, NATO, the developed Europe) and the East (the Transition Europe, the former WP, the ruined Europe) is still there (Klemenčić, 1997, p. 16), imposing itself over the more precise breakdown of the continent into basic units with particular historical backgrounds. It will

Joachim F. Weber
**Mitteleuropa/Central Europe
– Fact or Political
Hallucination? A German
Geographer's Viewpoint**

take time to change that. However, the decisions at Jalta clearly will not be the last word of history.

The disappearance of the Iron Curtain and its sharp borderline will result, in the long run, in a restoration of more "natural" spatial structures with gradual transition from one economic, cultural, and linguistic entity into another. An exact borderline in phenomena dealing with human life can never be drawn, unless a situation is very artificial and due to a violent imposition ("pure Serbian" territories of the so-called Serbian Krajina or in Kosovo are contemporary examples). Historically based cultural differences in Europe between places which are more than 2,000 km apart, like West-European Madrid and the Central East European Warsaw, will remain a part of the European future.

Today's "Mitteleuropa" and its extent, can no longer be defined by the old recipe of "German speaking countries plus". German is no longer the *lingua franca* of the commerce world and definitely not the foremost culture among its western neighbours. Political power and more than that, the will to exercise it, is completely gone (compare Tietze, 1989, p. 175), as well as most of the German ethnic groups in the East after mass expulsions following the defeat of Germany in 1945. Germany's (south-)eastern neighbors that were mainly under Habsburgian rule until 1914 became completely independent nations. Thus, "Mitteleuropa" nowadays seems to consist of two parts: Germany, or the area where the German language is spoken constituting its western half (Westmitteleuropa), and a number of small or medium-sized nations between Germany and a line somewhere to the west of the River Bug and the Carpathian Mountains (Ostmitteleuropa). Halecki (1957) also shared this opinion.

Perhaps in the future, both parts of "Mitteleuropa" will become closer as they were before the tragic events of the "World Wars" seen by many modern historians as European Civil Wars with an interference of Semi and Non-European Powers. Conceivably, Germany's role as the largest European nation, clearly a part of the West, in a political sense, may once again be that of a mediator of advanced "western" developments, becoming the long missing link between the confronted West and the East of the old continent. For all these reasons, it might be too early to abandon the concept of "Mitteleuropa" completely.

Hence, the question, which regions in the transitional zones between the macro-units should be considered to be a part of this or that unit, remains disputable. For exam-

ple, historical/cultural reasons will make it possible to see large portions of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia as parts of Ostmitteleuropa. Undisputedly, from a German geographer's viewpoint, the position of Croatia belongs in its (semi-)Pannonian parts decisively to the middle-European tradition and culture, while its western, Adriatic parts belong to the Mediterranean culture. In a similarly complicated way, this is what we encounter in a continent with centuries of history and many differences. Or, as the Chinese geographer Yi-Fu Tuan said: "The study of space, from the humanistic perspective, is a study of a people's spatial feelings and ideas in a stream of experience."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Czyzewski, K. (1994): The Central and Eastern Europe of 1996, or How to Be Yourself, in: *The Cultural Identity of Central Europe*, Zagreb 1997, 19–24 (Culturelink Joint Publication Series No. 1).

Diercke-Weltatlas (1998): 4. aktualisierte Auflage 1996, Braunschweig.

Dorn, P. (1960): Geologie von Mitteleuropa, Stuttgart.

Halecki, O. (1957): Europa. Grenzen und Gliederung seiner Geschichte, Darmstadt.

Klemenčić, M. (1997): The Changing Shape of Central Europe, in: *The Cultural Identity of Central Europe*, Zagreb 1997, 15–17 (Culturelink Joint Publication Series No. 1).

Kundera, M. (1985): Die Tragödie Mitteleuropas, in: *Gordogan* 17/18 (1985), 289–305.

Machatschek, F. (1925): Länderkunde von Mitteleuropa, Leipzig/Wien.

Naumann, F. (1915): Mitteleuropa, Berlin.

Ruppert, K. (1995): Der Mitteleuropa-Begriff – raumstrukturelle Annäherung, in*: Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen* 35 (1995), 18–29.

Schenk, W. (1995): Mitteleuropa – typologische Annäherungen an einen schwierigen Begriff aus der Sicht der Geographie, in: *Europa regional* 3 (1995), 25–36.

Schultz, H. D. (1997): Räume sind nicht, Räume werden gemacht. Zur Genese "Mitteleuropas" in der deutschen Geographie, in: *Europa regional* 5 (1997), 2–14.

Sinnhuber, K. (1954): Central Europa – Mitteleuropa – Europe Centrale. An Analysis of a Geographical Term, in: *Transactions and Papers of the Institute of British Geographers* 20 (1954), 15–39.

Tietze, W. (1989): What is Germany – What is Central Europe (Mitteleuropa), in: *GeoJournal* 19 (1989), 173–176.

Zeune, A. (1808): Gea. Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Erdbeschreibung, Berlin.

III.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: SECURITY AND STABILITY ASPECTS

Janusz
BUGAJSKI

Washington D.C., USA

EUROPE'S
SECURITY
PILLARS

At the outset, we must define the purpose of Europe's security structures at the beginning of the third millennium. This can be summarized as providing a basis for stability on the European continent and a secure foundation for European integration. In recent years, the mission of NATO, as the sole coherent and capable security organization has evolved from one of mutual defense of NATO members to the mutual security of an expanding Europe. The two mandates, mutual defense and mutual security, are not mutually exclusive and have been outlined in NATO's new Strategic Concept. There are four major pillars to the development of European security that I will outline: American engagement, European responsibility, institutional enlargement, and evolving missions. Weaknesses in any of these pillars will weaken the Alliance as a whole and could undermine Europe's evolution at the start of the next millennium.

AMERICAN ENGAGEMENT

With the end of the Cold War, policy makers assumed that the U.S. military presence in Europe would be significantly reduced and this would coincide with the emergence of a more vigorous European foreign and defense policy. Despite initial high hopes, the EU and other sole European institutions failed to play an effective role in the continent's post-Cold War conflicts. NATO, led by the United States, remains the central political and military player in Europe. By contrast, the EU has lacked a clear definition of interests and objectives. It has been handicapped by the unwillingness of national governments to place limits on their individual foreign policies.

The importance of continuing American engagement in Europe has been displayed in a number of recent developments: for example, the ongoing NATO mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the successful air war against Ser-

bia, and the K-FOR operation in Kosovo. The United States were also at the forefront of NATO enlargement into Eastern Europe. Through their enormous weight and influence, the U.S. are able to bridge the gaps between the European states and help facilitate faster decision-making. On the negative side, when Washington is not engaged in a European conflict, the crisis tends to escalate.

The war in Bosnia provides the most pertinent recent example. Between 1992-1995, the U.S. remained largely on the sidelines as the European countries dispatched troops under a United Nations umbrella but failed to impose peace in the country. It was only with the full-scale political engagement of the U.S. as well as the employment of American military muscle and the involvement of American-led NATO forces that the Dayton accords were finally signed and peace was restored. For the past four years, the three contending parties in Bosnia have made it clear that an American military presence remains essential for NATO forces to benefit from popular respect, something that the largely European UNPROFOR mission could not attain.

But Washington remains in a dilemma as to its future role on the European continent. On the one hand, it understands that Europe is still unable to handle the most serious insecurities on the continent without a strong American presence. On the other hand, policy makers and congressional leaders are seeking to limit the U.S. role in the longer term and to encourage more balanced burden sharing with the major European states. This dilemma is unlikely to be resolved in the short-term as so much depends on the reality of the newly emerging European Security Identity.

A useful example of potential trans-Atlantic problems looming ahead is the question of the Southeast Europe Stability Pact. The United States have urged Europe to take the lead in Balkan reconstruction. Having carried the overwhelming military and financial burden during the campaign against Serbia, Washington now expects the EU leadership to assume primary responsibility for regional rebuilding. But the Clinton administration also fears that the EU's slowness or incompetence could unleash a Congressional backlash during the coming presidential election year. This could seriously jeopardize funding for future American initiatives and increase pressure on the administration to cut the U.S. military presence in the Balkans. Such issues will not be easily resolved even while the American commitment to European security remains steadfast.

One major lesson of the Kosovo conflict is the need for Europe to enhance its military assets and capabilities. But it is not clear whether the resources will be raised to pay for major new expenditures or the reorganization conducted to improve the capabilities of European forces. European countries currently spend about two-thirds of what the U.S. does on defense, but without possessing anything like two-thirds of the capability. The Allies will need to boost their defense spending approximately threefold and address the issue of military modernization and adaptation to new crises. European leaders were dismayed by the inadequacy of their armed forces against Serbia and by the extent of dependence on Washington, as U.S. planes provided three-quarters of the air power.

At the Köln summit in June 1999, EU leaders took a series of decisions designed to bring foreign and security issues into the framework of EU institutions. Javier Solana was appointed to the new post of European high representative for foreign and security affairs. Plans were also approved for combined EU military operations in future emergencies that would be independent of NATO while using NATO assets. EU members set the end of 2000 as a target date for the completion of reforms that would enable the Union to initiate its own conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations. Nevertheless, the Köln declaration made clear that the EU is not challenging NATO's role as the main guarantor of European security.

Regardless of whether the Kosovo mission will become the rule of the exception in future NATO strategy, the war has given a boost to proposals for integrating defense policies more closely into EU structures. There are plans to fold the WEU into the EU and so give the Union a more formal defense dimension. Proposals have also been made to create an EU military committee composed of military personnel that would make recommendations to a permanent new political-security body in Brussels. The stated objective of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is to strengthen the security of the EU member states, which may soon include several East Europeans. Ultimately, the success or failure of the European security pillar depends on whether its members are ready to invest in their own defense and security capabilities.

NATO is supposed to assist the European to act by themselves on a case-by-case basis, and to make its assets available for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is

111

not militarily engaged. According to the Defense Capabilities Initiative at the 1999 Washington Summit, future Alliance operations are likely to be small in scale, long in duration, extend multinational cooperation to lower levels, and take place concurrently with other Alliance operations. The U.S. have welcomed moves to enhance Europe's capacity to respond to crises and thus strengthen NATO's European pillar.

Although some progress has been made in adapting European forces to the new security environment, most Allies have only limited capabilities for rapid deployment of significant forces or for extended operations far from home bases. Command and control and information systems need to be better matched to the requirements of future operations. The effectiveness of multinational operations will also require greater interoperability or common approaches to doctrine, training, operational procedures, standardization, and rapid technological change.

In practice, a viable and independent European security structure does not exist. An effective CFSP supported by a competent military organization, may be a decade away. During this time, the EU will not be in a position to assume full responsibility for continental security. Other European structures have a role to play in promoting stability, but they all contain serious limitations. The WEU is officially the EU's security arm that can implement CFSP decisions. But it does not possess the military capability to respond to international crises. It lacks the structure for any significant troop deployments, is incapable of conducting any major military operations, and has limited operational experience. The notion of a European army is premature.

Given the weakness of alternative institutions and the likely demands of future instabilities, NATO remains the only international political and military organization with an integrated military structure, an absolute condition for any effective military action, whether collective defense or collective peace missions. NATO keeps the U.S. deeply engaged in European affairs. Without such involvement existing security structures would lose much of their impact and credibility, and thereby contribute to undermining European stability at a time when resources for a European pillar are being assembled.

INSTITUTIONAL ENLARGEMENT

During 1996, Alliance leaders committed themselves to institutional enlargement after several years of hesitation.

The process of including new members was viewed both as inevitable and beneficial for the Alliance given the development of democratic governance in several Central European states. Supporters of NATO expansion maintained that it was essential to stabilize countries such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic by offering them membership in the only credible security structure that could defend their sovereignty and democracy on a permanent basis. Enlargement coupled with adaptation to handle the new European insecurities would also give NATO a new lease on life and eliminate nagging questions about its purpose and lifespan.

The arguments in favor of including three Central European states have revolved around several practical factors. Enlargement would provide a secure environment for consolidating democracy and market reform; it would help promote trade, investment, interdependence, and European integration, it would help project security both eastward and southward as NATO will assume a direct interest in the stability and independence of states initially excluded from the enlargement process; and it would relieve pressures on the EU to develop a security dimension at a time when the Union is engaged in deepening and expanding its economic structures.

The most persistent argument against NATO enlargement is the prospect that it would provoke Russia and create the very security threat that the Alliance is seeking to avoid. However, this position has some serious misunderstandings. At present, Russia is in a weak political, economic, and military position to resist NATO expansion. The next few years may provide an unrepeatable window of opportunity for Alliance enlargement in the event that Moscow's drive for empire is reanimated given the volatility in Russian politics. In such an eventuality, any aggressive acts of the East European countries would be less likely in the future if the potential aggressor understood that NATO is obliged to provide a viable defense. Instead of NATO enlargement being directed against Russia, I would argue that it is directed against potential future Russian enlargement.

Rationally speaking, NATO expansion in itself does not threaten Russia's security interests. On the contrary, it will actually help to stabilize Russia's western borders. NATO is defensive alliance that can help guarantee that Russia's NATO neighbors will pursue friendly relations with Moscow. NATO enlargement will not redivide Europe but will simply expand the Alliance eastwards and leave the door open to other emerging democracies. By

contrast, non-expansion and the avoidance of genuine security guarantees may actually embolden Russian nationalists and imperialists as they could view NATO's hesitation as evidence of their importance, thus stimulating further ambitions. Allied resolve concerning further enlargement could actually help silence Russian revanchism by eliminating any lingering Western ambiguities.

Ultimately, Balkan-Russian relations will contain a built-in contradiction and the potential for renewed conflict. All Balkan states, with the exception of Serbia, are seeking NATO membership, while Russia does not want further NATO expansion. Hence, Moscow is likely to engage in a range of measures either to draw various Balkan states away from NATO or to undermine their ability to meet the criteria for NATO membership. We should be prepared for Russia's ongoing anti-NATO maneuvers.

NATO planners have concentrated primarily on the impact of enlargement on the Central European states. Unfortunately, they have not comprehensively addressed the question of candidates and their long-term reactions to exclusion. The Allies will need to devise a longer-term security strategy that will not only ensure the collective defense of the stable Central European nations but will project security and stability toward the more unpredictable parts of the continent.

One important component of such a strategy would be to offer firmer defense arrangements to countries that were omitted from the first wave of entrants but could be included in NATO early in the next century. Much depends of course on whether NATO, as a result of its experiences in Central Europe, will continue to expand. Limited expansion could have some adverse repercussions for the excluded East European states unless assurances are offered that the enlargement process will continue and will include any European candidates that meet the required criteria. The issue of further enlargement will be decided through a combination of factors, including the performance on new members and the cost and effectiveness of new operations.

EVOLVING MISSION

Shortly after the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the Atlantic Alliance formulated a Strategic Concept to identify the variety of security challenges and risks facing member states in the wake of the East European earthquake. This Concept was further elaborated at the April 1999 Summit in Washington. NATO analysts drew attention to the diverse

threats to security that had emerged following the disappearance of the Soviet menace. In particular, the Strategic Concept focused on the threats and challenges facing Europe's southern and southeastern peripheries. It concluded that unlike the challenges emanating from the Cold War, the new risks to European stability were more numerous, unpredictable, and in many cases more intricate and elusive.

Domestic instabilities generating regional conflicts have become the primary challenge to European stability and integration. The diversity of national, ethnic, and territorial disputes, both within and between the East European states, and the possibility for simultaneous occurrence escalation, and duplication, presented costly and potentially destructive challenges for the Alliance. The wars in the former Yugoslavia vividly underscored the dangers: ethnic strife (sponsored by nationalist politicians), mass murder and massive civilian expulsions, the breakdown of law and order, separatism and territorial competition, refugee outflows, terrorism and sabotage arms and drug smuggling, weapons proliferation, international organized crime, and the involvement of hostile outside powers in Europe's unstable regions.

Potential instabilities in Eastern Europe call for novel responses in terms of conflict prevention and peace-enforcement missions – capabilities for which the Alliance and other multi-national bodies had not been properly equipped during the Cold War. Although no major military threat confronts the Alliance, NATO faces a series of risks that could undermine the very fabric and rationale of the existing security structures. But probably the biggest challenge of all remains the threat of redundancy and irrelevance if NATO is unwilling or incapable of resolutely handling the emerging new crises.

The Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo missions indicate that NATO is significantly adapting its mandate to include major peace-enforcement challenges; such efforts may need to be replicated in the future. In the European Theater, only NATO possesses the headquarters, troops, equipment, infrastructure, command and control, airlift, and transportation facilities that provide it with indispensable peacekeeping, and indeed peace-making, potential. Of course, prevention or early involvement in a crisis is preferable to finding a cure once a crisis has assumed tragic and massive proportions. Early warning signals, crisis monitoring and preventive intervention will need to be substantially developed to potential trouble spots. In addition to a purposeful and adaptive military strategy, NATO

must improve its political coordination to deal with scenarios of crisis management and preventive deterrents in unstable regions of the continent.

CONCLUSIONS

In the longer term, NATO's effectiveness as peacemaker, peacekeeper, and state builder, as well as its cohesiveness as a growing European security structure, still needs to be determined. Many lessons will be learnt from the Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo experience; not least how NATO can operate in tandem with other institutions such as the United Nations, the EU, and the OSCE. If either mission were to end in failure of a prolonged open-ended deployment without the construction of stable democratic states, then the possibility of applying NATO's new Strategic Concept in future crises would be severely questioned and the future growth of the Alliance could be jeopardized.

Marvin
LEIBSTONE

Washington, D.C., USA

OBSERVATIONS: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY – YEAR 2000 AND BEYOND, NATO AND EUROPEAN ISSUES – YEAR 2000 & BEYOND

Distinguished guests, as you would imagine any over-arching description of American foreign policy would have to be other than *static*, for American foreign policy is a principled-*dynamic*. It is a fluid process connected to, and serving, unchanging values. It evolves from interactions with the policies of other nations, but it never goes outside the orbit of its primary goal and guiding premise, which is to remain sovereign and free in a stable and peaceful world, with least risk to its lawfully-attained economic assets and political resources.

In other words, American foreign policy is a *dynamic* that is liberated by democratic principles. More specifically, American foreign policy is beholden first unto concepts and laws enabling freedom for itself with respect for sovereignty of all other nations and for universally-defined human rights. Though it has been accused of veering off course in recent decades, such behavior has not been the *norm*. American foreign policy is, for the most part, the world's leading model of democracy-advocacy within and across all international forums and activities.

Of course, to remain in a position of *grace* within the family of democracies and as a leader among nations, the U.S. has had to re-visit, recast and reinvigorate those principles "and intentions" upon which its foreign policy actions should be based. To do this, it is now debating many questions, among them: *What kind of nation must America avoid being characterized as in the 21ˢᵗ Century; in view of its primacy, and how can such perceptions be avoided? For instance – Unfair partner? Rich uncle? Benign Imperialist? Hardcore Imperialist? Reluctant Partner that can switch to Isolationism overnight?* These are difficult perceptions to avoid.

And: *Where can America's short term interests abroad interfere with its wishes and strategies for long-term global stability?*

So: Prestige, morality and pragmatism rank high for American diplomacy, separately and joined within the American foreign policy agenda.

America is also re-defining the meaning of Superpower-*dom*. In effect, it is asking, *"What is the real meaning and true value of our primacy in world politics, in a very fast-changing era of 'globalization'?"*

Too, American diplomacy is recognizing a greater need to raise foreign policy endeavors to a higher level of concern among U.S. citizens, and to a higher level of knowledge among voters, as well. This is becoming evident in the usually early attention being given to foreign policy actions by both Democratic Party and Republican Party presidential candidate-hopefuls in their campaigns. Much of this has to do with the fact that so many foreign policy issues that were classified as items of interest for Washington bureaucrats only, are now also of the domestic variety that average American voters concern themselves with, for instance, jobs at home that are affected by global trade matters. Relatedly where enthusiasm among U.S. voters for certain diplomatic actions had always existed, there has not always been sufficient knowledge about the outcomes of desired options. Enthusiasm without enlightenment is always a dangerous prospect, therefore has been an increase in U.S. State Department, White House and even intelligence-community openness toward general and specific media and Internet access in America.

In addition, the U.S. government has learned the hard way in a post-cold War era that it must make quite clear to the rest of the world its policies regarding "conflict resolution" its criteria for when to enter into a military situation and when not to. This worked well against the former Soviet Union in the Reagan years when it was made quite clear to the Kremlin what the U.S. and NATO would do if provoked in Europe, but it was not clear in the early and mid nineties to Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic precisely what the U.S. would do in the Balkans, nor were U.S. pre-Desert Storm intentions ever properly understood by Iraq's Saddam Hussein.

Furthermore, America will continue to pursue the concept of multi-national military force-structures for reactions to unlawful aggression, that is, of balanced coalition military reaction for dealing with regional crises. Thus, there will be continued strong U.S. advocacy for NATO and the European Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, for the military-impacted aspects of the proposed southeastern Europe "Stability Pact", for continuance of east Asia security agreements with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. This advocacy is, for American diplomacy, essential for many reasons: **First**, it engages those nations closest to related problems in ways "out of conflict", thus to-

ward long-term regional stability. **Second**, the U.S. national *will* to operate with military force "unilaterally" may be politically impossible to obtain in the future. **Third**, the cost of unilateral U.S. military action has become so high fiscally and of such enormous drainage on military resources, U.S. diplomacy may be forced in the near future to increase the practice of – "*selective* unilateral intervention".

Also, the U.S. foreign policy community will surely re-think the acceptance of low, even below-the-margin dividend outcomes from high-dollar U.S. investments overseas in order to help sustain bedrock for furtherance of democracy where it has floundered, where, as in Russia, it has gotten off to a very rocky start. While instead of being a steadily-growing democracy for ten years, Russia has been a fledgling democracy one year ten times, some of this due to early fears of investment-increases among U.S. providers (justified in light of early losses, unjustified in that specific U.S. regulatory procedures and specific U.S.-demanded corrective actions could have made a difference five, seven years ago).

Additionally, there is in the U.S. some steam behind efforts to help achieve speedier European integration, and not just as en *end* but as an interim-phase so that Europe can successfully go beyond regional integration toward more cogent, more robust "inter-regional" and "trans-continental" relations in the future – in a way that keeps pace with "globalization". My personal observation on this, is that doing so will require a greater need for recognition in America of the strategic importance of certain nations within the subset of the family of European democracies that we have been calling, "*the new democracies*", among them, Croatia, Romania, and of certain recast and reinvigorated democracies, among these, Greece, South Korea, and Chile. Croatia and Romania can serve most effectively as bridging and staging-area nations for the future's more likely conflict-resolution efforts that are needed to join further to core-Europe the Balkan and Baltic nations. Greece is a proper candidate-nation for bridging actions connecting not only southeastern Europe but all of Europe with an inevitably economically-stronger northern Africa, and Greece is also a necessary actor for the future likely possibilities of intensified and improved Euro/eastern Mediterranean and Euro/Middle East security and trade opportunities. In east Asia, South Korea remains America's most stable *operational*-security ally and therefore a key Euro-trade ally, and Chile, despite a recent recession and political moves characterized as center-left, re-

mains an advanced democracy+capitalism model for other Latin America nations to follow (Chile is already a strong U.S. and Euro trading partner).

Consequently, American diplomacy will probably continue to do all that it can to clear the playing fields for the aforementioned "inter-regional" and "trans-continental" values by seeking "closure" with regard to the world's hot-spot issues, for example, North Korea as spoiler, India versus Pakistan, China/Taiwan, Greece vs. Turkey, bringing a lasting peace to southeastern Europe. In doing so, it is likely that American diplomacy will not only recognize further the increasingly important influence of the United Nations and also non-government organizations (NGO's); it will seek to increase partnership-opportunities with select NGO's.

WITH regard to NATO and European issues, I believe:

(a) That NATO should reconvene an enlargement schedule at a rate commensurate with "globalization" and "advanced electronic information technologies". NATO should act diplomatically to strongly influence the sharing of more advanced information technologies among member-countries, which will allow for the necessary military equipment modernization that enables "coalition security responses", that is, allows "multi-national warfare and/or peacekeeping forces" to succeed. It makes no sense to have a NATO, or a PfP program, for that matter, that includes nations that cannot keep up with other NATO-member nations on "the electronic battlefield". This is extremely important for U.S. policy, since the U.S. military can no longer always perform "unilaterally";

And, (b) Formal Europe should state openly through all of its security-related forums (the EU, WEU and NATO among them), that it recognizes the proposed southeastern Europe "Stability Pact" as a necessary transition phase for greater European integration and for future Euro "inter-regional" and "trans-continental" participation, and not only as an entity for a general Balkans peace that is apart from such integration efforts;

(c) NATO should incorporate as quickly as possible the lessons learned during its 1999 anti-Yugoslavia military campaign, among these:

• Need for better HUMINT (Human intelliegence);
• More consultation from friendly countries within "the crisis region";
• Better understanding of Information Warfare (IW) Strategies;
• The fact that air campaign success must be determined less by the number of successful sorties and targets hit

but mostly from "quality-of-power" drained from the enemy and from drainage of the infrastructures related to an enemy's external as well as internal political power.

Moreover, NATO should rethink its policy regarding a post-Chechnya/more democratized Russia, if and when this ever comes about. While under present circumstances, Russia as a full NATO-member state seems inappropriate, maximum military NATO/Russia cooperation with regard to training and common security issues makes a lot of sense, and so does increased open Euro-trade with Russia. NATO has to keep in mind that it shares many security concerns with Russia, where no NATO/Russia conflicts exist and cooperation can be optimized, for example, Islamic extremism backing anti-Euro interests in the Middle East; proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; terrorism; illegal drug smuggling; petroleum distribution security.

As to final and over-arching observations, I suppose the best news about American foreign policy for Europeans, is that what may have seemed like "fast-creeping Isolationism" has reached a wall and will go no further than the silly rantings of politican-wannabe's who lack a necessary dimension for understanding what liberal democracy really means and how the U.S. can't have such and nurture it for itself without liberal democracy spreading and working viably elsewhere in the world. In fact, America will likely be just as involved as a political actor on the world stage as anytime in the past century.

Will America ever attempt to exercise control in an imperial fashion? This is most doubtful, for America is primarily in the business of self-liberation through economic, technological, political, cultural and social innovations within and beyond its own environs, and this cannot be accomplished optimally through even the most benevolent versions of imperialism, but it is always possible through effective partnerships upon a liberal political and economic playing field.

Josip
JURČEVIĆ

Zagreb, Croatia

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND CROATIAN INDEPENDENCE

INTRODUCTION

Considering the totality of the historical development of the 20th century, it can be undisputedly concluded that change and an aspiration for change have remained the hallmark of both the natural and the social spheres of life. According to this feature, the 20th century does not fundamentally differ from previous historical periods. However, an ever-increasing speed and magnitude of change, continuously increasing the rhythm and aspiration for change have marked this process in the 20th century. Thus, in this way change has become a **state** of human civilization. One may also conclude that the **need** for faster rhythm of movement has even turned into and imposed itself as a kind of addiction.

That addiction, among other things, implies a substantial decrease, or even a total absence, of a need for rational questioning or understanding of objectives, procedures, facts, phenomena, perspectives, etc.

Thus, the human being, as a rational being – in both individual and social senses – has been facing a predicament which mainly entails a denial of fundamental rationalist principles; such as *clarae et distinctae* (clarity and distinctness), and *Omnibus dubitandur est* (no acceptance without doubting and questioning).

By leaving these principles out of the sphere of social life, we have condemned ourselves to an ignorance of historical experiences, that is, their unconscious repetition. Namely, due to the ever-increasing rhythm of contemporary events and ever more complex and less clear perspective of the future, it is frequently observed that any discussion of historical experience as a way to learn about the future is considered non-functional, superfluous, useless, and unimportant; promoting at the same time unfounded *a priori* orientations.

These brief, fundamental observations should be borne in mind when discussing, planning or dealing, in whatever way, with the problems of European integration and the

variety of possible aspects of independence within those integrative processes. Clearly, most of the global as well as particular issues and problems raised today in connection with the process of European integration are not new. They represent a fundamental continuation or a mere repetition of both theoretical and practical models of European integration offered to numerous earlier generations of Europeans. However, it is significant that the proponents and supporters of current integration interests have been stubbornly turning a blind eye to this fact, trying to publicly present themselves as new, original and desirable designers-builders of a better, integrated future. Such an approach, that is contrary to the rational requirements of an objective comprehension, is, at the same time, an additional stimulus for intelligibly questioning the goals and quality of the current model of European integration.

From a historical standpoint, this paper reviews some of the main features of 20th century European history as well as the key determinants of the problem of European integration that basically repeat themselves today. A special emphasis will be placed on independent, national, state and social identity groups in general; all of which are meant to be constituent parts of a broader European integration.

Moreover, it stands to reason that such a general and abstract level of discourse as such a general approach implies, will include shortcomings and understatements.

By way of introduction, it is necessary to emphasize as historical fact that issues of various military, political, economic, cultural, religious or other collective interest attempts at European integration can be traced back, both in terms of facts and interpretation, to at least the Roman period. In addition to the Roman Empire, at a political-military level, a wide range of historical examples of European integration can be recalled. These periods of integration have been identified with well-known conquerors such as Attila, Charlemagne, Charles V, Turkish Sultans, Napoleon, etc. For such integrative processes in the realm of the spiritual, religious, cultural, and artistic, it is sufficient to recall Christianity, Latin, philosophy of history, the European literary and artistic styles, common ethnological characteristics, etc.

COMMON CONDITIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF 20TH CENTURY EUROPE

From the viewpoint of world history, and as testified by a series of historical and civilizational indicators, the European continent entered the 20th century as a clearly identi-

fiable entity with a number of recognizable features. European individuality at the beginning of the 20th century was most clearly collectively manifested by the almost total European domination over the rest of the world.

Most non-European states, peoples and continents were European colonial property. In that way, Europe directly controlled world political processes and economic resources. The efficient organization of European states, societies, and production as well as Europe's infrastructure, new technologies, natural science potential, new inventions, etc., all contributed to its privilege and advantage. On this basis, world domination of Europe's culture appeared even more convincing, as well as the desirability of the European way of life. Even the U.S. was in many ways subordinate to Europe. These include world colonial domination of European states, the European positive balance of payment in economic exchange, American dependence on European immigrants as well as the identification of American elite with their European roots.

In brief, at the beginning of the 20th century, the European continent was the center of the world in every respect. It was well aware of that, and it believed in the immutability of such a position.

On the other hand, the internal structure of Europe at the beginning of the 20th century was founded on national states, which had come into being through centuries-old historical developments of different internal and international processes. In that way, the national states of Europe came to represent the highest organizational type of human society, within which various interests were developed and brought together at a common, that is, national level. Namely, in international relations the state and its related interests were identified with national interests, which was also revealed in cases of international cooperation and conflict.

For example, international-law conventions did not infringe upon the national sovereignty of particular states. On the contrary, they maximally guaranteed protection of national-state interests. Inter-state cooperation and treaties, alliances, and pacts were founded upon and oriented toward a full realization of particular national interests. In the same way, different forms of suspension of international cooperation as well as state participation in local and world wars were primarily motivated by a desire to achieve particular national interests.

The European model of structuring national interests within the framework of a national state was gradually taken over by other continents. This was particularly evi-

dent during the process of de-colonization whereby the maturation of national consciousness in the colonies unfolded in a parallel way with liberation movements and the creation of independent national states.

Thus, during the course of the 20th century, the national state has established itself as an almost exclusive form of social community organization, be it in Europe or elsewhere. Moreover, national-state interests have become, both in formal and real terms, almost without exception, the foundation of international relations most lucidly demonstrated by world organizations such as the League of Nations or the United Nations.

Within such a world structure and experience, it is logical that the longest-lasting and greatest state crises with the most serious consequences of the 20th century, occurred in multinational state communities. This has been true regardless of different time periods and political system. It is also noteworthy that a number of multinational states collapsed during the 20th century, only to be replaced by independent national states.

In that context, it is sufficient to recall the downfall of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and the second Yugoslavia, or the length of the Irish, Basque, and Kurdish crises.

Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the European national states with a well-defined historical identity have demonstrated convincingly that they have the most stable and most durable form of social community. In terms of their sovereignty and integrity, they have perseveringly withstood various internal crises and foreign challenges, as their histories clearly testify. For example, Germany survived and recently was reunited in spite of grave political upheavals of the 20th century and defeats in both World Wars. Similar political vicissitudes, social and economic challenges have been endured by Italy in the 20th century. French national policy, both internal and foreign, has for centuries been a superb example of skillful representation of national interests. In 1918, Poland was reestablished as a national state thanks to its powerful national identity, after more than a century of being the property of neighbouring states, etc.

However, the power of national identity and the deeply rooted foundation and restrictedness of national interest of the most powerful European states during the 20th century has also had a fateful impact on world as well as on the collapse of traditional power of the European continent on a world scale.

Namely, among other things, the irreconcilable clashes of interests of the most powerful European states were the

cause of two world wars. These were started on European soil, which subsequently served as the primary battlefield and in every respect suffered the most difficult consequences of war. This means that the economic and demographic potential of European states were wasted on world warfare, accompanied by the destruction of material and spiritual assets, and the extreme suffering of the European population.

During the course of the First World War, the European states from an economic perspective had already become debtors rather than creditors of the United States. This trend continued in the aftermath of the war and had an identical influence in other aspects of social life and world geopolitical significance.

The course and results of the Second World War were crucial for a total dethronement of Europe on a world scale. They influenced the general marginalization of Europe, a process that has continued since the end of the war until the present day. There are a number of heterogeneous indicators that can be used as evidence. For example, the Cold War was fought most intensively between European states, which were, in terms of their security, politics, and economy greatly dependent upon the interests of the two superpowers – the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. In terms of natural science, technology and economy, Europe not only fell behind the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., but it also started to lag behind the Far East (Japan, Korea, and China).

Furthermore, the traditional European worldview, values, cultural creativity and way of life have also been increasingly marginalized, not only in the world, but within Europe itself to be replaced by the views and products of ohlocratic, that is, mass consumer societies. In terms of future life perspectives it is especially disturbing that Europe has become the most ecologically polluted and demographically least productive continent.

Thus, it may be justifiably concluded that at the end of the 20th century, Europe found itself in a disadvantageous position compared to the one it held at the beginning. In other words, Europe has lost during the course of the 20th century its decisive and central position in the world, which it had held for centuries. In terms of civilization, the 20th century may be thus marked as the century of Europe's greatest crisis. The reasons for this are complex and beyond the scope of this paper. Yet it should be emphasized that throughout the 19th century a profound crisis of European civilization was announced by a number of outstanding European thinkers (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, etc.).

131

ATTEMPTS AT EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
IN THE 20TH CENTURY

If we define integration as a procedure of linkage or unification, or of combining several parts into a whole, then it can be noted that several integration-oriented processes, ideas, and attempts were at work in Europe throughout the 20th century. In principle, one may speak of cultural, ideational, economic, geopolitical, and other forms of integration. In terms of space, the forms of integrations can be simply classified as regional and continental. Systematization in terms of the way integrations were carried out is more complex, but basically it can be reduced to dichotomies which moved between self-initiative (spontaneity) and organization, voluntariness and coercion.

It is clear that the real processes of integration, in terms of content, time, space and mode, were developed at various levels of mutual intertwinement and inner contradictions in relation to the classifications listed above. However, this problem will not be discussed here.

From a general standpoint one may conclude that cultural and ideational forms of European integration were predominantly self-initiating and voluntary, and in terms of space, ranged from regional to continental. Numerous examples of cultural integration may be found in the fine arts and literature (expressionism, cubism, dadaism, surrealism, etc.), as a way of life (ohlocratic society) or ideational integration that ranged from worldviews (existentialism, positivism, etc.) to ideologies (for example, pan-Slavism, pan-Germanism, social democracy, communism, Christian democracy, etc.).

The basic theoretical starting point for the need for economic integration indicates self-initiative and voluntariness that stems from the principle of production and consumer effectiveness, but the implementation of economic integration was mostly organized by national state interests, accompanied by threat or use of force (economic, military, and political). It is illustrative to recall here the problems linked to interstate economic associations such as the European Union (EU, formerly the European Community – EC), the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), or those associated with multinational states, as for example, with the unique Yugoslav market, etc.

Geopolitical, political, and military integrations represent the most interconnected and complex form of integration. They were, in principle, carried out in an orga-

nized manner and were accompanied by economic, political, and military pressures.

Another essential characteristic of these integrations was that they endeavoured to be comprehensive, i.e., to incorporate all other forms of integration: cultural, ideological/ideational, economic, etc. Only by creating and recognizing a totality of interests and identities could the existence of more durable political entities created through integration be expected.

European historical experience, including the 20th century, also confirms that these most complex types of integration were often preceded by various levels of economic, cultural, and ideational integration. Alternatively, these forms of integration served as a stimulus and justification for the implementation of geopolitical, military and political integration. The half-century establishment of the EU is a good example of this, which, due to a number of components, clearly should be oriented toward complete political integration.

It is interesting to note that after the Second World War, the integration of the European communist countries into the politico-military *Warsaw Pact* (1955) was preceded by the worldview (dialectical and historical materialism), ideological-party (dictatorship of the proletariat, Informbiro – Information Bureau of the Cominform, etc.), economic (Comecon) and cultural (socialist realism in culture, information, and education) integration. Likewise, the creation of the Yugoslav State was preceded by ideational integration (South-Slavism as an aspect of pan-Slavism and so-called "cultural Yugoslavianism").

Certain forms and levels of geopolitical and military integration in Europe and the world belong to various forms of interstate and other alliances or unification that were drawn up during preparation for world or regional wars. Thus, the alliances *Entente* and the *Axis Powers* were connected to the First World War whereas the *Anti-Comintern International* and *Triple Alliance* (Germany, Japan, Italy and a number of other countries, which joined under various circumstances), were formed in connection with the Second World War. Alternatively, a complex cooperation of states, movements and organizations opposed to the states of *Triple Alliance*, such as the *Comintern* and the *Popular Fronts* were also formed.

Between the two wars, as a way of stopping the "*red*" menace (Communist) danger in Europe, various types and levels of regional integration were established. For example, the most powerful West-European states (initially France) considered the area between Poland and the first

Yugoslavia as a *sanitary corridor* and controlled it by various economic, political, cultural, and intelligence means, but without formal unification. For the purpose of preserving the *Versailles treaty*, a military-political alliance called "*The Little Entente*" (Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the first Yugoslavia) was created in the early twenties followed by "*The Balkans Pact*" (Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey) in the mid-thirties.

All in all, it can be concluded that the majority of mentioned alliances and other forms of cooperation were formed, to serve the interests of the most powerful European states and the nation of Europe. In every respect, they had a decisive influence and were the carriers of these processes, so that a number of smaller European states were compelled to participate in integration processes and to adjust their national interests, and even identities. Thus, the most powerful European nations/states were the subjects of integration in Europe, while the smaller nations or states were merely the objects of those integrative processes. Obviously, the criteria of integration were inequitable, which subsequently aggravated or led to the failure of European integrative processes.

This relationship between the powerful and the powerless was best exemplified by the *Versailles* structuring of Europe in which decisions on creation, territorial borders and even the international status of a series of new (and existing) states was both formally and actually dictated by a few of the most powerful states. The same approach was used during and after the Second World War at the Teheran, Jalta, and Potsdam Conferences. An extreme example whereby smaller states are literally sacrificed is illustrated in the *Munich Pact* (1938), when France and Great Britain ratified the German breaking up of Czechoslovakia. Although this was contrary to bilateral agreements and international law, it was believed that this would satisfy Germany and preserve the remaining French and British national interests.

The most powerful European states failed to establish a single continental interest during the 20th century. Therefore, it is understandable that all the integration processes were partial, revealing an inner paradox. In other words, they simultaneously deepened European divisions and contributed to Europe's disintegration.

A strategic need for the complete integration of the European continent was envisaged and supported by many individuals and organizations throughout the 20th century. At the beginning of the century, on the basis of class, such ideas were advocated by social democrat parties,

who were assembled in the *First International*. However, this attempt failed miserably at the beginning of the First World War, as all social democrat parties (with the exception of the Russian Bolsheviks) rallied to support their countries' national interests. The attempts of the *Second International* ("Comintern") between the two wars and in the first years of the Second World War revealed similar patterns. A continuation of this process after the Second World War is represented by the *Eurocommunism* movement in Western Europe as well as the ideas and intentions grouped around the slogan "Socialism as a world process", in Eastern Europe.

However, it is important to emphasize that the most comprehensive spatial and substantial integration of Europe in the 20th century was carried out by the totalitarian power of Nazi Germany prior to and at the beginning of the Second World War (1935–1941). In many ways, this has remained a telling example for future periods. By using various methods, which included economic privileges, political pressure, and military threats – Germany succeeded in accomplishing a dominant position in the majority of the Central and Southeast European states in addition to annexing Austria and occupying Czechoslovakia.

At the time of Germany's lightning conquest of Western and Northern Europe in the first years of the war (1939–1940), powerful European states had developed a significant relation toward Southeastern Europe. Namely, economic interests (petroleum and food) primarily determined the German relation towards Southeastern Europe. Moreover, Germany was, at that point in time, the only state in Europe that was seriously interested in the stability of that area – as long as the states of Southeast Europe were pro-German oriented. On the other hand, Great Britain and France, following their own war interests, did their best to light the "Balkan tinderbox", that is, push it into war against Germany.

Thus, Germany went to great efforts to curb Italian aggressive plans against Yugoslavia while on its own territory it banned any activities that were anti-Yugoslav oriented by Croatian émigrés. In contrast to Germany, Great Britain undertook several political steps and carried out special war operations to push the Balkans and Yugoslavia into war against Germany.

However, as a result of the overall superiority that Germany achieved in South Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia, this area became ever more dependent upon Germany. This was particularly evident in 1940 owing to general circumstances, i.e., when Germany overpowered France and

135

set out to conquer Great Britain. This generated a belief and atmosphere, in a number of European countries including Yugoslavia, that the systems of authority thus far led and represented by Great Britain and France was about to collapse, and that Germany was about to win and establish the *New Order* in Europe. Therefore, wishing to retain positions of power, the ruling and public structures in those countries initiated processes of an inner state adjustment to the *New Order* on their own and this is still significant today.

In this context, a text published by a Belgrade newspaper, *Vreme*, that had close connections to the Yugoslav government in July 1940, speaks loud and clear: "A New Europe is being created, new principles will rule European political life and woe to the countries in which those principles find the nation's heart closed, locked by horrible tales of a need for the continuation of a weak system." Similar thoughts were at the same time expressed by the *Hrvatski tjednik,* a weekly backed by the Croatian Peasant Party: "We are on the eve of radical changes in the structure of Old Europe. The outlines of a new political and economic system may be clearly seen. A New Europe must become a political and economic community securing fortune for both big and small nations. Germany and Italy will succeed where Great Britain and France, bearers of old concepts, have failed."

In mid August 1940, the Yugoslav government held a formal session in which they issued a press release. Among other things, the press release states that the Royal Government "expresses its desire to emphasize that its friendship with Germany and Italy is not of a temporary character, but based on essential interests. Recent years have clearly revealed the efficacy of this cooperation that have become closer each day. Today, when the whole world is facing a turning point as well as new directions with respect to the restructuring of European order, Yugoslavia is fully conscious that it must take part in all of these new developments". Additionally, the Government, during its regular sessions, often debated about the need to adjust the Yugoslav economic and social system to the *New Order* and carried out appropriate by personnel changes within the Government itself.

Under such conditions favoring integration, any public questioning of the *New Order*, and of its criteria, interests, modalities, foundations, goals, or objectives was undesirable and proscribed. Instead, public life was saturated by unfounded affirmation of the *New Order.* Unfortunately, in a number of smaller European countries, and especially

in the Republic of Croatia, an approach bearing a funda-
mental and stylistic similarity to the events just described,
is being repeated in the sphere of controlled public life
within the current processes of European integration or
world globalization at the end of the 20th century.

CROATIAN INDEPENDENCE WITHIN
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Croatian national identity has for almost nine centuries
been formed within political frameworks which rightly in
many ways and to various degrees can be represented as in-
tegrated wholes. This relates to the personal union with
Hungary (since 1102), and of joining the Habsburg mon-
archy (since 1526), and both Yugoslavias (1918–1941 and
1945–1991). This long history undoubtedly influenced the
shaping of many determining factors of Croatian national
identity, facilitating Croatian openness for participation
in integration processes, which has manifested itself at sev-
eral levels: from worldview and cultural openness to the
centuries-long pluralistic attitude of Croatian elite toward
religious persuasions, ethnic background, social character-
istics, political orientations, etc.

On the other hand, Croatia's continual centuries-long
closeness to integrated entities has provided a legacy of
both positive and negative experiences, which should es-
sentially contribute to an objective consideration of inte-
gration models which are either offered or imposed today.
In other words, from this standpoint, contemporary cur-
rent Croatian questioning of integration models cannot be
considered as an *a priori* reaction, nor is it a result of un-
conscious prejudices or stereotypes, but a well-founded un-
derstanding and reaction to first-hand lived national expe-
rience.

In accordance with the mentioned European stan-
dards, the Croatian national entity, during the 20th cen-
tury, realized to a greater extent that the national state is
undoubtedly the most stable model for securing national
interests. Along these lines, it is important to consider
both the starting-point of Croatian awareness and all its
practical strivings to establish an independent state.

That self-awareness was fully expressed at the beginning
of the nineties when, within the context of the historical
disintegration of European communist systems of power
and Croatia's defense against Serb armed aggression, an in-
dependent Croatian state was finally established. After the
collapse of communist states, various West-European inte-
gration associations that had existed for decades, (such as

137

the *Council of Europe, EU, NATO*, etc.) hurriedly became interested in integratively and globally conquering areas that had long been inaccessible in the east and south of Europe.

Decades of experience with models and procedures had at least two clearly linked goals. The first goal was to insure stability and security of South Eastern Europe so that uncontrollable processes would not spread or have a negative impact in Western Europe. The other goal, pursued at the same time for stabilization purposes, was to firmly place Eastern and Southern Europe under total (security, economic, and political) administrative control in the interest of the most powerful states of Western Europe. In addition to all the complex activities, both goals are best illustrated in the *Stability Pact* draft.

Thus far, as it has been possible to read several fundamental flaws in this entire integration operation, which raises serious questions about the feasibility of the above-mentioned goals, as well as about the actual success of the current attempt to integrate the European continent. First, the model in *communication* terms, allows for adjustments insofar as it suits the interests of West European countries. Any diversity with respect to East and South European identity and state communities and their related interests are simply not *heard* or taken into consideration.

Hence, inconsistent, repeatedly uniform and inappropriate criteria and procedures that are outside of international customary and legal norms are being used. Such activity has had certain – more formal and less real – consequences, thanks primarily to the application of political, economic, and military pressure. However, it surely does not enhance lasting integration that is, profound cultivation and stability of the area. On the contrary, it has been generating dissatisfaction, which may sooner or later be articulated as more powerful and more direct forms of resistance and confrontation.

Furthermore, West-European integration models have been shown to be outdated and inadequate in the new situation at the beginning of the nineties. Namely, the *Council of Europe*, the EU, and NATO were formed during the intense *Cold War*, upon which their concepts, methods, and structure were based. This means, they were established primarily as defensive and secondarily as offensive structures. Moreover, the territory they covered was smaller in comparison to that of Eastern and Southern Europe. In this sense, it was far more ordered and thus simpler to manage.

In support of such a thesis, one should recall the course of West European relations and organization to-

ward the problem of Serb aggression against the Republic of Croatia, and especially against Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, no distinction was made between the aggressor and the victim and the arms embargo effectively denied victims their legitimate and lawful right to defense, etc. Moreover, the temporary results established in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, were achieved only after intensified U.S. involvement (the *Washington* and *Dayton Accords*, and especially the treaties between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina with NATO).

CONCLUSION

The general continual marginalization of the European continent during the 20th century was first of all a consequence of an irreconcilable clash of interests between the most powerful European national states. Numerous and various attempts at European integration have occurred within this context, but they all proved to be unsuccessful, because the integration concepts were both exclusive and limited. The main reason for such an approach was determined by the fact that the proponents of integration (one or a few states) offered models that served their national interests.

In doing so they neglected or violated achievements, which belong to the spiritual heritage of European civilization. This heritage was founded on humanism in both an individual and a social sense. As such, by the 20th century, it became ingrained in most expressions of European consciousness – from law to the most abstract forms of creativity. Thus this heritage became an integral part of both individual and social (as well as national) identities, regardless of the real power these identities have in the European balance of power.

Therefore, it is comprehensible that European integration, insofar as it intends to be successful, must be founded on true humanist principles, which from a spiritual viewpoint have already integrated Europe. Similarly, it is also understandable that due to suspension of such principles, attempts at primarily economic and political integration have so far actually contributed to the disintegration of Europe.

Under such circumstances, the current insistence of smaller European nations and states, including the Republic of Croatia, on national independence on one hand, and defense of European spiritual principles on the other, represents a stimulus to accept such models of European integration which, when applied, will not deviate from

these declared standards. Moreover, the historical course of both European and world history in the 20th century, and particularly current globalization processes clearly indicate that demands for protection of European prosperity imperatively impose a need for European integration.

Miroslav
PRCE

Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

Just a year ago, the establishment of a new security architecture in Southeastern Europe seemed like a great challenge. Today, after the inauguration of the Stability Pact and the latest OSCE Summit in Istanbul, a need for such an architecture remains. Namely, this is an area where three layers of civilization are interrelated; bearing the heavy burden of a heritage characterised by ethnic chaos.

Ethnic chaos prevented most of the countries in Southeastern Europe from following the democratic processes of the European West. Today, when the problems of this region, and especially of the Balkan countries need to be expeditiously resolved by the acceleration of the European integration processes, Europe must be ready to accept this region and to allow for the security of each country. This would entail collective security, so that this region can become an inseparable part of the common security architecture. Any other path would turn the Southeast of Europe into an area susceptible to organized crime, religious and nationalistic terrorism, illegal trafficking, etc. Such an approach is the best alternative for this area, i.e., the Balkans, so that the negative associations it has endured throughout this century no longer burden it. At the same time, the ruling political elite would be forced to modify their overall political and cultural mentality. Moreover, the practices of exploiting one's own problems to serve narrow state interests would be terminated.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, or rather in the Federation of Bosnians and Croats, we think that a completely new defense and security architecture should be established in the Southeast of Europe. This is because both the present and future military threats are linked with a serious imbalance among the armed forces of the Balkan states. Moreover, in the event of ethnic and religious intolerance, this could acquire a regional dimension.

The peoples in the area of the former Yugoslavia experienced this in a most brutal sense. Thus, taking all limita-

tions into account, we wish to commence with a construction of a unified security system in the Balkans and the Southeast of Europe. We would like to offer our assistance so that constructive potentials can be sought and designed. Since, we fear that particular states may end up in isolation that in the recent past was almost raised to an official level.

Evidently, the Dayton Accords stopped the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and ended ethnic cleansing and the destruction of material property. The Agreement was not voluntarily accepted by the warring states; it was a forcefully imposed solution that unfortunately did not permanently resolve the security issue of the peoples, entities, and entire state. It also involves the long-term presence of international military forces and an international administration that essentially hinders a long-term solution of lasting self-sustainable peace. My view is that the solutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as those being imposed in Kosovo, should be amended through the construction of a joint security policy.

The results or more precisely the minimum effectiveness of the Global Crisis Management Model tested in Bosnia and Herzegovina questions the very essence of such a concept in regional conflict management. Conversely, there are a growing number of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina who favor the so-called Dayton Europeanization. Namely, the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina are assuming their own responsibilities for the establishment of a sustainable security system, which could become an example or initiative for the establishment of a unified security system in the Balkans and the Southeast of Europe. Europeanization or the concrete application of European economic and security models does not exclude Washington, nor does it essentially change the peace agreement. A significant number of countries in the region are not part of the Dayton Agreement. The European solutions that these countries apply are based on confidence building and security consolidation and they presuppose control of arms and military activities. Bosnia and Herzegovina wishes to become precisely a part of this environment and process.

I am convinced that all of us here agree that establishment of a new security architecture or security system in the area of Southeastern Europe implies the leading role of NATO. Moreover, I understand that presently this is the best way to overcome local fears of modalities for regional co-operation as well as the best guarantee that the sovereignty of a particular country is not left to the mercy

of its former adversaries. NATO, besides other things, en-
sures standards that guarantee the protection of sovereign
rights within a unified security system.

Most of the countries in the region are NATO mem-
bers or on the right track to becoming members through
the Partnership for Peace. Preparation of the countries in
the region for EU or NATO membership is one of the
more important objectives of the Stability Pact. In the Bal-
kans, there are only three countries that are not members
or partners in the Partnership for Peace. According to all
indications, Croatia has clearly declared that its objective
is to enter NATO. At present, Yugoslavia due to circum-
stances that are familiar demonstrates neither interest nor
commitment towards NATO. Of course, in a long-term
context this issue should remain open.

Here I would like to clarify the situation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina with regard to the establishment of a
new security architecture in the area of Southeastern Eu-
rope. Evidently, a global model for resolving crisis points
in the world is being tested in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Unfortunately, so far it has been a rather questionable ex-
periment that has neglected dimensions of reintegration
similar to those applied in today's Europe that tested and
produced a reconciled nation and an integration model
within a longer time frame. If we add to this their work
and attitude towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, intentional
or not, the international factors stimulate undesired de-
pendency culture. Inevitably, the experiment could pro-
duce negative results instead of long-term stability.

As far as Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned we are
in a specific situation because of NATO's major role in
the implementation of the Dayton-Paris Accords. From
this perspective, one can say that we are *de facto* a member
of NATO in the context of regional security. However, the
formal initiation of Bosnia and Herzegovina into NATO
is a long-term issue, because of the unresolved internal
constitutional and legal situation in the country, as well as
in NATO itself.

Pertaining to the internal situation, and for clarifica-
tion purposes, it should be emphasized that Bosnia and
Herzegovina consists of two entities. These are the Federa-
tion of B&H (Bosnian-Croat Federation) and the Republic
of Serbia, where neither of them has an international legal
subject position. In B&H, there are two armies that differ
in their force structure and standards with different weap-
ons and equipment. In addition, they do not fundamen-
tally differ in their concept from that of the entity's politi-
cal leadership.

145

Placing this into perspective, it becomes clear that only a state and not the entities it consists of can join NATO and Partnership for Peace. In a political sense, this should be preceded by the consensus of the respective constituent peoples. Such a consensus does not exist at present. Nevertheless, at the level of the state, there is a view that the relationship with NATO should be enhanced. However, to what degree, has not as yet been explicated. Through the "Train & Equip" program within the Military Stabilization Program, the Army of the Federation (AoF) has adopted standards, equipment, and weapons, policies and procedures that are compatible with NATO. By doing so, it *de facto* meets the terms; content and meaning of the transitional period represented by the Partnership for Peace. Hence, the AoF is absolutely committed to building a security system in the Balkans under the NATO umbrella.

I consider that the Stability Pact has taken the place of any other solution, and that the two entities in B&H will completely accept the described path as their political and security policy promptly. Simultaneously, this is the only way in regard to membership possibilities that fulfills NATO terms. Namely, just as the EU has its Copenhagen criteria for EU membership, NATO also has its criteria. Specifically, NATO accepts states, rather than armies or entities as members. In other words, it only accepts states with one army.

There is a long road ahead of us in B&H, before we can become a part of a unified security system in the Balkans. Therefore, we need to make our joint defense and security functions acceptable to both entities at least. This is sometimes not that simple. Until recently, we had three armies that according to the political elite barely accepted joint interests at the expense of giving up part of their sovereignty. However, if B&H fails to comply with these terms or it fails to resolve its internal problems, other models that will ensure our internal and external security will have to be sought. Does total demilitarization for the purposes of establishing a neutral state imply reliance on a strong defense alliance? Is this a feasible solution? Or is minimal defense potential such as in Austria, Switzerland and Sweden the solution? Unfortunately, these dilemmas are still prevalent in post-war B&H, along with different visions of its internal organization.

My opinion is that the establishment of a Southeastern European brigade that was recently promoted in Bulgaria would serve to support regional peacekeeping operations. This represents a positive sign for the creation of a

joint European defense and security policy that presently focuses on humanitarian activity, as in the so-called Petersburg missions. At the same time, this is a chance for all the countries in the region to join, i.e., to reintegrate into a process that could become an embryo for establishing and constructing a new, unified defense and security architecture in a wider region, e.g., in Europe.

Such an approach has great philosophical value for me, because in the event of disasters, especially if caused by war, it allows the joint security and defense system to intervene and rightly place itself above the supreme authority of a particular country. I am sure that the UN Security Council will always allow responses to this type of crisis. However, countries that tend to minimize Security Council authority, and by doing so the role of OSCE indirectly, represent a danger as well. Thus, "umbrella" as the key element for regional security and basis for overall future European security would be questioned.

Therefore, I am convinced that it is necessary to establish a new security architecture, complete with all its mechanisms and modalities so that it is capable to meet security challenges in such a complex region such as the Southeast of Europe. Such security presupposes urgent fulfilment of terms that countries in the region should meet, before we start to build this system with accountability.

Here I would like to single out the importance of balancing economic potential with the size and structure of each army as an important condition. The Stability Pact has set the groundwork for such an approach through multilateral co-operation between countries of the region. In my view, this can and needs to result in the establishment of a new defense and security architecture in the sub-region as well as a new balance of forces by a corresponding reduction in troops and heavy weapon categories. By accepting the principles and spirit of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, countries accept responsibility for the initiation of any conflict in their own territory or outside their borders, as well as the possible consequences of retaliation similar to those we had the opportunity to witness during the Kosovo crisis. By establishing a new unified security system in the Southeast of Europe, the settlement of any conflict would gain completely different dimensions. Moreover, this would finally facilitate peace in the Balkans, long due after all the bloody war experiences that have occurred throughout this century.

The institutional policy of European and European-Atlantic structures towards Southeastern Europe must come up with a formula of joint interests, a formula that con-

tains all that is positive as well as any sacrifice that each country must make. The integration of Southeastern Europe into the European-Atlantic political, economic, security structures that are of particular interest in B&H should represent a joint political choice in a process that has a determined set of rules as well as a clear and unambiguous objective. By accomplishing this objective, all the countries in the Southeast of Europe would join the zone of higher level security. This would also positively change the political and economic appeal of the region, and the region itself would simultaneously become a factor of security and stability in light of overall stabilization in the Southeast of Europe.

IV.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: CROATIAN PERSPECTIVE

Vladimir P.
GOSS

Washington, D.C., USA

CROATIAN ART AND THE WEST: A VENERABLE WITNESS RECALLED

In 1978, I published an article in the *Cahiers archéologiques,* (27/1978) entitled "The Southeastern Border of Carolingian Architecture". Following the line of research proposed in my doctoral dissertation at Cornell University in 1972, and developed in my books on Pre-Romanesque architecture in Croatia, published in London in 1987, and Zagreb in 1996, I discovered within the body of Croatian Pre-Romanesque and Early Romanesque architecture (9th–11th century), a group of nine churches of fairly monumental proportions. They were linked with the Croatian royal court or the high dignitaries of the land, which, as I have demonstrated, clearly reveal elements of the contemporary Carolingian architecture of the West.[1]

The key feature of all those buildings is the appearance of a western tower, or massive – a westwork, a major contribution of the Carolingian architects to the evolution of the western facade of the standard basilican structure. Writing in 1963, Carol Heitz convincingly argued that the western massive, a *vollwestwerk* (including a tower and a gallery), were linked with the liturgy of the Savior (forming in fact a separate church dedicated to the Savior), and that the main liturgical events of the year, i.e., celebrations of Easter and Christmas were linked with the westwork. Terrestrial rulers, from the Emperor to lesser dignitaries, soon found their way into the symbolism, iconography and architecture of the westwork, and were given a seat on the second story of the western gallery overlooking the church nave. In addition to being a Savior's church, the westwork thus also became a *Kaiserkirche.*[2]

The Croatian royal foundations that have been mentioned are all in ruins or known through excavations. The only partially preserved monument of the group is the church of Sv. Spas (St. Savior's) at Cetina in the Dalmatian Highlands. For the sake of our argument, allow me to briefly recall this venerable witness from around the year 900.

Sv. Spas is an aisleless church, originally with a trefoil sanctuary, a concession to a local predilection for complex centralized forms. In front of the aisle, there is a two story gallery overlooking the nave, and a tall tapering tower. The walls are lined by heavy semicircular buttresses, a strong indication that the nave was vaulted. The gallery was accessible from the outside by means of a stairway landing in front of the second story of the tower. It communicated with the nave by three roundheaded openings, and the central one, taller than the rest, is enframed by pilaster-strips. Although the gallery in not visible from the outside, we are obviously dealing with a local version of a *vollwestwerk*.[3]

St. Savior's church was the central religious structure of the Cetina county. From the remains of a choir-screen inscription, we learn that it was founded by a *đupan* (Count, i.e., royal administrator of the county) named Gastica, who most likely had his seat in the gallery, wherefrom he observed the rites, or addressed the people. Around the church there is a huge cemetery of the county people, both noble and common.[4]

At a local level and in simplified local forms, Sv. Spas presents a complete program of a Carolingian westwork church – dedication to the Savior, a *vollwestwork,* a place for a terrestrial ruler within the westwork setting. Together with the other monuments of the group, it is a witness of early Croatian society highest strata's interest in the art of the West.[5] This is not surprising. In the ninth century, Croatian rulers were nominally subject to the Franks, and the Carolingian tradition was not discarded when full independence was gained around 870. The king, judging from the relief in the baptistery of Split, wore a Frankish costume and crown. The entire scene, with the count-swordbearer (the sword was obliterated at a later date) and a prostrated supplicant, was modeled upon the Carolingian and Ottonian ruler portraits, known from contemporary miniatures.[6] The spurs found at the ducal tomb of the Crkvina church in Biskupija were a local product resembling a Carolingian model.[7] The Croatian court was organized along Frankish lines, with the *Maior Domus,* Croatian *Ded* at its head; king's officers (*missi dominici*) who performed the king's commissions in the provinces.[8]

The "Royal Group" of early Croatian architecture represents the southeastern rim of western, Carolingian art. At a very early stage, as soon as Croats started building monumental structures in stone, around 800, it signaled the western orientation of the country's culture and art. Although one can find some interesting hybrids due to

the presence of eastern Christian, Byzantine influences in Croatia, this main, pro-western bias has never changed.[9] It remained the same throughout the Romanesque, Gothic, and Renaissance periods. Moreover, it was revived after the liberation of the occupied Croatian lands from the Turks in the Baroque, and it has continued until the present-day. The venerable old ruin of Sv. Spas at Cetina is a witness of that millennial development.

In the Early Middle Ages the rim lands of Europe – Croatia, Poland, Scandinavia, and the British Isles (also Hungary later), remained outside the European Union of Charlemagne and its successors. They did so on purpose, retaining their independence while acting as a bulwark of the West. However, they all embraced, in a local tongue, the forms of western culture.

The new Carolingian Empire centered in Brussels, has embarked upon the integration of those parts of Europe which failed to incorporate themselves into the old Charlemagne's Union. It is our hope that Croatia will not be left out for long. In a way, Croatia cannot *join* Europe. As its art and culture amply reveal, as witnessed in the example of Sv. Spas, it has been a part of it ever since the earliest attempts at European integration began twelve hundred years ago.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Vladimir Gvozdanović, The South-Eastern Border of Carolingian Architecture, *Cahiers archéologiques* 27, 1978, pp. 85–100; Vladimir Goss, *Early Croatian Architecture,* London: Duckworth, 1987; and *Pre-Romanesque Architecture in Croatia,* Zagreb: Architectonica Croatica, 1996.

[2] Carol Heitz, *Les recherches sur les rapports entre l'architecture et la liturgie à l'époque carolingienne,* Paris, SEVPEN, 1963, p. 77ff, p. 92ff, pp. 102–106ff, p. 121ff.

[3] Vladimir P. Goss, *Pre-Romanesque Architecture in Croatia,* Zagreb: Architectonica Croatica, 1996, pp. 136–138. Ibid., p. 136.

[4] Ibid., pp. 127–152.

[5] Ibid., p. 128.

[6] Ibid., pp. 127–128.

[7] Ibid., p. 128.

[8] Ibid., pp. 118–122.

Mladen
KLEMENČIĆ

Zagreb, Croatia

CROATIA
BETWEEN
THE BALKANS
AND EUROPE

Themes and issues related to national, ethnic, and regional identity occupy a prominent place in contemporary geography, particularly political geography. This has been borne out at numerous conferences on these topics as well as in publications that were published during the nineties, in which various authors discuss the mentioned categories (Hooson, 1994). These concepts are of particular importance for the new European states, that is, those historical entities and identities that Hooson calls *long repressed*, and to which he has dedicated an entire chapter in his anthology (Hooson, 1994). During the period of geopolitical transition that began with the end of the Cold War, those countries – including Croatia as a paradigmatic example – has changed their geopolitical code and harmonized it with national interests and existing regional, continental, and global structures and relations.

Geographic position is a dynamic social-geographic category and an important component of national identity, in contrast to location, which is a static category, determined by natural-geographic elements. However, before defining the geographic position of a particular country, it is possible to reach different results depending on the perspective from which one approaches the structure of a certain space. The following can be considered as an illustration. Many were surprised when a Georgian geographer claimed that Georgia, one of the three post Soviet states in the Transcaucasian area, is a European state and that "it has always leaned toward the West", (Gachechiladze, 1995). The Georgian geographer has, of course, given valid argumentation for such an assertion, but the viability of this assertion does not depend on his argumentation; but depends on the answer to this question: Where are in fact the boundary lines of Europe? The context and the perspective from which Georgia is talked about condition the answer.

Some doubts have also been raised concerning the position of Croatia in post-cold-war Europe. There is an ob-

vious discrepancy between national aspirations and the attained degree of integration into the emerging European structure, which is for the majority the fundamental measure of current regional affiliation in Europe at the turn of the century. Simply, such doubts can be reduced to a simple but essentially crucial question: the Balkans or Europe? Moreover, it should be emphasized that the notion of the Balkans carries extremely negative features with connotations of disorder, primitivism and backwardness. To belong to the Balkans, means to be banished from "club of the chosen". On the other hand, Europe has become a hallmark of order, civilized behavior, culture, development, and progress, or in other words, a prerequisite for "full membership in the club".

TRADITIONAL GEOGRAPHIC UNDERSTANDING OF POSITION

In one of the first articles published after Croatian independence, I defined Croatia as a country in contact with "various cultural, political, and economic... circles which, throughout history, have interacted and clashed within the territory of Croatia" (Klemenčić, 1993).

Retrospectively, it is a question of three cultural circles that have had a decisive influence on the territorial, national, spiritual and material formation of Croatian space and people. The west and south of Croatia were exposed to influences of the European Mediterranean. Although, as a whole, the Mediterranean is a markedly heterogeneous space, only its northwestern, European component is important for Croatia. First of all, this meant contacts with Catholicism in the cultural sense, that is with the Roman, particularly Italian sphere in the ethnic and political sense. In the north, Croatian space was influenced by the Central European circle, that is predominantly Catholic, although its Protestant and Jewish aspects must not be overlooked, as these are also components of that circle. In an ethnic and political sense, Central Europe meant contacts with Germanic peoples (Germans and Austrians) and with Hungarians as well, mostly resulting in influences of a political kind. The third circle is the Balkan or Southeastern European one that is characterized by the domination of Orthodoxy, as well as Islam brought to Europe by the Ottomans in the 15th and the 16th century. In terms of ethnic contact, the main representatives of that circle are the Serbs from the Croatian perspective.

Since the first two influential circles are commonly considered as belonging to parts of the European West, and the third to the European East, Croatia is defined as a

country that is on the boundary of two European cultural poles. However, since the Croatian medieval state came into being under the patronage of the West and it has continued to be under the decisive influence of that circle until the 20th century, I concluded that there is no reason to question Croatia's place in the West regardless of its border position. The influences of the Mediterranean and the Central European circles were long-lasting and stable and for most of its history, Croatia was in political union with countries from those circles. Its northern, continental areas have been, throughout history a part of the political communities centered in Central European space, whereas Venice, one of the Italian State components influenced the southern, littoral regions, for a long time. Similar conclusions have been made about the position of Croatia by other authors, not only local (Topalović, 1996), but foreign (Ruppert, 1994) as well.

The transitional, that is, contiguous characteristics of Croatia's position, but also its fundamental affiliation to the western circle, is attested to in the world's leading encyclopedias. An excellent illustration, in this sense, is offered by the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (in its edition published in the 1990s). However, a glimpse at that handbook reveals something else: a specific dilemma, which the position of Croatia sets off when an attempt is made to position the country within any of the larger European regions.

In its third volume, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* is quite unambiguous in response to questions about Croatia's position. The entry for Croatia states that it is "... a country in west-central Balkans". Likewise, in volume fourteen, Croatia can also be found under the entry of Balkan states. As a common feature, in all Balkan societies, including Croatia the entry states "Subjection to Eastern imperial forces isolated most Balkan societies from Western developments for almost two millennia". However, the sub-entry on Croatia within the same macropedic unit, specifies the following about Croatian regions, "although these regions were ruled for centuries by various foreign powers, they remained firmly Western-oriented in culture acquiring a legacy of Roman law, Latin alphabet, and western European political and economic traditions and institutions".

Thus, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* recognizes Croatia as a land of western heritage and culture, yet, at the same time, it is considered as part of the "Balkan states". Moreover, it is claimed that one of the states' main features is that for two millennia they have not participated in the

161

life and creativity of the West. We are obviously dealing with contradictory points of view, but this contradiction plainly demonstrates that position is a changeable category, that is, the transitional features of Croatia's position.

The author of one of the most comprehensive works on Croatia after its independence also emphasized the border position of Croatia (Tanner, 1997): "Croatia is border land. It lies on the geographical border between Central Europe and the Balkans, and between the Mediterranean world and continental Europe. It lies also on a cultural and religious border between eastern, Byzantine Christendom and Latin West. The very shape of the country reinforces the impression of a frontier. Nothing compact, square or secure. Instead the country curves around Bosnia in a narrow arc, in the shape of a crescent moon, or a boomerang." This is not all. Tanner is fully aware of all the consequences that such a border position has left upon the people who inhabit such a land and therefore points out that: "Because they inhabit the rim, or the ramparts, never the middle, the people of border land are not relaxed about their heritage or culture. There is always the lurking danger that the rest of Europe may forget about them or – worse – confuse them with the people to the east and south."

It seems that from these perceptions that have been quoted, Tanner understands correctly Croatian dissatisfaction with the way major western countries, the European Union in particular, have classified Croatia. From a Croatian perspective, the Southeast European or Balkan component is often downplayed, while the Mediterranean and, especially, the Central European is highlighted. In this way, it is believed that this will ensure and establish the desired affiliation to Europe. Any dispute of these characteristics in Croatia is met with disapproval or total rejection. Tanner brings this to our attention very well: "Pick up any recent publication by the Croatian authorities, even a tourist brochure, and count the number of times such words as *Western*, *Catholic*, *Central Europe* or even *civilization* appear. Or try dropping the word *Balkan* into a conversation with a Croat and wait for the inevitable protest: Croatia is not part of the Balkans, but part of the *West*."

THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF CROATIA

In the period after the Second World War, Europe was divided into the East and West. By the end of the eighties, that division had definitely become history. Thereafter, a new geopolitical division of Europe began to take shape. Al-

though at first glance the picture appears complex, Europe in fact has once again two fundamental components, that is, two basic groups of countries. European Union members constitute one group. This group is in fact identical to the European West from the cold-war period. The other group is made up of the so-called transition countries. Thus, at the beginning of the new millennium Europe consists of the European Union and transition Europe.

Since the model developed by the West European countries during the cold-war period has become a generally acceptable European model for the 21st century, all the transitional countries have expressed both an intention and desire to become, in the future, part of a united Europe. This model has no alternative, so it is justifiable to conclude that the European Union has not only imposed itself as the European hegemon but that other countries have accepted this role.

However, not all the countries in transition share the same relation with the European Union. They have often been compared to the Solar system in which the European Union takes the sun's central position. Transitional countries rotate around the European Union at various distances, just like planets of the Solar system around the star in the center. The distance from the center of the system is proportional to the stage achieved by each country in its approach to the European Union, that is, the position of each country in the process of European integration.

According to the position of transitional countries in "orbit", the European Union developed a so-called regional approach in which transitional countries are divided into several groups. Although these regions, i.e., groups of countries with similar characteristics have been given geographic names, the division is based on a combination of geographic position and the evaluation of the European Union concerning the quality of the political and economic system of particular countries. There are different views, as well as various divisions of transitional countries into groups, largely depending on the context. However, it seems legitimate to refer to four groups of transitional countries: (1) the East European group including Russia, Belorussia (politically tied) and the Ukraine (functionally tied); (2) the three post-Soviet Baltic states; (3) successor states to the former Yugoslavia along with Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania make up the Balkan lands, or, more politely Southeastern Europe. This third group is further subdivided into the "Eastern Balkans" consisting of Bulgaria and Romania, and the "Western Balkans" including the former Yugoslav states and Albania; (4) finally,

the fourth group consists of countries that are geographically closest to the European Union – Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia, as well as Slovenia that was later included, even though it was previously considered to be a Balkan country. This group is usually called "Central Europe", and the states within it are in principle first in line to join the European Union.

In the case of Croatia, there is a discrepancy between expectation and conceptions of the official government policy, as well as the majority of the population on the one hand, and the real situation, i.e., the above-mentioned regional division by the European Union on the other. From a Croatian perspective, the actual position of the country is not consistent with its heritage and potential. Croatia should not be in the Balkan group; its place is in the Central European group of transitional countries. This "misunderstanding" has been a source of deep frustration, and even an outburst of "Anti-Europeanism" in Croatia.

The obvious gap that exists between the conceptual maps of Europe from a Croatian perspective compared to the European Union's perspective is due to the fact that the contemporary concept of regional affiliation has not been determined by geographic, historic, and cultural factors, as emphasized by Croats, but primarily by political, economic, and geopolitical factors and reasons. Since West European integration depends on a set of general principles, that constitute the foundation stones of the common institutions, it is only logical that the European Union expects and requires prospective members among the transitional countries to respect these same principles and to accept the "rules of the game", or parameters. The existing regionalization, with which Croatia is dissatisfied, has been carried out from the "wide-angle" perspective of the European Union. It depends, first of all, on evaluation of the potential quality of the national political elite. Countries have been grouped primarily according to an assessment that has been obtained through the behavior of the ruling political elite, and this includes readiness to accept and apply the proclaimed and prevalent European principles.

Leaving aside an analysis of reasons, it is valid to conclude that Croatia did not join the Central European group of transitional countries on time. Instead, Croatian foreign policy was largely oriented toward Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, as one of the signatories of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Croatia accepted its share of responsibility for the Accord's implementation, and thus, in the eyes of the international community, became a part of the so-called "Daytonland". Hence, the countries from this

group are not part of Central Europe, but, rather, belong to the Balkans.

Croatian political attempts to influence a different regional classification of the country have been very much like the desperate attempts of a person drowning in quicksand attempting to survive: instead of support at the surface, rescue attempts have pulled the drowning person down further into the mud. This applies to Croatian politics; attempts to show that the country does not belong to the Balkans reinforced the international community's perception of Croatia as a Balkan state.

INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION

The existing political regionalization of Europe created from the "wide-angle" perspective of the European Union largely depends on the current quality of the ruling national elite. Transitional countries have been classified, first of all, according to the assessment of national elite behavior. In this context, it is valid to consider the current position of Croatia. Since political practice can change quickly, a particular country can change its political image overnight. Thus, one may expect that just as quickly the European Union can reposition such a country, that is, revise its position on the map of transitional Europe that, in turn, has an impact on the treatment of these countries.

The priority given to political criteria is the main reason why other criteria have been pushed aside. In a discussion about the geopolitical division of Europe today, the question of context has remained paramount. If the political context is taken into account, no space can be given to other factors. Moreover, the final picture – regional grouping – is quite different from one that could emerge within a different context. Political geography uses a complex definition of position – one that rests on several principles.

From a Croatian perspective, a pronounced tendency to belittle the importance of the complex, transitional position of Croatia, by emphasizing and singling out exclusively the Central European characteristics can be noted.

The uncertainty that needs to be resolved in the future is how to suppress and overcome the negative heritage springing forth from the transitional position of the country. Instead, it is crucial to develop amenities and highlight the advantages that stem from Croatia's position at the meeting point of several European macro-entities.

The issue of perspective also remains important. It is not the same if one looks from Vukovar, Dubrovnik, or Zagreb, or from Brussels, Strasbourg, Paris, or London. In

addition, if one assumes a bird's eye view of the European Union, many details and nuances that are so important from the insiders' perspective are likely to be missed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gachechiladze, R. (1995), *The New Georgia*. London: UCL Press.

Hooson, D. (ed.), (1994), *Geography and National Identity*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Klemenčić, M. (1993), Croatia – Past and Present: Location, Position, Territory, Borders, Regions. *Acta Geographica Croatica* Vol. 28, pp. 23–38.

Rupert, K. (1994), Central Europe – Approaching a Concept. *Acta Geographica Croatica* 29, pp. 1–11.

Tanner, M. (1997), *Croatia, A Nation Forged in War*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Topalović, D. (1996), Croatia and Central Europe – The Geopolitical Relationship. *Geojournal* 38, 4, pp. 399–405.

Srećko
LIPOVČAN

Zagreb, Croatia

THE MEANING OF CULTURAL SUBSTRATUM IN THE PROCESSES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

"A true European does not live in one nation, but within an order of nations. (...) Different languages and different cultures are inextricably bound to Europe's being."

I.

If we were to evaluate the prospects of European integration in the upcoming century against the background of the "Old" Continent's *political* history, there would be no reason for exaggerated optimism. Within that scope (of diplomatic deals at the expense of third parties, conflict and war) the human position can be sarcastically revealed as *destruction*. As an initiating mechanism, *historiae* generates *instinct,* the selfish interest of the individual, disguised as "the vital interest of a broader community": i.e., of the clan, tribe, (social) rank, religious denomination and community, class, nation – depending upon which epoch we are talking about. This is the native locus of *Clausewitz's* axiom: war is nothing but the continuation of *policy* with other means. This was best confirmed by the catastrophe named the two World Wars, even though, from the viewpoint of internal structural connection, the "interwar" period (1919–1939) was just a breather between two (unequal) halftimes of the same match. Therefore, when globalization, which *is already* a process is talked about today, then one must bear in mind that it is a dimension and that its negative connotations appeared back in 1914. By 1945, Europe definitely had lost its privileged *world historical* position and soon began to search for itself.

Yet, albeit quite convincing, a picture of the European past as "a series of causally linked destructions" is nevertheless not a picture of the *entire* past. With regard to the next century, i.e., Europe's future, one should definitely bear this in mind, because, without any doubt, Europe will (only) be a part of the global, world process. Moreover, given the nuclear potential that is available,

169

there is no choice: the world will either exist without war as a global confrontation, or it will cease to exist. This means that the set of policies, which follow the Clausewitz axiom, which is no longer relevant, will have to be replaced by a *differently* constituted set of policies. On which foundations? Do these lie, still unrecognized, in the future, or have some although surely ineffective, been present? In other words, can we juxtapose the *old policy* with a new position, which focuses on an image of a *con*structive, rather than a *de*structive front when considering the historical activities of European Man?

Undoubtedly, different answers are possible. I believe that one of them is to focus on *culture* if European integration is a part of a global process. Culture as an eminently creative, *constructive activity* of the human spirit and energy (on the condition that the "condition humaine" is not considered as *absolute* but as *limited, stripped* of the new age arrogance concerning the self-sufficiency of "a world without God", which culminated in the totalitarianisms of the 20th century).

2.

Having determined that *culture* and *integration* are the key operative concepts of this discussion, one must immediately state that their content in *colloquial usage* is often confusing, and in this sense, they cannot be satisfactory. This is borne out by two, for this occasion randomly chosen and widely circulated contemporary dictionaries, a Croatian one (Anić's Croatian dictionary[1]), and a foreign one (Wahrig's German dictionary[2]). Hence, it is necessary to try to find the *original*, that nowadays has become perhaps concealed or its meanings forgotten.

1. The Notion of *Culture*

Both dictionaries, essentially in the same way, illustrate that, the **central** meaning of the word is found by highlighting the *result* of the activity, and not in the *activity itself* "**1. A totality of spiritual, moral, social and productive activity of a human society**"[3]; or: "**1. A totality of spiritual and artistic expressive forms of a nation (art, science, etc.)**"[4]. *Wahrig* precisely points to the Latin origin (and meaning)[5], whereas *Anić* only registers a wider source (classical Europeanism). It is worth referring to the source when searching for the original meaning of *activity*, and not just its present visible *results*. To retain the lexicographic source, two more dictionaries were consulted, spe-

cifically Divković's large Latin (school) dictionary[6], and Šulek's German-Croatian dictionary[7].

1.a. The word *cultura* in Latin, according to an ordinary "school" dictionary (1,162 large format pages), originally meant primordial. As one of the earliest human *creative activities*: **cultivating, tilling, working** (land or fields); the notion soon acquired a figurative meaning: **moral education, ennoblement.** In the singular, the adjective *cultus* means **one who is aspired,** whereas in the plural *culta* turns into a substantive: **cultivated, tilled land;** *cultus* hereafter, figuratively speaking, is one who is **educated, refined.** *Cultus*[8] as a noun has the same meaning as well as a new one: **cultivating and training of the spirit**.

1.b. Thus, the key feature of these activities is *cultivation* and *care,* so, having our operational needs in mind, we may say that culture, as a *constructive human activity*, represents *a provident creation of what is created.* Hence, while the colloquial definition is limited to what has *already been created,* our suggestion and interpretation, expanded by the original meanings, emphasizes that the need for cultivating and care is not completed by a created totality, but is *a continuous and consequently a present-day and future task of historical (human) practice.*

2. The Notion of *Integration*

2.a. If we open our contemporary dictionaries again, we will see that *integration* according to *Anić* (again denoted as *classical Europeanism*) means **transformation or merging of parts into a whole,**[9] and according to *Wahrig* **creation of a whole, assembly, unification/association.** *To integrate* according to *Wahrig* means **shape into a whole**; he also lists the modern syntagm *European integration* which is explained as a dynamic political project: **the cooperation of European states by creating supranational bodies**[10]. No doubt, we are dealing with a *process. Wahrig* also indicates that the root of the word should be sought for in the Latin adjective *integer* and the verb *integrare,* which he translates as **renew, complete**[11]. This is a very important instruction. If we consult *Divković's* explanation of the semantic base, we find that *integer,* first of all, means *untouched* in the sense of **unhurt, undamaged, intact,** and then also **whole.** Here we find reference to the first meaning of the verb integrare – *to renew*[12]. *Divković* does not list the nouns (it would surely be *integratio*), but here, as usual we find help in *Šulek*. His translation from German (for

Integration, f.) without doubt again indicates *process* (*completing, completion of process*), and the verb (*integrieren*) is translated as *to complete, to complete a process*[13]. *Anić* also draws attention to a duality: the perfective and imperfective – of the verb *to integrate*[14], implying dynamism of historical process.

The levels of meaning provided by these insights lead to fruitful examination of the place and the role of cultural substrata, especially the one whereby the verb *to integrate* indicates that we are dealing with something in need of *renewing, completing. Renewal* thus becomes a permanent feature of a (permanent) process. This is the level at which the notions of *integration* and *culture* meet each other.

3.

I believe that we may all agree that concepts of European integration only make sense if they aim at a *cancellation*[15] of past history *as* a history of destruction. I also believe and we can all agree that another Utopian project should not be added to the long list of well-known ones. This means that the new concept that is not just another Utopian one, must be, in reality, founded on what has *already* been proven as real and constructive in that same European history, and as something already confirmed as *possible. European culture* is this exactly: a mutual relationship of particular cultures, or *cultural substrata*, which some authors see in any language "the foundation of every culture"[16].

European identity is quite certainly a *whole* made up of separate cultural substrata. Without them, it does not even exist as a reality. However, it is crucial to bear in mind, that this whole has *never* been a mere *sum* of particular substrata in some mechanical series, but a productive *mutual relationship of giving and receiving.*

When *Gide* refers to the "future of Europe" in 1923 (*L'Avenir de l'Europe*), he speaks about it precisely from experience of its history. He says: *"(...) no country of Europe can strive for true progress of its own culture, if it insulates itself and rejects cooperation with other countries".*

Therefore, upon completion of this model, he is able to define the European spirit as follows: *"The true spirit of Europe is opposed to the isolationist arrogance of nationalism, but it also opposes the loss of national individuality, which clashes with internationalism."*[17]

Thus, a duality of the spirit of *open subjects is at work,* and this is exactly what we refer to when we say "separate European cultures as parts of a whole". In any case, isn't *in-*

tegration a renewal, shaping, the *constitution of a whole*? The European whole implies a mutual relationship of all genuine "open subjects". Otherwise, it would not be a *whole*, but only (some, unrelated) *part* of a (still non-existent) whole, opposing some other *part*, and such a "state" is nothing but the (military, political) history of Europe as we know it.[18] That this whole including *all* existing (legitimate) subjects has *not* been realized so far, should not be taken as an argument against culture as a guardian of the European spirit, but against policies which have not attained a model in which culture has long lived as a dual constant: *and* as a supposition *and* as a creation.

Therefore *A. Thibaudet*, another Frenchman, could write:

"A true European does not live in one nation, but within an order of nations. (...) Different languages and different cultures are inextricably bound to Europe's being."[19]

This was written as early as 1928 and has retained its significance until today on the threshold of the third millennium and of European integration. Moreover, it was written specifically after horrible experiences with the totalitarian systems of the 20th century, which are, let us not forget, of **European** origin. By suspending freedom, the totalitarian systems of the 20th century (Fascism, Nazism, Communism/Bolshevism), also abolished the freedom of *cultural creativity*. They favoured creations which they, often and willingly, manipulated as decor of their own ideology, founded on national or social **collectivism** (or on one and the other simultaneouslly),[20] and not on the respect for **an individual as a person**. The quoted thought that "language is the reducible basis of every culture" received a dreadful confirmation with the burning or banning of "undesirable books" because they are truly "a storage of preserved values".

The period of European totalitarianisms as historically expended is, we believe, forever behind us, but it should not be ignored that it had characteristics that were capable of independent existence, that is, outside these concepts. We are afraid: what if the *uravnilovka* (*leveling*) and *Gleichschaltung* meaning the *erasure of the individual* outlive the historical framework of the expended ideological concepts, and are rivived in planetary envisaged *globalization*? Instead of ideological concepts of the "old" collectivism – the "framework" becomes a more sophisticated development of *technology* without a firm system of values. From planetary heights, globalization projects exhaust themselves in discovery (and artificial creation) of *the same* – with the goal of leveling: the *same* must be contained in

one, so that all that is *different* is discarded as undesirable, unnecessary and removed as harmful. An inundation of *Burger Kings* all over the world is just a symbolic expression of such a push.

There where no distinctions are made between the developed diversity of historical and topically open subjects (like it is in the European case) it is easier to use the *desert* as the most ideal starting point of every "pure" globalization. In the European case, such a procedure would open a road toward the creation of a common *Euro-desert*. Such a perspective is not mere speculation: on a planetary level, WTO's grain prices provokes fewer disputes than the protection of some "products of culture" from more powerful and far stronger *commercialization* (read: disappearance) of the same segment under global conditions. It is not that there is *no* consciousness in Europe of the pernicious leveling under the pressure of economic powers of the most powerful world powers. However, there is not *enough* consciousness of one's own position from which a defense from danger is at all possible. Not yet constituted Europe (as a whole *sui generis*), is still **incomplete** (Šulek), and in a weaker position in relation to the global demands which do not suit its *nature.*

If the abandonment of politics is like destruction of historical necessity, it can be justifiably asked: Does a new policy, which could successfully oppose unnatural demands exist at all? Considering the problem, pragmatically, the question is: Do the economic and political *elite* of European states, the promoters of the 21st century integration, think, that politics, rationally defined as a *skill of the possible,* does *not* have any chance unless it takes into consideration the realities of space and time? Within such politics, the chances of true and successful European integration are small, insofar as it is not known who are all the "open subjects" of integration, that is, what is the nature – and true potential – of each subject. Unless this is taken into consideration, subjects of European integration processes will be determined *arbitrarily* from the viewpoint of the needs of *globalization* and not for the purposes of an *internal renewal of Europe.* This is best revealed by the relationship between the current-day EU country members and those who are not (yet).

4.

Now we are in a position to place Croatia and its surroundings within this general framework. Both the geopolitical position of Croatia as well as its margin and

frontier positions have been amply discussed at this Symposium, so there is no need for repetition.[21] Still, one should bear in mind that, from a culturological point of view, things appear somewhat different. The *frontier* is not only an area of *clash,* but also of *meeting.* In the foreword of his book, *Croatia in the Heart of Europe – Mediterranean and Central European Cultural Landscapes of Croatia,*[22] Radoslav Katičić, a member of the Croatian Academy, has singled out the key determinant of "Croatia's cultural image":

> *"The Croatian entity emerges amidst the tension prevailing at the meeting place of the European Transalpine and Mediterranean realms. Even the tourist trends today vividly illustrate the fact that the Mediterranean is nowhere so Central European and Central Europe so Mediterranean as in Croatia. Likewise, nowhere is the authentically Latin Europe so closely linked to the literacy of the Slavonic Middle Ages that the entire prominent literature is bilingual, that there is a bishop reading the mass* 'in Latin or Croatian as he likes', *to quote the 14th century glagolitic priest Juraj Slavonac (Georges d'Esclavonie), a teacher at Sorbonne."*[23]

In the title of the text already quoted, *A. Stamać* defines Croatian culture as "a meeting place of four superstrata",[24] which have co-constituted its historic and current content: Mediterranean, Central European, Pannonian – and least significantly – Western Balkan (resulting from the dynamics brought about by the politics of the Ottoman Empire since the middle of the 15th century, particularly in regard to great demographic changes). Any visitor to one of the larger Croatian cities – Dubrovnik, Zadar, Split, Zagreb, Varaždin, Osijek, or Vukovar (before the devastations during the war aggression of 1991) – could testify to that historic character of Croatian cultural identity. That character of Croatian culture can be defined only as an "open subject" of a kind that was earlier postulated as the subject of European integration. The standpoint expounded here, substantiated by the arguments of two outstanding Croatian theoreticians of language and culture is our self-understanding of our own position. However, by a combination of circumstances, this position has not gained acceptance in a wider circle. In dialogue with "others", Croatia has not demanded nothing more than respect, after checking the relevancy of the presented arguments, for the *reasons* of this kind of self-understanding. In such a dialogue, if conducted in the right fashion, this position will undergo corrections, which can only strengthen it. Moreover, our collocutors will have fewer problems understanding why we are so surprised when the Brussels bureaucracy places Croatia within the

invented framework of the "Western Balkans". Consequently, in our opinion, all the other identified components of its being are being ignored or suppressed, even though they are dominant.

It is worthwhile to clearly state the following: our efforts to secure an appropriate place to the cultural substratum as a constituent factor in European integration is not based on historicism or a look into the past, but on insights into the living present, which, while historically founded, are oriented to the future. In other words: for the realization of European integration, centuries-old cultural presence is unimportant if viewed as a mere decor of contemporary inefficiency and inability (or, even worse, of possible arrogance as a result of the value of /just/ one's own tradition). It is, however, essential inasmuch as that same spirit remains alive – as *potential* for tomorrow, and not as dead archival data. Unfortunately, the general conditions in Croatia in the past century blocked, to a large extent, its independence and potentials, as well as its *own responsibility* in creating these potentials and in co-activity in a civilization circle to which it belongs. In striving for and in stimulating such responsibility we can find help in cultural history, inasmuch as we can recognize the *models* in which the cultural substratum is indeed identified as legitimate potential in co-building of Western European spiritual, and thus also of social space.

This Symposium took place in Dubrovnik enabling our guests, in particular those from abroad, to experience a personal meeting with the *City*,[25] and the centuries-old atmosphere which has created both the Dubrovnik *walls* and all that they protected: human individuals-creators (of spiritual and material values). Hence, I will use a *model* from another Croatian city, which recently marked 1,700 years of its existence. Namely, Split, the second largest city of contemporary Croatia, that sprung up in the middle of the Palace of Diocletian.

Our example takes us back half a millennium, to the writer *Marko Marulić* (1450–1524). The population of Split, today Dalmatia's metropolis, was 6,000 in Marulić's time. Although this author is rightly considered the "father of Croatian artistic literature" thanks to his epic poem *Judita*, written in the Croatian language, his numerous Latin works are no less important for Croatian culture; in the Europe of the 16th and the 17th centuries they were given an extraordinary, exceptional reception. Marulić is the *most published* Croatian author of all time *in the world*, that is, documented by two recent publications: seventeen studies by the outstanding French scholar and Renaissance specialist (Rab-

elais, Erasmus of Rotterdam), *Charles Béné*,[26] and the large monograph by the most outstanding among Croatian Marulić students, *Mirko Tomasović*, member of the Croatian Academy.[27] His book, *De institutione bene vivendi per exempla sanctorum* won him world-wide fame, which between 1498 and 1987 was published in **sixty-five editions, thirty-one** of which were in **original Latin** (Venice, Mantua, Solingen, Basel, Cologne, Antwerp, Paris). It was also translated and published in Italian, German, Portuguese, Czech, French, Japanese, and Croatian.[28] His work, *Evangelistarium* was published in Cologne in 1529 – in as many as four editions. The following is worth emphasizing: since he upheld the moral values of a true Christian life throughout the difficult crisis of European societies, Marulić's works – after his death – were popular in both the Catholic and the Protestant circles of a divided Christian Europe. As a *European humanist* (not only in terms of the *significance* of his work, but its *reception*), the Croatian writer Marulić is a fine example of the thesis *unity in diversity*: in a (permanent) effort to build a common European *home*, which also means within Thibaudet's *order of nations.*

There is no reason for absence of such figures – even though in a more humble and less spectacular way – among our contemporaries, who might co-work within a broad spectrum of European culture: especially inspired *individuals*, which, as we know, are born where "the Holy Spirit wishes to blow". Moreover, an inspired *individual* is not cramped by the logic of small and large numbers (size of population).

FOOTNOTES

[1] Vladimir Anić, *Rječnik hrvatskoga jezika,* Zagreb: Novi Liber, 1991.

[2] Gerhard Wahrig, *Deutsches Wörterbuch,* Munich: Mosaik Verlag, 1989.

[3] Anić, ibid., p. 297.

[4] Wahrig, ibid., p. 800: "1. Gesamtheit der geistigen u. künstler. Ausdrucksformen eines Volkes (Kunst, Wissenschaft usw.)." Anić attributes culture (as an activity) to *society*, whereas Wahrig attributes it to *nation*.

[5] Wahrig: "[< lat. *cultura* 'Landbau, Pflege (des Körpers u. Geistes)'; zu lat. *colere* '(be)bauen, (be)wohnen, pflegen'; (verwand mit *Kolonie*)]".

[6] *Latinsko-hrvatski rječnik za škole*, second edition, prepared by Mirko Divković, Director of the Royal Upper Town Gymnasium of Zagreb; in Zagreb with the support of and published by the Royal Croatian-Slavonian-Dalmatian Land Government, 1900.

[7] *Deutsch-Kroatisches Wörterbuch* von Bogoslav Šulek. *Ndmačko-hrvatski rdčnik,* Agram (Zagreb), 1860, Verlag der Franz Suppan'schen Buchhandlung.

[8] Divković, ibid., p. 264. *Cultus* to the Romans also means **respect** (for Gods), and the concept of *cult* in contemporary languages is also based on this meaning.

[9] Anić, op.cit., p. 206.

[10] Wahrig, ibid., p 694: "Integration – *Herstellung eines Ganzen, Zusammenschlub, Vereinigung;* integrieren – *zu einem Ganzen bilden*; europäische Integration: *Zusammenarbeit europ. Staaten durch Bildung übernationaler Organe.*" Anić does not mention those syntagms: it seems that the theme was not yet "topical" at this time.

[11] *Wiederherstellen, ergänzen.*

[12] Divković, ibid., pp. 543, 544.

[13] Šulek, ibid., p. 720.

[14] "To complete or carry out an integration, to link or combine (in its entirety), to bring together or unite (what was separated or divided)", ibid., p. 206.

[15] In the sense of the term *aufheben.*

[16] "Cultural achievements may be also read from non-linguistic signs (...). However, language almost exclusively language that is written in documents and can be reproduced and preserved permanently, is the foundation of every culture. Foundation, meaning: a safe repository of preserved values. Thus, the language and its realizations – communicational, functional, conceptual, and esthetic – parts constitute the basic foundation of every culture" (Ante Stamać, "Hrvatska kultura kao susretište četiriju superstrata", *Smotra/Rundschau - The Journal of Croatian-German Society,* II, 3–4, p. 21 Zagreb, December 1996 (A German translation of the entire text can be found on pp. 24–28).

[17] André Gide, "The Future of Europe", in: *Discourse on Europe.* Cultural-Philosophical Essays by French Writers. Prepared and translated by Ivo Hergešić, Zagreb: Matica hrvatska – Educational and Political Library, series B, 12, 1944, pp. 29–30. The source is, as specified by the editor in "Notes" on p. 167, a response to a survey by the journal *Revue de Genève* in 1923; the text was reprinted in the edition, *Works* (vol. Incidences, *Oeuvres d'André Gide* vol. 11, Paris 1936).

[18] For example, the following historic contraversies as fights for priority: Aachen – Constantinople; the One-Hundred Years War between England and France; the Habsburg-French/Prussian-French wars; the First and the Second World Wars.

[19] A. Thibaudet, "For a definition of Europe", in: *Discourse on Europe*, p. 125. Source: "Pour une définition de l'Europe", 1928. In: *Antologie des essayistes français contemporaines,* Paris, 1929 (Notes, p. 167).

[20] The official name of the party that is colloquially called Nazi was NSDAP – Nazionalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National-Socialist German Workers' Party).

[21] Compare, for example, "Croatia Between the Balkans and Europe" by M. Klemenčić, read at this Symposium.

[22] *Croatian Pan-European Union,* Zagreb, 1996, pp. 7–8. The book was printed in Croatian, English, French, and German.

[23] Ibid., pp. 7–8.

[24] "Every culture is a historical 'co-play' between the home substratum and historically active superstrata, each in its own way", Stamać, ibid. p. 21.

[25] As a *notion* of city, Dubrovnik is called *City* here.

[26] Charles Béné, *Études maruliennes. Le rayonnement européen de l'oeuvre de Marc Marule de Split,* Zagreb-Split, 1998 (251 pgs).

[27] Mirko Tomasović, *Marko Marulić Marul,* Zagreb-Split, 1999 (326 pgs with comprehensive summaries in Italian, French, German, and English).

[28] Compare Tomasović, ibid., pp. 62, 127.

Ivan
ROGIĆ

Zagreb, Croatia

TRANSITION AND/OR (POST)MODERNIZATION

Transition and/or (post)modernization? At first sight, this question seems, if not pointless, then superfluous. The main basis for such an impression lies, first of all, in some sort of intuitive confidence that the word "transition", precisely and without any cynical intentions on the part of those involved in the transition change, points to a **complete** atlas of developmental tasks in transition countries. The mentioned confidence is further supported by two facts that have significant consequences. The first reflected is in the practices of Euro-American countries. Namely, the main/obligatory changes and measures of their quality assigned to post-socialist countries after 1990 are performed within the framework of transition, and no other. The second is reflected in the practices of the ruling groups in post-socialist countries, such that transitional imperatives are used and applied as a complete set of national development goals. Both of these facts, already due to a type of direct pressure by political institutions that help maintain their "naturalness", stimulate a critical evaluation – that the list of transition tasks and intentions represents a **complete** list of the main national development goals. The articulate insight of many participants in transition societies should be added to this. Namely, the mechanical efficacy in applying transition imperatives and fulfilling transition tasks, **is no guarantee** of successful management of developmental crises in which, predictably, post-socialist societies have found themselves in, following the exhaustion of the socialist model. We believe it to be reasonable to propose a sketch whereby the above-mentioned critical intention acquires a wider area of argumentation.

TRANSITION AND MODERNIZATION: TYPICAL DIFFERENCES

Inasmuch as one can conclude from empirical data, a transitional program encompasses an array of **institutional** changes needed for the transformation from a so-

cialist model of management to a civic one. In other words, a set of institutional changes needed for the transition from socialism to capitalism. These two alternative definitions are not synonymous, yet the second one provides an additional dimension. If nothing else, it helps bring to our attention the possibility that a society pauperized in socialism may **very successfully** "transit" into a **likewise poor** capitalism. If the success of transition is measured by the yardstick of main transition tasks, then that possibility cannot even be clearly envisioned. However, if the success of transition is measured using modernization measures, the possibility not only becomes easily visible, but the need to avoid it becomes an **independent** stronghold of parallel modernization practices. It is worth noting that these **are not the required content** of a transitional program of change. It is easy to see the reason. The transitional program rests on three main tasks: privatization of (public) property; democratization of political relations; and autonomy of the civil ("the third") sector of the society. The program is based on the hypothesis that such a reconstruction of social reality would, **in itself**, become a sufficient reason for a successful development recovery of transitional societies. Beyond any doubt, the mentioned changes are necessary for "transition from socialism to capitalism". Private ownership and related market rationality, as well as democracy and civism are at the top of the list of required conditions needed for a successful transition into a civic world. However, blind trust in their automatic effects in a desirable direction clashes with a few unbending conditions of success, without which it is impossible to put together any list of examples of successful social or economic development. Here are some of the more important ones: (1) general technical competence of participants in developmental change; (2) readiness for risky development mobilization (without which there is no good entrepreneurship); (3) capability to imaginatively formulate new objects for "old" cravings (needs); (4) the size of the population "naturally" oriented towards innovative behavior; (5) quality of social heritage of development participants. Although only a few, from a long list of important modernization bases have been mentioned, it is not difficult to perceive that they all have common ground. This can be briefly summed up as **quality of development participants**. If a society does not have development participants of necessary quality, its transitional "elegance" may be sufficient for the kind disposition of Euro-American governments and for the financial "gifts" of the International Monetary Fond. However, it is not

sufficient for the actual autonomous development of the transitional society as a whole. Moreover, without such autonomy, the final balance of the transition process cannot be separated from the process where a dependence framework is exchanged for another. The proposed sketch, thus, advocates a conclusion that transitional and modernization goals and imperatives **are not quite congruent**. It may be useful to explore how that lack of congruence appears from a theoretical stance that maintains confidence in modernization.

Following M. Weber, three separate "sector" processes within the modernization process can be differentiated. Briefly, these are production-technical reconstruction (industrialization), territorial reconstruction (urbanization), and institutional reconstruction (bureaucratization) of society. Their task is of the same kind: to facilitate/strengthen the forms of production, territorial, and institutional autonomy of the society undergoing modernization. Consequently, the modernization section in all separate sectors of social practices is **intentionally the same**. If we follow the path indicated, it becomes clear that the focal point of the modernization intent is **a program of breaking up networks of dependency**. The program is relevant for both society as a whole and for its individual participants. However, a comparison with the transition tasks indicates that the direct **thematic** link between transition and modernization can be determined within only one sector of modernization: in the area of the institutional reconstruction of the society. Contrastingly, the processes of the other two sectors of the transition program are not talked about.

A particularly dramatic separation of modernization and transition imperatives is visible in view that all three sector forms of modernization actuate a precise determination of the internal oriented development; those that we conventionally call **national interests**. It is impossible to stimulate development and choose modernization alternatives in industry, urban network, technical infrastructure, scientific research, and similar fields which, decisively determine the forms of modernization without clear notions determining the way in which the general operation of modernization autonomy practically forms into networks of separate forms of societal activity. Their importance is greater inasmuch as the transition society has more **atypical** structural features, which the transition society displays.

First example: In both Estonian or Croatian society, socialism formed statistical ethnic minority groups with a

183

surplus of political power; an ethnic minority group was used for the local "thug" system. From the transitional perspective, after the collapse of socialism such groups should have conventional members of a civil sector. However, from a modernization perspective, their persuasiveness in roles as conventional members of the civil sector is at any rate problematic. The reason is that such groups continually derive their social identity from the model of distribution of social and political power as it existed during socialism. According to that model, these minority groups are equal/undiscriminated only **if and when they are** politically and socially privileged. A mere possibility that they are not to be privileged (but undiscriminated) is sufficient reason for persistent enmity toward the other members of the society, particularly toward those who have modernization autonomy as their main goal. In other words, they have formed their social identity **in opposition to** the program of creating a modernizing autonomous society to which they physically belong.

Second example: Reliance on market rationality should be, according to transition rules, obligatory. However, within Croatian society there is much territory that does not have appeal. In these territories, there is a marked absence of youth; there is no suitable or required technical infrastructure; the close proximity of mine fields from the 1991-1995 war period is threatening; the local population still suffers from the images of war cruelty, etc. To believe that "spontaneous" market processes would revive those areas, borders on the fantastic. On the other hand, many of those areas are near the Croatian state border. Past experiences strongly indicate that it is against national interests (security) to leave such areas neglected. The implications of transitional rules seem to suggest that it is best to trust the general market mechanics. The implications of modernization rules indicate that it is necessary to actively shape a renewal and revitalization of such areas on the basis of a special alliance between competent actors.

Third example: Croatian society is an emigration society, similar to Irish or Ukrainian. Without support and cooperation between the "homeland" and the diaspora, as data clearly indicate, many modernization projects undertaken in Croatia especially after state independence (1991), would never have been possible. Transitional rules imply that emigrant groups cannot be recognized members of the civil sector in Croatian "homeland" society. However, modernization rules affirm that the emigrant groups are at the top of the list of modernization participants who successfully make up for the scarcity of competence, money, and

civic courage of the modernization participants "at home". Therefore, transition rules censor the possibility that emigrant groups have special representation as political participants in the "homeland" society. Thus, the mentioned groups, by the logic of the transition grammar itself, turn into **important, albeit unrecognized** modernization participants. Whereas, paradoxically, according to the same grammar, it has been seen that groups of the colonially privileged, without any modernization merit, with merits of the **opposers** to the modernization program have become conventional members of the civil network.

It is possible to object to the choice of examples by claiming it was based on author's predilection for a kind of analytic irony. Or, that they are protected by a concept of modernization that pays too much attention to **internal** social circumstances. However, by recognizing that there is validity to both objections does not allow a complete rejection of the outlined difference between transition and modernization rules. We are dealing with two incongruent groups of rules and with two incongruent grammars. In typical transitional societies such as the Czech, Polish, or Hungarian, incongruity rarely produces such paradoxes as those that were afore-mentioned. The total network of internal relations and participants is simply resistant to them. In societies with more atypical features, incongruity is not irrelevant. It is self-understood that its effects must be eliminated with regard to the general bases of **civil** transformation. However, in doing so, modernization imperatives **must not** be parenthesized. Their roots in the social processes are "from below", that is, in the life world of mainstream society. Therefore, they most precisely indicate with which/what kind of actual participants of transformation a particular society may count on. Depending on this, appropriate forms of modernization may be developed. Since such forms are necessarily linked with the transformation of a concrete territory and a concrete technical (industrial) heritage, their institutional performance, in spite of their obligation to be transitionally consistent, cannot be separated from the mentioned fact.

In other words, institutional transformation, required for a suitable transition "from socialism to capitalism", **is doubly coded**. At one level, it is coded by transitional grammar: privatization/democracy/civism. At another level, it is coded by a grammar of modernization: **success** in creating/shaping a modernistic autonomy of the "in transit" society; that is, success in shaping its new technical and urban reality and the presence of **capabilities for independent development** (society "in transit").

185

MODERNIZATION AND (POST)MODERNIZATION: SCARECROW AND GARDEN

Many competent analysts write the word "moderniza-tion" with discernable caution. The reason is simple. Modernization has prepared/formed many aspects of production/technical, urban, and institutional auton-omy. With surprising vigor, it also confirmed issues re-lated to the autonomy of special groups and individuals. However, on the other side, "in the shade", it remained dependent on several processes and relations that **di-rectly oppose** its autonomous intentions. A more com-prehensive review of the mentioned "shady" spots will be presented in a separate study. Here, the original ambition will be abridged to an appropriate summary. The list of "shady", (even dark) sides of the modernization program most certainly includes: (1) polarization of moderniza-tion effects according to the scheme: center/margin; (2) colonization of the "taciturn" subjects (victims), in par-ticular nature and those groups which cannot present anything else except naturalness in their defense (pre-in-dustrial groups); (3) uncontrolled multiplication of risky consequences of development (expansion of "risk soci-ety"); (4) concentration of political, production, and fi-nancial power under the control of those interested in power itself (outside of control that is derivable from value); (5) blindness for the drama of The Other. To say that emphasizing and critique of features from the list became more frequent since the seventies, when the com-pound word, "post-modernism", was used more often, is not allowed. Namely, the modernization process, during the entire period when it was the main base of the civic transformation, **at the same time** also questioned and re-acted to multi-type and multiple rebellions (ranging from rebellions in art and cultural practices, such as the cul-tural Modernism at the beginning of the 20th century to rebellions in technical and political sectors).

In other words, modernization as a **model** unfolds (convincingly argued by A. Toynbee) according to the scheme: modernization/(post)modernization. At the first level it was required to develop forms of social autonomy and progress using technical, urban, and management her-itage. At another level, it was required to develop forms of defense against destructive aspects of such a transforma-tion of the world of life. It is useful to note that both the inducement of autonomy (technical, urban, management, and, finally, existential), and defense of life from destruc-tive aspects of such an inducement, are forms of the **same**

program. Their empirical tasks are unequivocally different. However, their goals are congruent.

It is self-explanatory in countries with marginal areas, which are homogenized by modernization processes (modernistic periphery) that they simultaneously experience the attraction of modernization promises and fear of its "dark" features. The main source of fear is not just the force of innovation which modernization processes inject into the mainstream areas of peripheral societies. The source of fear also lies (well justified) in their suspicion that the modernization center may **export to the periphery its own (modernistic) past**. According to that scheme, the modernistic future of peripheral societies is feasible and conceivable only as an archeological offprint of modernistic past societies from the central development circle. In this scheme there is **no place** for peripheral societies to appear as autonomous participants of modernistic transformation **in special "niches of excellence"**. Since, the transitional grammar is blind to the effects of modernization, especially in the technical and urban sectors (i.e., in industry, science, finances, infrastructures, etc.) consistency in its application guarantees a peripheral society just the **basic quality** of an integration framework, necessary for membership in an outer division of the central circle of modern societies. However, this does not guarantee that this new modernization reality created in them will be essentially different from the reality that came about by exporting the modernistic past from countries in the center to countries on the margin. Social participants who consistently strive for a complete (in a model sense) program of modernization are especially sensitive to this possibility. This means for those countries "in transit", such as Croatia, the only internally legitimate modernization is the one, which is at the same time – (post)modernization.

The proposed statement clearly announces that in this type of usage, the word (post)modernization **is not** synonymous with compounds such as ethical relativism or cynical skepticism. By reducing the meanings of the word, (post)modernism, to those contained in the above-mentioned compounds we are then not inclined to hold a "neutral", technical, interpretation. However, research on the footholds and motives of such and similar reductions by far surpass convincingly the scope of this study. Thus, we shall limit ourselves to the already presented designation. We hold this essential so that the use of the word (post)modern may retain the semantic "glow" which, conventionally belongs to words such as: development, perspective, defense of life, and the like. Used in such a way,

the word (post)modern becomes a suitable indicator of the multiplicity of efforts, which share their roots with the efforts of modernization attributes mentioned in the previous paragraphs. It is useful here to turn to examples once again.

First example: In spite of a predominantly old-fashioned industry with a predictable ecological roughness, built during the period of socialism, 1945–1990, Croatia has succeeded in preserving its environment better than most other transitional countries "in transit". New modernization, shaped according to the afore-mentioned model of importing the developmental modernistic past of the center to countries on the margin, would undoubtedly endanger this ecological advantage. The chance of this in fact happening is even greater as Croatian society still cherishes the notion of industry as being the sector which has the self-explanatory right to oppress other sectors of life (socialistic "social base"). A (post)modern correction, however, introduces into Croatian society a developmental orientation fully congruent with its main **modernistic** aspirations. It, simply, imposes an attitude that welfare for the ecological quality of the environment in Croatia is the central basis of (post)modern development.

Second example: Under the protection of transitional privatization, many new owners bought socialist firms. In many cases "rationalization" of corporate transactions had to be organized. The data, however, indicate that quite frequently such programs of "rationalization" end by consistently eradicating research groups, teams, and departments in privatized companies. In this way, companies are being reduced to "efficient" technical users of innovations created elsewhere. It is indisputable that such behavior in industrial everyday reality is a part of the "obligatory forms". However, it is indisputable that participation in contemporary developmental practices and strategies cannot be formed without a **capability for partnership relations** with other participants in the world of labor. **The basis of these capabilities is developmental research**. Participation, or, in other words, developmental individuality, is an essential component of (post)modernist polarization of the modernization process. In a clearer way, (post)modern sensitivity makes appropriate **modernization** activity within the outlined transition circumstances both easier and possible.

There are many related examples. They, indirectly, show that the (post)modern polarization of modernization processes and models is more than a moral gesture. Although we of course maintain that such gestures are im-

portant, they are not sufficient for a practical orientation of national development, or for choosing key alternatives. In addition, it is necessary to have **the practical capability to "transfer" (post)modernist standards and forms to places with a modernization emphasis**. The right to, and capability of polarizing the process of developmental transformation according to the scheme: modernization – (post)modernization, is thus highlighted as the central framework of including transitional imperatives in rhythm with "modernization from below"; or, into the practice of modernization that are "socialized" by specific life positions of particular "in transit" societies. Only inasmuch as it is included into those rhythms and how much it developmentally functions, as their component, a transitional program has a chance to be more than just an abstract typical modification of European peripheral societies caught in the traps of the epochal "transit". Moreover, to be more than a directive for transition from a poor socialism – to a poor capitalism.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Čučković, N., (1998) "Proces privatizacije u srednjoj i istočnoj Europi: koliko su blizu namjere i stvarnost", (The Process of Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe: How Close are Intentions and Reality) *Financijska praksa* 22 (6), 691–704.

Giddens, A., (1990) *The Consequences of Modernity*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990.

Harrison, D., (1988) *The Sociology of Modernization and Development*, London: Unwin Hyman Ltd.

Mokyr, J., (1990) *The Lever of Riches*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rogić, I., and Zeman, Z., (1998) *Privatizacija i modernizacija*, (Privatization and Modernization) Zagreb: Institut Pilar.

Smart, B., (1990) *Modernity Postmodernity and Present*, London: Sage Publications.

Various Authors, (1990) *Human Development Under Transition*, New York: UN Development Program.

Maja
ŠTAMBUK

Zagreb, Croatia

CROATIAN RURAL SPACE: BETWEEN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND CENTRAL EUROPE.
A Few Keywords

The intention of this paper is to introduce Croatian rural space into a discussion on European integration, assuming that many integrative elements can be found in its features and present state. In the same manner, European influences, or, more precisely, from the Central European and Mediterranean circles, can be read in this space. The objective of this text is to explore a number of keywords and attempt to present some similarities and differences found in this part of Europe, which are, undoubtedly, a consequence of long-term political, economic, cultural, and other influences, as well as the geographic position of the country.

The identification of Croatia's affiliation with Europe can be classified at several levels. Prior to this, it is important to emphasize the heterogeneous character of Europe and in an analytical sense, the existence of macro-regions, that is, specific macro-regional qualities. Special attention shall be given to **rural areas and agrarian situations** in this paper. The following points mention some of them.

a. Comparison of geographic position,[1] which in a definite way influenced the marginal position of Croatia and the geographic special qualities (similarities between Mediterranean, Highland, and Pannonian landscapes[2]);

b. Comparing and standardizing macro-regions, regions, or states in view of **a group of syndromes** which mark the type and the attained level of rural area development (*modern life-pressure* syndrome, *rural decay* syndrome, *marginal areas* syndrome). By doing this, the direct influence of geographic position is disregarded, that is, it is understood as just an indirect factor;

c. Comparison of regions or states according to their cultural-historical affiliation and the specific qualities of their rural areas;

d. Comparison of regions or states with regard to their participation in recent and current political systems or integrations, that is, the former socialist countries' relationship toward the country and the peasant.[3]

The collapse of the East European political and economic system means that Croatia once again has had to search for its place with a dramatically changed political starting point (as an independent state) and within a framework of "new" cultural-economic developmental matrices. What do we want? What is available? To whom are we attracted to in a historical, economic, and cultural sense? Who needs us and why, and with which and what characteristics? Many questions need to be raised before occupying an appropriate place within one's "natural" socio-cultural environment.

Table I
European Macro-Regions

	Population in 1989 (millions)	Percentage	Participation Value Added per Person (EU = 100)	Purchasing Power Standard (EU = 100)
Alpine Arc	**54.7**	**16.5**	**127**	**122**
Atlantic Arc	52.9	16.0	75	83
Northern Arc	41.4	12.5	109	104
World Capitals	99.8	30.1	116	111
Continental Diagonal	15.5	4.7	74	81
Central Mediterranean	**31.0**	**9.4**	**58**	**65**
Western Mediterranean	37.7	11.4	86	91
European Union	**331.4**	**100.0**	**100**	**100**

Source: Eurostat REGIO in *Cambridge Econometrics* (ERECO, 1992). Quoted according to: Andrej Gulič, Regionalni razvoj Slovenije – odziv na globalne in nacionalne spremembe: primer Pomurja, *IB revija*, 11–12/XXX, (1996), p. 18.

The regions at issue are large transnational areas. According to these indicators, Croatia as a space between the Central European and Mediterranean circles of influence belongs to two rather different macro-regions. With reference to European macro-regions, a much higher number of inhabitants belong to the Alpine in comparison to the Central Mediterranean circle, where the participation added value per person is more than double. In addition, the standard of purchasing power is also double in the Alpine circle. Thus, it is not difficult to explain why for decades Croatian political and economic strategies and plans have had difficulty or have almost failed to penetrate the permanent reserves of the Adriatic. The Mediterranean part of Croatia (although Croatia is a small country) has remained poorly linked to the rest of the country in terms of transport and electric power infrastructure, waterworks systems, commercial routes, etc. This part of the country has nothing attractive and developmentally interesting to

rely upon. Without major investments in infrastructure, a precondition for faster and stable growth, the southern part of Croatia, in particular, will remain a space that is referred to as having developmental potential. The international initiative for the Adriatic-Ionian highway is very important in that sense. This is because all the previously preferred European road and railroad routes have been leaving that part of Croatia at a dead end. We, ourselves, have not as yet been able to adequately support that orientation with continuous investment.

When we from Croatia want to be a part of Europe, we most often choose as a common denominator our belonging to a similar cultural-historical circle. In doing so, most of the Croatian arguments are drawn from the period of Austrian, that is, Austro-Hungarian rule, often omitting the French occupation of most of Croatia's territory that was in terms of modernization, a brief but significant period,[4] and not to mention a further and deeper analysis of earlier history. Few are willing to attempt that, although every historian, even the amateur, knows the importance of history very well, and that even distant history leaves indelible marks in the historical memory.

Traces of the recent and distant past can be identified in today's connections or lack of connections between regions within a national community, or between particular countries, or groups of countries. They are visible almost everywhere. Historical cracks or, on the other hand, links, are a reality of every national, or especially, multinational state, or of a group of states. Examples of this include: the Italian Padania, the Spanish Basque region or Catalonia, Belgium split into a French and Flemish part, the new division of Germany into East and West, Scotland and Wales in Great Britain, Brittany, Corsica, Provence, Alsace and Lorraine in France, Voivodina and Kosovo in Serbia, North and South America, etc.

All these splits, cracks, and borders reflect in their own way differences in the state and organization of rural space.

The common features that link the formerly occupied states within Central European national spaces, for example, in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, or the states of the former Soviet Union or the Eastern Block should also be mentioned.

Since my interest is the country and rural space, I will discuss a few keywords relevant to Croatian rural space and its links with surrounding European spaces.

Modernization processes in Croatia, as an echo of European modernization, did not reach the same effects as in

Europe. Transformation from a pre-industrial to an industrial country in England was accomplished by the third decade of the 19th century. The lands of the "European Core" – France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland and soon afterwards by mid-century, Germany followed. The peripheral lands, such as the Scandinavian countries, Spain, Portugal, countries in the area of present-day Italy, the Balkans lands, eastern countries of the Habsburg Monarchy, and the Russian Empire "without their own spontaneous forces that would make them more competent for transformation in the spirit of revolution" gradually joined modernization processes.[5] The peripheral position of Croatian space – viewed politically, temporally, and even geographically with regard to the center (core) of modernization, resulted in delayed industrialization and a specific type of industrialization in which production on the basis of the needs and demands of the core and in quantities that could not "disturb" the core prevailed. Industrialization started in Croatia as late as the third decade of the 20th century, that is, an entire century after the first industrialized countries.[6] All that was built before that period was just the first railroads and a few roads opening some areas to industrial development.

Parallel, with the fast modernization of Western Europe, differences between the developed core and the peripheral circle were enhanced. There was a clear division at the level of total population.[7] **The population growth was much higher** in countries that pioneered in the Industrial Revolution than in countries where industrialization started later.[8] There were also essential changes within the demographic structure. Namely, in the core countries there was an accelerated decrease in the agricultural population and decline of agricultural income within the total income. Thus, peripheral countries engaged in most of the European agricultural production, which for a long period of time slowed down (and postponed) the heterogenization processes of demographic, economic and settlement structure. This was also true of all other modernization transformations (in education, health, nutrition, housing, etc.). Thus, what was more peripheral was more agrarian. In addition to agricultural products, the peripheral countries exported other raw materials. These were the two basic sources of their slowed down industrialization and gradual progress. Urban development was also slow. Moreover, third sector economic activity was slow to assert its role in social and economic systems.

Small country periphery communities in Croatia were peripheries up to the end of the 19th century until some of

their representatives and solitary "subsidaries" of the public service linked up with the global society. Using their traditional supplementary skills and experiences, the peasantry composed (established) an acceptable social, economic, and cultural life. "The feudal characteristics of the first modernization" in Croatian regions under Austrian authorities prevented the systematic solution of peasants' problems. The possibility of land ownership was a particular problem among many peasants. A high percentage of peasantry also slowed down the process of industrialization and determined the character of parallel socio-economic phenomena. During the first modernization, serious differences emerged between Croatian countries and developed core countries. One may postulate that one of the causes for this lagging was the absence of a national state, and that this delay resulted in a "prolonged deadline" for the emergence of an independent Croatian state.

In servicing the modernization process, states behave in different ways. Some encourage the abandonment of the rural economy, some try to maintain it. Croatia, on the Austrian periphery, and further divided into Dalmatia and Civil Croatia, not to mention the Military-Border, a politically separate entity under direct Viennese rule until 1881, received little encouragement and space for modernization of its society and economy. As a consequence, its rural milieu remained rather preserved throughout the 19th century. The abolishment of serfdom and the final political settlement of serf relations (1848 and 1853) did not inspire more intensive changes. In any case, even on the eve of the Second World War, instances of colonate relations, a specific relationship tying the peasant to the owner of the land, were found in the southern parts of Croatia, in Dalmatia.[9] It should be emphasized that through the Austrian administration in Dalmatia, the Central European economic-political concept was extended to the Mediterranean area. Its main features, in an agrarian sense, were products of market-oriented cultures so that market crashes of any one of them had markedly tragic consequences.[10] The beginning of contemporary Croatian emigration occurred precisely in Dalmatia as a result of the insensitivity and thoughtlessness of the center for the specific qualities of Adriatic area development.

On the basis of their historical research, Berend and Ranki have concluded that it is possible to assume the existence of **a common pattern in the development of Southern European countries and all Mediterranean countries** due a stronger Eastern and weaker Germanic influence during the last years of the Roman Empire. In the

post-antiquity periods, the eastern "Asian" feudal influence was maintained by Turkish and Arab conquests (no private landowners, communal system of land lease, strong central power in an economic and political sense).[11] The total socio-economic crisis of Dalmatian Croatia brought about the Wine Crisis at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries as well as the already mentioned spread of some forms of (pre)feudal bondage of the Dalmatian peasant. The Adriatic part of the country, following a relatively successful sailboat period, was unable to generate the financial and technological means to switch to steamboats. Differences in historical development of various parts of Croatia necessitate, obviously even today, a conscientious effort to overcome the differences that is a consequence of this historical legacy. In a way, Dalmatia during recent history has developed as a peripheral area compared to the Northern Croatian "local" core. Or, more precisely, it can be stated that Dalmatia is more peripheral than Northern Croatia in relation to the West-European or Central European core. However, this is not a result of development potentials, but of the continual transport isolation.

Affiliation with Mediterranean civilization has left historical traces, but these have not been powerful enough for the inception of modern development actors.

Agriculture, in which self-sufficiency and extensive production prevailed, was also to blame for the slowed down transition to industrial society. As the agricultural population represented a majority **so its consumption pattern influenced overall consumption and significantly directed general commercial developments**.[12] M. Novak has shown how the rural population modernized their "industrialized" consumption patterns faster than their production ones.

The modernization period (like the period of transition from pre-industrial to industrial society) failed to take place in some Croatian rural milieus owing to different circumstances of development.[13]

Hardships (in terms of the population and economy) during the First and Second World Wars, as well as Yugoslavia in several regime variants and a socialist system is a short history of Croatia of the 20th century. All in all, they did not facilitate unhindered national development that is a prerequisite for the emergence of a self-confident modern entrepreneurial class. The contemporary national state, created under difficult conditions at the very end of the 20th century, has had an exceptionally difficult task to begin modernization processes and to redirect and complete under peripheral conditions. In addition, another task has

been to develop equally all areas of the state taking the in-
herited differences into consideration.

The countries of Central and South Eastern Europe,
especially those which recently separated from multina-
tional repressive state entities that subsequently changed
their social structure (or "just" changed the structure) are
faced with a very difficult period of restructuring agricul-
ture and the process of recomposing the entire rural social
space. Demands made by the European Union concerning
the quality and (quantity), as well as the price of agricul-
tural products, will make the process of transition of all
agriculture in Croatia, and elsewhere, even more burden-
some. As agriculture is not independent from other rural
or global systems, changes within agriculture are connect-
ed with the entire transition project of the state, along
with development, its plan, and objectives.

Transition, as a multi-layered historical project touches
spheres of human activities and parts of (state or national)
space with different intensity and nonsynchronously. The
disharmonious relationship between urban and rural, his-
torically unresolved and incomplete, resurfaces in this pro-
ject. Moreover, it is recognized that there is a need to
change the classic approach to this problem. On the other
hand, possibilities for a better solution are available
thanks to modernization processes, which weaken the tra-
ditional antagonism between agrarian and non-agrarian
"civilizations". The city, as a dense network of total life
continues to emit insufficient transitional impulses in the
direction of peripheral spaces and their demographic and
economic resources damaging an even spatial distribution
of progress. However, peripheral spaces can discover their
own potentials even inside banked up social and cultural
memory, so that they find the self-confidence necessary to
speak up and place demands. Assistance can be obtained
through a quality distribution of institutional and finan-
cial power between particular levels of government, which
would reinforce the position of local self-government and
increase the influence and responsibility for direction and
intensity of the development processes. This has already
happened in Europe.

During the sixties, Europe discovered its rural prov-
ince, which had been gradually disappearing (quietly and
commonplace for rural phenomena). Meanwhile, Croatian
rural society has continued to decay. In some areas, social,
demographic, and economic degradation is irreversible.
The unwieldiness of Croatian industrialization as well as
tertiary activities (just recall the enormous hotels along the
coast and on the islands), inappropriate for smaller com-

199

munities, conditioned building exclusively in cities both smaller and larger. As a consequence, rural areas around industrial centers were vacated.

Europe's interest and care to sustain its living rural areas is also evident in much research that serves as a basis for every intervention in this socially, demographically, economically and spacially sensitive rural material. Along these lines and with the intention of analyzing the state of affairs in rural areas, L. Malassis[14] developed the European economic-demographic model which takes into consideration a number of statistically available facts: demographic growth, a decrease in the agrarian population, an increase in the total population per active farmer, a decrease in total land surface used for agricultural purposes, and growth of land surface used by an active farmer.

This model is presented in the following table:

Table 2
The European Economic-Demographic Model

Country	Used Farmland Per 100 Inhabitants (in hectares)	Number of Inhabitants Per Active Farmer	Used Farmland Per Active Farmer (in hectares)	Indicator of Internal Gross Product Expressed Through Purchasing Power	Average Used Land Per Farm (in hectares)
The European Ten	37.0	21.0	7.8	100.0	–
Belgium	14.0	63.0	9.0	102.0	14.1
Denmark	56.0	32.0	18.0	117.0	30.7
Germany	20.0	35.0	6.9	115.0	16.0
France	57.0	25.0	13.9	111.0	27.0
The Netherlands	**14.0**	49.0	6.8	107.0	14.9
The United Kingdom	33.0	78.0	25.7	104.0	65.1
Greece	93.0	**5.0**	4.5	57.0	**4.3**
Spain	71.0	12.0	8.6	72.0	12.9
Ireland	162.0	8.0	13.3	64.0	22.7
Italy	31.0	11.0	3.4	103.0	5.6
Portugal	43.0	**5.0**	**2.2**	**53.0**	**4.3**

Source: Louis Malassis, L'agriculture dans l'activité économique et dans l'espace: deux modèles d'interprétation, *Economie rurale,* 202–203 (1991), p. 7.

Countries with a large agrarian populousness, where agriculture plays a large role in the economy, with fragmented farms, and with unmodern agriculture are less developed and their gross product is considerably lower than that of the other countries of the Union. Thus, there is a Europe with high and a Europe with low values with re-

gard to those indicators. A fairly precise division into Northern and Mediterranean Europe is also possible. The conclusion is clear: for provinces to be alive they must diversify both socially and economically, and not only rely on agriculture in terms of development. A state with poor provinces cannot be a rich and progressive country.

On average, our "small-scale" agriculture has neither a quality work force, nor quality property, nor quality capital. All this decreases its role in and influence upon the total social dynamic of a rural society, which also decreases the general level of the dynamic.

The following table illustrates the agrarian structure of countries in the European Union. At first glance, it seems very heterogeneous.

Country	Total Number of Farms (in 000)		Growth Index for the Number of Farms	Farm Land (hectares per farm)		Growth Index of Farmland	Average Number of Working Units Per Farm	
	1979/80	1989/90	1989/79	1979/80	1989/90	1989/79	1979/80	1989/90
Greece	998.9	923.5	92	3.6	4.0	103	0.8	0.9
Italy	2832.4	2664.6	94	5.5	5.6	96	0.8	0.7
Belgium	115.1	85.0	74	12.3	15.8	95	1.1	1.1
The Netherl.	148.7	124.8	84	13.7	16.1	99	1.6	1.8
Germany	849.9	665.1	78	14.4	17.7	96	1.2	1.2
France	1255.3	1017.0	81	23.3	28.1	97	1.5	1.4
Denmark	122.7	81.3	66	23.8	34.2	95	1.4	1.2
Great Britain	268.6	243.1	91	63.7	67.9	96	2.2	1.9
Spain	1818.2	1593.6	88	12.9	15.4	104	0.8	0.7
Portugal	769.4	598.7	78	4.3	6.7	121	1.5	1.4
Luxemburg	5.2	4.0	77	25.0	31.7	97	1.8	1.6
Ireland	223.5	170.6	76	22.6	26.0	88	1.4	1.5
EU-together	9405.5	8171.2	87	12.4	14.0	99	1.1	1.0
Slovenia	192.1	156.5	81	4.6	5.5	97	1.0	1.0
Croatia	569.0	534.3	94	3.6	3.8	97	0.7	0.5

Sources: Eurostat. *Agricultural Statistical Yearbook;* 1994. *Statistični letopis Slovenije,* 1994. For Croatia the data refer to 1981 and 1991. See *Statistički ljetopis,* for these years, Zagreb, DZS.

Croatia is among the countries with the least property and an almost unchanged surface structure during the period in question. The group of countries with small-scale farming also includes Greece (4 hectares), Slovenia (5.5 hectares), Italy (5.6 hectares), Portugal (6.7 hectares). Need-

less to say, small properties are not the only barrier to rational and profitable agriculture. Likewise, a large holding in itself does not secure success. What needs to be emphasized in Croatia's case is that the customary dynamic links between the farm and family have been severed, so that some fundamental characteristics of the farm have not changed with changes in the family.[15] However, this is not a case in which on the one hand, the family and on the other, the farm "becomes independent". If this were the case, many family farms would change ownership and their total number would dwindle. It mainly concerns non-economic reasons in which inherited land is firmly tied to a family, which has ceased to be agrarian. If this is not a profit consideration, at least it has certain romanticism. Therein it is worthwhile to look for footholds for positive moves in revitalizing rural space. An awareness of links between the family and land should be the guiding idea in any such concept of rural-agrarian policy, which will also stimulate cultivation of small areas. It is difficult to rely on rapid changes in this sentimental linkage, even if these are stimulated (or enforced).

The size of Croatian property is far from the European Union average of 14 hectares.

During the decade in question, Denmark had the largest decline in the number of rural farms, from 122,700 to 81,300 (index = 66). At the same time the average size of a farm grew from 23.8 to 34.2 hectares. **In countries with a property structure similar to that of Croatia, property transformation was in some places much slower, in others, faster.** The change index for Greece amounted to 92, for Italy 94, for Portugal 78, and for Slovenia 81. For Croatia it amounted to 94. The great change in the number of farms in Portugal is evidence of a dynamic agricultural policy within a dynamic development concept, which resulted in a change. It certainly seems that this example is well-worth studying. An average Portuguese rural farm grew from 4.6 hectares to 6.7 hectares in those ten years.

Differences in historical and political opportunities in which agricultural changes took place – stimulating changes in rural regions of Europe – are quite clear from the presented data. While considering them, attention should be drawn to the existence of "two Europes" a Mediterranean and a Northern one. According to the data from both tables (2 and 3), Croatia belongs to the Mediterranean agricultural circle. Most of the rural farms are within the lowest property categories. A similar situation can be found in Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and, of course, in Slovenia.

Croatian family farms of up to 5 hectares are occupied by 64% of all active farmers and include 54% of used farmlands.

	Up to 5 hectares	5–20 hectares	More than 20 hectares	50–100 hectares	More than 100 hectares	Total	Total no. of farms (in 000)
Greece	77.8	19.9	1.9	0.3	0.1	100.0	923.5
Italy	78.8	16.2	3.3	0.9	0.5	100.0	2664.6
Belgium	37.8	34.6	21.9	4.8	0.9	100.0	85.0
The Netherl.	32.3	37.6	25.3	4.2	0.6	100.0	124.8
Germany	32.6	36.5	24.0	5.8	1.0	100.0	665.1
France	27.3	27.5	28.3	12.6	4.3	100.0	1017.0
Denmark	2.7	39.6	38.5	15.0	4.2	100.0	81.3
Great Britain	13.8	27.9	25.0	17.5	15.8	100.0	243.1
Spain	61.0	25.8	7.8	3.1	2.4	100.0	1593.6
Portugal	82.2	13.9	2.3	0.7	0.9	100.0	598.7
Luxemburg	25.0	20.0	27.5	25.0	2.5	100.0	4.0
Ireland	11.3	42.4	34.8	9.2	2.3	100.0	170.6
EU	60.0	23.1	10.9	4.0	1.9	100.0	8171.2
Slovenia*	64.4	35.7	–	–	–	100.0	156.5
Croatia*	84.6	15.4	–	–	–	100.0	534.3

* Data for Slovenia and Croatia are from 1991

Sources: Eurostat. Agricultural Statistical Yearbook, 1994, pp. 112–113, Statistični letopis Republike Slovenije, 1994, p. 264. Documentation, 894. Domaćinstva i poljoprivredna gospodarstva po općinama, Zagreb, Državni zavod za statistiku, 1996, p. 217.

Fordist agriculture, which was the final point of the modernization process in agriculture, entails a devaluation of traditional knowledge, destruction of peasant identity and social isolation of peasant society.[16] In former Yugoslavia such consequences resulted from a totally different position of agriculture and a policy which with all its power tried to prevent progress, and even attempted to "phase out" the farmer and the private family farm. The farmer disappears not only in a highly urbanized and industrialized world as a result of rational modernization processes – but disappears because of a kind of resistance in similar conditions to our own when production is reduced and people move to the cities. Characteristically, the farmer who protests by not participating in such agrarian and general policies does not sell land. This is yet another reason why there are so many smaller and fragmented farms in Croatia.

Table 4

The structure of agricultural farms according to size in countries of the European Union, and in Slovenia and Croatia, 1989/90.

The modernization process that has been slowed down due to the long-term economic crisis, creation of an independent state, change of social system, but above all because of the destructive war and the enormous number of refugees and displaced persons, mostly from rural areas, will significantly slow down and even change the course of social changes in rural Croatia. During the Croatian War of Independence, the village was the worse hit in every respect. Moreover, return to and revitalization of war-devastated rural areas have been met with many problems.[17]

The agrarian structure and the rural social picture are the result of numerous factors outside of production so that their "balancing out" or adjustment and course toward contemporary development challenges is a very complex task, requiring interventions, coordinated measures, and instruments. Emphasis in this paper has been first and foremost that Croatia is a small country with an unusual shape, vast border areas, and different climatic zones; that politically and in terms of civilization it belongs to Central Europe and the Mediterranean, which has influenced the forms of property and production structures, as well as the types of community and characteristics of community networks. This is something one should definitely bear in mind when planning their revitalization.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Geographic position is important! If Croatia were located where Switzerland (regardless of any associations and integrations) or Lichtenstein are, nobody would dispute Croatia's place in Europe.

[2] For example, Dalmatia, the most southern region of Croatia, is a space with the most extreme rocky ground in the Mediterranean, which is a limitation and yet another reason for the fragmented quality and parcelization of cultivable land, one of the basic barriers to the successful development of agriculture.

[3] All East European states, members of the East Bloc, had rather different "solutions" to agriculture and the farmer, and so that the current state of affairs in rural and agrarian areas of these countries differs. Following changes in the social system, and frequently borders, they came across very different problems in their provinces. For example, in Czechoslovakia, only 6.1% of agricultural land was in private ownership, while in Poland 77.9% was privately owned. The rural population in East Germany was 9.0% while in Romania it was 23.8%. Some were food exporters, some importers. In 1991, Hungary had about a million and a half family farms, but few were privately owned. In Poland, the average size of family farm was 6 hectares. In Bulgaria, family farms produced their produce on plots between 0.5 to 1.0 hectares. (Cited from M. and V. Tadić, "Promjene u poljoprivredi istočno-europskih zemalja", /Changes in the agriculture of East European countries/ *Sociologija sela* 1–2 (1992), pp. 125–134.)

4 After the collapse of Venetian rule in Dalmatia in 1797, Austria briefly succeeded it. However, by 1805, Dalmatia belonged to Napoleon, according to the Treaty of Bratislava. The founded Illyrian Provinces remained under French rule for ten years. Namely, in 1815 (The Congress of Vienna) Dalmatia once again belonged to Austria and remained an Austrian province until the fall of the monarchy in 1918, more than a century later.

5 For more details see Ivan Berend and György Ranki, *Europska periferija i industrijalizacija, 1780-1914,* Zagreb: Naprijed, 1996 pp. 241; (Povijest i historija), pp. 24–30.

6 The Hungarian authors, Berend and Ranki in search of the origin of differences between states as well as why some during a certain historic period are the center(s) or core(s), while others are peripheral, explain the historical etiology starting with antiquity.

7 "Core" and "periphery" are in fact historical categories, and they refer to areas that incessantly change. Thus, some peripheral areas may catch up with more developed ones, while some parts of the core may break away and lose their "central" significance. Therefore, the term "periphery" is understood as an arena that is dependent on a "core" (op. cit., pp. 25–26).

8 M. Friganović concluded "Industrialization was the main cause of the population increase during the last 150 years or so... The population, therefore, even though it appears as a factor and modifier of social processes behaves at a given moment in time and space as a consequence of these processes." M. Friganović, *Demografija: stanovništvo svijeta,* Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1990, p. 47.

9 The colonate relation existed in pre-feudal Europe. It was a private legal contract between a landowner and a free but poor citizen, often a former slave. It came into being during the disintegration of the Roman Empire, and it enabled landowners to keep their land cultivated. Following division of the land into many small plots, the landowner drew up a separate contract with each cultivator. A farmer rarely could afford to buy land if he was not subject to a serf out of necessity so he and his heirs depended on a landowner. In Croatia, the colonate relation existed in parts of the country, which used to be under the Roman rule.

10 An example of this is the "wine crisis".

11 Ibid. p. 29.

12 On the agrarian sector as the core of peripheral industrialization see: Mojca Novak, *Zamudniški vzorci industrijalizacije. Slovenija na obrobju Europe,* Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče, 1991, p. 113.

13 An interesting example is Žumberak. See: *Žumberak: Baština i izazovi budućnosti,* Stari grad Žumberak: Odbor za proslavu 700-te godišnjice imena Žumberak, 1996, 323 pp.

14 Louis Malassis, L'agriculture dans l'activité économique et dans l'espace: deux modèles d'interprétation, *Economie rurale,* 202-203 (1991), p. 4. Collaterally, Malassis presented a European model of agricultural and food economy, which is not included here since it depends exclusively on economic parameters.

15 It also, quite surprisingly, depends little on the changes in the immediate rural social surroundings.

16 M. Sauer, "Fordist Modernization of German Agriculture and the Future of Family Farms", *Sociologia ruralis,* 3-4 (1990), p. 267.

205

[17] One of them is specifically agrarian-rural. An immense number of mines were scattered over fields, meadows, forests, and along the roads. Clearly, therefore reinstallation of the rural population does not depend on the people so much, but more on the speed and efficacy of the steps leading to their economic reintegration. Moreover, those who have returned or will return; who have chosen the village as the space of their life and work, are no longer the same. Experiences of war, persecution and exile will mark their return for a long time. Undoubtedly, it will take some time for rural communities to gain their lost identity due to everything that has happened from persecution until return.

Hrvoje
KAČIĆ

Zagreb, Croatia

THE AFFIRMATION OF STATEHOOD AND THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF CROATIA

INTRODUCTION

Croatia's tradition of statehood extends over thirteen centuries back to the medieval period. It continued until the establishment by the Versailles Peace Treaty of the entity of the Slovenes, Croatians, and Serbs (in essence, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia). Croatians' experience with Serbia's Karađorđević dynasty during the interwar period, and with Tito in the second Yugoslavia, only validated and strengthened the traditional yearning of all Croatians to have their own state.

The creation of the Banovina (Viceroyalty) of Croatia in 1939, as well as the Independent State of Croatia in 1941 under adverse conditions, were expressions of that desire shared by all Croatians. Subsequently, the affirmation of the golden thread of Croatian statehood continued during the Communist period, expressed by the ZAVNOH (State Anti-Fascist Council for the People's Liberation of Croatia) and in Croatia's constitutions, beginning in 1946 and continuing until the last, that is, the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia. All these initiatives reflected the basic quest for Croatian independence, despite the fact that they were manipulated from the top with the intent, on the one hand, of creating an illusion of legality and of building legitimacy for Communist Yugoslavia and, on the other, of attracting Croatian support.

In light of this, it is important to point out that the provisions enshrined in the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia guaranteed the right of nations to self-determination – including the right to secession – and also guaranteed precisely determined borders among the republics. This was to have a significant impact on Croatia's achievement of diplomatic recognition.

In order to fully understand Croatia's situation during the crucial period of 1990–92 – to which the fate and collapse of the second, Communist, Yugoslavia was also closely connected – it is necessary to take into consideration the political situation abroad, especially in Europe,

as well as to assess the political balance within the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) itself.

In the present assessment, I will not deal with the domestic political situation in great detail. Rather, I will focus on the international political context during the last several years, principal actors who were not in favour of the disintegration and collapse of even an artificial state such as Yugoslavia (or the "Yugoslav tragedy" as it has been called with good reason).

THE INTERNATIONAL BALANCE

For a more comprehensive understanding of international relations, especially within the European context, a detailed analysis of the Congresses of Vienna and Berlin, the Versailles and Rapallo Treaties, and the League of Nations, as well as of the Monroe, Wilson, Truman, Kennedy, Nixon, and Reagan Doctrines would be required. However, in dealing with these very important principles, we will have to limit ourselves, only to those historical sources that have a direct bearing on an understanding of present-day international relations. These include the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the basic documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the 1989 Paris Charter. These documents can be justifiably viewed as the basis for the generally accepted terms of reference and as the legal basis of the present-day interstate system in Europe. Of course, the role of NATO and the European Union should also be taken into account.

Here, I will address only one basic principle which was established by the Wilson Doctrine just before the end of the World War I. Even today it is seen as the keystone of that doctrine, namely *"the right of peoples to self-determination"*. This principle, and rightly so, found a prominent place in the principles of the League of Nations and, later, in the United Nations Charter, as well as in the CSCE documents.

This principle played a determinant role in the new framework in the aftermath of World War I as well as in the international process of decolonisation.

However, although the principle of national self-determination was applied when the international community recognized Croatia and Slovenia, it is no longer a keystone or a decisive principle in international relations today.

Significantly, President Bush's term in office, which coincided with the collapse of the Communist system and the disintegration of the last two neo-colonialist states in

Europe – the U.S.S.R. and the S.F.R.Y. – introduced a new doctrine that constituted United States' day-to-day foreign policy and was diametrically opposed to the Wilson Doctrine. Known as the Bush Doctrine, the latter held that:

"States may neither be destroyed nor created."

Moreover, this meant that those countries which were recognized and that exist at present are not allowed to disappear or disintegrate, and, by the same token, new states are not allowed to emerge. All this is in line with the well-known attitude of "the great powers" favouring the *status quo ante*, which is also the prevailing ethos of international relations, especially as conducted by the great powers of the world. Confirmation of this mentality was evident in the behaviour of the United Nations, especially when De Cuellar was its Secretary-General. Given this framework, it was not by accident that Budimir Lončar, the Foreign Minister of the SFRY – then already in its death-throes – sought to frighten and threaten the world at the CSCE summit in Berlin on 19 June 1991 by claiming that "The collapse of Yugoslavia would be like a time-bomb in the middle of Europe and could even now spark a chain reaction on the old continent, in which there are already forty-six ethnic conflicts."

De Cuellar's successor, Butros Butros Ghali confirmed his support for *status quo* during the initial period of his term as Secretary-General of the United Nations by ardently insisting that the United Nations would no longer be able to respect the principle of "national self-determination". Consequently, the international community was confronted with massive upheaval caused by the emergence of more new states than those that exist at present, forcing the United Nations to cope with more than four hundred states.

In view of the international world order at the end of the twentieth century, one can conclude without exaggerating that the Slovenes and Croatians caught one of the last trains to independence. Clearly, they relied heavily on the principle of a nation's right to self-defence. At the same time, Croatia must be aware that, now this right has been taken advantage of and used up. Thus, the contemporary principles of world order must take precedence, which is eminently pragmatic in the case of Croatia. The principle of national self-determination must now be treated as a historical category. Croatia must adhere to the world's great powers concept to the effect that this principle from the Wilson Doctrine, despite its continuing presence in the United Nations Charter, has undergone a revision.

However, it was not only because it took the world so long to understand the right of self-determination that Croatia's prospects for achieving the Croatian people's centuries-old desire for an independent Croatia were obstructed. There were also other obstacles:

1. Yugoslavia's standing and reputation around the world, which it gained in 1948 as the first "dissident" state by standing up to Stalin and the Comintern and, subsequently, as a leader in the Non-Aligned Movement.

2. The interests of the permanent members of the United Nations' Security Council.

a. Great Britain and France. They were the main supporters of the creation of Yugoslavia – or Greater Serbia – following both World Wars, and there was close diplomatic coordination between Belgrade, London, and Paris. Of course, there is an additional reason for this sensitivity, for one cannot exclude the existence of similar movements in Northern Ireland, Wales or, in Scotland and, as far as France is concerned, in Corsica and in its Basque region.

b. The United States, as a result of its experience in Vietnam has consistently followed a policy of avoiding military participation in crises that do not directly threaten its vital interests and in which it cannot guarantee a successful and quick outcome. In the crisis of former Yugoslavia, the United States displayed inertia and indecisiveness, delivering the problem first to the European Community, and subsequently steering it toward the United Nations.

c. Following the collapse of the "East Bloc" and the voluntary but unavoidable dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and by convulsions due to the U.S.S.R.'s economic collapse, Russia, using its position in the Security Council sought to ensure that developments in and the lessons from the Balkans did not spread to the Eurasian landmass, and supported Yugoslavia's continued existence. The first Russian ambassador to Croatia, Mr. Kerestezhants, acknowledged that for Russia, Belgrade used to be equivalent to Yugoslavia. As a result, no attention was paid at all to the other republics and peoples in the former Yugoslavia. This was not only the case in Russia or in the former U.S.S.R., but also in the most of the world and even in Europe. In addition, the fact that Russia is also Orthodox and in a traditional alliance with Serbia should not be underestimated.

d. China was also hesitant because of its ethnic composition and its determination that while accepting the need for changes in its social structure, by a gradual adoption of market conditions, it would freeze the democrati-

sation of its political system. Above all, China viewed the example of Croatia and Slovenia as an unwelcome precedent for the future of Tibet, and even Taiwan.

3. The end of the Cold War, the withdrawal of the U.S.S.R. from the world's political stage as a "superpower", the voluntary dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unsuccessful coup attempt in Moscow in August 1991 – all occurred without firing a single shot. – All of these events lulled Europe into thinking that armed conflict would no longer be possible in Europe, and that it was only a painful memory from the past as the East Bloc was disappearing. The Paris Charter, filled as it is with wonderful declarations about order in Europe is basically flawed, since it does not enforce penalties and sanctions for those who do not respect the Charter's principles and prescriptions. Clearly, Europe underestimated the possibility of tyrants like Saddam Hussein or Idi Amin to emerge in Europe.

4. The international community witnessed the breakdown of the "Extraordinary" Congress of Yugoslavia's League of Communists in January 1990, as well as the results of the first democratic elections as part of a gradual democratisation process within the continuing framework of Yugoslavia, and as a result of the meltdown of Communism. Within that context, it was ignored that power in Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina had passed to the newly emerged genuinely democratic political parties, while in Serbia and Montenegro the same totalitarian Communist parties remained in power, with the cynical omission of "Communist" from their name.

5. In January 1991, Europe and the rest of the world were focused on the Gulf War. Under these circumstances only then can one explain orders from the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav Army on January 9, commanding the surrender of the Territorial Defence Forces' arms in Croatia and Slovenia. This ultimatum and "Communique" by the Information Directorate of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence on January 24, were completely ignored by governments abroad, and hardly received any attention from the world media. Even though there was talk at the time of a "quiet" military coup or of a tendency toward military rule, take January 24, 1991 can be determined as the date when that really occurred. It was on that day that the Yugoslav Army announced that it was the leading and the determining force in the former Yugoslavia, and that it was above and outside any official political body in the state. This announcement was made disregarding, at this

213

stage, the role Slobodan Milošević or his right-hand man, Borisav Jović, may play in shaping events.

6. During the first half of 1991, official positions throughout Europe toward the Yugoslav crisis were identical to those of France and Great Britain. For example, at the end of the European Community Summit on April 7, 1991, Jacques Santer announced the European Community's agreed-upon positions.

a. That the European Community has a duty to support Yugoslavia's unity and territorial integrity.

b. That individual republics, with Slovenia and Croatia specifically mentioned, as integral parts of Yugoslavia, must not foster any illusions about their prospects of joining Europe. That opportunity will be available in the future only to Yugoslavia.

c. That the European Community sees no reason to become involved in the SFRY's sensitive internal matters.

7. The visit by the United States Secretary of State, James Baker, to Belgrade in June 1991, as well as his terse discussions with the presidents of each of the republics of the former Yugoslavia, and his statement before he departed, reflected the international community's stand on the Yugoslav crisis. Belgrade interpreted this as a "green light" to use armed force to bring the "troublemakers" in Slovenia and Croatia under control.

8. On June 24, 1991, the European Community announced that it had approved a loan to Yugoslavia – read Belgrade – of 730 million ECUs, which the federal president, Ante Marković, viewed as a triumph of his personal policy. This initiative on the part of the European Community can only be explained as a resolute intention to show that the European Twelve were behind a "united" Yugoslavia. In formal terms, this was cast as support for the Marković government, but in real terms, it also served as encouragement to Milošević, and the military and communist leadership. They were now assured that they could use force and move toward final armed confrontation without any fear of sanctions, responsibility or punishment.

The expected disintegration of the Communist system in the world, inspired political activity in the Croatian diaspora, a process which became especially prominent in Germany and the U.S., and in some other countries of the New World. It is difficult to list all the self-sacrificing and devoted actions, or the instances of help that the Croatian diaspora provided for the "old country". Results of the first multi-party elections marked the newest Croatian revival in the homeland, and we can freely say that Croats around the world also greeted it with great enthusiasm.

Under the influence of such a process, American Members of Congress such as R. Dole, C. Pell, De Concini, D'Amato, and many others, started embracing Croatia's cause. They used their authority to criticize the official policy of the United States of America towards Yugoslavia and Croatia. Strong and efficient Croatian lobbying in the USA took place during 1990.

However, the Serbian lobby was also effective during that period. With reference to the direct influence on the course of events in Croatia, in the middle of 1990, it is necessary to mention the role of Mrs. Helen Delich Bentley.

KOSOVO CRISIS 1989/1990 AND THE KNIN BARRICADES

During 1989, due to the repression by Serbian authorities of the Albanian majority in Kosovo, worldwide appeals were made to Yugoslav authorities to stop the use of force. As a result of disrespect for human rights, the U.S. Congress and many other parliamentary institutions in the world condemned Yugoslavia.

Helen Delich Bentley, a member of the House of Representatives from the State of Maryland, was a well-known lobbyist for the interests of Yugoslavia. At the beginning of August 1990, she visited Belgrade where she met Jović, President of the SFRY presidency, and Milošević, President of Serbia. The basic thrust of her advice to her Belgrade friends was to loosen their policy towards Kosovo. She also suggested that if for any reason Serbia was unable to comply with that request, it would certainly be in the best interest of Serbia to divert the attention of the world public from Kosovo by generating some other centres of crisis within the former Yugoslavia.

It is understandable that the Serbian military leadership, which controlled a tremendously superior military potential, found Mrs. Delich's alternative suggestion much more appealing. Consequently, Jović, met Rašković, Babić, and Opačić, leaders of the local Serbs in Knin, without the presence of Croatian government representatives, (which was a departure from the usual way of communication). Tension increased when it was made public that the meeting had taken place. The next day, August 16, JNA troops were called in, and on August 17, 1990, Serbs from the town of Knin placed barricades (tree-trunks) on the roads in the areas of Knin, Gračac, and Obrovac. This was the beginning of the so-called "tree-trunk" revolution in which the role of the leader of the Serbian lobby in the USA, Mrs. Delich Bentley, should not be neglected.

215

The fact that the "Knin barricades" – (as one of the protagonists, Mrs. Delich Bentley obsessively claimed that Croatia could not economically survive as an independent state) – did not offer a pretext for a direct military intervention, and did not force a change in the democratically elected government in Croatia, left the military option as the main and the only solution for Milošević.

BELGRADE'S CHOICE – THE WAR OPTION

Slovenia was the first to be attacked. However, after a six-day war and with the Serbian Army facing defeat, the creation of Serbo-Slavia was restricted to Yugoslavia minus Slovenia. On July 6, 1991 the Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army, General Blagoje Adžić, commented on the adventure in Slovenia in an aggressive speech: "We lost a battle, but not the war", ending his speech with the appeal: "You should use all your knowledge and skills in the battle for the ideals of the October revolution."

Milošević – Saddam of the Balkans – accused by the British *Guardian* in the summer of 1991 of "leading Serbia into a paranoia of wilderness", and who was described by *The New York Times* as a "Butcher of the Balkans", the head of the last communist regime in Europe, adjusted his policy after the six-day war, to what appeared to be from a Belgrade point of view, a realistic perspective. His slogan, "All Serbs in one state", as a means of protecting the entire "Serbhood", are reminders of Hitler's and his nazi preoccupation with the "blut und boden" theory. This was initiated with the "Anschluss" (of Austria), and continued with the Sudetenland (in the Czech Republic, then Czechoslovakia) and Danzig (Poland), after which Great Britain and France, although unprepared, declared war on Hitler's Germany, thus, launching World War II.

The United States of America gave Milošević six months, from June until December of 1991, to carry out his demonic ambitions. For the sake of historical truth, it is also necessary to publicly state that during this period in which Milošević could carry out his Greater Serbian dreams, there appeared, in relevant places, voices that differed from the officially declared policies of the EC and the U.S. I witnessed some of those events. For example, in the political department of NATO in Brussels, in mid June 1991, a draft working model entitled "Europe's Lebanon" had been drawn up, in which it was suggested that the NATO and the EC accept a joint declaration that should, among others, contain the following elements:

"a) identification of the aggressor in the Yugoslav conflict and the condemnation of any border changes between the republics by force;

b) appeal to all democratic forces to oppose the use of force and to search for a solution to the conflict by means of negotiations on the basis of the principles and stipulations of the Helsinki Final Act and the Treaty of Paris;

c) recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, and any other republic declaring independence, provided that they guarantee rights of minorities within the borders established after World War II, and fulfil obligations of the Helsinki Final Act and the Treaty of Paris;

d) beginning of a diplomatic campaign for internationalisation of the conflict within the UN;

e) consideration of economic embargo on Serbia, with a remark put in brackets, that it would be counter-productive to impose an arms embargo upon all Yugoslav republics, since Serbian militias and the JNA, compared to other forces, were militarily better equipped."

This initiative within NATO, which was not only one of the most important, but also the only indisputable strong military institution, was unfortunately blocked by some members of NATO, led by Greece. The excuse was that the political department of NATO should not be allowed to take political stands before official political bodies of its members had discussed certain questions, and before certain viewpoints had been accepted at the highest levels of NATO.

In this way a precious and critical period of six to nine months was lost. At that moment, French diplomacy was flirting with the WEU, and the U.S. was passively observing and waiting for things to develop, unfortunately encouraging the aggressor by its inactivity.

Since they could not extend the "anti-bureaucratic revolution" to Ljubljana and Zagreb by means of "peace and solidarity rallies", using the masses which had gathered at Gazimestan (Kosovo, in June 1989), the ruling circles in Belgrade – and especially Milošević and the top military leadership – were convinced that they could make the disobedient Slovenes and Croatians submit by using force.

That point was reached after the results of the first democratic elections in all of the republics of the former Yugoslavia (apart from Serbia and Montenegro) were made known. It was only a question of when this would happen, and what pretext would be offered to soothe the world, not local, opinion.

In that complex context and, given the balance of military power, the exploitation of the "Prečani" Serbs

217

(i.e., those living outside Serbia) became a convenient means, as well as a motive for action.

As we have already seen, on August 15, 1990, the President of Yugoslavia, Borisav Jović (as representative of the federal government) met with Jovan Rašković, Milan Babić, and Jovan Opačić, the Serbian leaders from Knin. No one from the Croatian government was present: This departure from the accepted norms of communication raised tensions when it was announced officially that the meeting had been held. The following day, August 16, units of the JNA (Yugoslav People's Army) stationed in Croatia were positioned, while on August 17, the Knin Serbs began to put up barricades on the roads in the Knin, Gračac, and Obrovac areas.

All this had been staged with the intent of provoking Croatian police intervention against the local Serbs, whom the JNA would then protect from the Croatian "threat".

Threat to a national community, in this case the Serbs, from the "Ustasha" authorities in Zagreb was a red herring that was used repeatedly. This was done in order to mobilize specific segments of the population in those areas. Had there been a threat to any national community this would have occurred above all in the areas where that national community was a minority rather than in those areas, such as in Knin, where the Serbs were in a vast majority. In fact, Knin was already under the control of ethnic Serbian officials at all levels.

Relying on its overwhelming military superiority, Belgrade opted for a military solution based on estimates by the KOS (military intelligence) and diplomatic representatives abroad that Europe and the rest of the world would not oppose. Fundamentally, this was the use of heavy weaponry to "pacify" those republics which had chosen parliamentary democracy as the basis of their political life. The timing and trigger that would launch the Serbian-dominated army against the democratically elected governments in Slovenia and Croatia were the only remaining issues.

Slovenia was the first target. However, after a six-day war in which the Serbian-dominated army faced impending defeat, Milošević decided to limit himself to the creation of a Serbian-run Yugoslavia without Slovenia. Hurried personnel reshuffling and other measures were being undertaken within the JNA so that it could refurbish its tarnished image.

Milošević continued acting on the basis of his slogan "All Serbs in a single state". He ignored the developments and achievements of European civilization with regard to human rights and the rights of minorities and national

communities based on the principles and resolutions of the Paris Charter. For Milošević his Nazi-ultranationalist slogan was only a means of achieving a much more nefarious goal. Namely, this was the imposition of centralized control from Belgrade throughout all of the former Yugoslavia, with the exception of Slovenia. Milošević would never have received support in Serbia had he intended to limit Yugoslavia to the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, and to those areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in which the Serbs had already constituted a majority.

Relying on deceit, Milošević was convinced that by presenting himself as a defender of "Yugoslavia's unity", he would ostensibly be upholding the same position that all states in the world had adopted, as had all the relevant international organizations. Milošević made use of demagogy and deception, but also of fire and the sword. He was confident that the Yugoslav Army and other such horsemen of the Apocalypse would impose his regime from Gevgelija (in Macedonia) to Varaždin, Umag, and Pula (in Croatia). These objectives were shared by both those who promoted a Greater Serbia and the Yugoslav unitarists, as well as by radicals who had set out to conquer "only" the area up to the Karlobag-Karlovac-Virovitica line (in Croatia). Through television, which is a powerful medium that informs – or disinforms – the public was completely under the control of Milošević's coterie, resulting in the visible deformation of political life under his rule.

THE MATURING OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

The Declaration of Independence proclaimed unanimously by the Croatian *Sabor* (Parliament) on June 25, 1991 (Slovene Parliament proclaimed Slovenia's independence on the same day) is of considerable historical significance and represents an inevitable and resolute, as well as justified, expression of the will and centuries-old aspirations of the Croatian people.

By so doing, Croatia became a legally independent actor *sui generis,* notwithstanding the hostile stance of what remained of the federal governing structure, and especially of the military establishment. This was dominated by Milošević's hypocritical policy of maintaining a unified Yugoslavia, and the manipulations of the federal government headed by Ante Marković and Budimir Lončar on the international scene with the intent of preserving Yugoslavia.

The arrival of J. Poos, Hans van den Broek, and Gianni De Michelis just three days after Croatia's declaration of independence, the Brijuni Declaration, numerous visits by

parliamentary delegations and official representatives of other states and international organizations, the European Community's declaration of August 27, 1991, and the October 1991 UN Security Council Resolution 713 on Yugoslavia were all indications that Croatia had become an independent actor and that it had established its sovereignty.

The first decision made by the European Community's Arbitration Commission on December 7, 1991 (which was chaired by Robert Badinter, who was the president of French Constitutional Court) in response to a request for clarification from Lord Carrington, the President of the Conference on Yugoslavia, clearly noted the position in section 1(a) that, in accordance with the intent of international law, "the existence or disappearance of a state is a question of fact, and the effect of recognition by other states is of a declarative nature only".

It is worth quoting here the often-forgotten summary decision by the European Community's Arbitration Commission, which is expressed in three points:

– The SFRY is in the process of disintegration.

– It is up to the republics to settle questions of state succession, subject to the principles and rules of international law, especially with regard to human rights and the rights of national groups and minorities. Those republics, which may wish to do so, may form a new association which would contain democratic institutions of their choice.

For Croatia, the European Community's diplomatic initiatives and other political steps taken around the world, appeared to be slow, bureaucratic, and ineffective. This is perhaps not a surprising reaction for a country, which lacked everything except self-sacrifice and courage in its struggle to defend its native soil from aggression by a much more powerful military foe. Days seemed like weeks, and months like years, to those who experienced the martyrdom of the inhabitants of Vukovar, Osijek, Petrinja, Karlovac, Sunja, Slunj, Kijevo, Škabrnja, Dubrovnik, and Cavtat. This notwithstanding, we must objectively assess the facts, circumstances, and what was possible within the context of the international situation, and acknowledge that Croatia's recognition by the European Twelve on January 15, 1992, as well as by many other states, came more quickly than we could have expected or hoped for in the summer and autumn of 1991.

It is also important to assess what factors influenced this chain of events.

The draft of the Hague "Convention on Yugoslavia" contained the accepted and unchallenged option that each

republic of the former Yugoslavia, if it wished so, could become independent. That act in and of itself was sufficient for recognition by the European Community and, consequently, by the international community. The third section of this draft also contained a complete plan for the establishment of joint economic and transportation relations, which took as their model relations at a somewhat lower level of integration than the one among the countries of the European Community prior to Maastricht. A closer examination of the draft was enough to convince anyone that acceptance of those proposals would not lead to a "Third Yugoslavia".

The British (Lord Carrington), Dutch (Van den Broek), and French (Badinter) trio planned, in a pragmatic way, to impose that structure on all the republics of the former Yugoslavia as part of a package of comprehensive solutions, accompanied by automatic diplomatic recognition of the complete sovereignty and independence of all those republics which so requested. However, this was meant to happen only upon the conclusion of the conference. The Conference on Yugoslavia, as the European Community, under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington envisioned it; *de facto* was the requiem for Yugoslavia.

However, Belgrade's approach (that is, Milošević's approach) was based on an assessment that the European Community would respect the "Bush Doctrine", especially in light of the frequent highlighting by international players of the need to preserve a united Yugoslavia. Belgrade believed that, in the meantime, Croatia's resistance would be broken through military force and that with a "fait accompli" it could create a Greater Serbia. By adding a few cosmetic initiatives on transitions to a market economy and on respecting human rights, etc., Milošević believed he could create a "modern federation" according to his vision; which would satisfy Europe while also serving the interests of a Greater Serbia. At the same time, such a Yugoslavia had to be capable of withstanding the alleged "Vatican-Comintern" conspiracy against Yugoslavia and, specifically, against Serbia.

Van den Broek and other European leaders were convinced that political means backed up by threats of economic sanctions and various promises, especially in the economic arena, would be sufficient to bring about a ceasefire. However, this approach, was the main cause for the failure and ineffectiveness of the European Community in dealing with Yugoslavia. At the same time, Serbia's determination to "pacify" all its opponents by using every available means, including brutal force, was to lead to a race against time.

221

The Croatian Parliament, having respected the three-month moratorium on implementing the Declaration of Independence, passed a resolution that severed its entire constitutional links to the other republics and autonomous provinces with which Croatia was connected within communist Yugoslavia on October 8, 1991.

As soon as Milošević realized that he would not be able to achieve his objectives by using the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia and that he would not be able to hinder the European Community's plans for the former Yugoslavia, Serbia began to obstruct the Conference on Yugoslavia. Regardless of the fact that Montenegrin president Momir Bulatović on October 18, 1991, announced at the Conference that Montenegro would accept the draft resolution as envisioned by the Conference. Moreover, Yugoslav diplomacy, in effect Serbia, now became active in steering any further negotiations on the Yugoslav crisis toward the United Nations, counting on Russia's favouritism, Chinese caution, and the support of some non-aligned nations. The intention all of this was to buy time and to prevent the diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, with the aim of rescuing the notion of a third Yugoslavia which was envisioned along hegemonic lines.

During this critical period, many foreign policy-makers were making errors that were reflected in their public statements. This occurred most often because of their lack of understanding of what was happening in this region and, in particular, because they did not grasp what kind of conflict this was. Thus, there were assessments claiming that the war in Yugoslavia was a "civil war" or a "religious war", and there were declarations along the lines that "any solution which is reached by peaceful means will be accepted". However, Belgrade always interpreted such calls for peace as "let us continue the violence, since there is no solution until the militarily weaker opponent is defeated, which will result in a peace which the world will accept", as demonstrated after the Tia-nan-men Square massacre in China.

Statements by the high ranking representatives of the United States that the U.S. had vital interests in Macedonia by default implied that it did not have such interests in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This gave Serbia a clear signal that it would have a free hand to use violence and force in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Time was a key factor in implementing the plans envisioned by the main players of the European Conference. Due to Serbia's obstruction, the Conference was unable to

achieve the results which the member-states expected, while at the same time violence stirred up by Serbia and the Yugoslav Army escalated into full-scale aggression against Croatia. The first appeals and calls for an end to the violence and for measures to halt Serbia started to come from official sources in Austria, Germany, and the Vatican, due in no small part to the great efforts by the Croatian diaspora.

Although it is not possible to scrutinize exactly at this stage how events developed day-by-day within the European Community, we do know that the positions of the twelve member-states toward Slovenia and Croatia's declarations of independence were not the same. A polarization within the European Twelve was evident very early. On one side, stood France, Great Britain, Greece, and Spain, that considered Croatia and Slovenia's desire for freedom and independence with unconcealed disfavour. At first, Italy and the Netherlands also held positions close to these. On the other side, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark and, to a certain extent, Luxembourg, showed considerably more sympathy for Croatia's and Slovenia's sovereignty and independence, while Ireland and Portugal took no stand.

Although European and international public opinion firmly supported the need to maintain the unity of Yugoslavia up to June 1991, the first dissident voice within the official European structure was heard in the first week of June 1991. Namely, just before a meeting in Dresden, Germany's Martin Bangemann, as Vice-President of the European Parliament, reminded the European Ministers of Foreign Affairs that Germany's unification too would not have happened if the "European dogma" about the inviolability of borders had been followed literally. The right of people to self-determination must also be taken into account and, Bangemann added on that occasion: "As far as the legitimate principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of individual states is concerned, we cannot conclude that a unified Yugoslav state must be preserved at all costs…. Likewise, as we evolve our position, the European Community cannot exert its influence from outside only in favour of a unified Yugoslavia".

GERMANY STEPS FORWARD

Even after the very recent unification of the two Germanies, the unified Germany was referred to by many western politicians as "an economic giant and a political dwarf". However, Germany's economic power was a significant factor in international politics, particularly in Europe.

Germany, in fact, was the fulcrum of the European Community and, along with France, the hub of European integration and of the political direction of the New Europe.

With the escalation of aggression against Croatia and with the seizure of Croatian territory and, particularly, as a reaction to the terror and the attempts to destroy everything in the occupied territories that was Croatian, Germany, together with Austria, were the first to use their diplomacy in a resolute manner to respond to the appeals from the Croatian and Slovene leaders. They were also the first to take the initiative to have Croatia and Slovenia recognized as soon as possible.

The German and Austrian public as well as all relevant political leaders were able to identify the causes of the escalation of violence in former Yugoslavia even earlier, as a result of the following factors:

1. The German community, which had lived in former Yugoslavia – especially on the plains – had been subjected in the 1920s to an intensive colonization (predominantly by Serbs) in the towns and villages which they had inhabited and on the fertile lands they had owned for centuries.

2. At the end of the World War II, about 500,000 ethnic Germans lived in Srijem, Banat, Bačka, and Eastern Slavonia. About half of them were forced out, the other half were killed. This extermination was part of a Communist terror campaign, the same phenomenon which today is called euphemistically "ethnic cleansing". Most of the expelled ethnic Germans moved to Austria and Germany. These events were not written down, nor taught in the schools, which in part may have contributed to the reconciliation process on which the New Europe is based. Nevertheless, many Germans remember what happened, and in this way an oral tradition has been kept alive by relatives, descendants, and friends of those expelled.

3. The German public always perceived Yugoslavia's Communist system very negatively, given the Germans' own direct experience with the tyranny and dictatorship of the East German regime. Even Tito's dissidence from Moscow in 1948 did not win for Yugoslavia any exoneration for the undemocratic nature of the Yugoslav system. In the 1970s, there was also the scandal surrounding the Baader-Meinhof terrorist group, as some of its members evaded arrest by seeking asylum in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav police demanded the surrender of five Croatian émigrés who were living and working in Germany as a condition for the extradition to Germany of these five German terrorists. Naturally, such an exchange was not ac-

ceptable to Germany, and the Yugoslav authorities assisted the Baader-Meinhof terrorists' subsequent escape to the Middle East. The considerable publicity which Yugoslavia received in the German media at the time contributed – even further and justifiably so – to Yugoslavia's negative image.

4. Many of the German media reporters – such as Karl Gustav Ströhm, Viktor Meier, Hans-Peter Rullmann, and Johann Reismuller – know the Slavic languages. They were thus able to travel the breadth of the former Yugoslavia and establish direct contacts and report with greater credibility and with a better grasp of events than their counterparts from Paris, London, and Washington, who sat in Belgrade and who sent back home an image of Yugoslavia as seen exclusively from their window in Belgrade.

5. It is well-known that the Yugoslav UDBA (secret police), with the help of Yugoslav diplomats and consular representatives abroad, organized dozens of attacks against Croatian émigrés. Most of these attacks occurred in Germany and, in some of these cases, the German legal system correctly and with concrete proofs was able to discover the motives for the attacks and report on the involvement of various Yugoslav officials in the assassinations. Moreover, this information was made public in Germany. On the contrary, when Bruno Bušić was assassinated in Paris and Maksim Krstulović in London, although the local police knew that Yugoslav agents had carried them out, they did not pursue an investigation. The attempted assassination of Nikola Štedul (in Scotland) by Sindičić, a Yugoslav secret operative in Great Britain, for example, led to his apprehension before the motive for the attack had become clear. Sindičić was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment, but only for a purely criminal act. Thus, the British public, as that in France in the Bruno Bušić case, was deprived of the full truth or of information about the criminal nature of some of the former Yugoslavia's government institutions.

It is commonplace that interest and power are the basic factors of politics. Although this is undeniable, in this case it is not correct to assume that Germany abandoned the well-established guidelines adopted by the European Community because of its own interests, such as the expansion of its spheres of influence. Alongside the initiative in German diplomacy led by Foreign Minister Hans Dieter Genscher (obviously working together with Chancellor Helmut Kohl), it is also important to stress the following: Without detracting from the ability and devotion of Germany's Foreign Minister and many other German

officials in their efforts to gain diplomatic recognition for Croatia, Germany's diplomacy could not have acted differently, since it was responding to influence and pressure from its entire public opinion.

I believe that it is abundantly clear that the public opinion in Germany as well as in Austria, Hungary, and Australia, on the issue of diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia was radically different (for various reasons) from the public opinion in Great Britain, France, and the United States, and especially from that in the Soviet Union and in the vast majority of other countries.

The United States had relinquished the initiative on the crisis in the former Yugoslavia completely to the European Community and, in November 1991, senior officials in the Bush Administration informed their German counterparts that the United States were prepared to support any initiative which Germany might undertake, assessing that this would contribute to the development of freedom, peace, and democracy.

THE DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF CROATIA AND SLOVENIA

The disintegration or collapse of Yugoslavia was well underway. With the resolution of August 27, 1991 by the European Twelve (with the agreement of all the republics and the federal government of the former Yugoslavia who were participating in the conference), Yugoslavia *de facto* became a state under international trusteeship. Yugoslavia thereby achieved a unique distinction in the history of international relations. Normally the states that emerge as independent entities are placed under the tutorship of international organizations. In the case of Yugoslavia, it was the latter's passing away which occurred under an international protectorate. This situation was confirmed by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 713.

In tandem with this, Croatia's international legal identity also developed, beginning on June 25, 1991. By the very act of passing its Declaration of Independence that day, Croatia achieved its *de facto* recognition. This was followed quickly by political recognition when the European Community sent its delegation on June 28, 1991 to Zagreb to meet with the leaders of Croatia and Slovenia. Final diplomatic recognition was only of a declaratory nature.

The reciprocal recognition between Croatia and Slovenia as soon as they had proclaimed their independence marked the beginning of this unavoidable process. Soon afterwards, Latvia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania recognized

Croatia, to be followed by Iceland. Nevertheless, the diplomatic recognition extended by the European Community on January 15, 1992 must be seen as the keystone in the recognition of Croatia. The subsequent recognition by other states was only a logical consequence of the European Twelve's consensus-based decision.

The United States, it should be noted, had already announced officially that it would stand by any decision by the European Community with regard to the recognition of Croatia – and thus the fate of Yugoslavia's unity – no matter what that decision might be. Actually, the United States decided to recognize Croatia only on April 7, 1992, that is after a considerable delay, and just one day before Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina were admitted as full-fledged members to the United Nations.

As noted already, with the establishment of the Conference on Yugoslavia under the aegis of the European Community, it was understood that the final result of the Conference would be to grant diplomatic recognition to those republics of the former SFRY, which so desired. The course of events, however, was to proceed in a different and unplanned manner, due to the onslaught by the Yugoslav Army (that is by Serbia and Montenegro) against Croatia, which involved the use of tanks, aircraft, warships, and surface-to-surface missiles, despite the repeated ceasefires on which the European Community insisted as expressed through its mission in Croatia.

The world, and especially Europe, was shocked by the brutality of the aggression against Croatia, and Germany now took the lead in promoting that the recognition of Croatia could reduce the level of violence and put a stop to the aggression. In addition to the factors already mentioned which enabled Germany – along with Austria and the Vatican – to take a positive stand before others did so on recognizing Croatia, there were also some other factors that were even more important:

1. The world was impressed by the willingness of Croatians, and especially of the younger generation, to take up arms and to stand up to a militarily much stronger adversary.

2. The world was shocked by the brutality with which the aggressor attacked and destroyed Croatia's cities and villages, killing and expelling the civilian population, as well as the plundering.

Initially, Germany sought to gain support from the rest of the European Community through informal contacts at a time when consultations among the European Community's foreign ministers were especially intensive in

227

preparation for the Maastricht Conference. To be clear, the Maastricht Conference held on December 9–10, 1991, turned out to be a major disappointment, since the Croatian issue was not even mentioned as part of the official conference agenda. However, what the conference did establish was in fact that the member states would adopt a common position on matters of defence and foreign policy. This was to be a decisive factor at the European Community meeting held a week later in Brussels.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MAKES A DECISION

Despite the request which De Cuellar and Baker sent in writing to Genscher and the one Bush sent to Kohl on December 15, 1991 asking Germany not to rush unilaterally to recognize Croatia and Slovenia – a request intended to moderate Germany's known readiness to do so – these demarches by the Secretary General of the United Nations and by the President of the United States did not have any effect, since Genscher was able to skilfully deflect such warnings and requests.

At Genscher's initiative, a discussion of a "list of conditions" for the recognition of new states – or more exactly a declaration of procedures for the recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union – was placed on the agenda at the Conference on Yugoslavia. The draft of this document had been worked out already by France and Germany, and contained the criteria which individual countries would have to fulfil in order to meet preconditions for diplomatic recognition. The foreign ministers quickly reached an agreement with regard to these criteria, based on the text of the above-mentioned declaration, a decision, which followed naturally from the reports of the Arbitration Commission of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Croatia had already met those criteria and following small adjustments the only question that remained was when diplomatic recognition would follow.

Lord Carrington, however, was strongly opposed to an early recognition, and firmly believed that at that moment conditions were not ripe yet and that the necessary preconditions for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia had not been met yet, i.e., in December 1991. In other words, he still adhered to the European Community's earlier position that recognition of Slovenia and Croatia should be coordinated with the outcome of the Conference on Yugoslavia. Great Britain's Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd, was somewhat less adamant, but he was also convinced that recogni-

tion was still premature. Allied to Genscher on this question were Denmark's Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen and Belgium's Foreign Minister Eyskens. France's Foreign Minister Roland Dumas did not take an openly opposing stand, but emphasized the need to understand Germany's position instead.

At that meeting, Italy's De Michelis, who until then had routinely taken a favourable stand toward Belgrade, warned (most likely influenced by the Italian President Cossiga) that the European Community's credibility was being undermined by the Serbs who had ignored its positions and warnings. De Michelis claimed that an end had to be put to this situation, and that this could be accomplished by granting recognition to Croatia and Slovenia. In particular, De Michelis stressed that all of the European Community members had to agree unanimously on recognition. Hans van den Broek, the Dutch Foreign Minister (acting as the President of the European Community's Council of Ministers – a position, which rotates every six months) also accepted this position, as he was especially irritated by Belgrade's duplicity. Specifically, the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav Army had signed ceasefire agreements and had promised not to shell civilian targets on several occasions. Contrary to the commitments already undertaken, the Yugoslav Army continued undeterred its attacks and land grab. The attacks on Vukovar, Slunj, Drniš, Zadar, Karlovac, Osijek, and Dubrovnik revealed the true nature of the Yugoslav Army's out-of-control leadership and had a profound impact on Van den Broek's views.

Thanks to the principles announced in Maastricht mandating a united approach on foreign policy matters for members of the European Community a consensus was achieved on December 17, 1991 on diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. It is natural and to be expected that there will be differences in the assessments and positions of twelve independent countries. Moreover, this is especially the case when the focus of such differences was only on the appropriate moment to provide Croatia and Slovenia with protection and the satisfaction of a diplomatic recognition from such a respected group of countries. Indeed, it would be more surprising if such differences did not exist, especially given the different experience, level of knowledge, and interpretation of the nature and cause of the conflicts, which generally appeared as the tyranny of Communism collapsed in Europe.

However, it is more difficult to understand how countries such as Great Britain and France, with a wealth of experience in foreign affairs, left room for speculation,

229

doubt and criticism surrounding the diplomatic recognition of Croatia. After having weighed all the pros and cons, France and Great Britain agreed to recognize Croatia. However, it seems that they should not have allowed the impression to develop in European public opinion that the decision had been made against their advice and even their will, and that they had agreed only under German pressure.

On the contrary, it is clear that both France and Great Britain had viewed the decision to recognize Croatia as both justified and appropriate. Based on that premise, having a very experienced diplomatic corps, these two countries should have used the strength of their authority and reputation to prevent the Belgrade regime from avoiding blame for its defeat before its own people by using such false excuses. France and Great Britain and in particular the USA had an obligation to prevent paranoia in the Serbian media from having a field day by distorting history and claiming that Croatia had achieved its independence solely due to German revanchism aimed at Serbia; that this represents a new German push toward the East, that Serbia's traditional allies in two world wars had betrayed it and that Serbia was a victim of German economic expansion. Since such distortions found fertile ground in Serbia, politicians of Great Britain and France should not have granted Milošević such a favour and, at the same time, such a disservice to the Serbian people.

The subsequent course of events suggests that Great Britain and France should have sent Belgrade a direct message that the diplomatic recognition of Croatia was a direct consequence of the aggression and policy of force which the JNA and Milošević's Serbia had implemented systematically against Croatia. Such a move would have put a stop to Serbia's exploitation of the *"Prečani"* Serbs and would have ended the hold of Milošević's propaganda on Serbian masses.

THE ULTIMATE AFFIRMATION OF STATEHOOD

In the weeks following Croatia's recognition by the European Community, Croatia was also recognized by countries from all the continents. Beginning with Austria, Hungary, Switzerland, Canada, the Scandinavian and Latin American countries, Australia, and New Zealand. With that, Croatia's legal existence as a state was confirmed irrevocably and for all times.

After the end of the Cold War, the United States remained the sole superpower. However, the United States

were to take the initiative commensurate with their role and importance only in those areas where American national interests were at stake. It sounds eminently logical when President William Clinton says that the United States do not want to be the world's policeman. However, being the sole superpower does not mean simply having more rights; it means, at the same time, also having more responsibilities. It is also understandable that the preconditions were not ripe for the United States to send their boys to die in some Balkan valley. Nevertheless, by the same token, the impression that the United States were not only tolerating, but encouraging aggression had been created. Such actions as the parade of the Sixth Fleet in the Adriatic, stationing the most modern aircraft a few minutes' flying time away from the combat zones, patrolling the air space over Bosnia-Hercegovina to monitor the "No Fly Zone" (even though the Serbian air force violated that air space hundreds of times), as well as the reinforcement provided indirectly by public declarations, suggest such an intent. How was Serbia to interpret statements and warnings by official spokesmen that the United States' national interests would be at risk if violence began against Macedonia or Kosovo? In Belgrade, the conclusion that was drawn from this was that Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were outside the United States' defence perimeter and that "we have a free hand to use violence there and seize as much land as we can".

This state of inertia, agony, violence, and war had lasted too long. Ambassador Warren Zimmerman, Secretary of State James Baker and, in particular, Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger had squandered valuable time before they understood that Milošević, the butcher of the Balkans, was hurtling the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, and perhaps beyond, into the maelstrom of war.

It must also be noted that the military power which Belgrade was able to build up over decades made the Yugoslav Army the third or fourth largest in Europe, and the United States cannot deny its part in creating that oversized armed force supplied with an arsenal of modern weaponry. It was that armed force which swooped down on the very people it had supposedly been designed to protect, while audiences across Europe, the United States, and around the world watched in horror. Finally, the principal financial infusions enabling the Yugoslav Communist dictatorship to survive came from the other side of the Atlantic.

It is also instructive to remember the decisive and courageous statement directed by President Ronald Reagan to the Soviets during his first days in office, when the Cold War was still raging and was, perhaps, at its peak: "The Soviets are prepared to lie, bluff, kill, and commit any crime in order to achieve their goals." Milošević, General Ratko Mladić, and their likes, weaned on the Soviet ideology, as the Soviets undoubtedly deserve the same approach. If Reagan were so successful using this approach against the Soviets, Bush would have surely been equally successful with Milošević. Despite a long and consequence-laden delay, policymakers in the U.S. eventually concluded that Milošević and Karadžić were war criminals, and that they would have to answer for war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia. Yet, surprisingly, Croatian policy was slow to respond to this clearly positive initiative.

At stake, ultimately, was the credibility of the European Community, the United Nations, and the only remaining superpower, the United States. Could their prestige be restored, in light of the fact that after so many months they still had not been able to completely cut off oil supplies to Serbia? It is sad to realize that if Serbia's oil had been cut off immediately when the United Nations sanctions were imposed, the destructive war and the civilian population's suffering in this region would have ended long ago. Despite the international role, significance, and power of the U.S., it accepted the fundamental principle of a sort of a Monroe Doctrine as applied to the territories of the former Soviet Union in a surprisingly casual manner. That is, other powers should not interfere in those areas that once formed a part of the Soviet Union. Indeed, Russia's hegemony has been tolerated and accepted, even though there has been no guarantee (or even likelihood) that totalitarianism, absolutism, and autocracy would disappear in Russia. For Moscow, the key concern has been to promote those forces in neighbouring states that favour greater direct political, economic, and state links with Russia. Even now, many orthodox Communists enjoy Moscow's support as they compete against democratic movements if the latter movements are seen to promote independence or autonomy from Russia. This shortsighted perspective of Russia should be of concern because it is very probable that the current economic and political crisis in Russia – which is the result of the breakdown of the Communist system – would abate and that Russia would recover in due course.

One has to remember that neither the foundations nor preconditions for democracy have ever existed in Russia, despite the fact that this society has produced many world-class philosophers, artists, and activists working for human and national rights, social justice, and tolerance. However, the Orthodox ethos and belief incline toward absolute rule, and the opportunity to prevent the development of a new mastodon in Eastern Europe will probably be lost soon, to the detriment of the U.S. and the European Union. A giant will arise again in the East. This giant will always be governed by absolutists and dictators because of its nature and essence. Bolstered by revived ideologies and utopias, and exploiting misunderstandings and crimes, this giant could become the dominant superpower in the Balkans. Contrary to the U.S., Russia will always consider the entire Balkans to be of a vital national interest, even without making any provocative declarations to that effect.

Ultimately, what the West and the United States have failed to understand about Milošević's Serbia is that Milošević has only changed the name of his Communist Party, while, under the new clothing the old Bolshevik structure, content, ideology, methods, and totalitarian machinery have survived unchanged.

I am inclined to agree with Michael Kramer who, in seeking to define the Clinton Doctrine, wrote in October 1993 in *Time* magazine that Clinton justified his retreats euphemistically as "pragmatism". As a result, Kramer warned, America must worry about becoming a prisoner of self-induced impotence that might be how the "Clinton Doctrine" will be remembered in history. The United States' performance in the Yugoslav crisis until the middle of August 1995 was less than adequate for the world's only super-power.

In view of the importance and the number of Muslim states in Africa and Asia, the Security Council and the U.S. Administration began to realise that the U.S. as the only world super-power should not remain passive regarding the war horrors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. During 1993–94 the U.S. finally took initiative which first resulted in the Washington and then the Dayton Agreement. It has to be said that as early as 1993, Washington initiated gathering of support among allies in Europe. First of all, this was initiated in Great Britain and France to stop the Serbian aggression by using superior military power in the air and on the sea.

The Pentagon prepared a strategy called *"lift and destroy"* which involved imposing the no-fly zone and de-

233

stroying the Serbian military potential in Bosnia. However, while touring the European capitals in the attempt to gather support, the U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher dismally failed.

THE CONFIRMATION OF CROATIAN INTEGRITY

By attaching high value and respect to all relevant UN Security Council resolutions, Croatia had the right to expect, that following a proposal submitted to the UN Security Council by Mr. Alois Mock, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria, "the Safe Areas" declared by the UN in the neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, would be protected and maintained despite the years of shelling and armed conflict. The Safe Areas included Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihać, Srebrenica, Goražde, and Žepa. The obligations and guarantees of the UN Security Council and the international community were not respected and the ruthless attacks on the civil population in the urban communities continued. A special envoy of the UN Secretary General, Mr. Akashi, tried in vain to stop the Serb paramilitary forces from attacking the Safe Area of Bihać from the Serb-occupied parts of Croatia.

However, the war criminals, Karadžić and Mladić, together with their Serb patrons in Belgrade, continued with ruthless and callous violence and ethnic cleansing. The tragic fate of the population of the Safe Areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the beginning of the summer 1995 reached its culmination in genocide suffered by the entire population of Srebrenica and Žepa in July 1995 passively observed and tolerated by UNPROFOR and the whole international community. Shocking scenes of women, children and the old people leaving their homes, not of their own will, but because they were forced to do so, i.e., ethnic cleansing, gained new momentum. Those examples finally unmasked the indecisiveness and ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR.

At the beginning of August 1995 it was up to the uncontrollable will of the war criminals Karadžić and Mladić to decide to either continue with their crimes in Bihać or to concentrate on Goražde – or to do both at the same time. Judging from the circumstances prevailing at the time that is precisely what would have happened if Croatia had not militarily intervened.

Acting in accordance with its constitutional obligations and indisputable commitment of the Croatian people and of all Croatian citizens to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their state, and in order to start

liberating the occupied parts of Banovina, Lika and northern Dalmatia, Croatia also had the obligation to prevent further humanitarian tragedy threatening the population of the Cazin and Bihać area. The basic human rights of the inhabitants of these areas were critically abused, and they were brought to the edge by suffering from starvation, lack of water, and, in particular, of medicine. It could and should not be passively observed any longer as it represented not only abuse of human rights but literally of the **right to live** for over one hundred thousand men, women, and children.

Under such circumstances and particularly as a result of the ineffectiveness of the UNPROFOR and Carl Buildt's erroneous judgements and proposals, operation "Storm" took place. Croatian defenders stopped further escalation of violence and ethnic cleansing. Although there was support in UN resolutions in writing and spirit, Croatia reached the whole of the borderline with Bosnia and Herzegovina by using its own forces. It has to be pointed out that operation "Storm" opened the way for NATO air strikes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which followed and created conditions for the Dayton Conference.

Acting in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and using its own forces, Croatia turned away the rebels and terrorists from its territory in Banovina, northwestern Lika and the northern part of Dalmatia. With the same police/military operation "Storm", Croatia also saved Bihać and Cazin, as well as Goražde. Obligations assumed by Europe, the NATO and the UN regarding these areas were carried out by Croatia.

In doing so Croatia not only stopped the horrendous suffering of the population in the neighbouring state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also saved the reputation of the UN Security Council.

Certain incidents that took place in the occupied areas of Croatia from which the terrorists had been driven away deserve criticism and condemnation. Croatia has an obligation to view them as such in order to prove that it is often unjustly placed in the same category as the aggressors. Perfection, however, is rarely found in this world.

Let me conclude by saying that all of this created conditions for the NATO military attack on the Serbian military targets in Bosnia and Herzegovina that were soon to follow. In accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions, NATO finally used the only language that Belgrade understood – the language of military force. Milošević agreed to halt the terror and subsequently realized that he could not avoid sitting at the negotiating table at Dayton.

Territory in addition to population and governing bodies is one of the three main determinants of any state. Territory of a state is defined by state borders up to which the state sovereignty is extended. Borders are lines, which define a state area and can also be defined as an uneven line, which crosses the surface of a landmass. Consequently, borders extend underground as well as into the air, as well as cover the area of the sea surface, the seabed and beneath the seabed.

As far as the border problems of Croatia are concerned, it has to be emphasised that neither along the border with Slovenia nor the one with Serbia or Montenegro are there any hamlets or villages that may be a matter of dispute. However, there is still work to be done on establishing Croatian borders with its neighbours along the sea, even after the integration of the Croatian Danube region, had been accomplished.

In the southernmost part of Croatia, at Cape Oštro, where UN observers are still present with the mandate of the UN Security Council resolutions on Prevlaka, there are certain restrictions preventing unhindered activities by the Croatian authorities. However, that does not essentially infringe on the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, which was clearly confirmed by the UN resolutions. The latest UN resolutions on Prevlaka explicitly state that "the Security Council confirms once again its obligation to protect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia".

Over the last few years Prevlaka has received a lot of publicity in the international community. Cape Oštro, or as it is most commonly called Prevlaka, does not physically touch the land border between Croatia and the FRY at the entrance into the Bay of Boka Kotorska. The land border between Croatia and Montenegro extends along the mountainous rocks on Bjelotina and Draževica above the eastern part of Konavle, while at the shore the border comes out at "Konfin", in the area of Cape Kobila which is not a part of Prevlaka. The whole 25 km land border has been bilaterally established with great precision and as such has been respected for centuries.

Despite the fact that the Agreement on the Normalisation of Relations between Croatia and Yugoslavia was signed on August 23, 1996, the basic precondition for the improvement of relations in the border area of the two countries is establishment of Croatia's border posts at both Bjelotina and Draževica, along the line which represents the internationally recognised border.

It is important to stress that in October 1991, the Parliament of Montenegro used the term "the existing border" for this particular border section. That was in June 1991 after NATO's Political Department in its working paper entitled "Europe's Lebanon", which referred to the areas of the SFRY, reminded members of the principles stated in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter. This paper also stated that Slovenia and Croatia should be recognised, as well as any other republic proclaiming independence within the borders established after the World War II.

Croatia has adhered to peaceful cooperation with its neighbours in its determination to build a marina for yachts within the area of the Prevlaka Bay, which in addition to the tourist facilities would stretch over the whole area of Cape Oštro. At the very top of the Cape, in the fortress built during the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, a memorial museum is planned to commemorate all the defenders of Croatian youth killed during the Liberation War, as well as the innocent victims sent to their deaths in attacks on Risanj and Ledenice in Boka Kotorska in the autumn of 1944.

There is real ground for hope that this initiative, which aims at creating tourist facilities in this deserted area of the Croatia's southernmost coast, will result in a positive reaction from our eastern neighbour. The Montenegrin Government has already submitted the Plan for the Regional Development for the whole of Montenegro to the Parliament of Montenegro, but the plan did not include the Prevlaka area, i.e., Cape Oštro.

The economic recovery of Boka Kotorska and of the entire coastal area of Montenegro is tied to tourism, which has no chance of further development unless Yugoslavia gives its territorial aspirations up for good, i.e., unless peaceful intentions prevail with our neighbours as well. Many of the Croatian southeastern neighbours have realised that any concessions on Croatia's part, either on land or at sea, would mean a reward for the aggression.

Croatia is approaching a final agreement on open issues regarding borders with neighbouring Slovenia. Along the whole 670-km land border that stretches from the three-border point with Hungary to the estuary of the river Dragonja in the Bay of Piran, the geodesist experts have done a great amount of good professional work. In several open and unresolved areas the final solutions hopefully acceptable to both countries are gaining shape. A long part of the land border goes along the rivers Mura, Sutla, Kupa and Dragonja, which makes the situation con-

siderably easier. However, a change in the course of these rivers over the last several decades has called for coordination efforts. That part of the job is in its final phase and that can explain the patience of the Croatian side regarding the actual situation at St. Gera.

Solutions to the border disputes between Slovenia and Croatia have been made easier by the Constitutional Decisions both countries made upon gaining their independence. On June 25, 1991 both countries expressed the same view with regard to mutual recognition and respect for borders as they existed in the former SFRY. Therefore, the task of diplomatic commissions of the two countries is to establish bilaterally the factual situation, which existed in June 1991. So far, the progress made in this area has been encouraging.

OPENING
ADDRESSES

Ljerka
MINTAS HODAK

Former Deputy Prime Minister
of the Republic of Croatia
and Minister for European Integration

OPENING ADDRESS

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have accepted the invitation to open this "European" symposium today in Dubrovnik, the "Croatian Athens", with great pleasure. We are in a town which represents Croatia in Europe where every stone bears witness to the centuries-old links between Croatia and Europe. Allow me therefore to say a few words of introduction.

With its culture, history and civilization, Croatia has always belonged to the "circle of European states", in the full literal meaning of this term. However, history, during which Croats were never asked what they wanted, has left indelible marks. Today we are one of the transitional, post-communist, "young" democracies, still not integrated into the leading European structures, among which the European Union is especially prominent.

It is important to note that the current European and world trends include integration and globalization, but also include regionalism within an articulate coherent structure.

Globalization, which ultimately necessitates a call for stronger integration, is a process of the future. It is also an essential factor in overall prospective harmonious development, regardless of all the problems its side effects bring. This is the reason why, today, we are all advocating globalization in a positive sense. However, a misconception of the term globalization may be a starting point for fundamental misunderstandings. Unification should not necessarily be the basic substance of globalization. Globalization *per se* should rather contain a well-balanced and harmonized spectrum of differences stemming from the overall cultural, sociological and other heritage of different existing societies and their models that could be applied equally regardless of borders in a broad sense.

Croatia is often used as an example of a country in transition, which has strong – within the framework of Europe, "surpassed" national awareness. Is it truly differ-

243

ent elsewhere? When the eleven European Union member countries established the monetary union, they transferred monetary sovereignty to the European Central Bank, but none of them fully waived their national identity. They forged their own symbols on the reverse side of all eight coins. Even today, the so-called "common policies" are in fact – a realistic compromise.

Therefore, when we talk about closer ties between nations, it is necessary to identify those forms of cooperation that have been developed through broader values and goals, shared by everybody, which take into account the values, customs and experiences of each of them.

This is especially important for Europe as a whole, which today is still far from a conflict-free homogenous zone. Ten years after the fall of communism, the continent continues to be divided, although this division is no longer along different ideological models of society but along significant development differences between the East and the West. Moreover, what causes additional concern is the fact that there are no indications of a decrease in this gap in the near future, not even on the verge of a new millennium. The outcome could be the formation of a new separation line on the continent. This still can be and must be avoided by joint efforts of the European Union and the states in transition. Division can be avoided, by expanding the European Union eastward, which would include not only the candidate states of the first and second group, but also those states, which have not lagged behind in any way, like Croatia, but still have not received an invitation to institutionalize their relations due to political and petty-political reasons.

Only an integration which respects the whole range of different cultures and which is sensitive to history and differences will foster trust and respect among the small states and big powers.

We can expect to reach a lasting consensus, as we have learned from the experience of "Europe at War", only if the vital interests of all the sides are taken into account and harmonized with global interests in the spirit of tolerance and true fairness. Such fairness is the only correct basis of any lasting mutual relationship, where "mutual relationship" is the key concept. A mutual relationship assumes a bilateral activity, and, most of all, equally strong activity by both sides in finding a unique mutually acceptable solution. A solution in which only one side is favored necessarily leads to processes of lasting instability and disintegration, examples of which we have seen in the disappearance of multi-ethnic artificial state formations.

A transitory period is indispensable in the case of a more serious expansion of the European Union eastward because the process of transition does not just assume democratization, privatization and civil society only. It also assumes a new industrialization and urbanization as a whole of a technical society. Thus, the creation of a modern state is concordant with the prevailing trends of the developed world, in all its segments, and a prerequisite of every successful integration into a more developed environment, such as the European Union. However, it should be emphasized that it is very difficult to meet that condition in the absence of technical assistance provided by the European Union and its member states. I would like to point out that so far Croatia has been deprived of such assistance. The Phare program was interrupted before its implementation, while negotiations on the Agreement on Trade and Cooperation were unilaterally suspended by the European Union. This happened immediately after the military-police actions: "Flash" and "Storm" in the summer of 1995. During these actions, Croatia liberated the occupied parts of its territory and in this way facilitated peace and stability in this part of Europe. Multi-layered frustrations, i.e., the negative psycho-social experiences of what was done, and especially of what was not done in relation to the citizens of Croatia between 1990–1992, even today, seven years later, obstruct the success and the pace of the overall process of integration into Europe.

The big gap between our own perceptions regarding the position of our country and its position as seen from the perspective of the European West is a cause of deep frustration among the majority of Croats. In its efforts to improve the position of the country, Croatia's main task is to bridge this gap.

Following the criteria of self-imposed quasi-associated membership, the Croatian Government and Croatian experts have, on their own, and within a year, developed the European Integration Plan of Action, which was presented to the European Commission in Brussels and subsequently achieved significant success. The Plan is an outline of further activities in future developments of the Strategy of Integration Activities and as such really deserves special attention.

However, we all sometimes forget that Europe, including the European Union, is made up of people organized in states, and not only of states *per se*. This is precisely why the issue of European identity imposes itself as well as the meaning of the term "European". Geography defined it long ago. Politics uses it, according to its needs, as it

245

pleases at any given moment. In addition, we have frequently witnessed how no distinction is made between "Europe" and the "European Union". This is impermissible, although we must admit that the creation of such an integration has in many aspects marked the last decade of the twentieth century.

Nevertheless, the term "European" should primarily be defined as a geographical and cultural notion. From this standpoint, Croatia and the Croatian people should not have any problems with claiming their right to call themselves European, nor with being perceived as such by others.

Since Europe is made up of people with articulate models of conduct, that have been organized throughout history into national states, we must be aware, although this is unwillingly admitted, the majority of the population in European Union member countries declare themselves primarily on a national basis. Namely, they identify themselves as Finns, Germans, English, Austrians... and only subsequently as Europeans. Why is this so? This most likely stems from the fact that "European" is a collective term for the entire population of Europe as a continent while the national name is the *differentia specifica*, which makes it recognizable. Due to its old, but still existent cultural heritage and identity inherited throughout history, a quick Americanization of Europe in this sense cannot be expected. However, isn't the beauty of Europe truly reflected precisely in its diversity? It certainly is, otherwise the European Union would not insist on the "Europe of regions". One also has to keep in mind that regionalism is only a sub-class of national identity, hence these two terms are not mutually exclusive.

In the new European democracies which emerged from multiethnic and totalitarian artificial state formations, national awareness, presented in the past exclusively as multiculturalism, is stronger than in those states that were nationally freely formed throughout history. Undoubtedly, there are examples in those states of unwilling full immersion of their own being into a uniform whole which has not yet succeeded to develop its own identity (Denmark, Great Britain).

The development of a new European identity encompassing all the nations which belong to it on the basis of cultural, sociological and historic foundations, and its recognizability in the future is one of the biggest tasks of Europe as a whole. Only then will it become evident that it is impossible for "black holes" to survive on the continent. Transparency and tolerance will play an important

role in this entire process. Transparency means the absence of games behind the scenes when deciding on behalf of others, and tolerance assumes sensitivity to the needs of others. The history of this town, Dubrovnik demonstrates this in the best possible manner.

The European Union, as a leading factor of everything that is progressive on the continent today, is faced with a historical task – to find strength and determination for the reintegration of all the parts of the continent. This can be achieved by expanding eastward, without excluding anybody in this expansion, keeping in mind that Europe is the common home of all those who live in it.

This is precisely why I would like to express the belief that in the near future the old Croatian people and the young Croatian state will have their place in a united Europe, to the mutual benefit of the European Union and Croatia. With these words I would like to thank you for your attention, wishing you pleasant and fruitful work on your reflections on European integration in the 21st century, and I proclaim the symposium "European Integration for the 21st century" open.

Mladen
ANDRLIĆ

Ambassador
Director of the Diplomatic Academy
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Croatia

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Madam Deputy Prime Minister,
Your Excellencies, Dear Colleagues,

It is an honor and privilege to be here today and to greet this distinguished gathering on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Mate Granić.

It seems to be significant that we have gathered here today, at the end of one and beginning of another millennium, in the city of Dubrovnik where there is so much international history and where the roots of Croatian diplomacy can be found. It needs to be emphasized that this part of the world where Croatia is situated was acknowledged as a part of Western civilization as long as three centuries ago. Specifically, the Republic of Dubrovnik was recognized as a port of the Western Mediterranean in a written document issued by the French court in 1760, which was a highly privileged status at that time. Although this international orientation has been modified since then, it has been a constant throughout Croatian history right up to until the eve of the year 2000.

In the context of the "Four-I-Concept" of internationalization, integration, individualization and informatics, which has prevailed in the last decade of this century or even millennium, Croatia has represented itself as a reliable player and a solid partner that has strived toward the Euro-Atlantic integration structures. Croatia will definitely become a full partner in the forthcoming years. The process of European integration is obviously the only viable process as it contains a number of wide multidisciplinary approaches where unification of all partners as well as recognition of their individual characteristics is their goal. All of Europe can only become stable and prosperous and a part of a wider globalized world through integration and decentralization of particular states.

The tectonic changes in the geostrategic matrix of Europe which started with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the communist system in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the dissolution of multinational states such as the former Czechoslovakia, former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and the former Soviet Union, have changed priorities for both Western and Eastern countries. It is often seen as a paradox that, on one hand, there is integration and on the other disintegration.

However, the key issue here is that associations should develop gradually out of the free will and interest of each people. This is also a very important feature of the Stability Pact for the Southeast of Europe, which is best illustrated by the fact that the involved countries are not only from Southeastern Europe, but encompass a much wider area. The primary reason behind this is that it is in the interest of all of Europe and the world to be peaceful and prosperous, while stability is seen as a vital prerequisite for reaching this common goal.

With the end of the Cold War and a bipolar world, the predominance of democratization and integration has become of utmost importance. However, as such changes cannot be, unfortunately always peaceful, the traditional roles of institutions have been questioned and put on trial. It is essential that in such circumstances where the number of players has been drastically increased, that institutions such as the European Union and NATO, find reliable partners who will be factors of stability and contribute to both regional and world peace and prosperity.

The Republic of Croatia underwent a fundamental transformation in the first free democratic elections in 1990 and subsequently became a pluralist multi-party democracy and a free market oriented society. Unfortunately, in contrast to other Central European countries it has not followed a peaceful transition pattern. The institutions of civil society, although established, have been hindered in their full development by the complicated geostrategic position of Croatia. Namely, Croatia was not only exposed to a war of aggression on its own territory, but also had to help establish conditions for the overall stability of the region, playing an important part in the Dayton Peace Accords. It was only on January 15, 1998, that the real peacetime development of Croatia was inaugurated, including its foreign policy, creating conditions for more intensive activities aimed toward Euro-Atlantic integration processes.

Nevertheless, in today's increasingly globalized world, the real challenge is integration and cooperation. With its

Central European, Mediterranean and Danubian geostrategic position as well as its orientation and commitment toward Euro-Atlantic integration structures, Croatia has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness and readiness to be an active actor in all the stabilizing processes in Europe. In pursuit of further democratization, rule of law, human and minority rights, as well as transparency, openness, stability and cooperation, including a credible and consistent foreign policy, Croatia is aware that this is the only way to contribute to a more prosperous development that offers an even more solid foundation for a better future to its citizens.

The seriousness with which we approach these processes can be also seen in the way Croatia has taken full responsibility for its own democratic development. Precisely, only as integrated, rich in differences and united in purpose, can Europe assure Croatia's future as well as become a part of the wider globalized world. Conferences such as this one reflect common interests and goals, and at the same time contribute to confidence building, cross-cultural understanding and professional and personal networking.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

As the Director of the Diplomatic Academy of the Croatian Foreign Ministry let me conclude by saying that in cooperation with the International Center of Croatian Universities of Dubrovnik, the Diplomatic Academy has already organized a number of successful conferences. Participants have come from home and abroad, some of whom are here with us today. As distinguished guests, they have dealt with various topics on diplomacy and diplomatic training and we shall continue in this direction.

This conference entitled "European Integration for the Twenty-First Century" will also be yet another impetus for the Diplomatic Academy to incorporate all of these interesting ideas so that they can be propounded in its own agenda. This will contribute to a better understanding, stability, transparency and prosperity of all of Europe, but also in positioning Croatia as a part of the overall process of confidence building, globalization and European integration.

Thank you.

ABOUT
THE
AUTHORS

Janusz Bugajski is Director of East European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

Laura Genero is President of Laura Genero & Associates, a corporate communications and consulting firm. Prior to that she held many high level positions in the U.S. government. They include serving as Associate Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor in the administration of President George Bush, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations in the administration of President Ronald Reagan. Ms. Genero's areas of expertise in the state department were refugees, human rights and supporting values and institutions that promoted press freedom and the free exchange of information and ideas. Prior to serving in the executive branch of government she worked for members of the U.S. House of Representatives and as a newspaper reporter. Her deep interest in Croatia and Southeastern Europe is rooted in her family ties to Dubrovnik. Her paternal grandparents, Mary Stjepovic and Petar Gjenero, immigrated to the United States from the Dubrovnik area at the turn of the last century.

Vladimir P. Goss has a Ph.D. in Art History (Cornell, 1972). The title of his doctoral dissertation is "Pre-Romanesque and Early Romanesque Architecture in Croatia". His research interests include Medieval and Renaissance art, Medieval culture, culture and mass media and Croatian diaspora. He is the author of three books and has co-authored four on Medieval art and culture. He has also published fifty-one scholarly and professional articles. Dr. Goss has participated in thirteen international and eighteen national (U.S.) scholarly symposia and he is a member of an international and three national (U.S. and Croatian) scholarly associations.

257

Lorna Hahn is the founder and Executive Director of the Washington-based Association on Third World Affairs, and organizer of its Capitol Hill conferences bringing together Members of Congress and their aides, Ambassadors, and other VIPs to explore important issues. In the course of her career, she taught graduate courses in International Relations at American, Catholic, Georgetown, and Howard Universities in Washington. She was also Director of the Intelligence Research and Analysis Program at American University. Ms. Hahn has done research at the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, at Operation and Policy Research, Inc., and at other organizations. She has lectured widely to governmental, academic and other groups and was the first woman to address the U.S. National War College. She has advised many American and other political leaders, made numerous media appearances, and participated in a large number of professional conferences. She is the author of five books and numerous articles, reviews and Op-Ed pieces, in both scholarly and popular publications.

Josip Jurčević is a researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences "Ivo Pilar" in Zagreb. He has a Ph.D. in History and the title of his doctoral dissertation is "The Repression of the Yugoslav System in Croatia in 1945". He teaches "General History of the Twentieth Century" at the Department of History and "History of the Establishment of the Modern Croatian State" at the Department of Journalism at *Studia Croatica*, University of Zagreb. He is the author of one and co-author of seven books on modern national history. Dr. Jurčević has also published twenty scientific and professional articles and has participated in four international and eight national scientific symposia.

Hrvoje Kačić has a Ph.D. in Maritime Law. Since 1965 he has been a member of the Presidency of the National Maritime Law Association and has participated as a member of the State Delegation in a number of various diplomatic conferences. During his professional career he was Chairman of the Legal Standing Committee of the International Ship-Owners Association (INSA) and member of the Executive Committee of the AIDE. He has also chaired the cathedra of the Maritime Faculty in Dubrovnik and was a professor in the graduate school of the Faculty of Law in Split, and at the International Interuniversity Center of the University of Zagreb. He has published four monographs on Maritime Law and over forty articles on commercial and legal topics in shipping, ship-

building, and insurance investments. He has been a practicing solicitor in his law office in Zagreb since 1989. In 1990 he was elected to the Croatian Parliament as a representative of the district of Dubrovnik and he served as President of the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs between 1990–1992. Since January 1994 he has been the President of the State Commission for Boundaries of the Croatian Government.

Mladen Klemenčić is a researcher and editor at the Lexicographic Institute in Zagreb and has a M.Sc. degree in Geography. He teaches "Political Geography" at the Faculty of Geography and at *Studia Croatica*, University of Zagreb. He is the author and co-author of over eighty articles and book chapters that have been published locally and abroad. He was a fellow at the International Boundaries Research Unit in Durham, U.K. and a regional editor of the Boundary and Security Bulletin. Mr. Klemenčić is the Expert member of the Croatian Boundary Commission and correspondent member of the IGU World Political Map Commission.

Mislav Kukoč has a Ph.D. in Philosophy and the title of his doctoral dissertation is "The Problem of Alienation and the Croatian Praxis Philosophy". He teaches "Social Philosophy" at *Studia Croatica*, University of Zagreb. He has published three books on social philosophy and social sciences and edited an anthology. He has also published seventy-five scientific and professional articles and has participated in thirty-nine international and thirty-one national scientific symposia. At present, Dr. Kukoč is assistant minister at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia.

Marvin Leibstone is a U.S. Army retiree with many years of experience at all command and staff levels, including combat assignments. As a respected global security/ military affairs analyst, he is currently the publisher/editor-in-chief of the Washington, D.C. based periodical *Global Security* & *Trade Journal* and the North American editor for *NATO's Magazine* and *Military Technology Magazine*. Colonel Leibstone has written numerous influential studies reflecting the likely regional outcomes of political and military objectives espoused by governments. He visited Croatia several times in 1998 and 1999 so that he could complete and publish a profile of Croatia's progress as a democracy. The profile was widely distributed in the U.S. as well as among NATO allies and facilitated Croatia's en-

try into *Partnership for Peace*. He has graduate degrees in political science/international politics and has lectured at several major U.S. universities.

Norbert Leser is Director of the Ludwig-Boltzman Institute for Recent Austrian History, University of Vienna, Austria. He received a Ph.D. in Law from the University of Vienna in 1958 and passed the Ability Exam in Law and the Philosophy of Government at the University of Graz in 1969. Since 1971 he has been the Dean of Political Science at the Salzburg University Law School. Since 1977 he has also acted as an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Social Science and Economy at Vienna University. He is a member of the PEN Club and the Vice President of the international Hans Kelsen Institute. Dr. Leser is the author of numerous books and studies. His main interests include the history of political ideas, with a special reference to Marxism and socialism, and contemporary Austrian history (social philosophy). Dr. Leser has been the recipient of a number of high Austrian state awards, including the Austrian Cross of Honor (first degree) for sciences and the arts. Since 1984 he has been the head of the Ludwig-Boltzman Institute for Recent Austrian History, and since 1995 the president of the University Center for Peace Studies. Dr. Leser is a corresponding member of the Austrian Academy of Sciences.

Srećko Lipovčan is a researcher at the Institute of Social Science "Ivo Pilar" in Zagreb. He has a Ph.D. in Literature Science and the title of his doctoral dissertation is "The Young Ujević: Prose Literature, 1909–1919". His research interests include Croatian cultural and political history of the nineteenth and twentieth century, Croatian journalism and publicist writing, and problems of Croatian emigration. He teaches "Publicist Writing" in the Department of Journalism and "Media and Croatian Culture" in the Department of Croatian Studies at *Studia Croatica*, University of Zagreb. He has edited several books on Croatian cultural history and has published twenty scientific and professional articles. Dr. Lipovčan has participated in eighteen international and nine national scientific symposia.

Thomas Patrick Melady is the former U.S. Ambassador to the Vatican, Uganda and Burundi and former assistant U.S. Secretary for Post Secondary Education. He is also President Emeritus of Sacred Heart University and the author of fourteen books on international relations,

human rights, religious freedom, and Vatican–U.S. relations.

Miroslav Prce is a former Defense Minister in the Federal Ministry of Defense in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. He has a Master's degree in International Relations and during his postgraduate studies he published several articles on geopolitics. Between 1992–1997, he was an official at the Ministry of Defense in what was at that time the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. Subsequently, in January 1997 he took up a position in the Federal Ministry of Defense as assistant minister of defense in the Personnel Sector. In a joint effort with the U.S. Company, MPRI, and with Bosnians as federal partners, the Federal Ministry of Defense and the Army of Federation structure was adopted. This effort was an initial step in the integration processes in a post-Dayton era.

Želimir Puljić is Bishop of Dubrovnik (nominated in 1989 and consecrated in 1990). He began his studies in Theology in Split and completed them at the Papal University "Urbaniana" in Rome in 1973. In 1978 he received a B.A. in Psychology at the Papal Salesian University of Rome. Subsequently, he did his M.A. in Pastoral Theology at the Papal Lateran University in Rome in 1978 and his Ph.D. in Psychology at the Papal Salesian University in Rome in 1980. He is the author of four books and has also edited three. Monsignor Puljić is a member of the Permanent Council of the Croatian Bishops' Conference, chairman of its Committee for Culture and the Committee for Relations with the State. He is also a member of the Supervisory Board of the Institution of St. Jerome in Rome, and from 1993 through to 1995 he was appointed as a member of the Governing Board of the Croatian University of Zagreb.

Ivan Rogić is a researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences "Ivo Pilar" in Zagreb. He has a Ph.D. in Sociology and the title of his doctoral dissertation is "Technical Society and Planning". His research interests include urban sociology, environmental sociology, and sociology of development. He teaches "Urban and Environmental Sociology" in the Department of Sociology at *Studia Croatica*, University of Zagreb, as well as "Urban Sociology" and "Environmental Sociology" at the Faculty of Architecture, University of Zagreb, and "Social Ecology" at the Interfaculty Study of Design, University of Zagreb. He has published four and co-authored eight books and co-edited five

anthologies in urban sociology, developmental sociology, and social ecology. Dr. Rogić has published over a hundred and twenty scientific and professional articles and has participated in numerous international and national scientific symposia.

Vlado Šakić is Director of the Institute of Social Sciences "Ivo Pilar" in Zagreb and the Head of the Department of Psychology at *Studia Croatica*, University of Zagreb. He has a Ph.D. in Psychology and the title of his doctoral dissertation is "Some Socio-Economic and Psychological Factors of Criminal Behavior". His research interests include social psychology, social pathology, personality psychology, and political psychology. He teaches "Social Psychology" in the Departments of Psychology and Sociology and "Introduction to Psychology" in the Department of Psychology at *Studia Croatica*, University of Zagreb. In addition, he also teaches the "Social Psychology" undergraduate course and "Psychology of Violence" postgraduate course at the Police Academy in Zagreb. He has published a book of essays on political psychology and co-authored two books on social psychology and personality psychology, as well as edited and co-edited a number of other books. Dr. Šakić has also published thirty scientific and professional articles and has participated in twenty international and twenty national scientific symposia.

Maja Štambuk is a researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences "Ivo Pilar" in Zagreb. She has a Ph.D. in Sociology (1998) and the title of her doctoral dissertation is "Modernization and Social Change in Croatian Rural Areas". Her research interest is in rural sociology. Dr. Štambuk teaches "Urban and Environmental Sociology" in the Department of Sociology, at *Studia Croatica*, University of Zagreb. She has published over twenty scientific and professional articles and is the co-author of ten books and anthologies related to rural sociology. Dr. Štambuk has also participated in four international and two national scientific symposia.

Benjamin Tolić studied Philosophy and German Language and Literature at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb and at the University of Vienna (1962–1970). He lived in Vienna as a political emigrant from 1967 to 1979. From 1972 until 1991, he taught German at Croatian primary and secondary schools, and edited the Eight Language Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Lexicographic Institute "Miroslav Krleža". Subsequently, he was the Secretary

of the Executive Committee of the Croatian Democratic Union for foreign relations, and from 1992 until 1993 he was the Minister-Advisor to the Croatian Embassy in Bonn. Mr. Tolić was the Consul General of the Republic of Croatia in Zürich from 1996 through to 1998, and then worked as the Editor-in-Chief of HINA (Croatian News Agency), a position he held until 2000. Currently, he is the Minister-Advisor to the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Tolić has also translated many German literary, philosophical, and scientific works into Croatian (e.g., Rilke, Bahr, Bürger, and Reich).

Joachim F. Weber studied History, Geography, Journalism, and Public Law at the Universities of Hamburg, Marburg, and Waco/Texas. He has a M.A. in History and has received a Ph.D. in Geography from Hamburg University (2000). The title of his Ph.D. thesis is "Processes of Transformation and Regional Development in Croatia". His main research interests are in the field of political geography. He also worked as a journalist (400 articles and a book on political themes) for five years.